Abstract
I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Yasushi Hirai and Mark Sinclair for their insightful comments. This gratitude extends both to comments presented in this special issue and to their earlier feedback on many of the arguments whose articulation led up to the publication of the monograph. I am particularly delighted that the comments in this special issue have come specifically from them. Both have been my great exemplars for how I read Bergson: Mark Sinclair (not only) for his meticulous accuracy and contextual interpretation of Bergson qua Bergson; Yasushi Hirai (not only) for the courage to take Bergson in new and unconventional directions. Regardless of whether such a characterization of their two styles of scholarship is accurate, my book has tried to do both. My thanks also go to Jakub Čapek and Pavel Arazim—organizers of the workshop on Bergson’s philosophy at Charles University in Prague (8–9 January 2024), which this symposium resulted from—and the editors of this journal for agreeing to publish it.
My reply is divided into two sections. The first section covers points raised by Sinclair and Hirai that I feel I can cogently respond to. The second section addresses points of critique that I feel much less confident I can dodge.
My reply is divided into two sections. The first section covers points raised by Sinclair and Hirai that I feel I can cogently respond to. The second section addresses points of critique that I feel much less confident I can dodge.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Continental Philosophy Review |
Early online date | 03 Apr 2025 |
DOIs |
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Publication status | Early online date - 03 Apr 2025 |
Keywords
- Henri Bergson
- free will
- determinism