Introduction: Realizing la fuerça de imaginan


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Introduction
Realizing la fuerça de imaginar

One of the greatest stories never told, in any compelling way, is the history of the imagination, and its relationship to reality. Wallace Stevens’ ‘necessary angel’, briefly glimpsed, hovering on the threshold of the ‘real’ world it shapes, is just one envisioning of a concept that has spawned unexpected, and even ‘untimely’, artistic permutations.\(^1\) There is no smooth narrative through Foucauldian-inspired epochal shifts; certainly none that allow us to remain attentive to imagination’s polysemantic possibilities.\(^2\) For it is the very nature of the imagination to elude demarcation of boundaries (its own and those we would draw around it), and to slip the too rigid moorings of historico-ontological designations and epistemological domains. As the imagination has demonstrated in its myriad cultural productions throughout the ages, it ‘maketh matter’ in ways that can defy the linear machinations that have privileged ‘Modernity’,\(^3\) and deconstruct (if not dissipate) the dominant narratives suggested by weighted use of a

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\(^1\) The interplay between the imagination and reality (construed in terms of the connections between consciousness and the world) was an obsessive concern of the American poet Wallace Stevens. The verse, ‘I am the necessary angel of the earth. / Since, in my sight, you see the world again’, was included by Stevens as an epigraph on the flyleaf of his volume, *The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination* by Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). The lines are taken from the poem ‘Angel Surrounded by Paysans’, from the anthology *The Auroras of Autumn* (1950) in which the imagination conjures up a personification of reality as an angel whose introduction to one of the countrymen opens: ‘I am the angel of reality, / Seen for the moment standing in the door’ (see Wallace Stevens, *Collected Poetry and Prose* [New York: Library of America, 1966], 638).

\(^2\) The philosopher Richard Kearney’s study *The Wake of Imagination: Towards a Postmodern Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1988) is a case in point. Kearney’s study investigates the imagination as moving through three paradigms in the history of the Western intellectual tradition. Notwithstanding his own caveats around the ‘flexible hermeneutic’ applied (heuristic guideline rather than historicist dogma’), and his insistence on history as ‘an open-ended drama of narratives’ (*The Wake of Imagination*, 19–20), it is his paradigmatic organization that has prevailed and been adapted by subsequent readers.

\(^3\) The quotation is taken from Sir Philip Sidney’s *The Defence of Poesy* and concludes a section in which he extolls the best poet as the one who follows ‘the course of his own invention’. Imagination makes the poet: ‘where all other arts retain themselves within their own subject and receive, as it were, their being from it, the poet only bringeth his own stuff, and doth not learn a conceit out of matter, but maketh matter for a conceit’ (*The Defence of Poesy*, in Sir Philip Sidney, *The Major Works*, ed., with an intro. & notes, by Katherine Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2002), 213–50 (pp. 218 and 232).
hierarchically-inflected prefix. As Matthew Maguire has reminded us, assumptions that have governed the imagination’s relationship to meaning, to value and to order, are themselves just ‘the product of a history’. To a large extent we too are ‘products’ of the great historical ‘movements’ that inform and fire our own imaginations: notably humanism, romanticism, modernism and, more recently, postmodernism. Enculturated in the latter, we now enjoy sufficient critical distance to assimilate any ‘losses’ sustained. We are, therefore, well positioned to appreciate that the radical permissiveness that characterized postmodernism’s engagement with power structures, and with their contingent discourses, constituted not so much a break with the past, but a re-evaluation of its own germinating seeds; and also to recognize our own ironic complicity in the prioritizing of privileged viewpoints (for we are constructed in, out of, or ‘other’ to, these very privileges). Through this contemporary lens, the possible worlds created by the poetic or ‘fictive imagination’, to use Timothy Reiss’ term, appear even more vitally metaphorical, and more difficult to reconcile with imagination’s ‘official’ genealogy: a system within which the mimetic pre-modern cedes to the productive early modern, which becomes in its turn the exalted modern, before collapsing into postmodern’s paradigmatic parody.

The essays in this volume offer a corrective to attempts to chart a history of the imagination as a progressive flow through a chronological series of philosophical tracts and treatises (generally evidenced in carefully chosen, illustrative textual case studies). Rather, the contributions included here

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4 Kearney refers to the risks of viewing the imagination as an ‘ineluctably developing essence rising to its golden maturity in the modern era and declining rapidly ever since’ (The Wake of Imagination, 19), though there is some tension between this and his interrogation of the imminent demise of the imagination from which comes the title of his book.


6 The end of the postmodern era is suggested by the emergence of retrospective exhibitions such as Postmodernism: Style and Subversion 1970–1990 on display at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London from 24 September 2011 to 15 January, 2012.

7 For Fredric Jameson four losses are symptomatic of postmodernism: suppression of subjective inwardness; referential depth, historical time and coherent human expression (see Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism [Durham, NC: Duke U. P., 1991].


seek to celebrate how the fictive imagination(s), as realized in diverse written and visual texts of Early Modern Iberia (a context often neglected in broad historical surveys) emerge from the matter of their specific moments of origin in epoch-marking, as well as epoch-(un)/making ways. So our approach is not ahistorical, nor do we treat imagination as a floating signifier, or engage with its plural manifestations as testimony to Derrida’s legacy of Babel. On the contrary, as we hope the reader will see, our shared conceptualization identifies in imagination’s inherent mobility a sensitivity to the following three key notions: primarily, the mutually constitutive interplay between the poetic imaginary (written, visual, performative) and contingent socio-cultural/political matters; secondly, the potential inversion of inherited binaries in/through this process—for instance, reality, understood as the ‘felt, “real world” ’, tested against Early Modern Iberia’s imaginative reconfigurations, or the imaginative when it makes sense only in relation to its non-subordination to realities (whose undoing from within is often a vital part of their coming into being); and finally, the creative role of the receiver, whose embodied integration as ‘other’ allows the articulations of selfhood (individual or collective), constructed by the imagination, to materialize fully as experiences in time. Ultimately, in showcasing the poetic imagination in Early Modern Iberia, in alignment with this understanding, we aim to restore to the imagination, in equal measure, both its reason and its ‘rhyme’.

