Secure Transmission in Cognitive MIMO Relaying Networks With Outdated Channel State Information


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Secure Transmission in Cognitive MIMO Relaying Networks With Outdated Channel State Information

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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce transmit antenna selection/maximal-ratio combining (TAS/MRC) scheme in dual-hop randomize-and-forward (RaF) cognitive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap networks with outdated channel state information (CSI). In this network, the secondary transmitter adopts TAS scheme to choose the antenna with the maximal received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), while the secondary receiver and eavesdropper adopt MRC scheme to combine the received signals. To thoroughly assess the secrecy performance achieved by TAS/MRC scheme and the impact of outdated CSI on the secrecy performance, we derive a new closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks. In order to achieve more insights on the application of TAS/MRC scheme, we further present tractable asymptotic secrecy outage probability at high SNR regimes under two distinct scenarios. From our analysis, several important concluding remarks are obtained as follows: a) The RaF relaying strategy achieves better secrecy performance than that of the decode-and-forward (DF) relaying strategy for dual-hop cognitive MIMO wiretap networks, b) Outdated CSI decreases the secrecy diversity gain of TAS/MRC scheme from \( N_N \min(N_A, N_B) \) to \( \min(N_R, N_N) \), c) Although TAS/MRC scheme can not attain full secrecy diversity gain for the considered system with outdated CSI, it still can achieve an extra secrecy coding gain compared with random antenna selection/MRC (RAS/MRC) scheme.

Index Terms—Cognitive radio networks, MIMO, secrecy outage probability, outdated channel state information.

I. INTRODUCTION

Cognitive radio, first coined by Mitola, has drawn considerable attention from the research community due to its ability to alleviate spectrum shortage problems. The key idea of cognitive radio is to enable unlicensed users (secondary users) to intelligently share the same spectrum resources with licensed users (primary users) [1]–[3]. Among spectrum sharing cognitive radio networks, taking into account its low complexity of implementation, the underlay scheme has been received much attention. In the underlay scheme, the secondary users (SUs) are allowed to transmit concurrently with the primary users (PUs) in the same spectrum as long as the quality of service of the PUs can be guaranteed [4], [5].

On the other hand, compared with wired transmission, wireless transmission suffers from a more serious eavesdropping due to the inherent openness of the wireless medium [6], [7]. As is well-known, cognitive radio networks can be regarded as a fundamental architecture of intelligent network, which includes a large scale number nodes, a higher transmission rate, and more information exchange. Hence, cognitive radio networks are confronted with a challenge security issue due to the more complex and uncertain transmission environments. Motivated by this, physical layer security technique has emerged as a promising solution to prevent information from being intercepted and to achieve perfect secrecy in cognitive radio networks. The key idea of physical layer security is to differentiate characteristics between the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, which was first investigated in [8]. Recently, the authors in [9]–[11] have introduced physical layer security into the cognitive radio networks for guaranteeing the secure transmission. Specifically, in [9], the authors proposed three different single-relay selection schemes for the secondary transmission in cognitive radio networks. Later, the authors in [10] extended the analysis in [9] to the more general multi-relay selection scheme. In [11], a new relay selection scheme was proposed to enhance the security of cognitive radio networks, where the first relay was selected to transmit the confidential information and the second relay was selected to transmit the jamming signal to confound the eavesdropper. However, these works only consider the single antenna scenario.

As we known, multi-antenna techniques can effectively improve the transmission rate in cognitive radio networks, and it has become a key enabling technology for future wireless standards, e.g., long term evolution (LTE) and LTE Advanced [12]. Therefore, physical layer security in multi-antenna cognitive wiretap networks has recently attracted tremendous amount of research efforts. For example, as shown in [13], the selection combining (SC) scheme was proposed to enhance the secrecy performance of the cognitive radio networks with secondary receiver being equipped with multiple antennas. Later, the authors in [14] extended the analysis in [13] to the full-duplex scenario, where the full-duplex secondary receiver can simultaneously receive the signal from the secondary source with the selected antenna and transmit jamming signals to the eavesdropper with the other selected antenna. Compared
with [13] and [14] that investigated secrecy performance for cognitive radio networks using SC scheme, the authors in [15] analyzed the secrecy performance of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) cognitive radio networks with transmit antenna selection (TAS) scheme at secondary transmitter and maximal ratio combining (MRC) scheme at secondary receiver. To further exploit the benefit of available multiple antennas, MRC/zero-forcing beamforming (MRC/ZFB) scheme at the relay was proposed to enhance the secrecy performance of the spectrum sharing relaying networks, and an exact closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability of the considered system was presented [16]. However, perfect channel state informations (CSIs) of the secondary transmission links and the interference links between the PUs and SUs were assumed in the above studies. However, the outdated CSI is often caused by channel variation and the feedback delay between secondary transmitter and secondary receiver, which yields the suboptimal transmission scheme. Therefore, the impact of outdated CSI on the secrecy performance of cognitive radio networks should be considered.

With these in mind, we consider a dual-hop randomize-and-forward (RaF) multi-antenna cognitive radio network, where a secondary transmitter (Alice) communicates with a secondary destination (Bob) with the help of a secondary RaF relay (Relay) in the presence of a primary receiver (PR) and an eavesdropper (Eve). Then, the impact of outdated CSI on the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks with TAS/MRC scheme is analyzed. The main contributions of our work are summarized as follows.

- Based on the proposed analytical model, we first derive the closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks. The derived analytical expression provides an efficient means to evaluate the impact of key system parameters, i.e., feedback delay, the interference threshold and the number of antennas on the secrecy performance of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks. In addition, we find that the RaF relaying strategy achieves better secrecy performance than the DF relaying strategy for dual-hop cognitive MIMO wiretap networks.
- To achieve more insights on the application of TAS/MRC scheme, we present the tractable asymptotic secrecy outage probability for dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks under two Scenarios. In Scenario I, i.e., the main channel has a good quality while the eavesdropper’s channel is severely blocked due to heavy shadowing, the considered system with outdated CSI achieves the secrecy diversity gain of \( \min (N_A, N_B) \). In Scenario II, i.e., both the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel have a good quality, no secrecy diversity gain can be obtained regardless of the outdated CSI.
- Our results demonstrate that the outdated CSI reduces the secrecy diversity order of TAS/MRC scheme from \( N_{R} \min (N_A, N_B) \) to \( \min (N_A, N_B) \). In order to show the advantage of TAS/MRC scheme, we provide the secrecy performance analysis of random antenna selection/MRC (RAS/MRC) scheme. Although TAS/MRC scheme cannot attain a full secrecy diversity gain for dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks with outdated CSI, it can provide more secrecy coding gain compared with RAS/MRC scheme. Specially, when the feedback delay is infinity, TAS/MRC scheme will reduce to RAS/MRC scheme.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is introduced in Section II. Section III formulates the problem and presents the analytical expressions of the secrecy outage performance. In Section IV, we provide a high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) analysis for the secrecy outage probability, and Section V presents the numerical results and discussions. Finally, Section VI concludes the key findings for the paper.

