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The Politicization of Indigenous Identities in Peru

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Abstract: Until now, scholars have argued that unlike other Latin American countries with sizable indigenous populations, indigenous politics are largely unimportant in Peru because indigenous-based parties or national-level movements are absent. Rather than focusing solely on the emergence of indigenous parties or movements, which ignores the larger consequence of individuals’ indigenous identifications for electoral politics, we argue that it is more important to examine the emergence of indigenous political divisions and their effects on indigenous representation. Using data from the World Values Survey across the presidential elections of 1995, 2001, and 2006, we show that as indigenous identity has become more carefully defined, indigenous voting divisions have emerged in Peru, and concomitantly, parties have begun to recognize and respond to these divisions.
On April 17, 2009, the Peruvian daily newspaper *El Correo* published on its front page a picture of congressional representative Hilaria Supa Huamán from Cuzco, the first elected politician to take the oath of office in her native language of Quechua in 2006. The front-page picture, however, was not meant to highlight Supa’s Quechua-speaking roots or her traditional indigenous clothing. Instead, the picture directed attention to the grammatical and orthographical mistakes contained in the hand-written notes the self-educated Supa had taken in Spanish. In an editorial, Aldo Mariátegui, the director of the newspaper, criticized the illiteracy and lack of legislative professionalism of elected representatives like Supa. Congressional representatives across party lines, several media outlets and other professional organizations quickly denounced the overt racial overtones of the newspaper and its director, who ironically is the grandson of José Carlos Mariátegui, a well-known indigenous rights advocate.

While the editorial itself was deplorable, the election of representatives like Supa also reveals the changing makeup of Peru’s political class. In the congressional elections of 2006, Supa became one of seven indigenous congressional representatives, up from one indigenous representative in 2001 (Paulina Arpasi). While mass suffrage was extended during Peru’s democratic transition, including many indigenous voters, the representation of indigenous groups by indigenous leaders like Arpasi and Supa constitutes a new political development. This forces us to ask, have ethnic identities become politicized in contemporary Peru, and if so, what accounts for this politicization?

The growing literature on indigenous politics in Latin America has portrayed Peru as an exceptional case, noting the absence of robust activism of nationally-organized indigenous movements and parties when compared to neighboring and ethnically similar Andean countries like Ecuador and Bolivia. The existing party politics literature focusing on Peru has traditionally
dwelt on class divisions to explain partisan choices (Dietz, 1985), including discussion of how the growth of the informal sector weakened the partisan manifestation of the class cleavage (Cameron, 1994; Roberts, 1996). Yet the salience of ethnic divisions for party competition remains unexplored. This is not entirely surprising given the widespread consensus on the absence of indigenous politics in contemporary Peru (Yashar, 1998).

While the indigenous politics literature emphasizes the cultural and organizational components of indigenous cleavages (Van Cott, 2005; Rice and Van Cott, 2006; on the three components of cleavages, see Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 213-20), we argue that the sociological component is the most important to explain the emergence of indigenous political representation, not just in Peru, but for cases like Bolivia and Ecuador as well. Previous research has argued that the incorporation of indigenous issues in Bolivia and Ecuador was achieved because indigenous voters in these countries are culturally distinct from the rest of the population and indigenous movements have launched indigenous political parties (Van Cott, 2005). While some literature assumes that indigenous Peruvians are not culturally distinct and do not have organizations to mobilize people for indigenous causes, other literature has shown these assertions to be false (see, for instance, García and Lucero, 2004). Indigenous cultural and organizational manifestations of the indigenous cleavage have long been present in Latin America. Only recently have indigenous ethnic identities emerged as political identities. This is because two presidential campaigns—those of Alejandro Toledo (2001) and Ollanta Humala (2006)—have realized the electoral potential of indigenous voters; recognizing this, both made numerous overt attempts to court indigenous voters. Arguments in the broader ethnic politics literature related to material grievances, the institutional setting, and the size of ethnic groups are unable to explain why indigenous issues were not represented prior to Toledo.
We utilize public opinion data from the World Values Survey across three separate presidential elections (1995, 2001, and 2006) to test whether the sociological element of an ethnic cleavage—party preferences—has emerged in Peru as a political division. The results show that indigenous identities have become politically salient, and that Toledo’s campaign successfully cultivated a significant electoral base among indigenous voters. This political division remains in 2006 with indigenous support going largely to the parties associated with Humala. These results confirm the increasing salience of indigenous identities that has been documented previously in other Latin American countries (Madrid, 2005a, 2005b, 2008), but not in Peru.

The Peruvian Case

During the 1980s, following the country’s return to civilian rule, Peruvian party politics appeared relatively stable: four major parties—the center-right Popular Action party (AP), the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance party (APRA), the leftist United Left (IU) and the conservative Popular Christian Party (PPC)—accounted for the bulk of the popular vote (Dietz and Myers, 2007: 69; Levitsky, 1999). These parties “possessed national structures, discernable programs or ideologies, and identifiable social bases” (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003: 6). These established parties, however, fell into crisis as a consequence of the economic collapse of the 1980s and heightened levels of political violence. The growth of the informal economy, which represented more than 50 percent of the economically active population by 1990, further weakened class-based organizations and eliminated partisan identities (Cameron, 1994).

The economic collapse and deteriorating social conditions of the 1980s led to the implosion of the party system. In the 1995 presidential election, which resulted in Fujimori’s second consecutive presidential term, the major political parties of the 1980s (AP, APRA, PPC
and IU) collectively accounted for only 10 percent of the popular vote (Dietz and Myers, 2007: 69). Fujimori ran for (and won) re-election for a third consecutive term in 2000, but mounting evidence of corruption and gross criminality forced him to resign from office in November of that same year. After Fujimori’s abrupt resignation, Valentín Paniagua was elected President of Peru’s unicameral Congress and appointed as a caretaker President of the country. Paniagua called for new presidential elections to be held in April 2001.

