Full-duplex cyber-weapon with massive arrays


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Abstract—In order to enhance secrecy performance of protecting scenarios, understanding the illegitimate side is crucial. In this paper, from the perspective of the illegitimate side, the security attack from a full-duplex cyber-weapon equipped with massive antenna arrays is considered. To evaluate the behavior of the proposed cyber-weapon, we develop a closed-form, a tight approximation, and asymptotic expressions of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate with taking into consideration imperfect channel estimation at the cyber-weapon. The results show that even under some disadvantage conditions, i.e., imperfect channel estimation and self-interference, the full-duplex massive array cyber-weapon can disable traditional physical layer protecting schemes, i.e., increasing the transmit power and the number of antennas at the legitimate transmitter. In addition, when a transmit power optimization scheme for maximizing the difference between the eavesdropping rate and the legitimate rate is applied at the full-duplex cyber-weapon, the malicious attack is even more dangerous. The results also reveal that when the legitimate side faces an advance adversary, it is essential to prevent important information in the training phases exposing to the illegitimate side.

Index Terms—Physical layer security, full-duplex, massive MIMO, active eavesdropper, jamming, cyber-weapon.

I. INTRODUCTION

Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems have become one of the key candidates for the next generation of wireless networks. In massive MIMO networks, the transmitters are equipped with a large number of antennas to serve end-users at the same time in the same frequency [1]. The advantage of massive MIMO is that the linear signal processing at the transmitter is nearly optimal thanks to the large number of antennas. Therefore, increasing the number of antennas at the transmitter can enhance the array gain with simple signal processing. Besides, the energy-efficiency and spectrum-efficiency of massive MIMO networks have been shown in [2].

Securing information is a challenge with the rapid development of wireless communication. Alongside with the conventional cryptography protocol, physical layer security (PLS) for wireless communication has attracted intensive attention from the research community recently [3]. The principle of PLS is to use the randomness of wireless channels to secure the transmission. By deploying PLS on top of the conventional cryptography protocols, the secrecy performance of wireless communication is enhanced [4]–[7]. There have been studies on PLS in massive MIMO networks. Artificial noise aided protecting schemes for massive MIMO networks under the malicious attack of multi-antenna passive eavesdropper were investigated in [8]. In [9], the secrecy performance of massive MIMO relay networks was studied. In [10], the authors proposed an uplink original symbol phase rotated scenario to protect the uplink transmission in a massive MIMO network in the presence of a massive MIMO eavesdropper. Power control schemes for training and data transmission to enhance the security of massive MIMO systems with the help of artificial noise were studied in [11]. In [12], the authors proposed various data precoders and artificial noise precoder to secure downlink transmission of a multi-cell massive MIMO system with large numbers of terminal users and antennas at the eavesdropper. The aforementioned works focused on designing the protecting schemes for the legitimate side and considered the passive eavesdroppers. However, the viewpoint of the illegitimate side is also important.

A. Related Works

Since understanding the abilities of the illegitimate side is also crucial to design effective protecting schemes for the legitimate side [13], [14]. This stream of research has attracted wide attention from the research community. In [15], an active half-duplex adversary that can perform as an eavesdropper or a jammer based on the legitimate side’s strategy was studied. In [16], secure strategies of a multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO system under the malicious attempt of a multi-antenna active eavesdropper were proposed. In [17], the channel estimation and jamming process of a massive MIMO eavesdropper for attacking a time division duplex (TDD) system were demonstrated. In [18], the behavior of a wireless powered adversary that can operate randomly as a jammer or an eavesdropper was investigated. In addition, a power splitting and jamming/eavesdropping probability selection scheme based on the available power at the adversary were proposed. However, the adversaries in these works can perform only eavesdropping or jamming.

