Moral Compromise

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    Moral Compromise. / Archard, Dave.

    In: Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 3, 07.2012, p. 403-420.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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    Archard, Dave. / Moral Compromise. In: Philosophy. 2012 ; Vol. 87, No. 3. pp. 403-420.

    Bibtex

    @article{f760118f33ff4a9790b4af6280b8ec35,
    title = "Moral Compromise",
    abstract = "A moral compromise is a compromise on moral matters; it is agreement in the face of moral disagreement but where there is agreement on the importance of consensus – namely that it secures a morally desirable outcome. It is distinguishable from other forms of agreement, and an important distinction between moral compromise with public agreement and moral compromise with public disagreement is also made. Circumstances in which the former might be permissible are outlined, and the sense in which it is allowed all things considered to agree is made clear. The relevant discussions of Dan Brock and Mary Warnock on the role of the philosopher to public policy are critically reviewed. Finally, a brief list is offered of the considerations relevant to an estimation of whether and, if so, when such compromise is allowed.",
    author = "Dave Archard",
    year = "2012",
    month = "7",
    doi = "10.1017/S0031819112000265",
    language = "English",
    volume = "87",
    pages = "403--420",
    journal = "Philosophy",
    issn = "0031-8191",
    publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
    number = "3",

    }

    RIS

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Moral Compromise

    AU - Archard, Dave

    PY - 2012/7

    Y1 - 2012/7

    N2 - A moral compromise is a compromise on moral matters; it is agreement in the face of moral disagreement but where there is agreement on the importance of consensus – namely that it secures a morally desirable outcome. It is distinguishable from other forms of agreement, and an important distinction between moral compromise with public agreement and moral compromise with public disagreement is also made. Circumstances in which the former might be permissible are outlined, and the sense in which it is allowed all things considered to agree is made clear. The relevant discussions of Dan Brock and Mary Warnock on the role of the philosopher to public policy are critically reviewed. Finally, a brief list is offered of the considerations relevant to an estimation of whether and, if so, when such compromise is allowed.

    AB - A moral compromise is a compromise on moral matters; it is agreement in the face of moral disagreement but where there is agreement on the importance of consensus – namely that it secures a morally desirable outcome. It is distinguishable from other forms of agreement, and an important distinction between moral compromise with public agreement and moral compromise with public disagreement is also made. Circumstances in which the former might be permissible are outlined, and the sense in which it is allowed all things considered to agree is made clear. The relevant discussions of Dan Brock and Mary Warnock on the role of the philosopher to public policy are critically reviewed. Finally, a brief list is offered of the considerations relevant to an estimation of whether and, if so, when such compromise is allowed.

    U2 - 10.1017/S0031819112000265

    DO - 10.1017/S0031819112000265

    M3 - Article

    VL - 87

    SP - 403

    EP - 420

    JO - Philosophy

    T2 - Philosophy

    JF - Philosophy

    SN - 0031-8191

    IS - 3

    ER -

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