According to García (2005: 55), the Paniagua government, while short, was a “crucial turning point in Peruvian indigenous politics.” Two important developments are worth noting. The first one was the creation of the National Truth Commission to investigate the human rights abuses that took place during the country’s insurgency war. The Commission’s work helped to bring to light the plight of indigenous people through hundreds of televised testimonies. Conflict with the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) left a death toll of more than 69,000 people among civilians, armed forces and insurgent militants; about two-thirds of the people who were killed or disappeared spoke Quechua, one of the country’s most widely spoken indigenous languages (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003). The second important development was the creation of national spaces of dialogue and negotiation between the government and a number of indigenous organizations, such as AIDESEP (Inter-Ethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Jungle) and CONAP (Confederation of Nationalities of the Peruvian Amazon).\(^1\) Compared to previous governments, Paniagua demonstrated greater interest in promoting indigenous issues.

Following the transitional Paniagua government, Alejandro Toledo was elected the country’s first popularly elected president of Andean roots in 2001. Toledo had run previously for the presidency in 1995 under the party label \textit{Pais Posible}, and again in 2000 with his current
party label *Perú Posible*. Toledo frequently used indigenous symbols and discussed issues of concern to indigenous voters during his presidential campaign. In 2000, for instance, he led a major protest in opposition to Fujimori’s third presidential term, calling it “la marcha de los cuatro suyos” (the march of the four *suyos*, or the march of the four corners of the Incan empire). During a widely-publicized campaign stop, Toledo’s wife—Eliane Karp, who speaks fluent Quechua—invoked Incan deities known as *apus* on behalf of her husband, and suggested that Toledo represented the reincarnation of the Inca Pachacuti. President Toledo subsequently inaugurated his term in a ceremony at the ruins of Machu Picchu, and there signed the Declaration of Machu Picchu in support of indigenous rights. Toledo often used the term “cholo”—which is often used to describe dark-skinned individuals, including those of indigenous decent, and still regarded as an insult by most Peruvians (García, 2005: 28)—to draw attention to his Andean origins.

Despite Toledo’s campaign rhetoric, his government failed to address the plight of indigenous groups, particularly regarding environmental damage to indigenous habitat (Greene, 2006) and the dislocations that resulted from the concessions given to mining and logging companies. Fujimori’s economic liberalization program had made mining investment a very attractive industry: mining claims by extractive companies skyrocketed from 4 million to 25 million hectares during the early 1990s (García, 2005: 58), and eleven of the world’s top twenty mining corporations now have operations in Peru (Bury, 2002: 6). Because mining is concentrated in the highlands where many indigenous Peruvians reside, this industry has had considerable impact on the rural population, where poverty is endemic (Loker, 1999; Korzeniewicz, 2000; López and della Maggiora, 2000). Due to the negative environmental effects associated with mining, transnational mining companies operating in Peru’s highlands...
have repeatedly come under siege by rural, national, and transnational protesters, constituting the most common type of social conflict in Peru today (Arce, 2008: 52-55).

García (2005: 28) has suggested that the political spaces that were initially created by the Paniagua government to dialogue with indigenous people became increasingly politicized under Toledo. For instance, Eliane Karp took a leading role in indigenous affairs by making them part of her official duties as first lady, becoming the president of CONAPA (National Commission for Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples)—a governmental organization created to support indigenous initiatives. According to some indigenous activists, the creation of CONAPA represented a loss of autonomy; other critics referred to CONAPA as simply “Comisión Karp” because the commission came to revolve largely around her. While not always successful, the Toledo government continued the dialogue between government and indigenous people beyond Paniagua, and these indigenous initiatives often became front-page newspaper material. Toledo also continued the work of the National Truth Commission (renamed as National Truth and Reconciliation Commission), which “sparked new debates over indigenous rights, reparations, state accountability, and impunity” (García, 2005: 36).

Following Toledo, APRA’s Alan García was reelected in July of 2006. Interestingly, the run-off of the 2006 elections pitted García, the president mostly responsible for the economic collapse and heightened insurgent violence of the 1980s, against Ollanta Humala, a nationalist and founder of the Partido Nacionalista del Perú (PNP). Espousing anti-globalization policies, Humala pledged to revoke the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, and “squeeze” multinational mining corporations that have received “sweetheart contracts” from the Peruvian government (Forero, 2006). Humala’s father (Isaac) was the founder of the ultranationalist movement known as “Etnocacerismo” (Ethnocacerist Movement). This movement seeks to
restore the Inca heritage of Peru, reasserting the role of marginalized indigenous masses in contemporary Peruvian society. Similar to Toledo, Humala made use of ethnic appeals during his campaign, and also vowed to stop the eradication of coca, following in the steps of Bolivia’s Evo Morales. During the campaign, Humala was quoted as saying in the print media that “he could not allow indigenous people be left without an answer to neoliberalism.”2 While Humala’s presidential bid was unsuccessful, his party’s last minute alliance with the movement Unión por el Perú (UPP)3 together won more seats (45 out of 120) than any other party in Congress, electing seven indigenous representatives.

