The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)48-51
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume174
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 01 Jan 2019
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Assignment schemes
  • Large matching markets
  • Replica economies
  • Social integration
  • Spouse ranking

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The losses from integration in matching markets can be large'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this