The Egalitarian Shapley Value: A generalization based on coalition sizes

Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Rajnish Kumar, Sudipta Sarangi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
258 Downloads (Pure)


In designing solution concepts for cooperative games with transferable utilities, consolidation of marginalism and egalitarianism has been widely studied. The αα-Egalitarian Shapley value is one such solution that combines the Shapley value and the Equal Division rule, the two most popular extreme instances of marginalism and egalitarianism respectively. This value gives the planner the flexibility to choose the level of marginality for the players by varying the convexity parameter αα. In this paper, we define the Generalized Egalitarian Shapley value that gives the planner more flexibility in choosing the level of marginality based on the coalition size. We then provide two characterizations of the Generalized Egalitarian Shapley value.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)55-63
Number of pages9
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
Publication statusPublished - 13 Jun 2020


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