The Politicization of Indigenous Identities

Much work in comparative politics has examined issues of ethnicity and party politics. Regarding the conditions under which indigenous identities (and ethnicity more generally) become politicized, some contend that ethnic conflicts—and the emergence of ethnic identities and the parties that represent them—are rooted in material grievances (see, for instance, Chua, 2003; for a comprehensive review, see Horowitz, 1985: 105-135). A long line of research suggests that permissive electoral systems (as well as other institutions) allow ethnic parties to emerge (see, for instance, Horowitz, 1985; Van Cott, 2003; Rice and Van Cott, 2006), while others stress that the size of the ethnic group matters as well (Posner, 2004; Madrid, 2005b). However, defining what constitutes an ethnic party is fraught with problems (Chandra, forthcoming). Additionally, by focusing solely on the emergence of explicitly indigenous political parties, recent scholarship on the emergence of ethnic politics in Latin America may be ignoring significant indigenous political expressions among voters.

Contrary to previous literature, we argue that indigenous political identities have formed in Peru despite the absence of an explicitly “indigenous” party. We argue that it is more
important to explain the emergence of indigenous political identities, whether represented by indigenous-based parties or as part of a multi-ethnic coalition. Although the examination of one country cannot resolve the major debates within this literature (including those not mentioned here), the case of Peru sheds some light onto these more prominent arguments. In particular, while some approaches to the study of ethnic politics are helpful in explaining the emergence of indigenous politics in Peru (grievance and ethnic group size explanations), and others are less helpful (institutional explanations), all are insufficient. While Peru has possessed many of the features highlighted by the literature as necessary for the emergence of ethnic political issues and parties for some time, the representation of indigenous issues by political parties constitutes a recent development. For this reason, we rely on arguments that stress the actions of political parties in creating and maintaining political identities among voters.

In terms of institutional explanations, the literature has focused on a few general themes. One regards electoral volatility and party fragmentation, which are viewed by some as the first signs of the potential incorporation of indigenous groups into the party system (Madrid, 2005b; Rice and Van Cott, 2006; Birnir and Van Cott, 2007). Other literature has argued that higher district magnitudes increase the likelihood of indigenous party success (Van Cott, 2003; Rice and Van Cott, 2006; see also Horowitz, 1985). Finally, Van Cott (2003) has also argued that other institutional barriers—like difficulties in gaining ballot access and centralized government—hamper indigenous representation.

The Peruvian case provides mixed support for these institutional arguments. For instance, recent developments in Peruvian party politics uphold arguments regarding electoral volatility and party fragmentation. As noted above, the Peruvian party system of the 1980s came unglued with Fujimori’s rise to power. Since then, the party system has been characterized by
high volatility and increased fragmentation as indigenous issues have been gradually incorporated into the political process (Dietz and Myers, 2007; Cameron, 2009; Vera Delgado and Zwarteveen, 2008). However, party fragmentation and volatility have been a feature of Peruvian party politics since Fujimori's rise to power in 1990, and therefore cannot explain why indigenous issues were not represented by parties until Toledo. Arguments relating to district magnitude are also unsatisfactory because indigenous political identities did not begin to manifest themselves until the 2001 election. Since 1985, Peru has elected members of Congress using one form of proportional representation or another. Since 2001, the number of districts has increased to 26, thereby reducing district magnitude during the period in which indigenous identities became salient. Moreover, both of the additional explanations provided by Van Cott (2003) are equally unsatisfactory. The emergence of an indigenous cleavage has emerged in spite of its centralized political system (Peru started a process of decentralization, but only after the 2001 elections), as well as a 1997 law designed to tighten ballot access that requires parties to collect the signatures of at least four percent of the population.

Explanations rooted in the sizes of ethnic groups and their material grievances appear somewhat more relevant to the Peruvian case. According to grievance-based accounts of ethnic identification, ethnic identities matter for party politics when such identities become socially and/or economically marginalized (Chua, 2003; Horowitz, 1985). That indigenous Peruvians are economically marginalized—as predicted by grievance explanations—is supported by recent work demonstrating ties between indigenous identity and economic marginalization (Loker, 1999; Montoya, 1989; Crabtree, 2002; Korzeniewicz, 2000; López and della Maggiora, 2000). In the 2006 World Values Survey, Peruvians who self-identified as Quechua, Aymara, or Amazonian had lower reported incomes than respondents of other ethnic identities.4 Morales
(2008) demonstrates that when indigenous groups are economically marginalized, indigenous identification negatively impacts individuals' levels of national identification; this, in turn, provides the foundation for political divisions along ethnic lines. Moreover, one would expect that economic inequality among indigenous Peruvians could produce social identities that would translate into an identifiable political division; recent evidence showing that Peruvians speaking indigenous languages have lower levels of national identification suggests this is the case (Carrión, Zárate, and Seligson, 2006). However, while indigenous identities are marginalized identities, little evidence exists demonstrating that indigenous Peruvians are more marginalized today than in decades past. Thus, while Toledo, then Humala discussed issues of social and economic marginalization, the incorporation of indigenous issues into Peruvian party politics is not due to intensifying material grievances.

Regarding arguments related to the size of ethnic groups, some authors contend that only those ethnic groups that are sizable enough in number are represented by political parties (Posner, 2004; Madrid, 2005b). According to this argument, Peru appears to be an anomaly when viewed in comparative perspective. Countries like Bolivia and Ecuador—with indigenous populations of 62 and 25 percent, respectively (Wessendorf, 2008)—are often touted as examples of robust indigenous politics. By comparison, Peru's indigenous population, comprising 33 percent of the total population (according to the 1993 census; see Wessendorf, 2008), seems to contradict arguments related to ethnic group size. Despite Peru's comparatively large indigenous population, indigenous Peruvians have long been cautious to identify as such, often preferring the less marginalized "Mestizo" identity, which allows them to remove the stigmas attached to their culture and practices without abandoning these traditions (de la Cadena,
Indigenous identification has been hampered further by frequent rural migration that has dislocated people and disrupted cultural practices (Degregori, 1998).