II. SYSTEM MODEL

We consider an underlay dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap network as shown in Fig. 1, where the PU and SU systems share the same spectral band. The PU system consists of a single antenna primary receiver (PR), where the primary transmitter (PT) is assumed far away from the secondary receiver, thus PT will not interfere the secondary receivers [13]–[15]. The SU system consists of a secondary source (Alice), a secondary RaF relay (Relay), and a secondary destination (Bob), equipped with \( N_A, N_R \) and \( N_E \) antennas, respectively. The eavesdropper (Eve) is equipped with \( N_E \) antennas and we assume that Eve is a passive eavesdropper such that the instantaneous CSIs of Alice to Eve and Relay to Eve are not available at Alice and Relay. In addition, we assume that there is no direct link between Alice and Bob due to path loss or severe shadowing caused by large obstacles.

In the Alice to Relay link, applying TAS/MRC scheme, the instantaneous SNR at Relay is derived as

\[
\gamma_{AR} = \frac{P_S}{\sigma^2} \left| h_{AR}^2 \right|^2, \tag{1}
\]

where \( P_S = \min \left( \frac{Q}{\vartheta_i^2}, P_t \right) \), in which \( h_{1,z} \) is the interference channel coefficient of Alice to PR link with zero mean and variance \( \lambda_{AP} \), \( P_t \) and \( Q \) denote the maximum transmit
power constraint at Alice and the interference temperature constraint at PR, respectively. In addition, \( \mathbf{h}_{AR}^* \) denotes the \( N_R \times 1 \) channel vector between the \( i^* \)-th transmit antenna at Alice and Relay with zero mean and variance \( \lambda_{AR} \), \( \sigma^2 \) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Relay. The index of the selected antenna \( i^* \) is formulated as

\[
i^* = \arg \max_{1 \leq i \leq N_A} \| \mathbf{h}_{AR}^* \|^2. \tag{2}\]

Similarly, in the Relay to Bob link, applying TAS/MRC scheme, the instantaneous SNR at Bob is derived as

\[
\gamma_{RB} = \frac{P_R}{\sigma^2} \| \mathbf{h}_{RB}^* \|^2, \tag{3}\]

where \( P_R = \min \left( \frac{Q}{\| h_{2j,i} \|^2}, P_t \right) \), in which \( h_{2j,i} \) is the interference channel coefficient of Relay to PR link with zero mean and variance \( \lambda_{RP} \), \( P_t \) and \( Q \) denote the maximum transmit power constraint at Relay and the interference temperature constraint at PR, respectively. In addition, \( \mathbf{h}_{RB}^* \) denotes the \( N_B \times 1 \) channel vector between the \( j^* \)-th transmit antenna at Relay and Bob with zero mean and variance \( \lambda_{RB} \), \( \sigma^2 \) is the AWGN at Bob. The index of the selected antenna \( j^* \) at Relay is given by

\[
j^* = \arg \max_{1 \leq j \leq N_B} \| \mathbf{h}_{RB}^* \|^2. \tag{4}\]

Without loss of generality, we assume that MRC scheme is adopted at Eve for improving successful eavesdropping as in [15], [16]. In addition, RaF relaying scheme is used for secure transmission. Thus, the instantaneous SNRs of Alice to Eve link and Relay to Eve link are respective expressed as

\[
\gamma_{AE} = \frac{P_S}{\sigma^2} \| \mathbf{h}_{AE} \|^2, \tag{5}\]

\[
\gamma_{RE} = \frac{P_R}{\sigma^2} \| \mathbf{h}_{RE} \|^2, \tag{6}\]

where \( \mathbf{h}_{AE} \) denotes the \( N_E \times 1 \) channel vector between the \( i^* \)-th transmit antenna at Alice and Eve with zero mean and variance \( \lambda_{AE} \), and \( \mathbf{h}_{RE} \) denotes the \( N_E \times 1 \) channel vector between the \( j^* \)-th transmit antenna at Relay and Eve with zero mean and variance \( \lambda_{RE} \).

From Eq. (2) and Eq. (4), we note that perfect CSI for the Alice to Relay link and Relay to Bob link must be guaranteed for TAS. However, due to the subsequent data transmission and dynamic movements between the nodes, the CSI associated with the selected antenna during the selection of antenna instant may be outdated. We define \( \mathbf{h}_{KT}^* \) as a delayed version of \( \mathbf{h}_{KT}^* \), and the relation can be modeled as

\[
\mathbf{h}_{KT}^* = \rho_d \mathbf{h}_{KT}^* + \sqrt{1 - \rho_d^2} \mathbf{e}_{KT}, \tag{7}\]

where \( K \in \{A, R\} \), \( T \in \{R, B\} \), \( \tau \in \{i, j\} \), \( d \in \{1, 2\} \), and \( \mathbf{e}_{KT} \) is an \( N_T \times 1 \) error vector, whose element is complex Gaussian random variable (RV) with zero mean and same variance as \( \mathbf{h}_{KT}^* \), and \( \rho_d \) is the time correlation coefficient between \( \mathbf{h}_{KT}^* \) and \( \mathbf{h}_{KT}^* \) (Specially, \( d = 1 \) for Alice to Relay link, and \( d = 2 \) for Relay to Bob link). Using Jake’s autocorrelation model [21], [22], we have \( \rho_d = J_0 \left( 2\pi f_d T_d \right) \), where \( J_0 (\cdot) \) is the zeroth-order Bessel function of the first kind, \( f_d \) is the maximum Doppler frequency, \( T_d \) is the delay between the selection instant and the transmission instant.