Yet, the introduction of full-duplex radio, which is promising to double the spectrum efficiency by allowing a wireless node to transmit and receive signals simultaneously in the same frequency band [19], has enabled the adversaries to perform eavesdropping and jamming at the same time. This topic has been investigated widely in the literature. In [20], an optimization scheme for a number of transmit and receive antennas at the full-duplex MIMO adversary was proposed.
in a multiple-input, multiple-output, multiple eavesdroppers (MIMOME) wiretap channel. A security scenario, in which a full-duplex eavesdropper attacks the training phase to modify the precoder at the transmitter, was presented in [21]. In [22], the authors proposed a rate maximization scheme for an active full-duplex legitimate monitor to efficiently eavesdrop a suspicious receiver with the assumption that the self-interference is perfectly cancelled. In [23], a full-duplex active eavesdropper equipped with one transmit and one receive antenna is considered. The optimization schemes for the performance of the legitimate and illegitimate side was formulated in a game frame work where the eavesdropper acts as the leader and the legitimate user is the follower. The case of partial channel state information is available at the legitimate users was also considered. The spoofing attack, in which the active adversary tries to modify the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel to obtain more confidential information, was considered in [24].

However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the malicious abilities of a powerful adversary, which is equipped with advanced technologies, i.e., full-duplex radio and massive array, have not been well-understood and considered in the literature. Motivated by the aforementioned discussions, in this paper, the abilities of a full-duplex massive array cyber-weapon in a conventional massive MISO system are investigated. In this scenario, the cyber-weapon is passive during the training phases to obtain CSI of the eavesdropping and jamming channels and then performs eavesdropping the confidential information and jamming the receiver simultaneously. Some related practical scenarios are: when the police and other first responder personnel want to interfere the private mobile radio systems and obtain important information; the thief wants to attack the wireless alarm systems in single-family homes so that the burglary will not be detected; or jamming against LTE, when used for private mobile radio applications.

B. Contributions

The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:

- In order to study the behavior of the proposed cyber-weapon, we derive exact closed-form expressions and tight approximations of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system in the perfect and imperfect channel estimation scenarios at the cyber-weapon.
- We demonstrate that increasing the number of receive antennas at the adversary can reduce the effect of the self-interference imposed by full-duplex mechanism. In addition, increasing the number of transmit antennas, i.e., $N$, at the adversary can reduce the jamming power proportionally to $\frac{1}{N^\alpha}$, $0 < \alpha < 1$. It is proved that with a certain proportion of the number of antennas at the adversary to the number of antennas at the information source, the illegitimate side can guarantee a zero secrecy rate. Besides, the illegitimate side benefits from increasing the transmit power at the legitimate side. Therefore, using high transmit power at the legitimate side does not guarantee an enhancement in the secrecy performance.

II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS

In this paper, we consider a malicious attack in which a cyber-weapon $Eve$ tries to jam the legitimate receiver $Bob$ and eavesdrop the confidential information from the legitimate transmitter $Alice$ simultaneously. In the considered system, $Alice$ is equipped with $K$ antennas and $Bob$ is equipped with a single antenna. Meanwhile, $Eve$ operates in full-duplex mode and is equipped with $M$ receive antennas and $N$ transmit antennas.

In this system, $Alice$ transmits confidential messages to $Bob$ over channel vector $g_L$ which is modeled by the independent small-scale fading and large-scale fading (geometric attenuation and shadow fading). The channel vector $g_L$ is expressed as

$$g_L = \sqrt{\beta_L} h_L,$$  

where $\beta_L$ is the decision variable and $h_L$ is the channel fading vector.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system and channel models are described in Section II. The exact closed-form, approximating, and asymptotic expressions of the system’s achievable ergodic secrecy rate in the perfect channel estimation at the cyber-weapon are presented in Section III. In Section IV, a specific channel estimation scheme at the cyber-weapon is proposed and evaluated. The numerical results based on Monte-Carlo methods are presented in Section V to confirm the tightness of the approximations and the correctness of our analyses. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VI.

