Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.
Original languageEnglish
JournalUnder Review
Volumex
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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Mediator
Mediation
Cheap talk
Decision maker
Probability distribution
Communication
Divergence

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title = "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game",
abstract = "In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.",
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Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game. / Ganguly, Chirantan.

In: Under Review, Vol. x, 2011.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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