The EU’s initiatives to regulate lobbyists: good or bad administration?

Michele Crepaz, Raj Chari

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The Joint Transparency Register (JTR) represents a positive change from its predecessors that can be explained on the basis of “learning rules / laws”. In this article we support this argument, providing results in two dimensions: first, by measuring the strength of the 'lobbying' law in the EU compared to other political systems where such a law has been enacted. Our study indicates that the EU's initial attempts to regulate lobbying in the European Parliament (1996) and the Commission (2008) are less robust and effective. Second, by analyzing the evolution of lobbyist registrations between 2008 and 2013, as well as that of the automobile, airline and electricity sectors, highlighting the willingness of the different companies to register and openly publicize the expenses associated with lobbying. The article concludes by considering the future challenges that the JTR needs to face, before it can be considered as an example of “good management”.
Original languageMultiple languages
JournalCuadernos Europeos de Deusto
Volume51
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Oct 2014
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The EU’s initiatives to regulate lobbyists: good or bad administration?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this