While there have always been indigenous Peruvians, they are just now beginning to identify as such, and as a result, the political parties are just now beginning to perceive indigenous voters as an electoral bloc that is sizable enough to be represented. Contrary to de la Cadena (2000), García and Lucero (2004) contend that indigenous identity is not subsumed under Mestizo identity. They argue that “Indianness” has emerged recently in opposition to Mestizo identity, being set in motion by a number of factors: indigenous Peruvians’ disappointment with the policies of the Toledo government; conflicts between indigenous groups and the central government over the use of indigenous lands (see also Vera Delgado and Zwarteveen, 2008; Bebbington, 2007, 2009; Aiello, 2009; Scurrah, 2008; De Echave, 2009; Wessendorf, 2008); financial, logistic, and moral support by the United Nations and several non-governmental organizations promoting indigenous causes internationally (Greene, 2006); and political liberalization, with a livelier and freer press following the end of the Fujimori regime. Although unorganized at the national level and not as powerful politically as in Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous activists in Peru have become more organized and politically active in recent years; as a result of these activities, they have brought indigenous issues to the attention of the political parties. All of these processes have served to increase indigenous identification, which in turn makes indigenous voters as a group sizable enough for representation by political parties. This discussion explains why explicit indigenous identification has increased in recent years; however, it cannot explain why the third of Peruvians classified as indigenous (according to the 1993 census) were ignored as an electoral bloc, and indigenous issues were not represented by the political parties, until the election of Toledo in 2001.
While grievance and ethnic group size arguments appear somewhat more useful than institutional arguments regarding the emergence of indigenous issues in Peruvian politics, all three are insufficient as explanations for why indigenous issues have emerged only recently. A more compelling explanation—and the one that we put forth here—is that indigenous political identities in Peru have surfaced only recently because political actors did not target these voters as a bloc prior to Toledo’s 2001 campaign. Politicians recognizing the distinctiveness of indigenous identities have also recognized the electoral potential that the support of these voters offers. As a result, political parties target these voters as a cohesive electoral base of support by claiming to represent indigenous interests, and as a result, indigenous voters respond with their support.

Like other arguments associating the formation and maintenance of political identities to political actors (Schattschneider, 1960; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; Evans, Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990), the missing sociological aspect of the indigenous cleavage (political identities) in Peru has been created and activated by political parties in an effort to establish their electoral bases. This was first achieved by Toledo in 2001, who articulated issues and policies favorable to indigenous voters while making specific overtures and references to indigenous culture in order to capitalize on the political potential they offered. Humala continued this campaign strategy in 2006. Although subtle, these symbolic campaign messages provide important cues to voters about the issues candidates will represent (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Popkin, 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). The use of such symbolism is important to any candidate wishing to win over indigenous voters, particularly in low-information settings like Peru with its high party volatility. While indigenous issues were not the centerpieces of either candidate’s campaign, the
fact that both candidates expended considerable effort to attract indigenous voters by referencing indigenous symbols and promising to address indigenous voters' concerns demonstrates that indigenous issues have become important to party politics in Peru. This is a particularly noteworthy development in a Latin American country like Peru, where scholars have long noted that parties were unwilling to campaign along identity-based lines, and therefore cleavages of all sorts among voters were often weak (see, for instance, Dix, 1989).

Although the organization of many parties in Peru and Latin America is often personalistic and/or elite-driven, possessing weak organizational tools with which to mobilize voters along identity-based lines, there is still reason to expect that campaign appeals to voters are enough to create political divisions in the electorate. The decline of the mass-based party model in Europe and the United States since the mid-twentieth century—leading to fewer, more professional party members geared toward competing in elections (Aldrich, 1995; Katz and Mair, 1992)—has not led to a wholesale dealignment of cleavage-based politics (see, for instance Elff [2007], Raymond [2011], and the works cited therein). Similarly, we do not expect that the admittedly weaker organization of indigenous groups in Peru (when compared to Bolivia and Ecuador) prevents the formation of political identities among indigenous voters.

The incorporation of indigenous issues into Peruvian party politics was likely aided by economic liberalization under Fujimori. As has been the case in other countries (Rice and Van Cott, 2006: 721), economic liberalization weakened the ties between class identities and the political parties, thereby creating the necessary political opening for indigenous issues to come to the attention of the parties. Similar to Yashar (1998)—though not complete at the time of her writing—economic liberalization under Fujimori weakened the state institutions that fostered the sorts of group-based class rights that previously inhibited explicitly indigenous mobilization.
This, in turn, weakened ties between class and the parties of the left, thereby opening the necessary political space for the incorporation of indigenous issues. As a standalone argument, however, economic liberalization cannot explain the emergence of indigenous representation because parties did not cater to indigenous issues until Toledo's campaign in 2000, 10 years after the neoliberal reforms known as "Fujishock." Instead, the representation of indigenous issues appears to have been the result of parties’ efforts to create indigenous political identities, and only supported by economic liberalization.

In sum, the case of Peru seems to defy the expectations of much of the literature regarding the emergence of ethnic group representation. Arguments relating to institutions, material grievances, and ethnic group size were all found to be deficient in some way when examined against the Peruvian case. Instead, we argue that what explains the incorporation of indigenous issues in Peruvian party politics are the actions of political parties, which did not create the political identities needed for an indigenous cleavage in Peru until Toledo's campaign in 2000. Thus, Peru appears to have been an anomaly when compared with other Latin American countries, not because of the absence of an explicitly indigenous party, but because of the absence of party actors seeking the support of indigenous voters as a distinctive bloc.

