Organizational Determinants of Bank Resilience: Explaining the Performance of SME Banks in the Dutch Financial Crisis of the 1920s

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    By the start of the twentieth century, the two organizational forms most used in Dutch financial services to disperse ownership were the cooperative association and the public company. Share ownership in cooperatives was typically restricted to customers, while companies permitted outside investors. Neither organizational form dictated specific shareholder liability arrangements. New specialist banks targeting SMEs combined these organizational forms and flexible liability rules to create hybrid forms. I find those which took the public company form were more likely to suffer distress during the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s. Liability arrangements for shareholders, by contrast, had a negligible impact on these banks’ resilience.

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    DOI

    Original languageEnglish
    JournalBusiness History Review
    Journal publication date16 Nov 2018
    DOIs
    Publication statusAccepted - 16 Nov 2018

      Research areas

    • organizational forms, shareholder liability, banking crises, law and finance hypothesis, the Netherlands

    ID: 160783506