The assumption of a single-antenna at users in massive MIMO system are widely deployed in the literature because of its cost-efficiency, power efficiency, simplicity, and typically high throughput [13], [16], [25]. In addition, the case of one single-antenna users can be considered as a special case of multi-antennas users when the auxiliary antennas can be treated as additional users. Under the assumption on favorable propagation in massive MIMO, which holds true when the number of antennas at the transmitter is large, $k$ autonomous single-antenna users system and one $k$-antenna user system have the same energy and spectral efficiency [25]. Besides, the assumption of a single antenna at Bob makes the considered system simple to analyze that provides important insights. Particularly, in the case of multiple antennas are deployed at Bob, the secrecy rate of the considered system still goes to zero when the numbers of antennas at Alice and Eve go to infinity. The detailed proof is provided in Appendix E.
where \( \mathbf{h}_k \) is the \( K \times 1 \) small-scale fading vector, \( \mathbf{h}_k \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \mathbf{I}_K) \), and \( \beta_L \) is the large-scale fading coefficient of the legitimate channel. At the same time, Eve wiretaps these confidential messages at her receive antennas over \( K \times M \) channel matrix \( \mathbf{G}_E \) which can be written as

\[
\mathbf{G}_E = \sqrt{\beta_L} \mathbf{H}_E,
\]

where \( \mathbf{H}_E \) is the matrix of small-scale fading coefficients whose elements are \( \mathcal{CN}(0,1) \) independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), and \( \beta_E \) is the large-scale fading coefficient of the eavesdropping channel. Meanwhile, at the transmit antennas of Eve, jamming signals are transmitted to Bob to confuse the decoding process. The channel between Eve and Bob is modeled as follows:

\[
\mathbf{g}_j = \sqrt{\beta_j} \mathbf{h}_j,
\]

where \( \mathbf{h}_j \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \mathbf{I}_N) \) is the \( N \times 1 \) vector of small-scale fading coefficients and \( \beta_j \) is the large-scale fading coefficient of the jamming channel.

In receiving and transmitting signals simultaneously, Eve suffers from self-interference. The self-interference between the transmit and receive antennas of Eve is modeled as an \( M \times N \) channel matrix

\[
\mathbf{G}_I = \mathbf{H}_I,
\]

where the elements are \( \mathcal{CN}(0,1) \) i.i.d., and \( \sigma_I \) represents the normalized self-interference impact. If \( \sigma_I = 0 \), the self-interference is perfectly cancelled out. Evaluating self-interference cancellation/isolation techniques is out of the scope of this paper.

In this work, we consider a downlink communication of a TDD MISO system. During each coherence interval, there are three phases. In the first phase, Bob needs to transmit his pilot signals to Alice so that she can estimate the legitimate CSI for performing beamforming. In the second phase, Alice needs to beamform the downlink pilot to Bob so that he can estimate the eavesdropping and jamming channels. To emphasize our idea of a powerful adversary, we assume that the CSI of the legitimate channel is perfectly known at Alice. Since Alice does not have the knowledge of CSI of the eavesdropping channel, she deploys maximal-ratio transmission (MRT) which is an optimal linear precoder in multiple-input single-output (MISO) channels to transmit her signal to Bob. With MRT, the transmit signal from Alice is formulated as

\[
s = \sqrt{P_A} \frac{g_{l}}{\|g_{l}\|} x,
\]

where \( \|x\| \) indicates the Frobenius norm, \( \sqrt{P_A} \frac{g_{l}}{\|g_{l}\|} \) is the MRT pre-coding vector, \( x \) is the confidential message with \( \mathbb{E} \{ |x|^2 \} = 1 \), and \( P_A \) is the average transmit power, i.e., \( \mathbb{E} \{ |s|^2 \} = P_A \).

### III. Perfect Channel Estimation at Eve

In this section, an assumption of perfect channel estimation at Eve is considered to provide a benchmark and initial insights of the considered system. The imperfect channel estimation scheme is discussed in detail in Section IV with a specific channel estimation method.

It is assumed that Eve can obtain perfect CSI of the eavesdropping and jamming links, i.e., it knows \( \mathbf{g}_E = \mathbf{G}_E^H \frac{g_{l}}{\|g_{l}\|} \) and \( \mathbf{g}_j \). This worst-case assumption is reasonable because Eve can take advantage of the pilots sent by Alice and Bob during the legimate CSI exchanging phases for estimating \( \mathbf{g}_E \) and \( \mathbf{g}_j \).

