Tenure-track contract helps self-selection

Sergey Popov

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

Tenure-track contract is criticized for curbing the incentives to expend effort after obtaining tenured status. Yet the most productive faculties seem to work on a tenure contract, and schools which aim to employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer tenure-track contracts to their new recruits. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2482-2486
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume35
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 21 Nov 2015

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