Imagination in the Western tradition (phantasia in its Platonic genesis) has long had a complex relationship with the rational, and a problematic association with fiction as a space where potentially destructive desires can be mobilized. Readers of Plato have much to answer for in this regard. For the tendency has been to derive from an overtly polyvocal philosopher a binary view of the imagination that locates it, not just on the opposing bank of our stream of consciousness, but in decidedly more perilous cognitive terrain. So, for instance, Dan Flory determines that, when it comes to a mental capacity that trades only in sensible knowledge and unstable
perceptions, Plato believes us to be better off without it. It is true that if we pay attention only to what Plato says, rather than to how he says it, there is no other conclusion to be reached. For notwithstanding a brief acknowledgement that imagination has a communicative power that is effective in opening up channels with the gods (Timaeus, 71–72), or a more positive attitude to erotic desire (the child of lack and invention) as a spur for creativity (a view that emerges in a drinking party definition of love) (Symposium, 205e), Plato postulates an ideal world of forms, a ‘true reality’, that can only be accessed properly by reason, and through the suppression of anything that holds us in the inferior, false realm of appearances. The great paradox in Plato, however, is that in order to persuade us of the truth as he would have it, he turns to the literary device of allegory—a practice which, according to his own theory, should push us further from his desired objective. In one of his most powerful poetic visions, the allegory of the cave, Plato depends entirely on the creative agency of the imaginative perceiver. Socrates asks us to ‘imagine’ a group of prisoners, chained up in a cave and forced endlessly to watch a shadow theatre, performed by puppeteers, and to further ‘imagine’ what would happen if an escaped prisoner were to access the world outside, and return with a knowledge of the sun that those incarcerated are unable and unwilling to grasp. Our participation in the Socratic allegory requires us to remake our own perception of reality, to create an alternative to our experience of it, to ‘imagine’ along the fault lines of reason (Republic, 514a–522b). The allegorical identifications do emerge (the puppeteer-poet; the escaped prisoner-philosopher), but not entirely unscathed. The sort of theodicy invoked here has a problematic reciprocal transfer at its core, reason and/or imagination vindicated in response to the evidence of the problem of the other. It is a short, albeit perhaps too radical, step from here to the notion of reason and the imagination in Platonic practice (if not theory) as cognitive correlates, but the creative interdependence demanded of Plato’s reader

15 According to the philosophy of mimesis most explicitly outlined in the Republic, the world around us is an inferior copy, a shadow world, of the ideal world of forms; literature, which imitates the appearance of our world, is therefore a bad copy of a bad copy, and so is twice removed from truth (see Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. by C. D. C. Reeve, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992).
16 The myth of Err, the culminating allegory of the soul, is arguable Plato’s most powerfully poetic passage (Plato, Republic, trans. Grube, 614b ff).
17 Interestingly recent advances in cognitive science suggest that rational thought is more imaginative than we have believed. This is the basis of Ruth M. J. Byrne’s ground-
certainly implies a much more inclusive, composite, appreciation than the Aristotelian model that would follow, for all that the latter would give rise to a more polemical reception.\textsuperscript{18}

The imagination figures centrally in a number of Aristotelian texts (e.g. accounts of dreaming and memory both make significant use of the notion),\textsuperscript{19} but only in the \textit{De anima} (III.3) do we find a systematic account. According to Michael Wedin this passage, which culminates in a ‘central thesis’, constitutes Aristotle’s official theory of the imagination and should be considered the ‘canonical text’.\textsuperscript{20}

But since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement must be necessarily incapable of existing apart from sensation (such that in virtue of its possession that in which it is found may present various phenomena both active and passive), and such that it may be either true or false […] then imagination must be a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of sense. As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name

\textsuperscript{18} This is not to suggest that Plato’s ‘afterlives’ are not varied in content and objectives, for one need only compare Wordsworth and Nietzsche. The former finds in Plato a power of poetic imagination that could be made ethical, the latter identifies in Plato a dawning of decadence that would last two millennia. As illustrative, see William Wordsworth, ‘Preface to \textit{Lyrical Ballads’}, in \textit{Romanticism: An Anthology}, ed., with an intro., by Duncan Wu, 4th ed. (Chichester/Malden: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 506–17 (esp. p. 507), and Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future}, trans., with an intro. & commentary, by R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 14. But the general thrust of Plato’s thinking on the imagination, as expressed at the primary level of the narration, is rarely disputed, whereas scholars have long debated the import of the Aristotelian definition.