The jamming signal from Eve is formulated as

\[
s_j = \sqrt{P_J} \frac{g_{j}}{\|g_{j}\|} x_j,
\]

where \( \mathbb{E} \{ |x_j|^2 \} = 1 \) and \( P_J \) is the average transmit power of Eve. As a consequence, the received signal at Bob is

\[
y_k = \sqrt{P_A} \mathbf{g}_E^H \frac{g_{l}}{\|g_{l}\|} x + \sqrt{P_J} \mathbf{g}_j^H \frac{g_{j}}{\|g_{j}\|} x_j + w_L,
\]

where \( w_L \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \sigma_L^2) \) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob.

Under the full-duplex mechanism, Eve receives both the confidential message and her self-interference. Therefore, the received signal at Eve is given as

\[
y_E = \sqrt{P_A} \mathbf{G}_E^H \frac{g_{l}}{\|g_{l}\|} x + \sqrt{P_J} \mathbf{G}_j^H \frac{g_{j}}{\|g_{j}\|} x_j + w_E,
\]

where \( w_E \sim \sigma_E \mathcal{CN}(0, \mathbf{I}_M) \) is the \( M \times 1 \) AWGN vector at the receiving side of Eve. Consequently, Eve uses \( \bar{g}_E \) to perform maximal ratio combining (MRC). The MRC processed signal at Eve is

\[
y_{E}^{\text{MRC}} = \frac{\bar{g}_E^H}{\|\bar{g}_E\|} y_E = \sqrt{P_A} \frac{g_{l}}{\|g_{l}\|} x + \sqrt{P_J} \frac{g_{j}}{\|g_{j}\|} \bar{g}_j x_j + \frac{\bar{g}_E^H}{\|\bar{g}_E\|} w_E,
\]

where \( \bar{g}_E = \mathbf{G}_E^H \frac{g_{l}}{\|g_{l}\|} \) and \( \bar{g}_j = \mathbf{G}_j \frac{g_{j}}{\|g_{j}\|} \).

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2Interested reader may find analysis and numerical results for the case of imperfect channel estimation at legitimate users in Appendix F.

3In the conventional massive MIMO/MISO networks, MRT is well-known for its good performance, low-complexity, and high cost-efficiency compared with the other two famous precoders, i.e., zero-forcing (ZF) and minimum mean-square error (MMSE) precoders which require huge amount of computational resources at the massive array transmitter. Besides, without any necessary knowledge of the adversary, it is hard for the legitimate side to design any enhancing secrecy performance precoders.

4In the conventional massive MIMO/MISO networks, using artificial noise (AN) can enhance the secrecy performance. However, without knowledge of the adversary, the conventional users have to use AN all the time which leads to inefficiency in using resources. This work aims to analyze and reveal some insights of a powerful adversary with advance technologies, i.e., massive arrays antennas and full-duplex radio. We let adequately protecting schemes for this kind of cyber-weapon for future work.
A. Closed-form Expressions for Finite K, M, N

1) Ergodic Legitimate Rate: Since Bob only knows the legitimate channel $g_L$, from (7), the ergodic legitimate rate is given as\(^5\)

$$R_L = \mathbb{E}_{g_L} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\mathbb{E} \left\{ |\sqrt{P_A} |g_L| x| \right\}}{\mathbb{E} \left\{ |\sqrt{P_A} |g_L| x + |w_E| \right\}^2 |g_L|} \right)$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{g_L} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma A \|g_L\|}{\gamma E NH \beta J + 1} \right), \quad (10)$$

where $\mathbb{E} \{X|Y\}$ is conditional expectation of $X$ on $Y$, $\gamma A = \frac{P_A}{\sigma_A^2}$ and $\gamma J = \frac{P_J}{\sigma_J^2}$.

