Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

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    Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game. / Ganguly, Chirantan.

    In: Under Review, Vol. x, 2011.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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    @article{4b437ac48370437c851dea4de6ebda90,
    title = "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game",
    abstract = "In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.",
    author = "Chirantan Ganguly",
    year = "2011",
    language = "English",
    volume = "x",
    journal = "unknown",

    }

    RIS

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

    AU - Ganguly, Chirantan

    PY - 2011

    Y1 - 2011

    N2 - In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.

    AB - In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.

    M3 - Article

    VL - x

    JO - unknown

    T2 - unknown

    JF - unknown

    ER -

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