\textsuperscript{20} See Michael V. Wedin, \textit{Mind and Imagination in Aristotle} (New Haven/London: Yale U. P., 1988), esp. Chapter 2, ‘The Canonical Theory of Imagination’, 23–63. Wedin proposes a cognitivist /functionalist interpretation which is remarkable for two key notions: (1) that most commentators are mistaken in following Aquinas in taking the broader ‘canonical text’ to contain Aristotle’s central thesis (i.e. imagination is identified with a movement resulting from sense perception), which is not actually asserted until a little further on; (2) that although the imagination has cognitive capability, it is functionally incomplete, and therefore not in itself a ‘discriminative faculty’ (48), but rather subserves other faculties and occurs in the course of another faculty’s operation (45–51).
Phantasia (imagination) has been formed from Phaos (light), because it is not possible to see without light. And because imaginations remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations, animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the non-existence in them of mind, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in them of mind by feeling or disease or sleep.

About imagination, what it is and why it exists, let so much suffice. Aristotle has often been charged with inconsistency in his treatment of the imagination, due in large part to the ‘serpentine’ nature of the argument as articulated above; a passage that appears to be presented by the author as his definitive word on the subject. But we are not concerned here with reconstructing an Aristotelian theory of the imagination based on a single (short) text in Aristotle’s corpus (a dubious enterprise that Amélie Oksenberg Rorty has dismissed as the ‘read and raid’ approach); rather we wish to reflect briefly upon the process of mediation through time and space that has, like the fluid workings of imagination itself, transformed traces of both Aristotle and Plato into distinct, critical interventions; moments in the

21 Scholars continue to dispute whether the common translation of ‘phantasia’ as ‘imagination’ actually makes sense in the light of Aristotle’s arguments. For a brief consideration of this issue, see Victor Caston, ‘Why Aristotle Needs Imagination’, Phronesis, 41:1 (1996), 20–55 (pp. 20–22). José María Pozuelo Yvancos notes that in Classical Latin literature ‘imaginatio’ is the accepted translation of the Greek ‘phantasia’, so is not surprising that Early Modern Spanish texts use ‘fantasía’ and ‘imaginación’ interchangeably, as there is an almost total coincidence of meaning (see José María Pozuelo Yvancos, La invención literaria: Garcilaso, Góngora, Cervantes, Quevedo y Gracián [Salamanca: Univ. de Salamanca, 2014], 41).


25 Among prominent new historicists Louis Montrose was instrumental in urging the reader to see the text within a continuous process of mediation. His most quoted phrase recognizes ‘the historicity of texts and the textuality of history’ (see Louis Adrian Montrose, ‘Renaissance Literary Studies and the Subject of History’, English Literary Renaissance, 16:1 [1986], 5–12 [p. 8]). Of course, as Virginia Mason Vaughan has pointed out, what was ‘strikingly “new” practice in the 1980s’ had already become ‘common practice’ by the beginning of the twenty-first century (see Virginia Mason Vaughan, ‘Stephen Greenblatt and the New
migration of the imagination that accommodate past conceptualizations alongside fresh resonance, while also playing host to future acts of response.

Whatever starting point the reader chooses, whatever reading route one follows, the points on the imaginative circuit tend to loop back round to the twin pillars of the Classical tradition (though of course not exclusively), and often within six degrees of separation. For instance, the Aristotelian notion of the imagination as movement haunts Walter Pater’s late Victorian engagement with Hellenism, notably on both sides of a dialectic that sets Romanticism against Classicism: the centrifugal tendency of the former ‘flying from the centre, throwing itself forth in endless play of undirected imagination’, [...] in changeful form everywhere, set against the centripetal impulse of the latter, pulling inwards towards a conservative centre.26 The fluidity of this centrifugal imagination has a transformative quality, a power of transfiguration that Pater associated with genius,27 and from which his predecessor Samuel Coleridge had deduced the poetic ideal of defamiliarization. Although more familiar to us, perhaps, as a cornerstone of Russian formalism (from Viktor Shklovsky’s declaration that the ‘technique of art is to make objects unfamiliar’),28 it is in Coleridge’s earlier version that the imagination’s capacity for shedding the skin of the familiar depends more obviously on its association with the heightened sensations of ‘beings that are percipient’.29 Coleridge’s theory of defamiliarization echoes radically in Shelley’s ‘A Defence of Poetry’, a treatise that advocates a sometimes contradictory counter-play of imagination and thought.30 Most notably, however, Shelley celebrates imagination’s power of association and, more specifically, our capacity, as perceivers, to recognize ‘the unapprehended relation of things’ and to renew our experience in, and of, a world that has been ‘blunted by reiteration’.31 Thus the imaginative acts of renewal intuited by Shelley extend beyond the aesthetic (and beyond Coleridge’s focus on individual selfhood) to embrace the possibility of social reform. Both Coleridge and Shelley seem wary, however, of the freedom that


29 See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia literaria; or, Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions, ed., with an intro., by George G. Watson (London: Dent, 1975). For reference to defamiliarization as a form of intensified, original, perception, see p. 49.


lies within imagination’s grasp, the power to conjure up images that are not an accurate reflection of the ‘Truth’ (or, in Aristotle’s words, ‘that may be false’). Both invoke, therefore, an idealistic Neoplatonism wherein poetry is rescued from the realm of illusions as a vehicle for the infinite.32

