Coordination, Efficiency and Two-Sided Cheap Talk

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    Coordination, Efficiency and Two-Sided Cheap Talk. / Ganguly, Chirantan.

    In: Under Review, Vol. x, 2011.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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    @article{0dca3a7136624e2f83c113165f7eb725,
    title = "Coordination, Efficiency and Two-Sided Cheap Talk",
    abstract = "We consider the Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow two-sided cheap talk before the game is played. We characterise the set of fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria. The best fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium, when exists, has a desirable characteristic. When the players' types are different, it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium. We also analyse the mediated communication equilibria of the game. We find the range of the prior for which this desirable equilibrium exists under unmediated and mediated communication processes.",
    author = "Chirantan Ganguly",
    year = "2011",
    language = "English",
    volume = "x",
    journal = "unknown",

    }

    RIS

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Coordination, Efficiency and Two-Sided Cheap Talk

    AU - Ganguly, Chirantan

    PY - 2011

    Y1 - 2011

    N2 - We consider the Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow two-sided cheap talk before the game is played. We characterise the set of fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria. The best fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium, when exists, has a desirable characteristic. When the players' types are different, it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium. We also analyse the mediated communication equilibria of the game. We find the range of the prior for which this desirable equilibrium exists under unmediated and mediated communication processes.

    AB - We consider the Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow two-sided cheap talk before the game is played. We characterise the set of fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibria. The best fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium, when exists, has a desirable characteristic. When the players' types are different, it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium. We also analyse the mediated communication equilibria of the game. We find the range of the prior for which this desirable equilibrium exists under unmediated and mediated communication processes.

    M3 - Article

    VL - x

    JO - unknown

    T2 - unknown

    JF - unknown

    ER -

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