TY - CHAP
T1 - Unmediated and mediated communication equilibria of battle of the sexes with incomplete information
AU - Ganguly, Chirantan
AU - Ray, Indrajit
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - We consider the Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow two-sided cheap talk before the game is played. We characterize the set of fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria. The best fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium, when exists, has a desirable characteristic. When the players' types are different, it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium. We also analyze the mediated communication equilibria of the game. We find the range of the prior for which this desirable equilibrium exists under unmediated and mediated communication processes.
AB - We consider the Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow two-sided cheap talk before the game is played. We characterize the set of fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria. The best fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium, when exists, has a desirable characteristic. When the players' types are different, it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium. We also analyze the mediated communication equilibria of the game. We find the range of the prior for which this desirable equilibrium exists under unmediated and mediated communication processes.
U2 - 10.1007/978-88-470-1501-2_33
DO - 10.1007/978-88-470-1501-2_33
M3 - Chapter
SN - 9788847015005
T3 - New Economic Windows
SP - 347
EP - 361
BT - Econophysics and Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques
A2 - Basu, Banasri
A2 - Chakrabarti, Bikas K.
A2 - Chakravarty, Satya R.
A2 - Gangopadhyay, Kausik
PB - Springer
ER -