The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

Josué Ortega; Thilo Klein

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.008

The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

Josué Ortega^*, Thilo Klein

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improves the placement of the worst-off student. Furthermore, RM generates less justified envy than TTC. We corroborate our findings using data on school admissions in Budapest.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	515-528
Number of pages	14
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	141
Early online date	04 Aug 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.008
Publication status	Published - Sept 2023

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10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.008Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
2023 Crown Copyright This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits distribution and reproduction for non-commercial purposes, provided the author and source are cited.
Final published version, 515 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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AB - We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improves the placement of the worst-off student. Furthermore, RM generates less justified envy than TTC. We corroborate our findings using data on school admissions in Budapest.

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The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

Abstract

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