Side-channel Trojan insertion - A practical foundry-side attack via ECO

Tiago Perez; Malik Imran; Pablo Vaz; Samuel Pagliarini

doi:10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401481

Side-channel Trojan insertion - A practical foundry-side attack via ECO

Tiago Perez
, Malik Imran
, Pablo Vaz
, Samuel Pagliarini

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to third parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertion of a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present a framework for designing and inserting an SCT based on an engineering change order (ECO) flow, which makes it the first to disclose how effortlessly a trojan can be inserted into an IC. The trojan is designed with the goal of leaking multiple bits per power signature reading. Our findings and results show that a rogue element within a foundry has, today, all means necessary for performing a foundry-side attack via ECO.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2021 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2021 - Proceedings
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)	9781728192017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401481
Publication status	Published - 27 Apr 2021
Externally published	Yes
Event	53rd IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2021 - Daegu, Korea, Republic of Duration: 22 May 2021 → 28 May 2021

Publication series

Name	Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems
Volume	2021-May
ISSN (Print)	2158-1525

Conference

Conference	53rd IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2021
Country/Territory	Korea, Republic of
City	Daegu
Period	22/05/2021 → 28/05/2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 IEEE

Keywords

ASIC
Hardware security
Hardware trojan horse
Manufacturing-time attack
Side-channel attack
VLSI

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401481Licence: Unspecified

Cite this

Perez, T., Imran, M., Vaz, P., & Pagliarini, S. (2021). Side-channel Trojan insertion - A practical foundry-side attack via ECO. In 2021 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2021 - Proceedings Article 9401481 (Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems; Vol. 2021-May). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401481

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title = "Side-channel Trojan insertion - A practical foundry-side attack via ECO",

abstract = "Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to third parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertion of a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present a framework for designing and inserting an SCT based on an engineering change order (ECO) flow, which makes it the first to disclose how effortlessly a trojan can be inserted into an IC. The trojan is designed with the goal of leaking multiple bits per power signature reading. Our findings and results show that a rogue element within a foundry has, today, all means necessary for performing a foundry-side attack via ECO.",

keywords = "ASIC, Hardware security, Hardware trojan horse, Manufacturing-time attack, Side-channel attack, VLSI",

author = "Tiago Perez and Malik Imran and Pablo Vaz and Samuel Pagliarini",

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doi = "10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401481",

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series = "Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems",

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Perez, T, Imran, M, Vaz, P & Pagliarini, S 2021, Side-channel Trojan insertion - A practical foundry-side attack via ECO. in 2021 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2021 - Proceedings., 9401481, Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, vol. 2021-May, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 53rd IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2021, Daegu, Korea, Republic of, 22/05/2021. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401481

Side-channel Trojan insertion - A practical foundry-side attack via ECO. / Perez, Tiago; Imran, Malik; Vaz, Pablo et al.
2021 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2021 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2021. 9401481 (Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems; Vol. 2021-May).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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N2 - Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to third parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertion of a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present a framework for designing and inserting an SCT based on an engineering change order (ECO) flow, which makes it the first to disclose how effortlessly a trojan can be inserted into an IC. The trojan is designed with the goal of leaking multiple bits per power signature reading. Our findings and results show that a rogue element within a foundry has, today, all means necessary for performing a foundry-side attack via ECO.

AB - Design companies often outsource their integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to third parties where ICs are susceptible to malicious acts such as the insertion of a side-channel hardware trojan horse (SCT). In this paper, we present a framework for designing and inserting an SCT based on an engineering change order (ECO) flow, which makes it the first to disclose how effortlessly a trojan can be inserted into an IC. The trojan is designed with the goal of leaking multiple bits per power signature reading. Our findings and results show that a rogue element within a foundry has, today, all means necessary for performing a foundry-side attack via ECO.

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KW - Side-channel attack

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M3 - Conference contribution

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T3 - Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems

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Perez T, Imran M, Vaz P, Pagliarini S. Side-channel Trojan insertion - A practical foundry-side attack via ECO. In 2021 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2021 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2021. 9401481. (Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems). doi: 10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401481

Side-channel Trojan insertion - A practical foundry-side attack via ECO

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this