Thus, due to the feedback delay, the received SNRs at Relay and Bob are respective expressed as

\[
\gamma_{AR} = \frac{P_S}{\sigma^2} \| \mathbf{h}_{AR}^* \|^2, \tag{8}\]

\[
\gamma_{RB} = \frac{P_R}{\sigma^2} \| \mathbf{h}_{RB}^* \|^2. \tag{9}\]

On the other hand, according to the underlay protocol, the interference at PR caused by SU should remain below a predefined interference requirement in order not to degrade the quality of service (QoS) of PU [13]. However, due to the impact of outdated CSI of the interference links between the PUs and SUs, it is difficult to meet the interference requirement at all times. Instead, we take the probabilistic approach as in [5], [23]–[25], where the secondary transmitter adapts its power such that the PUs can maintain a pre-selected outage probability \( \delta \). Hence, the transmit powers at Alice and Relay are limited to

\[
P_S = \min \left( \kappa_1 \left( \frac{Q}{h_{1i,s}} \right)^2, P_t \right), \tag{10}\]

\[
P_R = \min \left( \kappa_2 \left( \frac{Q}{h_{2j,s}} \right)^2, P_t \right), \tag{11}\]

where \( h_{1i,s} \) is a delayed version of \( h_{1i,s} \). \( h_{2j,s} \) is a delayed version of \( h_{2j,s} \). The correlation coefficients between \( h_{1i,s} \), \( h_{1i,s} \), \( h_{2j,s} \), and \( h_{2j,s} \) are expressed as \( \rho_3 = J_0 \left( 2\pi f_d T_3 \right) \), and \( \rho_4 = J_0 \left( 2\pi f_d T_4 \right) \), respectively. In addition, \( \kappa_1 \) and \( \kappa_2 \) denote the power marginal factors at Alice and Relay, respectively. According to [5], [23]–[25], the closed-form expression of \( \kappa_1 \) is not easily derived and it can be numerically derived by solving the following equation.

\[
\delta = e^{-\frac{Q}{\lambda_{AP} P_t}} - \frac{t}{r} Q_0 \left( \frac{(s - r) Q}{2 P_t}, \frac{(s + r) Q}{2 P_t} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \frac{t}{r} \right) e^{-\frac{Q}{\lambda_{AP} P_t}} I_0 \left( \frac{2 \rho_3^2 Q \sqrt{\kappa_1}}{(1 - \rho_3^2) \lambda_{AP} P_t} \right) - e^{-\frac{Q}{\lambda_{AP} P_t}} Q_0 \left( \frac{2 \rho_3^2 Q}{(1 - \rho_3^2) \lambda_{AP} P_t}, \frac{2 \kappa_3 Q}{(1 - \rho_3^2) \lambda_{AP} P_t} \right), \tag{12}\]

where \( s = \frac{2}{\lambda_{AP} \left( \frac{1 + \kappa_1}{1 - \rho_3^2} \right)} \), \( t = \frac{2}{\lambda_{AP} \left( \frac{1 - \kappa_1}{1 - \rho_3^2} \right)} \), \( r = \sqrt{s^2 - \frac{16 \kappa_1 \rho_3^2}{\lambda_{AP} (1 - \rho_3^2)} \right) \) and \( Q_0 (a, b) \) is the first-order Marcum Q-function [26]. \( I_0 (\cdot) \) is the zeroth-order modified Bessel function of the first kind [27, Eq. (8.311)]. Similarly, \( \kappa_2 \) can be derived by interchanging \( \lambda_{AP} \rightarrow \lambda_{RP} \) and \( \rho_3 \rightarrow \rho_4 \) in Eq. (12).

To make the following analysis more tractable, we define

\[
\mu = \frac{Q}{P_t}, \quad \gamma_{AR} = \frac{P_s}{\sigma^2} \frac{\lambda_{AR}}{\mu}, \quad \gamma_{RB} = \frac{P_R}{\sigma^2} \frac{\lambda_{RB}}{\mu}, \quad \gamma_{AE} = \frac{P_S}{\sigma^2} \frac{\lambda_{AE}}{\mu}, \quad \gamma_{RE} = \frac{P_R}{\sigma^2} \frac{\lambda_{RE}}{\mu}. \tag{13}\]
III. Secrecy Performance Analysis

In this section, we investigate the secrecy outage probability of the dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks with TAS/MRC scheme. Specifically, we derive closed-form expressions for secrecy outage probability under two cases. Case 1: outdated CSI for the secondary transmission links, and Case 2: perfect CSI for the secondary transmission links. For case 1, to demonstrate the advantage of TAS/MRC scheme with outdated CSI, the analysis for RAS/MRC scheme is also given.

A. Outdated CSI for the secondary transmission links

The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity falls below a predefined threshold $R_s$. For the RaF protocol, the Alice and Relay transmit independent randomization signal in each hop, and the message is secured if the two hops are both secured [17], [20]. Mathematically, it can be expressed as [20]

$$P_{out}(R_s) = 1 - Pr\{C_{1s} > R_s\} Pr\{C_{2s} > R_s\},$$

(13)

where $C_{1s}$ and $C_{2s}$ are the secrecy capacity of the first hop and the second hop, which can be respectively expressed as

$$C_{1s} = \log_2 (1 + \frac{1}{\gamma_{AR}}) = \log_2 (1 + \min\left(\frac{\kappa_1}{h_{1s}}, \frac{\eta_0}{\sigma^2}, P_t \right) ||h_{AR}||^2 / \sigma^2),$$

(14)

$$C_{2s} = \log_2 (1 + \frac{1}{\gamma_{RB}}) = \log_2 (1 + \min\left(\frac{\kappa_2}{h_{2s}}, \frac{\eta_0}{\sigma^2}, P_t \right) ||h_{RB}||^2 / \sigma^2),$$

(15)

From (14) and (15), we have

$$Pr\{C_{1s} > R_s\} = 1 - Pr\{\tilde{\gamma}_1 \leq 2R_s\} = 1 - F_{\tilde{\gamma}_1}(R_s),$$

(16)

$$Pr\{C_{2s} > R_s\} = 1 - Pr\{\tilde{\gamma}_2 \leq 2R_s\} = 1 - F_{\tilde{\gamma}_2}(R_s),$$

(17)

where

$$\tilde{\gamma}_1 = \frac{1 + \min\left(\frac{\kappa_1}{h_{1s}}, \frac{\eta_0}{\sigma^2}, P_t \right) ||h_{AR}||^2 / \sigma^2}{1 + \min\left(\frac{\kappa_2}{h_{2s}}, \frac{\eta_0}{\sigma^2}, P_t \right) ||h_{RB}||^2 / \sigma^2},$$

$$\tilde{\gamma}_2 =$$

$$\frac{1 + \min\left(\frac{\kappa_2}{h_{2s}}, \frac{\eta_0}{\sigma^2}, P_t \right) ||h_{RB}||^2 / \sigma^2}{1 + \min\left(\frac{\kappa_2}{h_{2s}}, \frac{\eta_0}{\sigma^2}, P_t \right) ||h_{RB}||^2 / \sigma^2}, F_{\tilde{\gamma}_1}()$$

and $F_{\tilde{\gamma}_2}()$ are the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of $\tilde{\gamma}_1$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_2$, respectively.

Now, taking the detailed derivation of $F_{\tilde{\gamma}_1}()$, for example, we first present the CDF of RV $\tilde{X} = ||h_{AR}||^2$, which is given in the following lemma.