From (10), we have the following lemma

**Lemma 1:** The exact closed-form of the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel can be formulated as follows:

$$R_L = \frac{1}{\ln 2} \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} \frac{1}{(K - 1 - k)!} \left( \frac{-\gamma J N \beta J - 1}{\gamma A \beta L} \right)^{K-k-1}$$

$$\times \left[ -\exp\left( \frac{\gamma J N \beta J + 1}{\gamma A \beta L} \right) \mathbb{E}\left( -\frac{-\gamma J N \beta J - 1}{\gamma A \beta L} \right) \right]^{-1}$$

$$+ \sum_{l=1}^{K-k-1} (l-1)! \left( \frac{-\gamma J N \beta J - 1}{\gamma A \beta L} \right)^{-l}, \quad (11)$$

where $\mathbb{E}(\cdot)$ is the exponential integral function [28, Eq. (8.211.1)].

**Proof:** The proof is given in Appendix A.

The closed-form expression (11) gives us some insights regarding the effects of $K$, $N$, $\gamma J$, $\gamma A$, and can be more efficiently evaluated compared with (10). However, it involves the complicated exponential integral function which is not easy to use for further designs of the considered system. Based (10), we have the following result.

**Lemma 2:** The ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is approximated as

$$R_L \approx R^2_a \triangleq \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma A K \beta L}{\gamma J N \beta J + 1} \right), \quad (12)$$

**Proof:** Eq. (12) is attained by using the identity

$$\frac{1}{M} \|v\|^2 M^{-\gamma \infty} \frac{1}{M} \mathbb{E}\left\{ \|v\|^2 \right\} = \mathbb{C}(0, I_M)$$

where $v \sim \mathbb{CN}(0, I_M)$. \(\Box\)

2) Ergodic Eavesdropping Rate: From (9), applying the properties of circularly symmetric normal vectors, it is observed that

$$g_L = G_1 \frac{g_L}{\|g_L\|} \sim \mathbb{CN}(0, \sigma_L^2)$$

and is independent of $g_J$. Similarly, $\frac{g_J^H}{\|g_J\|} \tilde{g}_E \sim \mathbb{CN}(0, \sigma_E^2)$, $\frac{g_E^H}{\|g_E\|} w_E \sim \mathbb{CN}(0, \sigma_E^2)$, and they are independent of $g_L$. At Eve, the information of $\tilde{g}_E$ and $g_L$ is available. Therefore, from (9), the ergodic rate of the eavesdropping channel is given as (15) on the top of the next page.

\(\Box\)

5This ergodic legitimate rate is obtained under the assumption of worst-case scenario where the interference plus noise is Gaussian distributed. This assumption is reasonable since the interference plus noise of (7) approximates to a Gaussian when the number of antennas at Eve is large.

**Lemma 3:** The ergodic rate of the eavesdropping channel admits the following closed-form:

$$R_E = \frac{1}{\ln 2} \sum_{m=0}^{M-1} \frac{1}{(M - 1 - m)!} \left( \frac{-\gamma J \sigma_E^2 - 1}{\gamma A \beta E} \right)^{M-m-1}$$

$$\times \left[ -\exp\left( \frac{\gamma J \sigma_E^2 + 1}{\gamma A \beta E} \right) \mathbb{E}\left( -\frac{-\gamma J \sigma_E^2 - 1}{\gamma A \beta E} \right) \right]^m$$

$$+ \sum_{p=1}^{M-m-1} (p-1)! \left( \frac{-\gamma J \sigma_E^2 - 1}{\gamma A \beta E} \right)^{p} \right]. \quad (16)$$

**Proof:** The proof is given in Appendix A. \(\Box\)

**Remark 1:** From (16), although Eve suffers from her self-interference, the ergodic eavesdropping rate does not depend on the number of transmit antennas at Eve. In addition, Eve can improve the ergodic eavesdropping rate by increasing her number of receive antennas.

The following lemma follows from (15).

**Lemma 4:** The eavesdropping channel’s ergodic rate is approximated as

$$R_E \approx R^2_E \triangleq \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma A M \beta E}{\gamma J \sigma_E^2 + 1} \right), \quad (17)$$

**Proof:** Eq. (17) is obtained by using the identity (13). \(\Box\)

3) Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate: From (11) and (16), the following theorem is given.