Data and Methods

The data in our research come from the World Values Survey corresponding with the years 1996, 2001, and 2006—which closely mirror the presidential elections of 1995, 2001, and 2006, respectively. Our dependent variable is a measure of respondents’ first-party preferences, which allows us to measure individuals’ likely vote choices. We examine several of the major parties in each of the three time periods, plus those respondents indicating that they would not vote. However, we focus primarily on the party of Alejandro Toledo (Perú Posible) in 2001.
and the parties associated with Ollanta Humala (PNP and UPP) in 2006. The list of parties is
given in Table 1. To give us greater confidence in the results pointing to indigenous identity
effects, we ran regressions for the 2001 and 2006 data. We use a binary logistic regression
model for the 2001 data, coding the dependent variable as one for Toledo's *Perú Posible*, and
zero for all other parties. This is because 45 percent of respondents reported support for Toledo,
while no other party received support from even 10 percent of respondents.\(^7\) We use a
multinomial coding of the dependent variable in the 2006 data in order to compare the parties
associated with Humala (both as one value, as well as separate values) to APRA, the party
winning the presidency in 2006 (which we use as the base category), apart from the other major
parties competing in that election. Because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable
with the 2006 data, we use multinomial logistic regression with Clarify 2.0 (King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg, 2000) to estimate predicted probabilities.

The independent variables of interest in this analysis measure indigenous identities
(coded one) relative to all other ethnic groups (coded zero). Measuring ethnicity changed from
year-to-year: in the 1996 data, indigenous refers only to those who identified as “Indian.” In
2001, only Amazonians are considered indigenous due to data availability; in addition to
Amazonians, in 2006 we include Quechua and Aymara identifiers. The results using
disaggregated measures of indigenous identity in 2006 produce similar results.\(^8\) To show the
effects of indigenous identity further, we also test models with a measure of Mestizo identity\(^9\)
instead of indigenous identity in order to show the differences between the two.

The effects of several other social identities are controlled. Three controls for class and
status are included. The first is a measure of income, ranging from one (lowest) to 10 (highest
income). Second, we control for union members who are coded as one, and zero otherwise.
Third, we include a measure of education, with those respondents attaining a university degree or higher coded as one, and zero otherwise. Controls for gender (females coded as one, males as zero), respondent age, and respondents’ self-placements along a left-right ideology scale ranging from one (left) to 10 (right) are also included.

**Analysis**

Table 1 presents contingency tables displaying party preferences among indigenous and Mestizo voters across the three elections. In the interests of space, the third ethnic category (all non-indigenous, non-Mestizos) is excluded for each election. Looking at indigenous voters in 1996, no one party receives extraordinarily more support from indigenous voters than the majority ethnic group, Mestizos. In fact, for most parties, the percentage of support coming from indigenous voters is roughly equivalent to the support they draw from Mestizos. While Fujimori's *Cambio 90* receives the largest percentage of the indigenous vote by far, it is because he fared almost equally well among Mestizo voters. It is worth noting that Alejandro Toledo's *País Posible* fared much better, proportionally, among indigenous than Mestizo voters; this relationship is insignificant, however, due in large part to the small number of indigenous Peruvians in the sample as well as Toledo's low levels of support.

*Table 1 about here*

In 2001 and 2006, however, the data show that indigenous identity becomes significantly associated with party preference. Toledo's *Perú Posible* was the main beneficiary of this in 2001, while PNP and UPP (the parties associated with Humala) are the disproportionate beneficiaries in 2006. These data suggest that 2001 may have been a turning point in Peruvian politics, especially for indigenous politics (similar to García, 2005: 55). With the candidacy of Toledo we see that an indigenous political division has formed in Peru. While indigenous voters
comprised only 8.3 percent of respondents in 2001, the fact that Toledo received disproportionate support from indigenous voters relative to the other parties suggests that his indigenous campaign appeals were effective in winning their support. Although indigenous voters comprised only about 10 percent of his total support, compared with over 53 percent coming from Mestizos, the fact remains that Toledo won this group overwhelmingly. Additionally, because Toledo also fared disproportionally well among Mestizo voters, his coalition of support appears broad-based, drawing majority support from the majority ethnic group, yet faring well among indigenous voters as well.

The appearance of indigenous political identities persists into 2006. While no party receives a substantial plurality of indigenous support, it is worth noting that the two parties affiliated with Humala (PNP and UPP) receive a majority of their support (51 percent) from indigenous voters, while the bulk of the remainder appears to come from Mestizo voters (44 percent). The fact that their support is drawn from these two groups almost exclusively is in keeping with their populist messages. In comparison, APRA’s indigenous support is significantly lower.

