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Physical Layer Security in Cooperative Energy Harvesting Networks with a Friendly Jammer

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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a cooperative wireless network consisting of a source, multiple intermediate energy harvesting nodes and a destination, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. First, the intermediate nodes use the time switching-based relaying protocol to harvest energy from the source signal. Then, a pair out of intermediate nodes are selected as a relay and a jammer to transmit confidential and jamming signals to the destination and eavesdropper. Under these assumptions, we evaluate the system performance in terms of secrecy outage probability.

Index Terms—Physical layer security, energy harvesting.

I. INTRODUCTION

Physical layer security (PLS) and energy harvesting (EH) have been attracting a great deal of attention from the researcher community. While the objective of PLS is to guarantee and enhance confidential messages [1]–[4], that of EH is to utilize the harvested energy of wireless received signals for information processing [5]. Although each topic has been well investigated as an individual body of knowledge in literature, it is only recently that their combination has been emerged as an attractive research approach [1]–[4].

In [1], the authors considered a secure network using a multiple-antenna relay which is capable of harvesting energy. In [2], a friendly jammer with the ability of harvesting energy was used to resist eavesdropping. Meanwhile, the authors in [3] designed artificial noise for both interfering with undesired destinations and being cancelable at the intended receiver. Besides, energy harvesting was also discussed in relation to the security of each individual subcarrier in an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing access network as in [4]. Motivated by these work, in this paper, we study the secure performance of a cooperative relaying network which consists of energy harvesting nodes. Different from [1]–[3] which only considered one intermediate node, we utilize two intermediate nodes (i.e., a relay and a jammer) for improving the gains of desired channel gain and simultaneously interfering with the eavesdropping channel. In [2] and [4], the authors did not consider the relaying protocol using time switching-based relaying (TSR) technique (presented in [5]). Moreover, the simultaneous use of both relay and jammer was not taken into account in these works. To the best of authors’ knowledge, the role of such TSR circuitries in both-relay-and-jammer-aided networks is not conducted by any previous work. Note that, although the impact of light-of-sight (LOS) on the harvested energy loss in the context of energy harvesting has recently emerged as one important topic [6], it is not considered in this paper. With many individual aspects of both security and energy harvesting, we choose not to investigate the LOS factor. Instead, we aim to highlight the secure performance when considering intermediate nodes equipped with energy harvesting circuitries. Furthermore, we examine the following two schemes: i) the best relay is chosen for forwarding the retransmitted signal while the jammer is random; ii) the best jammer is chosen for interfering with the eavesdropper while the relay is random. Based on the two schemes of interest, we evaluate the secure performance through the security outage probability (SOP). We demonstrate that the system performance deteriorates in terms of security if the amount of time used for energy harvesting is much larger than that used for information processing and vice versa.

II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL

We consider a cooperative wireless network, which consists of one source $S$, one destination $D$, one eavesdropper $E$, and $M + 1$ intermediate nodes $I_i, (i = 1, 2, \ldots, M + 1)$ using decode-and-forward protocol. We assume that the direct link between $S$ and $D$ is not available due to bad conditions and the transmission from $S$ to $D$ is performed by the help of the trusted intermediate nodes $\{I_i\}_{i=1}^{M+1}$. All channels are assumed to undergo Rayleigh fading, and the channel power gain between $X \in \{S, I_i\}$ and $Y \in \{I_i, D, E\}$ is denoted by $h_{XY}$. Then we can say that $h_{XY}$ obeys the exponential distribution with rate $1/\Omega_{XY}$, i.e., $h_{XY} \sim \text{Exp} \left( \frac{1}{\Omega_{XY}} \right)$. For simplicity, we set $\Omega_{SI} = \Omega_{SI}$, and $\Omega_{I_iE} = \Omega_{I_iE}$ with $i \neq j$.

Among $M + 1$ intermediate nodes, we choose a node as a relay $R$ and another node as a jammer $J$. The relay $R$ will
transmit confidential signals, while the jammer \( J \) will transmit jamming signals. Suppose that \( D \) and \( J \) cooperate with each other such that the jamming signal can be nullled out at \( D \) [7]. In contrast, \( E \) has to extract both the confidential information from \( R \) and the interference from \( J \).

