The logic of brokerage: why interest organizations network with their opponents

Cooperation in lobbying is central to policymaking, and the formation of coalitions is a frequently-used strategy by interest groups seeking to influence policy outcomes. While coalition formation between like-minded organizations is well documented, the literature has so far overlooked interest groups networking with groups that pursue opposed policy goals. In this paper, we advance a novel theoretical proposition to explain an interest group’s propensity to network with its political opponents based on the logic of brokerage. We argue that brokers between opposing policy positions can secure long-term advantages as political insiders across diverse issues, but risk damaging their reputation and alienating their members. We test our argument empirically based on survey data for roughly 2,000 interest groups in seven European countries. Our findings give robust support to our theoretical framework and shed new light on lobbying strategies and the logics that drive cooperation in lobbying, de-escalation and access to policymaking.