Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment

Thomas Peikenkamp; Antonella Cavallo; Laura Valacca; Eckard Böde; Matthias Pretzer; Ernst Moritz Hahn

doi:10.1007/11875567_21

Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment

Thomas Peikenkamp, Antonella Cavallo, Laura Valacca, Eckard Böde, Matthias Pretzer, Ernst Moritz Hahn

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The increase of complexity in aircraft systems demands for enhanced analysis techniques. Methods are required that leverage the burden of their application by reusing existing design and process information and by enforcing the reusability of analyses results allowing early identification of design’s weak points and check of design alternatives.This report elaborates on a method that assumes a system specification in an industrial standard notation and allows to perform several formal safety analyses. Based on a collection of failure models and means of specifying safety requirements, the techniques produce results along the lines of traditional methods.

We show how to combine traditional techniques, required by the Aerospace Recommended Practice (SAE-ARP) standards, like FaultTree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Common Cause Analysis and also how to automate most of the analysis activities.

The methods described in this paper can be used as means to support the Certification process.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, 25th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2006, Gdansk, Poland, September 27-29, 2006, Proceedings
Pages	275-288
Number of pages	14
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/11875567_21
Publication status	Published - 2006
Externally published	Yes

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https://doi.org/10.1007/11875567_21

Cite this

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title = "Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment",

abstract = "The increase of complexity in aircraft systems demands for enhanced analysis techniques. Methods are required that leverage the burden of their application by reusing existing design and process information and by enforcing the reusability of analyses results allowing early identification of design{\textquoteright}s weak points and check of design alternatives.This report elaborates on a method that assumes a system specification in an industrial standard notation and allows to perform several formal safety analyses. Based on a collection of failure models and means of specifying safety requirements, the techniques produce results along the lines of traditional methods.We show how to combine traditional techniques, required by the Aerospace Recommended Practice (SAE-ARP) standards, like FaultTree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Common Cause Analysis and also how to automate most of the analysis activities.The methods described in this paper can be used as means to support the Certification process.",

author = "Thomas Peikenkamp and Antonella Cavallo and Laura Valacca and Eckard B{\"o}de and Matthias Pretzer and Hahn, {Ernst Moritz}",

year = "2006",

doi = "10.1007/11875567_21",

language = "English",

pages = "275--288",

booktitle = "Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, 25th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2006, Gdansk, Poland, September 27-29, 2006, Proceedings",

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Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment. / Peikenkamp, Thomas; Cavallo, Antonella; Valacca, Laura; Böde, Eckard; Pretzer, Matthias; Hahn, Ernst Moritz.

Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, 25th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2006, Gdansk, Poland, September 27-29, 2006, Proceedings. 2006. p. 275-288.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment

AU - Peikenkamp, Thomas

AU - Cavallo, Antonella

AU - Valacca, Laura

AU - Böde, Eckard

AU - Pretzer, Matthias

AU - Hahn, Ernst Moritz

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - The increase of complexity in aircraft systems demands for enhanced analysis techniques. Methods are required that leverage the burden of their application by reusing existing design and process information and by enforcing the reusability of analyses results allowing early identification of design’s weak points and check of design alternatives.This report elaborates on a method that assumes a system specification in an industrial standard notation and allows to perform several formal safety analyses. Based on a collection of failure models and means of specifying safety requirements, the techniques produce results along the lines of traditional methods.We show how to combine traditional techniques, required by the Aerospace Recommended Practice (SAE-ARP) standards, like FaultTree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Common Cause Analysis and also how to automate most of the analysis activities.The methods described in this paper can be used as means to support the Certification process.

AB - The increase of complexity in aircraft systems demands for enhanced analysis techniques. Methods are required that leverage the burden of their application by reusing existing design and process information and by enforcing the reusability of analyses results allowing early identification of design’s weak points and check of design alternatives.This report elaborates on a method that assumes a system specification in an industrial standard notation and allows to perform several formal safety analyses. Based on a collection of failure models and means of specifying safety requirements, the techniques produce results along the lines of traditional methods.We show how to combine traditional techniques, required by the Aerospace Recommended Practice (SAE-ARP) standards, like FaultTree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Common Cause Analysis and also how to automate most of the analysis activities.The methods described in this paper can be used as means to support the Certification process.

U2 - 10.1007/11875567_21

DO - 10.1007/11875567_21

M3 - Conference contribution

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BT - Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, 25th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2006, Gdansk, Poland, September 27-29, 2006, Proceedings

ER -

Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment

Abstract

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