The imagination that emerges from the interconnectedness of Pater, Coleridge, Shklovsky and Shelley is a subject in constant reinvention, an entity that can be immersed in precise socio-cultural relations of knowledge and power, while also constituting a broader conversation that runs deep into Plato and Aristotle, and so transcends historical particulars. It is important to bear this in mind when broaching the question of the ‘imagination’ as realized in Early Modern Iberia; and to approach monolithic conceptualizations about the Renaissance with some caution. For just as the inventive vernacular fictions of Boccaccio and Petrarch are liable to evoke the affective responses that Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola would ban from the watchtower of reason,33 so the creative imagination at work in the sensually evocative love poetry of Garcilaso de la Vega seems a worldview removed from the moralistic musings of Juan Luis Vives.34 Where the latter’s interest in the operations of the soul betrays a fundamental distrust of the erotic powers of human phantasy, Garcilaso puts the corporeal at the centre of a complex meshing of memory, imagination, mind and matter.35 Even in the pitched battle of Canción IV, the conflicting spheres of reason and the imagination seem to be invaded by the opposing force, so that ultimately the poem’s ‘making believe’ depends on a certain synthesis or ‘trade-off’, rather than a truce.36 Indeed, throughout Garcilaso’s poetic universe, thought

32 See, for instance, Coleridge, Biographia literaria, ed. Watson, I. 263, where he states that his ‘system’ is that of ‘Pythagoras and of Plato revived and purified from impure mixtures’; and Shelley, ‘A Defence of Poetry’, 677: ‘A poet participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one’.

33 See Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, Liber De Imaginazione/On the Imagination, Latin text with an intro., an English trans. & notes by Harry Caplan (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1930); the soul transcends the flesh, high above the whirl of phantasms, in the ‘lofty watch-tower of the intellect’ (85).

34 See Juan Luis Vives, De anima et vita, in Opera omnia, ed. Gregorio Mayans y Siscar, 8 vols (Valencia: Montford, 1782–90; repr. London: Gregg Press, 1964), III, 300–514. Written in 1538, the De anima et vita is one of Vives’ works that was not translated into vernacular languages.

35 See Mary E. Barnard’s chapter, ‘Eros at Material Sites’, which includes insightful analysis of a key metaphor in Garcilaso’s Sonnet V (the woman as a garment covering the subject’s soul) as an eroticized reimagining of a passage from Hugh of St Victor: Mary E. Barnard, Garcilaso de la Vega and the Material Culture of Renaissance Europe (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2014), 125–51 (pp. 150–51).

36 The fluctuating fortunes of imagination/appetite and reason, and the impact on the poetic subject are captured in the stanza that opens: ‘No reina siempre aquesta fantasía, / que en imaginación tan variable / no se reposa un hora el pensamiento: viene con un rigor tan intratable / a tiempos el dolor que al alma mía / desampara, huyendo, el sufrimiento. / Lo que dura la furia del tormento, / no hay parte en mí que no se me trastorne / y que en torno de mí no esté llorando, / de nuevo protestando / que de la via espantosa atrás me torne’ (Garcilaso
emerges emotionalized, while emotion (materialized in words) is made to catch at fact (including the definitive cadences of death) across a welter of immaterialities. The poet’s most famous editor, Fernando de Herrera, commenting on Sonnet III, intuits this fluid cross-fertilization, but attempts to corral the strands into identifiable sources, and although not entirely successful, nor accurate, the effort is testimony to the idiosyncratic priorities of the individual reader (in this case the editor/poet’s rhetorical leanings), as well as to the transcultural currents that flowed into the collective imaginary:

Es la fantasía potencia natural de l’anima sensitiva, i es aquel movimiento o acción de las imágenes aparentes i de las especies impressas. Tomó nombre griego de la lumbre, como dize Aristóteles, porque el viso, que es el más aventajado i nobilísimo sentido, no se puede ejercer sin lumbre [...] Tulio la interpretó viso; Quintiliano visio, i los modernos imaginación. Pinciano Lido, en el libro sobre Teofrasto Del sentido i fantasía, dize en el Libro I, que son tres las facultades interiores de l’anima, que Galeno llama regidoras, dexando el entendimiento, que el médico lo considera poco: la memoria, la razón i la fuerça de imaginar, que es la fantasía, común a todos los animados, pero mucho mayor i más distinta en el ombre [...] i por esta se representan de tal suerte en el ánimo las imágenes de las cosas ausentes que nos parece que las vemos con los ojos i las tenemos presentes, i podemos fingir i formar en el ánimo verdaderas i falsas imágenes a nuestra voluntad i arbitrio, i estas imágenes vienen a la fantasía de los sentidos exteriores.37

Herrera’s entry also testifies to the significance of a third Classical theory of the imagination that is often overlooked, despite the fact that it offers an epistemology that appears to be much closer to the ‘modern’ philosophical notion of imagination as a primary source of artistic creativity and knowledge: the Stoic treatment of phantasai that was transmitted through the writings of Greek and Latin rhetoricians, such as Longinus, Philostratus, Cicero and Quintilian.38 Developing upon Gerard Watson’s research, Flory makes a compelling case for the transmission of the resolutely materialistic theory expounded by the Stoics wherein all human beings possess a psychic domain whose contents may be approved by reason but are provided by the imagination.39 Within this internal realm (or ‘parallel universe’) we perform

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37 Fernando de Herrera, Obras de Garcilaso de la Vega con anotaciones (Sevilla: Alonso de la Barrera, 1580), 299–300.
38 See Flory, ‘Stoic Psychology’. Relevant passages from the rhetoricians are included throughout the article.
a range of mental operations, including incorporeal world-building (the construction of new mental entities), the visualisation of objects not previously seen, and the capacity to convey these end products of *phantasai* in speech. The writings of Quintilian demonstrate how philosophical rhetoric played a key role in transferring these theories of its sister discipline:

