Recognition and trust: Hegel and Confucius on the normative basis of ethical life

Alexei Procyshyn; Mario Wenning

doi:10.1007/s11712-018-9644-4

Recognition and trust: Hegel and Confucius on the normative basis of ethical life

Alexei Procyshyn^*, Mario Wenning

^*Corresponding author for this work

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9 Citations (Scopus)

49 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This essay offers a comparative analysis of the notion of trust in Hegel and Confucius. It shows that Hegel’s two senses of trust (Zutrauen and Vertrauen) depend upon his theory of recognition and recognitive struggle. The competitive thrust of Hegel’s account of trust, it argues, introduces a series of problems that cannot be adequately resolved within his theory, since it presupposes the kinds of trusting relations—self-, intersubjective- and world-trust—that it purports to explain. This essay then turns to the Confucian notions of xin 心 and li 理 to address the problems in the Hegelian account. It concludes by outlining the Confucian account’s salience for critical social theory.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1–22
Journal	Dao
Volume	18
Issue number	1
Early online date	03 Jan 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-018-9644-4
Publication status	Published - 15 Mar 2019
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Reciipient of Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy's "Best Article of 2019" award

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Recognition and trust: Hegel and Confucius on the normative basis of ethical life
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Cite this

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Recognition and trust: Hegel and Confucius on the normative basis of ethical life

Abstract

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