Lemma 1. The CDF of $\tilde{X}$ is given by

$$F_{\tilde{X}}(x) = 1 - N_A \sum_{n=0}^{N_A - 1} \left(\frac{N_A - 1}{n} \right) \frac{1}{\Gamma(N_R)} \sum_{k=0}^{\varphi_1} \left(\frac{x}{\varphi_1}\right)^k,$$

$$\times \sum_{m=0}^{N_R+k-1} \frac{N_R + \varphi_1}{\Gamma(N_R+\varphi_1)} \frac{1}{\Gamma(m+1)(1+n)} N_R - m \sum \frac{n_k m \varphi_1 (\lambda_{AR})^m}{(n_{k+1} - n_k)}$$

where

$$\varphi_1 = \sum_{q=1}^{N_R} n_q, n_0 = n and n_{N_R} = 0.$$
B. Perfect CSI for the secondary transmission links

When the CSIs about the secondary transmission links are perfect, the outage probability is mathematically expressed as

\[
P_{\text{out}}(R_s) = 1 - \Pr \{ C_{1s} > R_s \} \Pr \{ C_{2s} > R_s \} = F_{\gamma_1}(r_s) + F_{\gamma_2}(r_s) - F_{\gamma_1}(r_s) F_{\gamma_2}(r_s),
\]

where \( \gamma_1 = 1 + \min(\kappa_1 \frac{Q_p}{\|h_{1i}^s\|^2}, \rho_1), \gamma_2 = 1 + \min(\kappa_2 \frac{Q_p}{\|h_{2i}^s\|^2}, \rho_2) \), \( F_{\gamma_1}(\cdot) \) and \( F_{\gamma_2}(\cdot) \) are the CDFs of \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 \) respectively.

Similar to the analysis in Section A, we first present the CDF of \( X = \|h_{AR}^s\|^2 \) in the following lemma.

**Lemma 2.** The CDF of \( X \) is given by

\[
F_X(x) = \sum_{p=0}^{N_A} \binom{N_A}{p} (-1)^p e^{-x/\lambda_{AR}} \times \prod_{u=1}^{N_U-1} \sum_{i_u=0}^{i_{u-1}} \left( \frac{1}{u!} \right) \left( x \right)^\theta
\]

where \( \theta = \sum_{u=1}^{N_U-1} i_u, i_0 = p, \) and \( i_{N_U} = 0. \)

**Proof:** The proof can be found in [15].

Then, we focus on deriving the CDF of \( \gamma_1 \) in the following theorem.

**Theorem 2.** The CDF of \( \gamma_1 \) can be expressed as

\[
F_{\gamma_1}(r_s) = \sum_{p=0}^{N_A} \binom{N_A}{p} (-1)^p \sum_{i_{u-1}=0}^{i_{u-1}} \left( \frac{1}{u!} \right) \left( x \right)^\theta
\]

where \( \theta = \sum_{u=1}^{N_U-1} i_u, i_0 = p, \) and \( i_{N_U} = 0. \)

**Proof:** Following similar procedure as in the proof of Theorem 1, the above result can be easily obtained.

By interchanging the parameters in Eq. (23), i.e., \( N_A \to N_R, N_R \to N_B, \lambda_{AR} \to \lambda_{BH}, \lambda_{AE} \to \lambda_{EB}, \lambda_{AP} \to \lambda_{DP}, \rho_3 \to \rho_4, \) and \( \kappa_1 \to \kappa_2, \) we can obtain the CDF of \( \gamma_2. \)

Then, substituting the CDFs of \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 \) into (21) yields the closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability of the considered system with perfect CSI for the secondary transmission links.

IV. HIGH SNR ANALYSIS

The derived closed-form expressions in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 provide an efficient means to evaluate the secrecy performance of the considered system. However, the derived expressions are too complicated to extract any insight on the impact of key system parameters on the secrecy performance of the considered system, i.e., feedback delay, the number of antennas and the interference threshold. Thus, in this section, we turn our attention to analyze the asymptotic secrecy outage probability in high SNR regimes under two distinct scenarios: 1) \( \gamma_B \to \infty \) and fixed \( \gamma_E, \) that is a scenario where the main channel has a good quality while the eavesdropper’s channel is severely blocked due to heavy shadowing. 2) \( \gamma_B \to \infty \) and \( \gamma_E \to \infty, \) that is a scenario where both the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel have a good quality.

A. Scenario I: \( \gamma_B \to \infty \) and fixed \( \gamma_E \)

In order to characterize the effect of outdated CSI on the secrecy diversity gain and secrecy coding gain of the system under this scenario, we analyze the asymptotic secrecy outage probability under two cases. Case 1: outdated CSIs for the secondary transmission links (\( \rho_1 \neq 1, \rho_2 \neq 1 \)), and Case 2: perfect CSIs for the secondary transmission links (\( \rho_1 = \rho_2 = 1 \)). Then, we have the following two corollaries.

**Corollary 1.** When the CSIs for the secondary transmission links are outdated, the asymptotic outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks when \( \gamma_B \to \infty \) and fixed \( \gamma_E \) is given by

\[
P_{\text{out}}(R_s) \approx \Delta_A \gamma_B^{-\min(N_R, N_B)},
\]

where \( \Delta_A \) is given by

\[
\Delta_A = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
\Delta_1, & N_R < N_B \\
\Delta_1 + \Delta_2, & N_R = N_B \\
\Delta_2, & N_R > N_B
\end{array} \right.
\]

with \( \Delta_1 \) and \( \Delta_2 \) being expressed as

\[
\Delta_1 = N_A \sum_{n=0}^{N_A-1} \binom{N_A-1}{n} (-1)^n \Phi_1 \left( N_R + \varphi_1 \right) \left( N_R + 1 \right) \gamma_B^{-N_R},
\]

\[
\times \sum_{i=0}^{N_R-1} \gamma_B^{-i} \left( 2R_s - 1 \right)^i (i + N_E - 1)! \left( N_E - 1 \right)!,
\]

\[
\Delta_2 = \frac{\left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^N \gamma_E^{N_E} \lambda_{AP} \left( 2R_s - 1 \right) \lambda_{AP} \left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^{N_E}}{\gamma_B^{N_E} \gamma_E^{N_E} \lambda_{AP} \left( 2R_s - 1 \right) \lambda_{AP} \left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^{N_E}},
\]

\[
\Delta_3 = \frac{\left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^N \gamma_B^{N_B} \lambda_{AP} \left( 2R_s - 1 \right) \lambda_{AP} \left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^{N_B}}{\gamma_E^{N_B} \gamma_B^{N_B} \lambda_{AP} \left( 2R_s - 1 \right) \lambda_{AP} \left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^{N_B}}.
\]