There are certain experiences which the Greeks call *phantasai*, and the Romans *visiones*, whereby things absent are presented to our imaginations with such extreme vividness *that they seem actually to be before our very eyes* [...] Some writers describe the possessor of this power of vivid imagination whereby things, words, and actions are presented in the most realistic manner by the Greek word *euphantasiotos* ['people blessed with imagination'], and *it is a power which all may readily acquire if they will.*

Flory is most insistent on a strong affinity between the creative and cognitive functions of the stoical/rhetorical theories of imagination, and post-Enlightenment conceptions in modern theories of knowledge. However, Herrera’s intervention as theorist (echoing Quintilian) on the one hand, and Garcilaso’s poetic practice on the other, would suggest that the Christian hold on epistemology which seriously restricted the mental capacity of the imagination may have been tested and loosened, if not entirely broken, in many individual, pre-Enlightenment, instantiations. Despite the legacy of Augustine, for whom the imagination, although treated on occasions with qualified appreciation, was always a conduit (with an error-prone dimension conducive to sinfulness), and less an independently creative power; the humanist celebration of literature as man’s creation, often followed rhetorical signposts and directed the imagination into the service of the creative arts.

Amidst these rhetorical explorations of the mechanisms of the imagination, its materializing dimension is often either implicit or openly acknowledged. Mary Barnard’s recent explanation of the concept of *Enargeia* presents it as a rhetoric of presence, using word-pictures to evoke mental images, its affective power residing in its ability to make the audience or reader ‘see’ what is being described. Barnard notes that in *De copia* Erasmus

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40 *Institutio Oratoria* 6.2.29, as cited by Flory, ‘Stoic Psychology’, 156; emphasis added.
41 Flory, ‘Stoic Psychology’, 158–61. Flory does acknowledge that Renaissance thinkers found in Classical rhetoric a ‘welcome resource’ (that Dante was an ‘early precursor’), and that later post-Enlightenment thinkers also found inspiration in Neoplatonic writings. But his central thesis (timeline), at least in this paper, remains unshaken by the admission (‘Stoic Psychology’, 162).
42 The bibliography on Augustine’s understanding of the imagination is immense, and bound up with his view of memory. For a very useful synthesis, see Marianne’s Djuth’s article ‘Veiled and Unveiled Beauty: The Role of the Imagination in Augustine’s Esthetics’, *Theological Studies*, 68 (2007), 77–91. Djuth notes that Augustine ‘places imagination at the crossroads of salvation’ (77).
suggested that instead of setting out the subject in bare simplicity, the colours are filled in and set up like a picture to look at, so that we seem to have painted the scene rather than described it, and the reader seems to have seen rather than read. Terence Cave finds a fusion of *res* and *verba* in this Erasmian understanding of linguistic plentitude: ‘For Erasmus true linguistic plenitude occurs when words are properly and richly “filled with” things calling forth a visible presence to the eyes of the mind, and achieving a fusion of *res* and *verba*. Barnard illustrates the concept by presenting Nemoroso in Garcilaso’s second Eclogue as the orator who, in the practice of *enargeia*, ‘breaks through the silence’. Certainly Nemoroso’s ecphrastic description underscores that accomplished artifice renders the verbal and the visual indistinguishable:

Él está ejercitando el duro oficio,
y con tal arteficio la pintura
mostraba su figura, que dijeras,
si pintado lo vieras, que hablaba.

(Garcilaso, Eclogue II, ll. 1228–31)

The ‘eyes of the mind’ are similarly prioritized within the realms of the sacred textual tradition; the dissemination of St Ignatius’ *Ejercicios espirituales* (1548) contributes to the emergence of a form of private devotion which encourages the imagination to move beyond the textual representation of the transcendent, to foster an immersive and emotive identification with the passion. Elena Carrera has reminded us that St Teresa’s contemplative devotion extended to encouraging the sisters to marshal their imaginative power to consider the details of suffering which the evangelists failed to capture: ‘licencia nos da el Señor —a lo que pienso—, como nos la da, para que pensando en la sagrada Pasión, pensemos muchas más cosas de fatigas y tormentos que allí devía de padecer el Señor de que los evangelistas escriven’. Teresa gestures towards the limitations of textual renderings of the spiritual and physical suffering of an incarnate God. Nevertheless the caution surrounding the potential of the imagination, heightened for a woman claiming direct contact with the deity, remains. In fact Teresa evokes

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45 Barnard, *Garcilaso de la Vega*, 120.
the limitations of the human imagination to underscore the veracity of the gradual revelation she documents in the *Libro de la vida*: ‘Pues ser imaginación esto, es imposible de toda imposibilidad; ningún camino lleva, porque sola la hermosura y blancura de una mano es sobre toda nuestra imaginación’.

To the Early Modern mind then, as the essays in this volume will show, the imagination was a formidable force. It was there that possibility, transcendence and freedom dwelled, for good or bad. For if the ‘fuerça de imaginariar’ could stimulate and illuminate, creating new worlds that allowed for the interrogation of ‘potentially damaging truths in imaginary spaces’, it also created imagined histories and built ‘new worlds’ that could, and would, cast a darker colonial shadow.