To determine the robustness of these findings, we turn to the regression analyses. Table 2 presents the results using the 2001 data. Here, both indigenous and Mestizo respondents were more likely to be Toledo supporters, but only indigenous voters were statistically significant supporters of Perú Posible. Holding the control variables at their means (modes in the case of nominal variables), Mestizo respondents were about five percent more likely to support Toledo’s Perú Posible party than non-Mestizos. Indigenous respondents were nearly 12 percent more likely to say that they support Perú Posible in 2001 than non-indigenous voters, with all other variables held to the same values as above.
Table 2 about here

A more convincing test for whether ethnic identities have been politicized would be to see if indigenous voters still concentrate their support for a particular party (or parties) even in the absence of Toledo as a candidate, who did not stand for re-election in 2006. If indigenous identities have become politicized, then we should find evidence that the parties have picked up where Toledo left off by targeting indigenous support. In lieu of presenting parameter estimates—which showed significant indigenous ethnicity effects in the expected direction—Figures 1-3 display the predicted probabilities of supporting PNP, UPP, the two parties collectively, and APRA where noted. The parameter estimates can be found in the supplementary file. Turning to the results displayed in Figure 1, the data show that when holding all variables at their means (modes in the case of binary variables), support for PNP and UPP is substantially higher among indigenous than Mestizo voters. Additionally, support for APRA is considerably lower among indigenous voters than among Mestizo voters. This indicates that indigenous political identities have persisted beyond the 2001 election. The same can be said with regard to support for APRA: while there is little difference between female indigenous and Mestizo voters, there is a 5.1 percent difference between indigenous and Mestizo males. Furthermore, there is a significant gender gap in support for Humala: the probability of indigenous support among males is over 28 percent, and only about 19 percent among females. Despite this gender gap, support for Humala is higher among indigenous than non-indigenous respondents, both male and female.

Figure 1 about here

Turning now to whether the party support found in Figure 1 is rooted in leftist populism (as the comparative implications in Madrid [2005b] imply), the results in Figure 2 suggest that
support for PNP/UPP reflects Humala's populist rhetoric. Poorer voters to the left of center (one standard deviation below both the means for income and left-right ideology) have predicted probabilities of PNP/UPP support that are much higher than wealthier, rightist voters (one standard deviation above both means). While these differences seem striking, looking at the confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities shows that the probabilities one standard deviation above and below the mean of income and left-right ideology are not significantly different from the probabilities when these variables are set at their means. Additionally, the predicted probabilities for both females and males remain higher for indigenous than Mestizo voters. Taken together, these findings show an indigenous identity effect that is independent of class and ideology.

*Figure 2 about here*

The analysis now turns to differences between the two parties affiliated with Humala. Because the PNP/UPP alliance occurred so late in the election campaign (see footnote 3), and because until then PNP was the party most affiliated with Humala's left-wing populist message, there should be sizable differences between support for PNP and UPP, particularly among indigenous voters. Figure 3 bears this point out: support for PNP is substantially higher than support for UPP. The predicted probabilities for UPP among male voters do not fall within the lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the predicted probabilities of PNP support; the same result nearly obtains among female voters, too. Although Mestizo voters were significantly less likely to support PNP than indigenous voters, the same pattern emerges.

*Figure 3 about here*

Viewing the findings presented above collectively, the fact that we find evidence of significant indigenous identity effects across two elections in which a different party catered to
indigenous voters in each election suggests that indigenous political divisions may continue to remain a prominent feature in Peruvian politics. Consistent with the argument presented here regarding the formation of cleavages by political parties—and consistent with similar arguments made elsewhere (Schattschneider, 1960; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; Evans, Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990)—the reason indigenous Peruvians voted as a bloc in these two elections is because both Toledo and Humala made electoral appeals to indigenous voters. Despite the tremendous party volatility between these two elections, indigenous identities remained activated, and thus we find evidence of indigenous political divisions in both elections. Were it not for these two parties' appeals to indigenous voters, this voting bloc would not have surfaced, and therefore Peru would continue to appear to be the outlier case in relation to its neighbors in terms of indigenous politics.

As of this writing, the 2011 elections show that indigenous identities remain a significant factor in several parties' electoral strategies. For one thing, Toledo and Humala are leading the presidential opinion polls. Other candidates taking up indigenous issues have also sought to enter the race. This includes Alberto Pizango, the Amazonian tribal leader who led the protests at Bagua in 2009, and current president of AIDESEP; and Miguel Hilario, a leader of Amazonian Shipibo-Conibo indigenous people, and former president of CONAPA. And while neither Pizango nor Hilario successfully entered the electoral contest, several parties including APRA, Solidaridad Nacional, and the Partido Fonavista del Perú, have sought to create alliances with these candidates and their organizations. In sum, several parties have realized the electoral potential of the indigenous vote, and indigenous issues appear to remain prominent in Peruvian politics as a result.

Conclusion
Contrary to previous arguments (Yashar, 1998), yet in keeping with the findings from other Latin American countries (Madrid, 2005b; Rice and Van Cott, 2006; Birnir and Van Cott, 2007), this paper demonstrates that Peru is not an exceptional case with regard to indigenous politics, especially if one focuses on the emergence of the indigenous political identities and not indigenous parties. Beginning with the successful campaign of former President Toledo and continuing with Humala’s 2006 presidential campaign, indigenous voters have formed political identities. Because indigenous social movement activity remains robust and because politicians continue to acknowledge indigenous voters’ concerns, we expect that politicians will continue to articulate indigenous interests and attract their support as a result in future elections.

Additionally, and more importantly, we have contributed to the existing body of theory regarding the emergence of indigenous cleavages in Latin America. While previous studies have focused on the emergence of indigenous-based parties, we have shown that by focusing on how party actors can activate indigenous political identities, the Peruvian exceptionalism noted in previous literature is understandable. The reason previous scholarship has not found evidence of indigenous-based party politics in Peru is because until recently, party actors did not target indigenous voters as a distinctive bloc. Only recently have political parties in Peru forged political identities among indigenous voters as parties have done elsewhere. This is due in part because indigenous identification has intensified and become more widespread as indigenous social movements have become more active (García and Lucero, 2004), and to economic liberalization, which weakened the ties between parties and class identities (Rice and Van Cott, 2006). Much like the experience of Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous voters have been targeted recently by party actors recognizing indigenous voters’ cultural distinctiveness, protest organizational structures, and socioeconomic marginalization. While arguments relating to
institutions, material grievances, and the size of ethnic groups were found to aid the representation of indigenous issues by political parties, none of these arguments explain why indigenous issues were not represented prior to Toledo.