**Theorem 1:** The exact-closed form expression of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate is given as

$$R_s \triangleq [R_L - R_E]^+, \quad (18)$$

where $R_L$ and $R_E$ are given in (11) and (16), respectively, and $[x]^+ = \max(x, 0)$.

Since this exact-closed form expression is complex, we develop an approximation of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate for further important insights, which is based on (12) and (17).

**Theorem 2:** The achievable ergodic secrecy rate is approximated as

$$R^2_s \triangleq [R^2_L - R^2_E]^+ = [\log_2 (\Psi)]^+, \quad (19)$$

where

$$\Psi = 1 + \frac{\gamma J \gamma A [K \beta L \sigma_L^2 - M \beta E N \beta J] + \gamma A [K \beta L - M \beta E]}{(\gamma J \sigma_L^2 + 1 + \gamma A M \beta E)(\gamma J N \beta J + 1)} \quad (20)$$

Typically, Alice tries to increase her transmit power to enhance the secrecy rate. From (19), to gain important insights of the considered system when the transmit power of Alice is high, we derive an asymptotic expression for the achievable ergodic secrecy rate.

**Lemma 5:** The asymptotic expression for the ergodic secrecy rate when the transmit power of Alice is high can be expressed as

$$R^2_s \xrightarrow{\gamma A \rightarrow \infty} \log_2 \left( \frac{(\gamma J \sigma_L^2 + 1)K \beta L}{(\gamma J N \beta J + 1)M \beta E} \right)^+, \quad (21)$$

**Proof:** The proof is given in Appendix B. \(\Box\)

From (21), we can observe that (i) increasing transmit power at Alice does not guarantee an improvement in the secrecy
performance of the legitimate side, and (ii) the cyber-weapon can increase the numbers of its transmit and receive antennas to reduce the effect of self-interference and enhance the malicious attack.

B. Asymptotic Analysis

1) Power Scale Law at Eve: Eve can benefit a reduction in her transmit power to perform a large number of transmit antennas.

Corollary 1: The transmit power at Eve can be reduced proportionally to \( \left( \frac{N}{\gamma} \right)^{\mu} \), where \( 0 < \mu < 1 \).

Proof: Plugging \( \gamma = 1/N \) into (19), where \( \gamma_j \) is the maximal transmit power of Eve. When the number of transmit antennas at Eve is large, \( R_S \) can be rewritten as

\[
R_S^{N \to \infty} \left[ \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{\gamma_{AE} GM + 1} \right) \right] = 0. \tag{22}
\]

Remark 2: From (22), increasing the number of transmit antennas at Eve can reduce the effect of the self-interference on the secrecy rate.

2) Rule of the Numbers of Antennas at Eve: It is popular to assume that Alice can increase the transmit power while Eve keeps the transmit power constant. However, Eve can also increase her power proportionally to Alice’s transmit power for disturbing the legitimate channel. Therefore, when transmit power of Alice and Eve is high, an interesting question is that for disturbing the legitimate channel. Therefore, when transmit power of Alice and Eve is large, \( \gamma \) increases transmit power for jamming process, the ergodic rate of legitimate link and eavesdropping link will reduce. The reason is that when the transmit power of jamming signal increases, the self-interference of full-duplex mechanism also increases at the receive antennas of Eve. However, reducing the transmit power of Eve will also reduce the ability of degrading legitimate channel. Therefore, to enhance the malicious attack, the transmit power at Eve should be optimized to maximize the difference between the eavesdropping rate and the legitimate rate. The optimization problem can be formulated as

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{\gamma_j} & \quad R_E^r - R_E^l \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad R_E^r > R_L^r, \quad 0 \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j, \text{max}},
\end{align*}
\tag{26}
\]

where \( \gamma_{j, \text{max}} \) is the maximal transmit power of Eve. From (26), an equivalent optimization problem can be expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{\gamma_j} & \quad \Theta(\gamma_j) \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad a \gamma_j + b > 0, \quad 0 \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j, \text{max}},
\end{align*}
\tag{27}
\]

where \( \Theta(\gamma_j) = 1 + \frac{a \gamma_j + b}{c \gamma_j + d \gamma_j + e} \), \( a = \gamma_A[M \beta_\ell \beta_E - \sigma_0^2 \beta_\ell K], \)

\[
b = \gamma_A[M \beta_\ell - K \beta_\ell], \quad c = \sigma_0^2 N \beta_J, \quad d = \sigma_0^2 + \beta_J N + \gamma_A K \beta_\ell \sigma_0^2, \quad e = 1 + \gamma_A K \beta_\ell.
\]