Within and beyond Early Modern Iberia the rhetorical concretizing of mental images continually collides with the physical materialization of imaginary spaces. Amidst the epistemological challenge presented by the Americas, we know that commentators sought to find precursors of their new reality in the imagined worlds of old. Indeed, the inclination to ‘read’ the new territories as other-worldly would prove persistent, continuing into the seventeenth century. Antonio León Pinelo’s *El paraíso en el Nuevo Mundo* (1656) argued for the Peruvian Amazon as the location of earthly paradise. This text is cited by Mario Vargas Llosa as an example of:

[...] la tenaz predilección de los cronistas y historiadores de Indias por ver en el dominio descubierto por Colón una tierra de maravillas, en la que se materializaban los reinos y ciudades de la mitología grecorromana y medieval y los personajes más extravagantes.

In fact, the imaginative modes and depictions of mythical spaces which flourished in the Renaissance would find their way off the page in myriad ways. Within the realms of festival and pageantry, the transformative power of the imagination was engaged in effectively ‘setting forth’ the material environment of Spain and Spanish America in rich tapestry. In a recent
plenary lecture, Maria Cristina Quintero, a contributor to this volume, referred to the celebration of the wedding of Philip III to Margarita of Austria in the Plaza del Pilar in Zaragoza. The plaza was transformed into a marvellous forest for the occasion, and the distinguished participants wandered amidst animals both domestic and ‘exotic’, encountering figures dressed as nymphs and shepherds:

[... ] llegados sus Magestades con todo el sobredicho acompañamiento a la gran plassa de nuestra señora del Pilar, entraron passeándose por huna artificiossa traza, nunca vista, que tomava toda la dicha plassa, de un grande bosque muy arbolado de diversos árboles y plantas de mucha verdura. Y entrando en este bosque sus Magestades con todas las demás damas y cavalleros s’estuvieron passeando a cavallo por él, mirando las cossas tan señaladas y curiossas que havía dentro deste deleitosso bosque, tan bien puestas y adornadas, y, enserrados dentro del sin poderse salir, los animales que havía bivos dentro del bosque, que hultra de mucha diversidad de animales silvestres, ansi cuadrúpedos como volátiles, de ciervos, corzos, cabras muntessas, bueyes, vacas y terneras, carneros y ovexas con sus corderos, y por otra parte mucha manera de cassa de liebres y conexos, perdizes y francolines, gallinhas domésticas y otras gallinas de las Indias y pavos reales con otras espescias y dife[re]ntes animallass. Y sin esto havía por sus cabos puestos en buen orden unas figuras y personados de bulto, los hunos adressados y vestidos como a pastores y otros como nimphas hermossas, puestos, adresados y hechos a coros, como suelen fingir adornar los pohetas sus cantos y discursos.

Subsequently we find abundant examples of attempts to capture such ephemeral spectacles in print, lush textual renderings of memorable displays of imperial might or of affective religious devotion occupying the pages of the festival books now gathering dust.  

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53 The full account is reproduced in Teresa Ferrer Valls, Nobleza y espectáculo teatral (1535–1622) (Sevilla/Valencia: UNED, 1993), 220–23. Conversely in Potosí, an urban religious celebration is exuberantly re-imagined as a dramatic eclogue by Diego de Méxia in his ‘Égloga intitulada el dios Pan’, from the largely unpublished Segunda parte del Parnaso antártico de divinos poemas (Potosí, 1617); see Anne Holloway, ‘ “Otros montes, otros ríos”: The Apprehension of Alterity in a Spanish American Pastoral’, in her The Potency of Pastoral in the Hispanic Baroque (Woodbridge: Tamesis, forthcoming).

54 See, for example, Fernando de la Torre Farfán, Fiestas de la S. Iglesia Metropolitana y Patriarcal de Sevilla. Al nuevo culto del señor Rey S. Fernando el tercero de Castilla y León (Sevilla, 1671).
Sidney also distinguishes between the unblemished world created by poets and the ‘Too-much-loved earth’, we occupy, a reminder that often the cherishing of the material is traceable as erosion—one need only consider the many objects of spiritual devotion in the Hispanic world, and beyond, which bear the traces of the passage of believers and their contact with the valorized artefacts. In this act of communing with the sacred, the very process which layers the material with significance wears it away in successive interactions. Conversely, cultural esteem and its associated material value can serve to enshrine the products of the artistic imagination, thereby imposing distance from the viewer, and rendering them somehow unassailable, frozen within particular interpretations. The relatively recent ‘turn towards materiality’ has seen the material object begin to feature amidst other types of evidence for humanities researchers. While the Renaissance period has been centrally positioned within these new approaches, they have also been recently marked by a focus on the everyday object.

As noted above, the imagination itself often slips between retrospectively imposed categories, with ‘epoch-(un)/making’ potential. A focus on material culture can similarly trouble simplistic views, since as Tara Hamling and Catherine Richardson note, the potential of the approach may lie in its ability to add ‘texture and nuance’, and the possibility that ‘the grand narratives of history can be read against the detail of lived experience’. In uniting the symbolic and the material, Anne J. Cruz’s Material and Symbolic Circulation (2008) is an important study within Hispanism in this regard. Cruz’s own contribution to the Vulnerata (an image of the virgin mutilated by English soldiers) underpins a consideration of how political adversaries are imagined, how religious artefacts which bear traces of contact with an imagined ‘other’ can create real support for symbolic warfare. Writing on the circulation of the body parts of martyrs Cruz reminds us that: ‘The recuperation of the Catholic martyrs’ body parts as sacred relics to be circulated among the