\[
\Delta_4 = \frac{\left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^N \gamma_N \lambda_{AP} \left( 2R_s - 1 \right) \lambda_{AP} \left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^{N_E}}{\gamma_B^{N_B} \gamma_E^{N_E} \lambda_{AP} \left( 2R_s - 1 \right) \lambda_{AP} \left( \kappa_1 \mu \right)^{N_E}}.
\]
\( \Delta_2 = N_R \sum_{n=0}^{N_R-1} \binom{N_R-1}{n} (N_B-1) (N_B+\varphi_2) (1-\rho_2)^{\varphi_2} \ \Gamma (N_B) / \Gamma (N_B+1) \zeta_2^{N_B} \) \\
\times \left[ 1 - e^{-\frac{s \mu}{\lambda ATP}} + \left( \frac{\lambda ATP}{\zeta_2} \right)^{N_B} \Gamma (N_B+1, \frac{\kappa_2 \mu}{\lambda ATP}) \right], \quad (27)

**Proof:** See Appendix B.

**Corollary 2.** When the CSIs for the secondary transmission links are perfectly known, the asymptotic outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks when \( \gamma_B \to \infty \) and fixed \( \gamma_E \) is given by

\[ P_{\text{out}} (R_s) \approx \Delta_B \gamma_B^{N_B \min(N_A, N_B)}, \quad (28) \]

where \( \Delta_B \) is given by

\[ \Delta_B = \begin{cases} \Delta_3, & N_A < N_B \\
\Delta_3 + \Delta_4, & N_A = N_B \\
\Delta_4, & N_A > N_B \end{cases}, \quad (29) \]

with \( \Delta_3 \) and \( \Delta_4 \) being expressed as

\[ \Delta_3 = \frac{1}{(N_B!)^{N_B}} \sum_{i=0}^{N_A N_R} \binom{N_A N_R}{i} (2R_s - 1)^{N_A N_R - i} \]

\[ \times \left[ 1 - e^{-\frac{s \mu}{\lambda ATP}} + \left( \frac{\lambda ATP}{\zeta_2} \right)^{N_B} \Gamma (N_B+1, \frac{\kappa_2 \mu}{\lambda ATP}) \right], \quad (30) \]

\[ \Delta_4 = \frac{1}{(N_B!)^{N_R}} \sum_{i=0}^{N_R N_B} \binom{N_R N_B}{i} (2R_s - 1)^{N_R N_B - i} \]

\[ \times \left[ 1 - e^{-\frac{s \mu}{\lambda ATP}} + \left( \frac{\lambda ATP}{\zeta_2} \right)^{N_B} \Gamma (N_B+1, \frac{\kappa_2 \mu}{\lambda ATP}) \right]. \quad (31) \]

**Proof:** See Appendix C.

**Remark 1:** From Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, we find that the considered two cases achieve different secrecy diversity gains, i.e., \( \min(N_R, N_B) \) and \( N_B \min(N_A, N_B) \). The result demonstrates that the outdated CSI has a significantly impact on the achievable secrecy diversity gain of the system and it will reduce the secrecy diversity gain from \( N_R \min(N_A, N_B) \) to \( \min(N_R, N_B) \) for Scenario 1. In addition, the parameters of the number of antennas, the eavesdropper’s channel and the interference temperature constraint of the primary networks will affect the secrecy performance through the secrecy coding gain, i.e.,

\[ G_1 = (\Delta_A)^{-1} \min(N_A, N_B), \quad (32) \]

\[ G_2 = (\Delta_B)^{-1} \min(N_A, N_B), \quad (33) \]

**B. Scenario II:** \( \gamma_B \to \infty \) and \( \gamma_E \to \infty \)

Now, we focus on analyzing the approximated secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks under Scenario II.

**Corollary 3.** When the CSIs for the secondary transmission links are outdated, the asymptotic outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks when \( \gamma_B \to \infty \) and \( \gamma_E \to \infty \) is given by

\[ P_{\text{out}} (R_s) \approx F_{\gamma_1} (R_s) + F_{\gamma_2} (R_s) - F_{\gamma_1} (R_a) F_{\gamma_2} (R_s), \quad (34) \]

where \( F_{\gamma_1} (R_s) \) and \( F_{\gamma_2} (R_s) \) are respective expressed as

\[ F_{\gamma_1} (R_s) \approx 1 - N_A \sum_{n=0}^{N_A-1} \binom{N_A-1}{n} \left( \frac{1}{N_B} \right) \left( 1 - \frac{\gamma_B}{\gamma_i} \right)^{\varphi_1} \sum_{k=0}^{\varphi_1} \binom{\varphi_1}{k} \]

\[ \times \frac{N_R + k - 1}{N_R + m + 1} \frac{\Gamma (N_R + \varphi_1) \Gamma (N_B + k - 1)}{\Gamma (N_B + m + 1)} \frac{(N_B - 1)!}{(N_B + k - 1)!} \]

\[ \times \left[ 1 - e^{-\frac{s \mu}{\lambda ATP}} + \left( \frac{\lambda ATP}{\zeta_2} \right)^{N_B} \Gamma (N_B+1, \frac{\kappa_2 \mu}{\lambda ATP}) \right]. \]

**Proof:** See Appendix D.

**Corollary 4.** When the CSIs for the secondary transmission links are perfect, the asymptotic outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks when \( \gamma_B \to \infty \) and \( \gamma_E \to \infty \) is given by

\[ P_{\text{out}} (R_s) \approx F_{\gamma_1} (R_s) + F_{\gamma_2} (R_s) - F_{\gamma_1} (R_a) F_{\gamma_2} (R_s), \quad (37) \]

where \( F_{\gamma_1} (R_s) \) and \( F_{\gamma_2} (R_s) \) are respective expressed as

\[ F_{\gamma_1} (R_s) \approx \sum_{p=0}^{N_A} \binom{N_A}{p} \frac{N_A - 1}{N_B} \prod_{u=1}^{i_{u-1}} \left( \frac{i_{u-1} - 1}{i_{u+1}} \right) \left( \frac{1}{i_{u-1}} \right)^{i_{u-1}} \]

\[ \times \frac{N_R + k - 1}{N_R + m + 1} \frac{\Gamma (N_R + \rho_1) \Gamma (N_B + k - 1)}{\Gamma (N_B + m + 1)} \frac{(N_B - 1)!}{(N_B + k - 1)!} \]