These findings suggest that the missing element to the formation of an indigenous cleavage in Peruvian politics has been the absence of political identities, which were not created until 2001 with the campaign of Alejandro Toledo. As the results of this study confirm the findings of previous research demonstrating the importance of political actors to the formation of political identities cross-nationally (Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Evans, 2000: 410-411; Evans, Heath, and Clive, 1999; Enyedi, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990), the actions of parties in creating these political identities appear paramount to explaining the presence or (apparent) absence of indigenous political representation, not just in Peru, but in every other case of ethnic political competition. Future research, therefore, should lend more weight to explanations of the emergence of indigenous politics that are based on the emergence of political identities.
References


Chandra, Kanchan (Forthcoming) 'What is an Ethnic Party?' *Party Politics*.


Table 1 Indigenous and Mestizo Party Preferences in Three Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toledo¹</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>2.65%</td>
<td>59.02%</td>
<td>48.05%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humala²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.81%</td>
<td>10.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambio 90³</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>37.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>14.75</td>
<td>15.44</td>
<td>17.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Parties</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>18.41</td>
<td>14.75</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>28.86</td>
<td>38.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank/Would Not Vote⁴</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>37.97</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>30.89</td>
<td>33.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio (df)</td>
<td>8.60†</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>33.85*</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>55.80*</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Indigenous⁵</td>
<td>4.13%</td>
<td>8.13%</td>
<td>31.25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mestizo⁶</td>
<td>71.76%</td>
<td>52.83%</td>
<td>59.07%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† not significant. * p ≤ .001. Cell entries are the percentages of the ethnic group supporting that party.
2 Partido Nacionalista del Perú and Unión por el Perú.
3 Alberto Fujimori’s party.
4 Includes respondents answering "don't know" in 1996.
5 This is the total percentage of the sample identifying as indigenous.
6 This is the total percentage of the sample identifying as Mestizo.
Table 2 Estimates of Party Preferences for Perú Posible (Toledo's Party in 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>.488**</td>
<td>.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.215)</td>
<td>(.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>.061** (.025)</td>
<td>.072*** (.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.142*** (.035)</td>
<td>-.140*** (.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>.446 (.285)</td>
<td>.479* (.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Educated</td>
<td>.042 (.158)</td>
<td>.046 (.158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>.032 (.114)</td>
<td>.035 (.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.012*** (.004)</td>
<td>.011** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.539** (.242)</td>
<td>-.647** (.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Chi-Square (df)</td>
<td>46.22 (7)</td>
<td>43.56 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>1299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Figure 1 Indigenous and Mestizo Party Preferences

- Indigenous Females: PNP/UPP 0.187, APRA 0.126
- Mestizo Females: PNP/UPP 0.085, APRA 0.157
- Indigenous Males: PNP/UPP 0.283, APRA 0.172
- Mestizo Males: PNP/UPP 0.139, APRA 0.223
Figure 2 Income and Ideology Effects on Support for PNP/UPP

- one σ below
- mean
- one σ above

Indigenous Females: 0.274, 0.187, 0.129
Mestizo Females: 0.14, 0.085, 0.053
Indigenous Males: 0.388, 0.283, 0.204
Mestizo Males: 0.218, 0.139, 0.09
Figure 3 Differences in Support between PNP and UPP

- Indigenous Females: PNP 0.132, UPP 0.05
- Mestizo Females: PNP 0.058, UPP 0.027
- Indigenous Males: PNP 0.205, UPP 0.076
- Mestizo Males: PNP 0.096, UPP 0.039
Supplementary Material

