The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

Josué Ortega

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028

The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

Josué Ortega

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	48-51
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	174
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028
Publication status	Published - 01 Jan 2019
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Assignment schemes
Large matching markets
Replica economies
Social integration
Spouse ranking

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10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028Licence: Unspecified

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title = "The losses from integration in matching markets can be large",

abstract = "Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.",

keywords = "Assignment schemes, Large matching markets, Replica economies, Social integration, Spouse ranking",

author = "Josu{\'e} Ortega",

year = "2019",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028",

language = "English",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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T1 - The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

AU - Ortega, Josué

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.

AB - Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.

KW - Assignment schemes

KW - Large matching markets

KW - Replica economies

KW - Social integration

KW - Spouse ranking

UR - http://www.mendeley.com/research/losses-integration-matching-markets-large

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.028

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 174

SP - 48

EP - 51

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

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Keywords

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Josue Ortega

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The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

Abstract

Keywords

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Josue Ortega

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