\[ \times \left[ 1 - e^{-\frac{s \mu}{\lambda ATP}} + \left( \frac{\lambda ATP}{\zeta_2} \right)^{N_B} \Gamma (N_B+1, \frac{\kappa_2 \mu}{\lambda ATP}) \right]. \]
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\[
\begin{align*}
\times \left[1 - e^{-\frac{\kappa_1 \mu_2 \gamma_B}{\Delta_{AP}}} + \frac{\kappa_1 \mu_2 \gamma_B}{\Delta_{AP}} \right] \left(1 + \frac{(2R_s - 1) \lambda_{AP} + \kappa_1 \mu_2 \gamma_B}{(2R_s - 1) \lambda_{AP} + \kappa_1 \mu_2 \gamma_B}ight) ,
\end{align*}
\] (38)

and

\[
\begin{align*}
F_{\gamma_s}(R_s) \approx & \sum_{p=0}^{N_{\rho}} \left(\frac{N_{R_s}}{p}\right)^{(-1)^p} \prod_{u=1}^{N_{\rho} - 1} \left[\sum_{i_{u-1}=0}^{i_{u-1}+1} \left(\frac{1}{i_u!}\right)^{i_u-i_{u-1}}\right] \\
\times & \frac{(2R_s)^{\theta+1} \gamma_s^{N_{\rho} - 1}}{(\eta_s^{N_{\rho}})^{\theta+1}} \left(\frac{\beta_s^{N_{\rho}} \gamma_B^{N_{\rho}}}{\beta_s^{N_{\rho}} \gamma_B^{N_{\rho}} + \beta_s^{N_{\rho}} 2R_s}ight) \\
\times & \left[1 - e^{-\frac{2\rho_2 \eta_s^{N_{\rho}} \gamma_B}{\Delta_{AP}}} + \frac{2\rho_2 \eta_s^{N_{\rho}} \gamma_B}{\Delta_{AP}} \right] \left(1 + \frac{(2R_s - 1) \lambda_{AP} + 2\rho_2 \eta_s^{N_{\rho}} \gamma_B}{(2R_s - 1) \lambda_{AP} + 2\rho_2 \eta_s^{N_{\rho}} \gamma_B}\right) .
\end{align*}
\] (39)

**Proof:** Following a similar procedure as in the proof of Corollary 3, the above result can be easily obtained after some simple mathematical manipulations.

**Remark 2:** From Corollary 3 and Corollary 4, we find that the two cases exhibit the secrecy outage floor when \(\gamma_B \to \infty\) and \(\gamma_E \to \infty\), which indicates that no secrecy diversity gain can be obtained. That is to say, the outdated CSI affects the secrecy performance by degrading the secrecy coding gain for Scenario II.

V. NUMERICAL RESULTS

In this section, representative numerical results are provided to evaluate the impacts of the number of antennas, outdated CSIs for the secondary transmission links, and outdated CSIs for the interference links between PUs and SUs on the secrecy outage performance of the secondary system. Unless otherwise stated, the following parameters are set, i.e., the SNR is \(10\), the outage probability is \(10\), and the average powers of all channel links are set to one. As shown in these figures, the Monte Carlo simulation results are in exact agreement with the analytical ones, which corroborates the accuracy of the analytical expressions.

Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks with TAS/MRC scheme. From both figures, we find that the secrecy outage probability of RaF relaying strategy is lower than that of DF relaying strategy and the secrecy outage performance can be improved by adopting more antennas at Relay and decreasing the feedback delay for both RaF and DF relaying strategies. In addition, the secrecy outage probability of the considered system using RaF relaying strategy becomes saturated due to the fixed interference temperature constraint, which verifies the analytical results shown in Eq. (34) and Eq. (37). However, the secrecy outage probability of the considered system using DF relaying strategy is not always decreasing with the increasing of the SNR. This is intuitive since the instantaneous SNR gap between the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel is mainly determined by interference threshold \(Q\) at high SNR, and the instantaneous SNR gap will become small with the increasing of the SNR.

Fig. 4 plots the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks with different \(N_{\rho}\) with perfect and outdated CSI, respectively. As shown in the figure, when \(N_{\rho}\) increases from 1 to 3, the outage probability decreases for both cases. As can be observed, when \(N_{\rho} = 1, 2, 3\), the achievable secrecy diversity gains are always 2 in the outdated CSI case, which confirms the analytical findings of Corollary 1 that when the feedback exists, \(N_{\rho}\) will not affect the secrecy diversity gain of the system, as indicated in Eq. (24). Moreover, we see that the left two sets of curves associated with perfect CSI achieve the same secrecy diversity gain of 4, which confirms the analytical findings of Corollary 2 that when the CSI is perfect, the full diversity order of \(N_{\rho} \min(N_{\rho}, N)\) can be achieved, as indicated in Eq. (28).

Fig. 5 shows the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks under different \(N_{\rho}\) with perfect and outdated CSI, respectively. As can be observed, when \(N_{\rho} = 1, 2, 3\), the achievable secrecy diversity gains are 1, 2, and 2 in the outdated CSI case, which become 2, 4, and 6 in the perfect CSI case. In other words, when the CSI is outdated, the secrecy diversity gain improves with the increase of \(N_{\rho}\), while keeps constant when \(N_{\rho} < N_{\rho}\), as indicated in
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Fig. 4. Exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities for TAS/MRC scheme: $\rho_3 = 1, \rho_4 = 1, N_R = 2, N_B = 2, N_E = 2$, and $\gamma_E = 10$ dB.

Fig. 5. Exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities for TAS/MRC scheme: $\rho_3 = 1, \rho_4 = 1, N_A = 2, N_B = 2, N_E = 2$, and $\gamma_E = 10$ dB.

Eq. (24). However, when it comes to the perfect CSI case, the secrecy diversity gain increases linearly with $N_R$, as indicated in Eq. (28).

Fig. 6 provides the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks under different $N_E$ with perfect and outdated CSI, respectively. As can be observed, when $N_E = 1, 3$, and 5, the achievable secrecy diversity gains are always 2 for outdated CSI case and 4 for perfect CSI case. The results demonstrate that the eavesdropper does not affect the secrecy diversity gain, and it will deteriorate the secrecy outage performance by degrading the secrecy coding gain, as indicated in Eq. (32) and Eq. (33).

