Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?

Paulo Sousa, Lauren Swiney

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)


The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)637-654
Number of pages18
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Issue number4
Early online date21 Sept 2011
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2013

Bibliographical note

Online First article


  • Thought insertion
  • Sense of thought ownership
  • Sense of thought agency
  • Sense of thought endorsement
  • Self-knowledge
  • Folk psychology
  • Schizophrenia

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Cognitive Neuroscience


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