In the considered network, we employ the TSR protocol presented in [5]. Then, assuming that each \( I_i \) harvests energy from \( S \) and uses this energy to transmit relaying and jamming signals, we can express the transmit power of \( I_i \) as

\[
P_i = \frac{\eta P_S h_{SI_i} \alpha T}{(1 - \alpha) T/2} = \frac{2\eta P_S h_{SI_i} \alpha}{(1 - \alpha)},
\]

(1)

where \( P_S \) is the transmit power of \( S \), \( \eta \in (0, 1) \) is the energy conversion efficiency which depends on the rectification process and the energy harvesting circuitry, \( T \) is the block time in which a certain block of information is transmitted from the source node to the destination node, \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) is the fraction of the block time in which intermediate nodes harvest energy from the source signal. \(^1\)

### A. Best relay and random jammer (bR-rJ)

In this strategy, the jammer \( J \) is first randomly selected among \( \{I_i\}_{i=1}^{M+1} \). Without loss of the generality, we assume that the \((M + 1)\)-th intermediate node is the jammer, \( J = I_{M+1} \). The relay \( R^* \) is then selected among the \( M \) remaining intermediate nodes such that the channel power gain of the \( R^*-D \) link is largest, i.e.,

\[
h_{R^*D} \triangleq \max_{i=1,...,M} h_{I_iD},
\]

(2)

where \( h_{I_iD} \) is the channel power gains of the \( I_i-D \) link. Then, the instantaneous received SNR at \( D \) and \( E \) are, respectively, given by

\[
\gamma_{RD}^{br-rl} = \frac{(P_R/N_0) h_{RD}}{h_{SR^*} h_{R^*D}}, \quad \gamma_{RE}^{br-rl} = \frac{h_{SR^*} h_{RE}}{(N_0 + P_J h_{JE})},
\]

(3)

(4)

where \( \xi \triangleq \frac{2\eta \rho_0 P_S}{(1 - \alpha) N_0} \).

### B. Random relay and best jammer (rR-bJ)

In this strategy, the relay \( R \) is first randomly selected among \( \{I_i\}_{i=1}^{M+1} \). Without loss of the generality, we assume that the \((M + 1)\)-th intermediate node is the relay, \( R = I_{M+1} \). The jammer \( J \) is then selected among the \( M \) remaining intermediate nodes such that the channel power gain of the \( J^*\)-\( E \) link is largest, i.e.,

\[
h_{J^*E} = \max_{i=1,...,M} h_{I_iE},
\]

(5)

where \( h_{I_iE} \) is the channel power gains of the \( I_i-E \) link. The instantaneous received SNRs at \( D \) and \( E \) are, respectively, given by

\[
\gamma_{RD}^{rR-bl} = \frac{(P_R/N_0) h_{RD}}{h_{SR^*} h_{R^*D}}, \quad \gamma_{RE}^{rR-bl} = \frac{h_{SR^*} h_{RE}}{(N_0 + P_J h_{JE})},
\]

(6)

(7)

\(^1\)Note that \( \alpha T \) is the amount of time used for energy harvesting, while the remaining of the block time, \((1 - \alpha) T \), is for information processing.

### III. Exact Secrecy Outage Probability

In this section, we consider two transmission strategies at the cooperative nodes: i) Best relay and random jammer (bR-rJ) and ii) random relay and best jammer (rR-bJ). To compare the effect of these two strategies on the security performance of our system, we evaluate the SOP which is given by

\[
P_{\text{out}} = P \{ C_s < R \} = P \{ \gamma_D < \beta \gamma_E + (\beta - 1) \}
\]

(8)

where \( \gamma_E \in \{ \gamma_E^{br-rl}, \gamma_E^{rR-bl} \} \), \( \gamma_D \in \{ \gamma_D^{br-rl}, \gamma_D^{rR-bl} \} \), and \( \beta = 2\frac{\lambda_D}{\lambda_E} \geq 1 \) with \( R \geq 0 \) and \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \).

#### A. Best relay and random jammer (bR-rJ)

By substituting Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) into Eq. (8), the SOP can be expressed as

\[
P_{\text{out}}^{br-rl} = P \{ \gamma_E^{br-rl} < \beta \gamma_D^{br-rl} + (\beta - 1) \}
\]

\[
= \int_{0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\beta h_{R^*D}} \left( \frac{\beta h_{R^*D}}{1 + \xi h_{SR^*} h_{RE}} + (\beta - 1) \right) f_{h_{SR^*}}(x) dx.
\]

(9)

Let \( V \triangleq 1 + \xi h_{SR^*} h_{JE} \) and \( a \triangleq \frac{\beta - 1}{\xi} \), we then rewrite the function \( \Phi_1(x) \) in Eq. (9) as

\[
\Phi_1(x) = \int_{1}^{\infty} \left( \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{h_{R^*D}}(x) f_{h_{RE}}(y) dh \right) f_y(v) dv
\]