55 Tara Hamling and Catherine Richardson point to a renewed interest in material culture from the 1990s onwards, beginning in Art History. They suggest that the level of cultural prestige associated with the study of the Italian Renaissance may have helped lend credibility to these ‘new’ approaches which focus upon ‘the things people owned and the way they used them’ (see their ‘Introduction’, in Everyday Objects: Medieval and Early Modern Material Culture and Its Meanings, ed. Tara Hamling & Catherine Richardson [Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2010], 1–23 [p. 1]). In the midst of her identification of an academic turn towards ‘the everyday’, Patricia Fumerton included the new-found interest in materiality in what she terms ‘a New New Historicism’ (see ‘Introduction: A New New Historicism’, in Renaissance Culture and the Everyday, ed. Patricia Fumerton & Simon Hunt [Philadelphia: Pennsylvania U. P., 1998], 1–17). For a useful overview of trends and preoccupations in the investigation of material culture see, for example, Daniel Miller, ‘Materiality: An Introduction’, in Materiality, ed. Daniel Miller (Durham, NC: Duke U. P., 2005), 1–50.

faithful demonstrates how the body politic could be united through the metonymical force imbued in each separate part’.57

The collaborative essays gathered in this volume survey a range of striking examples of textual and visual artefacts, tangible evidence of the artistic imagination, channelled and distilled to produce the compelling material legacy of Early Modern Iberia. The explorations are anchored in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Iberia, in the period known as the Golden Age. While some contributors have opted for fully integrated, co-authored essays, others have offered complementary or dialogical readings; all are innovative reflective responses to the overarching theme of ‘Imaginary Matters’. We are delighted to number amongst the issue’s contributors scholars who rank among the most distinguished in their respective fields, many of whom have collaborated with emerging early career researchers. Within the first grouping of essays (‘Material Imagination’) we include innovative reflections upon the Gongorist, Borgesian and Cervantine imaginations. It is now well established that long before Shelley, Luis de Góngora had already invited his reader to discern ‘the unapprehended relation of things’. In ‘Metaphor and Matter(s) Arising: Gongorine Metaphor and the Cultivation of the Imagination’ (000–000), Marsha Collins and Isabel Torres suggest, through a reading of the Fábula de Polifemo y Galatea and the Soledades, as well as poems by Jorge Guillén and Vicente Aleixandre, that Góngora’s innovative deployment of metaphor produces ‘an imagined materiality that points to affect; an affective sensibility that has traditionally been denied to Góngora by literary critics and poetic disciples alike’ (000). From Góngora’s enigmatic cyclops to Borges’ ‘monstrous’ enumerations (Foucault), Lindsay Kerr and Bill Richardson’s ‘Locating Knowledge in Góngora and Borges’ (000–000) offers a critical reading of the Borgesian re-imagining of the figure of Góngora; the hubris which Borges attributes to ‘Daneri’ underpins a collaborative reading which is founded on an appreciation of the ‘self-awareness and playfulness that is always present in Góngora’s work’ (000). Ignacio Navarrete and Mary B. Quinn’s ‘Imagining Domesticity in Cervantes’ Novelas ejemplares and Don Quijote’ (000–000) considers the mundane domestic space as one no less ‘imagined’, albeit collectively; the ability of its imagined confines to uphold value systems and circumscribe individual freedoms is shown to be easily troubled in Cervantes’ shorter fiction as well as in his masterpiece.

In the subsequent grouping (‘Imagining Imperialism’) we find the immensity of epic and the subjectivity of lyric given equal weighting to interrogate nuanced poetic reflections upon the anxieties of empire. Anne J. Cruz and María Cristina Quintero’s readings explore the juncture of empire and poetic selfhood, their contribution ‘Garcilaso/Góngora: Imagining the Self, Imagining Empire’ (000–000) unites the dominant poetic actors of the Spanish Renaissance and the Baroque. Redressing a critical tendency to prioritize only classical and Italian poetics, Cruz detects neglected presences and tensions (Ausiàs March, the unorthodox theology of Juan de Valdés) amidst Garcilaso’s lyric. The generic hybridity of the sonnets of Luis de Góngora reveals, Quintero suggests, ‘an at times jaundiced perspective on the mechanisms of power within a unique literary subjectivity’ (000). Catarina Fouto and Julian Weiss’ ‘Reimagining Imperialism in Faria e Sousa’s Lusíadas comentadas’ (000–000) re-examines the significance of this work of critical exegesis (Madrid, 1639) on the epic poem by Luis de Camões (Lisbon, 1572). They contend that while the text certainly reveals promotion of Early Modern imperialism, it also points to a simultaneous ‘anxiety over the shapelessness of empire, whose protean monstrosity threatens to overwhelm the creative imagination and swallow up the irreducible uniqueness of those who are its subjects and its agents’ (000).

