Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies

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    Employee participation is a vital ingredient of what the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls ‘representation security’. This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to social policy impact of worker participation, specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive (ICD) for employee voice rights. While existing research on the ICD offers important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to examine the potential effectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework to explain why national implementing legislation is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in two LMEs: UK and the Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical (metaphorical) propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs.

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    • Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies

      Rights statement: Copyright 2015 Wiley and Sons Inc. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cullinane, N 2015, 'Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies' International Labour Review, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x/abstract. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

      Accepted author manuscript, 404 KB, PDF-document

    DOI

    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages40
    Pages (from-to)395-422
    JournalInternational Labour Review
    Journal publication dateDec 2017
    Issue number3-4
    Volume156
    Early online date30 Dec 2015
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2017

    ID: 25576732