(10)

where the PDF of \( V \) is derived as Eq. (A.2) in Appendix A. The function \( \Phi_2(x,v) \) in Eq. (10) can be calculated as

\[
\Phi_2(x,v) = \int_{0}^{\infty} \left( -\exp \left( -\frac{\beta h_{R^*D}}{v + \frac{\beta - 1}{\xi}} \right) \right) M
\]

\[
\times \left( 1/\Omega_{D} \right) \exp (-h/\Omega_{D}) dh
\]

\[
= 1 - \sum_{m=1}^{M} e^{m(1-\beta)/(\xi x)} v + m \beta (\Omega_{E}/\Omega_{D})
\]

(11)

where \( \sum_{m=1}^{M} = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \frac{M-1}{m-1} e^{-m(1-\beta)/(\xi x)} \). Substituting Eq. (11) and Eq. (A.2) into Eq. (10), we obtain

\[
\Phi_1(x) = 1 - \sum_{m=1}^{M} e^{m(1-\beta)/(\xi x)} \int_{1}^{\infty} v + m \beta (\Omega_{E}/\Omega_{D}) K_0 \left( 2 \frac{\phi_m}{\xi x} \right) dv
\]

\[
= 1 - \sum_{m=1}^{M} e^{m(1-\beta)/(\xi x)} \int_{1}^{\infty} v + m \beta (\Omega_{E}/\Omega_{D}) S_{-1,0} \left( 2 \frac{\phi_m}{\xi x} \right)
\]

(12)

where \( \phi_m \triangleq \sqrt{1 + m \beta (\Omega_{E}/\Omega_{D})} \), \( S_{-1,0}(\cdot) \) is the Lommel function [8, Eq. (10.73.4)], and \( K_n(\cdot) \) (with \( n = 0, 1, \ldots) \) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind [9]. It is noted that the last equality is obtained with the help of [9, Eqs. (6.561.16) and (6.565.7)].

Finally, we substitute Eq. (12) into Eq. (9) and arrive at

\[
P_{\text{out}}^{br-rl} = 1 - \sum_{m=1}^{M} \left[ 1 - 4m^{(\beta-1)} \frac{\phi_m}{\xi x} S_{-1,0} \left( 2 \frac{\phi_m}{\xi x} \right) \right]
\]

\[
\times \frac{4m^{(\beta-1)} \phi_m}{\xi x} K_1 \left( \frac{4m^{(\beta-1)} \phi_m}{\xi x} \right)
\]

(13)
obtain the approximate expressions for i.e.,

\[ U = \frac{S}{\xi} = 1 \]

The exact expression for the SOP at very high \( \xi (i.e. 1/\xi \to 0) \) as follows:

\[ P_{\text{out}}^{\text{bR-rJ}} = \lim_{\xi \to 0} P_{\text{out}}^{\text{bR-rJ}} = 1 - \sum K_{\text{asy}} \left( \sqrt{4(\beta - 1) / \xi \Omega_{\text{mth}}} \right) \left[ 1 - 4 m_\beta / \sqrt{\Omega_{\text{mth}}} S_{\text{asy}} \left( 2 \theta_m / \sqrt{\xi} \right) \right]. \] (21)

2) Random relay and best jammer (rR-bJ): Applying (19) and (20) to (18), we can obtain the asymptotic expression for the SOP at very high \( \xi (i.e. 1/\xi \to 0) \) as follows:

\[ P_{\text{out}}^{\text{R-bJ}} = \lim_{\xi \to 0} P_{\text{out}}^{\text{R-bJ}} = 1 - K_{\text{asy}} \left( \sqrt{4(\beta - 1) / \xi \Omega_{\text{mth}}} \right) \left[ 1 - 4 m_\beta / \sqrt{\Omega_{\text{mth}}} S_{\text{asy}} \left( 2 \theta_m / \sqrt{\xi} \right) \right]. \] (22)

Remark 1: If \( M = 1 \), the exact expressions Eq. (13) and Eq. (18) for the SOP are exactly the same. This also applies to the asymptotic expressions Eq. (21) and Eq. (22) when \( M = 1 \).

