The Watchdog or the Mandarin? Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process

Anastasia Ershova

doi:10.1080/13501763.2018.1447009

The Watchdog or the Mandarin? Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process

Anastasia Ershova^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: ‘the Watchdog’ and ‘the Mandarin’ of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs will notify the EU principals of prospective bureaucratic drift, leading to more restrictive discretionary limits imposed on the Commission in the implementation stage. However, if the lead DG acts as the Mandarin, proximity of its preference to the EU principals should result in more executive leeway as its policy preference is more beneficial for the EU legislators. To tests the conjunctions, this study focuses on two dimensions of EU political space: Left-Right (LR) and Pro/Anti-EU. The results suggest that the legislators will indulge the Commission with more leeway for the implementation when their preferences are more congruent with the position of the lead DG on the LR dimension, thus supporting ‘the Mandarin’ perspective.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	407-427
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of European Public Policy
Volume	26
Issue number	3
Early online date	15 Mar 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1447009
Publication status	Published - 04 Mar 2019
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This research has been supported by Landesgraduiertenförderungsgesetz (LGFG) Scholarship at the University of Konstanz.

Funding Information:
This research has been supported by Landesgraduiertenf?rderungsgesetz (LGFG) Scholarship at the University of Konstanz. I am grateful for the constructive comments from the editors and two anonymous reviewers. Additionally, I would like to thank Gerald Schneider, Friederike Kelle, and Drago? Ad?sc?li?ei for their continuous support and invaluable feedback on the earlier drafts of this paper.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

Keywords

Directorates general
discretionary limits
EU commission
legislative politics
principal–agent

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
Public Administration

Access to Document

10.1080/13501763.2018.1447009Licence: Unspecified

Cite this

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abstract = "This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: {\textquoteleft}the Watchdog{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}the Mandarin{\textquoteright} of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs will notify the EU principals of prospective bureaucratic drift, leading to more restrictive discretionary limits imposed on the Commission in the implementation stage. However, if the lead DG acts as the Mandarin, proximity of its preference to the EU principals should result in more executive leeway as its policy preference is more beneficial for the EU legislators. To tests the conjunctions, this study focuses on two dimensions of EU political space: Left-Right (LR) and Pro/Anti-EU. The results suggest that the legislators will indulge the Commission with more leeway for the implementation when their preferences are more congruent with the position of the lead DG on the LR dimension, thus supporting {\textquoteleft}the Mandarin{\textquoteright} perspective.",

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