Fig. 7 compares the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks for different relaying strategy and different interference outage constraints, respectively. As observed from the figure, the secrecy performance of RaF relaying strategy is better than that of DF relaying strategy. This is intuitive since the eavesdropper can not combine the eavesdropping information with RaF relaying strategy. In addition, for RaF relaying strategy, the secrecy outage probability of the system with $\delta_0 = 10\%$ is strictly smaller than that with $\delta_0 = 1\%$, which explains the fact

Fig. 8. Performance comparison between RAS/MRC and TAS/MRC when $\rho_3 = \rho_4 = 1$ and $\gamma_E = 10$ dB.
that allowing a less stringent interference outage constraint could significantly improve the secrecy outage performance of the secondary transmission. Moreover, we observe that the performance gain depends on $\rho_1(\rho_2)$, the larger $\rho_1(\rho_2)$, the higher the gain. Finally, we can see that, at the low correlation regime, i.e., $\rho_3(\rho_1) < 0.4$, the performance gap between different interference outage constraints is large, in contrast, at the high correlation, i.e., $\rho_3(\rho_1) > 0.8$, the performance gap is very small. This is intuitive since the interference outage constraint will not affect the secondary transmission when the CSI of the interference link from secondary transmitter to PR is perfect.

Fig. 8 provides the performance comparison between TAS/MRC scheme and RAS/MRC scheme. As shown in the figure, TAS/MRC scheme always achieves better secrecy outage performance than RAS/MRC scheme for both $N_A = N_R = N_B = N_E = 2$ and $N_A = N_R = N_B = N_E = 3$. When the CSI is perfect, i.e., $\rho_1 = \rho_2 = 1$, TAS/MRC scheme attains more secrecy diversity gain and secrecy codding gain than RAS/MRC scheme. When the CSI is perfect, it may still worthwhile to choose TAS/MRC scheme for both TAS/MRC scheme and RAS/MRC scheme. As shown in the high correlation, i.e., $\rho_3(\rho_1) = 2$, although TAS/MRC scheme can not attain more secrecy diversity gain, it may still worthwhile to choose TAS/MRC scheme over RAS/MRC scheme for it can provide more secrecy coding gain. Specially, when the feedback delay is infinity, i.e., $\rho_1 = \rho_2 = 0$, TAS/MRC scheme reduces to RAS/MRC scheme.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we introduced TAS/MRC scheme in dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks with outdated CSI. In our analysis, the secondary transmitter adopted TAS scheme to choose the antenna that maximizes the received SNR to transmit information, while the secondary receiver and eavesdropper adopted MRC scheme to combine the received signals. We derived new closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability of dual-hop RaF cognitive MIMO wiretap networks. Further, tractable asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities at high SNR regime were analyzed under two distinct scenarios. From the analysis, we observed that the outdated CSI reduced the secrecy diversity gain of TAS/MRC scheme from $N_R \min (N_A, N_B)$ to $\min (N_R, N_B)$. Finally, our results demonstrate that although TAS/MRC scheme could not attain more secrecy diversity gain for the considered system with outdated CSI compared with RAS/MRC scheme, it could provide more secrecy coding gain.

APPENDIX A

PROOF OF THEOREM 1

For the derivation of the CDF of $\gamma_1$, we first define $\tilde{X} = ||\tilde{h}_{AR}||^2$, $Y = ||h_{AE}||^2$, $Z = ||h_{11s}||^2$ in $\gamma_1$, and then we have

$$F_{\gamma_1}(R_s) = \Pr \left\{ 1 + \frac{P_1}{1 + \frac{Q}{Z}} \leq 2R_s, P_t \leq \frac{Q}{Z} \right\} + \Pr \left\{ 1 + \frac{1 + \frac{Q}{Z}}{1 + \frac{Q}{Z}} \leq 2R_s, P_t \leq \frac{Q}{Z} \right\}.$$

Firstly, we focus on deriving the first summand $\Xi_1$ in (40) and we have

$$\Xi_1 = \frac{\gamma_1}{Q} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{F_X((2R_s-1)r^2 + 2R_s \gamma)}{F_Y(y)} dy. \tag{41}$$

Substituting the probability density function (PDF) of $Y$ and the CDFs of $X$ and $Z$ into (41) and performing some mathematical manipulations, the closed-form expression for $\Xi_1$ can be derived with the help of [27] as

$$\Xi_1 = \left\{ 1 - e^{-\frac{\gamma_1}{2R_s}} \right\} \left\{ 1 - N_A \sum_{n=0}^{N_A-1} \left( \frac{N_A - 1}{n} \right) \frac{(-1)^n \Phi_1}{\Gamma(N_R)} \times \sum_{k=0}^{\varphi_1} \sum_{m=0}^{N_R+k-1} \frac{\Gamma(N_R + \varphi_1) P_1^k (1 - P_1)^{\varphi_1-k}}{\Gamma(m+1)(1+n)^{N_R+k-m} \gamma^{m+\varphi_1}} \times e^{-\frac{\gamma_1}{2R_s}} \frac{1}{(\gamma_B)^m}(\frac{\alpha_1}{\gamma_E})^{N_E-1} \sum_{i=0}^{m} \frac{m!}{i}(2R_s-1)^{-m-i} (2R_s)^i \times (i + N_E-1)! \left[ \frac{\gamma_E^\gamma_1 \gamma_1}{\gamma_B \gamma_1 (1+n) 2R_s \gamma_E} \right]^{N_E-1} \right\}.$$

Then, we focus on deriving the second summand $\Xi_2$ in (40). Observing that RV $Z$ depends on RVs $X$ and $Z$, thus, $\Xi_2$ can be derived by solving the following double integral as

$$\Xi_2 = \int_0^{\gamma_1} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{F_X((2R_s-1)r^2 + 2R_s \gamma)}{\kappa Q} \Phi_1(N_R) \Phi_2(N_E) dy.$$
\[
(\kappa_1 \mu \gamma_B \xi \lambda_{AP})^{m+1} \Gamma \left( \frac{n - i + 1}{2} \right) \frac{1}{\zeta_1 \gamma_B \lambda_{AP}} \\xi \gamma_B \lambda_{AP} \left( \zeta_1 \gamma_B \lambda_{AP} \right)^{m+1}.
\]

(45)

Finally, substituting (42) and (45) into (40), the CDF of \( \tilde{\gamma}_1 \) with the outdated CSIs for the secondary transmission links in (19) is derived.