B. Special cases of \( \alpha \)

1) \( \alpha \to 0^+ \): In this case, we have \( \xi \to 0 \) and \( \beta \to 2^{2R} \).

\[ \text{From (3)-(4) and (6)-(7), the instantaneous SNRs } \gamma_D \text{ and } \gamma_E \text{ approach 0. As a result, } P_{\text{out}} \text{ in (8) is approximated as} \]

\[ \lim_{\alpha \to 0^+} P_{\text{out}} = P \left\{ 0 < 2^{2R} \times 0 + (\beta - 1) \right\} = 1. \] (23)

2) \( \alpha \to 1^- \): In this case, we rewrite \( \gamma_D = c_1 / \eta \) with \( c_1 = \frac{2 h_{SR} h_{RD}}{\xi \Omega_{\text{mth}}} \) from (3)-(4), and have \( \gamma_E \to c_2 \) with \( c_2 \in \left\{ h_{SJ} h_{RE} / \xi \Omega_{\text{mth}}, h_{SR} h_{RD} / \xi \Omega_{\text{mth}}, h_{SJ} h_{RE} / \xi \Omega_{\text{mth}} \right\} \) from (6)-(7). Then \( P_{\text{out}} \) in (8) becomes

\[ \lim_{\alpha \to 1^-} P_{\text{out}} = \lim_{t \to +\infty} \frac{t^{(1-\alpha)^{-1}}}{t} \left\{ c_1 < 2^{2R} / t + c_2 - 1 / t \right\} = 1. \] (24)

V. NUMERICAL RESULTS

In this section, we evaluate the SOP and verify the analysis through the simulation. Common parameters for both Figs. 2 and 3 are as follows: \( M = 1, 10, \eta = 0.85, R = 0.25 \) (bits/s/Hz), \( \Omega_{\text{mth}} = 2.5, \Omega_{BD} = 1.5 \) and \( \Omega_E = 2 \). In Fig. 2, we show the SOP as a function of \( PS / N_0 \) with \( \alpha = 0.5 \). In Fig. 3 and 4, we fix \( PS / N_0 = 15 \) dB, then respectively showing the SOP versus \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) and \( \eta \in (0, 1) \). Based on numerical results, we observe that when \( M \) increases, the rR-I scheme is more efficient than the rR-bJ scheme in terms of security. Moreover, the secure performance can be further improved when \( M \) increases.

Finally, Fig. 2 verifies the agreement between the exact analysis and simulation, while the asymptotic analysis is very close to the exact analysis at high \( PS / N_0 \). Besides, Fig. 3 shows that setting \( \alpha \to 0^+ \) or \( \alpha \to 1^- \) is not beneficial to the secure performance. In Fig. 4, the security level of the system increases with \( \eta \) given that the harvested energy also benefits from this parameter.
This paper has derived exact and asymptotic expressions for the SOP in a cooperative secure network utilizing energy harvesting. Based on analytical and simulation results, we confirm that the security of the proposed system can be further enhanced with increasing number of intermediate nodes and increasing the SNR. More importantly, we show that in the TSR protocol [5], the secure performance deteriorates significantly in two cases: $\alpha \rightarrow 0^+$ and $\alpha \rightarrow 1^-$. In contrast, the more $\eta$ becomes, the more secure and harvested energy performance the system gains.

### VI. Conclusions

The distribution of $\mathcal{U} \equiv \mathcal{V} = 1 + \xi h_{SJ} h_{JE}$

The CDF of $\mathcal{V}$ can be derived as

$$F_\mathcal{V}(v) = 1 - 2 \sqrt{\frac{v}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}}} K_0 \left( 2 \sqrt{\frac{v}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}}} \right) \text{ if } v \geq 1,$$

(A.1)

and its PDF is consequently calculated as

$$f_\mathcal{V}(v) = \frac{2}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}} K_0 \left( 2 \sqrt{\frac{v}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}}} \right) \text{ if } v \geq 1.$$

(A.2)

### Appendix

**A. The distribution of $\mathcal{V} = 1 + \xi h_{SJ} h_{JE}$**

The CDF of $\mathcal{V}$ can be derived as

$$F_\mathcal{V}(v) = 1 - 2 \sqrt{\frac{v}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}}} K_0 \left( 2 \sqrt{\frac{v}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}}} \right) \text{ if } v \geq 1,$$

(A.1)

and its PDF is consequently calculated as

$$f_\mathcal{V}(v) = \frac{2}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}} K_0 \left( 2 \sqrt{\frac{v}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}}} \right) \text{ if } v \geq 1.$$

(A.2)

**B. The distribution of $\mathcal{U} = 1 + \xi h_{SJ} h_{JE}$**

The CDF of $\mathcal{U}$ can be derived as

$$F_\mathcal{U}(u) = 1 - 2 \sum \frac{(u-1)^m}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}} K_1 \left( 2 \sqrt{\frac{(u-1)^m}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}}} \right) \text{ if } u \geq 1,$$

(B.1)

and its PDF is consequently calculated as

$$f_\mathcal{U}(u) = \sum \frac{2m}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}} K_0 \left( 2 \sqrt{\frac{(u-1)^m}{\xi \Omega_{SI} \Omega_{IE}}} \right) \text{ if } u \geq 1.$$

(B.2)

### References