The third grouping, ‘Cultural Material in the Visual Imaginary’, unites explorations of Spain’s rich visual legacy, with a particular focus on sacred subject matter. In ‘Image and word in El Greco: The Stockholm Painting of St Peter and St Paul’ (000–000), Terence O’Reilly considers the full implications of the painting’s potential to ‘touch the conscience’ (000), based on an understanding of Christ as cornerstone or uniting wall, which is central to its poignant appeal for unity within a context of strife and division. In the companion essay to O’Reilly’s, ‘Pied Beauty: The Baroque Microcosms of Daniel Seghers’, Jeremy Robbins presents Seghers’ intricate canvases as ‘true exemplars of the cultural preoccupations, and the visual and intellectual tropes of Early Modern Europe’ (000), their feigned materiality connecting with their eschatological undercurrent. In Laura Bass and Jean Andrews’ ‘“Me juzgo por natural de Madrid”: Vincencio Carducho, Theorist and Painter of Spain's Court Capital’ (000–000), Vicencio Carducho is positioned as firmly rooted within the artistic sensibility of his adopted Madrid. Bass proposes that the re-imagining of the court capital is central to the efforts of artists to re-define their own oficio in order to dignify their status. Andrews considers the affective piety which informs Carducho’s visual depiction of interactions between believers and material representations of the sacred. Depictions of saints in adoration of the crucifix produce compelling readings of faith’s power to ‘move’ the material object as well as the viewer. In ‘The Fabric of Saintly Proof: Leocadia of Toledo from Orrente to Calderón’ (000–000), Arantza Mayo and Peter Cherry offer a detailed exploration of the ways in which authors and artists chronicle and
recreate the material signs of sanctity. Mayo appraises the tellings and retellings of this fourth-century patron of Toledo’s resurrection by Early Modern Spanish authors as celebrated as Lope de Vega and Pedro Calderón de la Barca, while Cherry focuses on the rich representation in the visual arts of Leocadia’s textual and material legacy. Both readings present the recurrent apparitions of the saint, both spectral and material as playing a crucial role in cementing the alliance of Church and Monarchy.

The collaborative essays in ‘Material and Symbolic Circulation’ share a focus on the women writers of Early Modern Iberia. Here we are reminded that Elizabeth Lehfeldt nuanced our understanding of conventual space by deeming it a ‘permeable cloister’. In ‘Beyond the Boundaries of Private Spaces: Women and the Spanish Court’ (000–000), Trevor J. Dadson and Laura S. Muñoz Pérez propose a need for a wider acknowledgement of the writerly participation of Early Modern women within public spaces as well as confined ones. Muñoz Pérez offers a striking example in Ana de Castro Egas, author of Eternidad del rey Felipe III (1629); a woman whose writings reveal the extent to which she was embedded in the court of Philip IV, and in literary as well as political intrigues. A comment on the materiality and indeed purity of her language comes from none other than Francisco de Quevedo: ‘Las palabras sin bastardía mendiga de otras lenguas, que en algunos cuadernos por blasonar noticia desaliñan la nota, y quando mas presumen de joyas, mejor se confiesen manchas’ (000). In ‘“O daughter ... forget your people and your father’s house”: Early Modern Women Writers and the Spanish Imaginary’ (000–000), Anne Holloway and Ramona Wray bring together two accounts by women writers for whom contact with Spanish culture proves a creative spur for the imagination in both secular and sacred mode, Lady Ann Fanshawe and Mary Bonaventure Browne respectively. Fanshawe’s Memoirs are considered alongside the material legacy of her ‘Booke of Receipts of Physickes, Salues, Waters, Cordialls, Preserues and Cookery’, both texts repeatedly demonstrating her cultural sensitivity to the Spanish context. Mary Bonaventure Browne’s account demonstrates that what Richard Kearney recently termed ‘the enigma of signifying flesh’ is intrinsic to female piety in the Iberian context, with the saintly body the site of confident interpretations of a religious community fractured and dispersed, yet still concerned with collective articulations of selfhood.

Within the final grouping ‘Matters of Representation’ Melanie Henry and Jonathan Thacker are enabled, via a focus on the imagination, to move beyond old antagonisms in their discussion of the mature dramatic output work of Lope and Cervantes. Their essay ‘Self Construction and the

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Imagination in the Drama of Lope de Vega and Cervantes’ (000-000) brings together the oft-commentated *El castigo sin venganza* and *La entrenida* (relatively over-looked within the Cervantine corpus), and prioritizes the use of imagined spaces within the imagined space of the stage. *El castigo’s* poeticized *locus amoenus* and *La entrenida’s* *entremés* permit the precarious realization of transgressive desires. In the final dialogical contribution ‘Imitation and Adaptation: A Meeting of Minds’ (000–000), Emilie L. Bergmann frames the creative conversation her essay establishes with Edward Friedman in Early Modern terms, reminding us of the imaginative potential of the Renaissance understanding of poetic imitation. Taking us forward in time, and exploring the varied possibilities for the realisation of the poetic imagination, Bergmann’s discussion, ‘Literary Creation As Collaboration: Working Together across Centuries’, encompasses Giannina Braschi’s *El imperio de los sueños*, underscoring the continuing vigour of the Renaissance pastoral metaphor within the urban North American context, an essay which serves to remind us of the continued need for the creation of imagined and potentially transformative spaces. Friedman’s overview of his own abundant contributions to the realization of the Early Modern imagination on the twentieth- and twenty-first-century stage in ‘Imitations of Life, Imitations of Art: Lost in Transition’ memorably presents us with a Quixote who defiantly confronts a malevolent ‘spectre of my own imagination!’ (000) In our own often troubling and uncertain present, perhaps this Quixotic moment of clarity is an instructive one, recalling Rebecca Solnit’s rallying call to an activism founded in hope. Solnit points out that all transformations must begin in the imagination, a timely reminder that the ‘necessary angel’ always requires us to ‘start over, with an imagination adequate to the possibilities and the strangeness and the dangers on the earth at this moment’.60

Anne Holloway & Isabel Torres


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