**APPENDIX B**

**PROOF OF COROLLARY 1**

When the CSIs for the secondary transmission links are outdated, the CDF of \( \tilde{X} \) simplifies to

\[
F_{\tilde{X}} (x) \approx \sum_{n=0}^{N A} \left( \frac{N A - 1}{n} \right) \times \frac{\xi \gamma_B (1 - \rho_1)^{\zeta_1}}{\Gamma (N R + 1) \zeta_1} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N R}.
\]

(46)

Based to the derivation of (42), substituting (46) and the CDF of \( \tilde{X} \) and the PDF of \( Y \) into (41), the asymptotic expression of \( \Xi_1 \) can be derived as

\[
\Xi_1 \approx \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}}} \right) \sum_{n=0}^{N A - 1} \left( \frac{N A - 1}{n} \right) \times \frac{(1 - \rho_1)^{\zeta_1}}{\Gamma (N R + 1) \zeta_1} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N R}.
\]

(47)

Similarly, we derive the asymptotic expression of \( \Xi_2 \) as

\[
\Xi_2 \approx \sum_{n=0}^{N A - 1} \left( \frac{N A - 1}{n} \right) \times \frac{(1 - \rho_1)^{\zeta_1}}{\Gamma (N R + 1) \zeta_1} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N R}.
\]

(48)

To this end, pulling (47) and (48) together, the asymptotic CDF of \( \tilde{\gamma}_1 \) with the outdated CSIs for the secondary transmission links is given by

\[
F_{\tilde{\gamma}_1} (R_s) \approx \frac{1}{(N R)!} \sum_{n=0}^{N A - 1} \left( \frac{N A - 1}{n} \right) \times \frac{(1 - \rho_1)^{\zeta_1}}{\Gamma (N R + 1) \zeta_1} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N R}.
\]

(49)

By interchanging the parameters in Eq. (49), the asymptotic CDF of \( \tilde{\gamma}_2 \) with the outdated CSIs for the secondary transmission links can be easily derived as

\[
F_{\tilde{\gamma}_2} (R_s) \approx \frac{1}{(N R)!} \sum_{n=0}^{N A - 1} \left( \frac{N A - 1}{n} \right) \times \frac{(1 - \rho_1)^{\zeta_1}}{\Gamma (N R + 1) \zeta_1} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N R}.
\]

(50)

Finally, substituting (49) and (50) into (13), the asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the considered system with the outdated CSIs for the secondary transmission links is derived.

**APPENDIX C**

**PROOF OF COROLLARY 2**

When the CSIs for the secondary transmission links are perfect, the CDF of \( X \) simplifies to

\[
F_X (x) \approx \frac{1}{(N R)!} \sum_{n=0}^{N A N R} \left( \frac{N A N R}{n} \right) \times \frac{1}{\lambda_{AR}} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N A N R}.
\]

(51)

With the help of Appendix B, we respective derive the asymptotic expressions of \( \Xi_1 \) and \( \Xi_2 \) as

\[
\Xi_1 \approx \frac{1}{(N R)!} \sum_{n=0}^{N A N R} \left( \frac{N A N R}{n} \right) \times \frac{1}{\lambda_{AR}} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N A N R}.
\]

(52)

and

\[
\Xi_2 \approx \sum_{n=0}^{N A N R} \left( \frac{N A N R}{n} \right) \times \frac{1}{\lambda_{AR}} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N A N R}.
\]

(53)

Then, pulling (52) and (53) together, the asymptotic CDF of \( \gamma_1 \) with the perfect CSIs for the secondary transmission links is given by

\[
F_{\gamma_1} (R_s) \approx \frac{1}{(N R)!} \sum_{n=0}^{N A N R} \left( \frac{N A N R}{n} \right) \times \frac{1}{\lambda_{AR}} \left( \frac{x}{\lambda_{AR}} \right)^{N A N R}.
\]

(54)

By interchanging the parameters in Eq. (54), the asymptotic CDF of \( \gamma_2 \) with the perfect CSIs for the secondary transmission links simplifies to
sion links can be easily derived as
\[
F_{\gamma_2}(R_s) \approx \frac{1}{(N_B)^{N_k}} \sum_{i=0}^{N_k N_B} \left( N_B N_R \right)(2R_s - 1)^{N_k N_B - i} \\
\times (2R_s)^{i} \left( 1 + N_E - 1 \right)(1 - \gamma_{\theta B})^{i} \frac{1}{(N_B N_R)^{(N_E - 1)!}} \\
\times \left[ 1 - e^{-\frac{\gamma_{\theta B}}{\sum_{\theta B}} + \left( \frac{\lambda_{RP}}{\kappa_2 \mu} \right)^{N_k N_B} \Gamma \left( N_k N_B + 1, \frac{\kappa_2 \mu}{\lambda_{RP}} \right) \right].
\]  
(55)

To this end, substituting (54) and (55) into (21), the asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the considered system with the perfect CSIs for the secondary transmission links can be derived.

**APPENDIX D**

**PROOF OF COROLLARY 3**

Similar to (40), the CDF of $\gamma_3$ with the outdated CSIs for the secondary transmission links can be expressed as
\[
F_{\gamma_3}(R_s) = \Pr \left\{ \frac{1 + P_1 Y}{1 + P_1 Y} \leq 2R_s, P_t \leq \frac{Q}{Z} \right\} \Xi_4 \\
+ \Pr \left\{ \frac{1 + \kappa_1 Q}{1 + \kappa_2 Q} \leq 2R_s, \frac{Q}{Z} \leq P_t \right\} \Xi_5.
\]  
(56)

When $\gamma_B \to \infty$ and $\gamma_{\theta E} \to \infty$, $\Xi_4$ and $\Xi_5$ can be derived, after performing some simple algebraic manipulations, as
\[
\Xi_4 = \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{\kappa_1 Q}{X}} \right) \left\{ 1 - N_A \sum_{n=0}^{N_k N_B - 1} \left( \frac{N_A - 1}{n} \right)(-1)^n \Phi_1 \Gamma(N_R) \\
\times \frac{\varphi_1}{k} \sum_{m=0}^{N_k N_B - 1} \frac{\Phi_1}{k} \left( \frac{1 + \kappa_1 Q}{1 + \kappa_1 Q} \right) \gamma_{\theta B} \gamma_{\theta E} (N_E - 1) \left[ \frac{\gamma_{\theta E}}{\gamma_{\theta B}} + (1 + 2R_s) \right]^{m + N_k N_B} \right\}. 
\]  
(57)

and
\[
\Xi_5 = e^{-\frac{\kappa_1 Q}{X}} - N_A \sum_{n=0}^{N_k N_B - 1} \left( \frac{N_A - 1}{n} \right)(-1)^n \Phi_1 \Gamma(N_R) \\
\times \frac{\varphi_1}{k} \sum_{m=0}^{N_k N_B - 1} \frac{\Phi_1}{k} \left( \frac{1 + \kappa_1 Q}{1 + \kappa_1 Q} \right) \gamma_{\theta B} \gamma_{\theta E} (N_E - 1) \left[ \frac{\gamma_{\theta E}}{\gamma_{\theta B}} + (1 + 2R_s) \right]^{m + N_k N_B} \right\}. 
\]  
(58)

To this end, substituting (57) and (58) into (56), we obtain the asymptotic CDF of $\gamma_3$. By interchanging the parameters in Eq. (56), the asymptotic CDF of $\gamma_2$ of the considered system can be easily derived. Finally, pulling the asymptotic CDFs of $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$ together, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the considered system can be derived.


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