The tables in this supplementary file correspond with Figures 1 through 3 in the main text. Tables 3 and 4 correspond with the predicted probabilities displayed in Figures 1 and 2. The alternative five-category measurement of the dependent variable in Tables 5 and 6 correspond with the predicted probabilities presented in Figure 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PNP$^1$ / UPP$^2$</th>
<th>Other Parties</th>
<th>Would not Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous$^3$</td>
<td>1.111*** (.247)</td>
<td>.180 (.223)</td>
<td>.260 (.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>-.124** (.048)</td>
<td>-.021 (.040)</td>
<td>-.115*** (.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.127 (.080)</td>
<td>.103* (.059)</td>
<td>.020 (.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>.382 (.406)</td>
<td>.094 (.362)</td>
<td>-.246 (.395)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Educated</td>
<td>.070 (.391)</td>
<td>.237 (.296)</td>
<td>.149 (.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>-.117 (.234)</td>
<td>.652*** (.188)</td>
<td>.397*** (.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.001 (.008)</td>
<td>-.00004 (.00653)</td>
<td>.005 (.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.509 (.507)</td>
<td>.108 (.424)</td>
<td>.580 (.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Chi-Square (df)</td>
<td></td>
<td>94.79 (21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R$^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>.037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td>975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p \leq .10$ ** $p \leq .05$ *** $p \leq .01$. Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Base category is APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano).
1 Partido Nacionalista Peruano (allied with UPP).
2 Unión por el Perú.
3 Indigenous here refers to Quechua, Aymara, and Amazonian respondents.
Table 4 Estimates of Party Preferences (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PNP¹ / UPP²</th>
<th>Other Parties</th>
<th>Would not Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo³</td>
<td>-.557***</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.228)</td>
<td>(.195)</td>
<td>(.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>-.125***</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-.117***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.179**</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>-.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.401)</td>
<td>(.362)</td>
<td>(.394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Educated</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.388)</td>
<td>(.296)</td>
<td>(.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>.640***</td>
<td>.386**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.232)</td>
<td>(.188)</td>
<td>(.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.414***</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.698*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.474)</td>
<td>(.412)</td>
<td>(.422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Chi-Square (df)</td>
<td>83.43 (21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01. Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Base category is APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano).
1 Partido Nacionalista Peruano (allied with UPP).
2 Unión por el Perú.
3 Mestizo refers to "Mulatto" category in the World Values Survey data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>UPP↑</th>
<th>PNP↓</th>
<th>Other Parties</th>
<th>Would not Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous↑</td>
<td>1.009*** (0.360)</td>
<td>1.155*** (0.270)</td>
<td>0.180 (0.223)</td>
<td>0.261 (0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>0.006 (0.071)</td>
<td>-1.177*** (0.053)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.041)</td>
<td>-1.16*** (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.080 (0.120)</td>
<td>-0.144 (0.091)</td>
<td>0.104* (0.059)</td>
<td>0.020 (0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>0.716 (0.555)</td>
<td>0.227 (0.448)</td>
<td>0.093 (0.362)</td>
<td>-0.250 (0.395)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Educated</td>
<td>-0.053 (0.615)</td>
<td>0.125 (0.432)</td>
<td>0.237 (0.296)</td>
<td>0.149 (0.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>-0.040 (0.352)</td>
<td>-0.142 (0.260)</td>
<td>0.651*** (0.188)</td>
<td>0.397** (0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.00004 (0.00654)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.172 (0.784)</td>
<td>0.317 (0.557)</td>
<td>0.108 (0.424)</td>
<td>0.582 (0.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Chi-Square (df)</td>
<td>103.36 (28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05 *** p ≤ .01. Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Base category is APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano).

1 Unión por el Perú.
2 Partido Nacionalista Peruano (allied with UPP).
3 Indigenous here refers to Quechua, Aymara, and Amazonian respondents.
Table 6 Estimates of Party Preferences (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UPP¹</th>
<th>PNP²</th>
<th>Other Parties</th>
<th>Would not Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo³</td>
<td>-.531</td>
<td>-.568**</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.344)</td>
<td>(.253)</td>
<td>(.195)</td>
<td>(.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-1.78***</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-.118***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.071)</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.125</td>
<td>-.199**</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.118)</td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>.821</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>-.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.551)</td>
<td>(.443)</td>
<td>(.362)</td>
<td>(.394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Educated</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.613)</td>
<td>(.428)</td>
<td>(.296)</td>
<td>(.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>-.055</td>
<td>-.166</td>
<td>.640***</td>
<td>.385**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.351)</td>
<td>(.258)</td>
<td>(.188)</td>
<td>(.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.355</td>
<td>1.260**</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.701*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.732)</td>
<td>(.516)</td>
<td>(.413)</td>
<td>(.422)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LR Chi-Square (df) | 91.84 (28)  |
Pseudo R²          | .033         |

n | 975          |

* p ≤ .10  ** p ≤ .05  *** p ≤ .01. Table entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Base category is APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano).
1 Unión por el Perú.
2 Partido Nacionalista Peruano (allied with UPP).
3 Mestizo refers to "Mulatto" category in the World Values Survey data.
1 For a discussion of the importance of national-scale organizations in advancing indigenous politics in Peru, see García and Lucero (2004), García (2005, Chapter 1), and Pajuelo (2007, Chapter 3).

2 In Spanish, the wording was “no puedo permitir que los indígenas no encuentren una respuesta al neoliberalismo” (Página 12, January 22, 2006).

3 Humala’s PNP failed to register properly for the 2006 elections and made a last minute deal with UPP to pursue his presidential ambitions (Schmidt, 2007: 816).

4 An OLS regression predicting the World Values Survey’s 10-point income scale (ranging from lowest to highest incomes) with dummy variables for each of the three indigenous identities yielded two-sided t-values of -9.08, -5.48, and -1.72 for Quechua, Aymara, and Amazonian respondents, respectively. This demonstrates significant economic marginalization among indigenous Peruvians.

5 The World Values Survey question asks respondents, “If there were a national election held tomorrow, for which party would you vote?” Those respondents initially answering “don’t know” were asked a follow-up question: “Which party appeals to you most?”

6 We opted to include all respondents because a substantial number of respondents in each survey stated that they would not vote or would cast a blank ballot. While we think that there is something to be said for examining the social bases of the parties relative to the whole sample, others may not agree and insist upon examining the parties’ supporters relative to actual voters only. Because this concern is merited, we reran the analyses with the restricted data set to check for robustness and found that these robustness checks did not substantially alter the results.
To ensure that nonvoters did not distort the results, we also operationalized this variable as a multinomial response. This did not affect the results.

All indigenous categories are more likely to vote for the expected parties, though only Quechua are significantly more likely. This is due to the small number of respondents in the Aymara and Amazonian categories and multicollinearity problems with the other independent variables in the model.

In the 1996 World Values Survey, this was listed as “Mestizaje Andino.” This changed to “Mestizo Andino” in 2001 and “mulatto” in 2006.

These results are robust to the addition of other variables. While variables measuring occupation were not available, adding additional control variables for lower levels of education did not alter the results. Additionally, controlling for those regions in which support for Humala was strongest produced the same pattern of results.

The upper bound of the predicted probability confidence interval for Mestizo males is .129, while the lower bound is .149 for indigenous males.