The optimal solution for transmit power \( \gamma_j^* \) is as follows:

\[
\gamma_j^* = \begin{cases} 
\arg \max_{\gamma_j \in [0, \min(\gamma_j^*, \gamma_{j, \text{max}})]} \Theta(\gamma_j), & \text{if } a > 0, b \geq 0, b^2 c + a^2 e > abd, \\
\min \left[ \gamma_j^+, \gamma_{j, \text{max}} \right], & \text{if } a > 0, b < 0, \\
0, & \text{other cases,}
\end{cases}
\tag{30}
\]

where \( \gamma_j^+ = \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} (bc + \sqrt{b^2 c^2 + a^2 e^2 - abd}). \)

Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.

From (30), it is observed that Eve operates in the passive mode when (i) the legitimate link has advantages over the eavesdropping link, i.e., \( b < 0 \), and the effect of self-interference is stronger than the jamming link, i.e., \( a < 0 \) and (ii) the eavesdropping link has advantages over the legitimate link, i.e., \( b > 0 \), and the effect of self-interference is stronger than the jamming link, i.e., \( a < 0 \). In the other cases, depending on the situation, Eve chooses her transmit power.

C. Transmit Power Optimization Scheme for Cyber-weapon

From (19), we can observe that if the cyber-weapon increases transmit power for jamming process, the ergodic rate of legitimate link and eavesdropping link will reduce. Therefore, to enhance the malicious attack, the transmit power at Eve should be optimized to maximize the difference between the eavesdropping rate and the legitimate rate. The optimization problem can be formulated as

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{\gamma_j} & \quad R_E^r - R_E^l \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad R_E^r > R_L^r, \\
& \quad 0 \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j, \text{max}},
\end{align*}
\tag{26}
\]

where \( \gamma_{j, \text{max}} \) is the maximal transmit power of Eve. From (26), an equivalent optimization problem can be expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{\gamma_j} & \quad \Theta(\gamma_j) \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad a \gamma_j + b > 0, \\
& \quad 0 \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j, \text{max}},
\end{align*}
\tag{27}
\]

where \( \Theta(\gamma_j) = 1 + \frac{a \gamma_j + b}{c \gamma_j + d \gamma_j + e} \), \( a = \gamma_A[M \beta_\ell \beta_E - \sigma_0^2 \beta_\ell K], \)

\[
b = \gamma_A[M \beta_\ell - K \beta_\ell], \quad c = \sigma_0^2 N \beta_J, \quad d = \sigma_0^2 + \beta_J N + \gamma_A K \beta_\ell \sigma_0^2, \quad e = 1 + \gamma_A K \beta_\ell.
\]

The optimal solution for transmit power \( \gamma_j^* \) is as follows:

\[
\gamma_j^* = \begin{cases} 
\arg \max_{\gamma_j \in [0, \min(\gamma_j^*, \gamma_{j, \text{max}})]} \Theta(\gamma_j), & \text{if } a > 0, b \geq 0, b^2 c + a^2 e > abd, \\
\min \left[ \gamma_j^+, \gamma_{j, \text{max}} \right], & \text{if } a > 0, b < 0, \\
0, & \text{other cases,}
\end{cases}
\tag{30}
\]

where \( \gamma_j^+ = \frac{1}{\alpha \epsilon} (bc + \sqrt{b^2 c^2 + a^2 e^2 - abd}). \)

Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.

From (30), it is observed that Eve operates in the passive mode when (i) the legitimate link has advantages over the eavesdropping link, i.e., \( b < 0 \), and the effect of self-interference is stronger than the jamming link, i.e., \( a < 0 \) and (ii) the eavesdropping link has advantages over the legitimate link, i.e., \( b > 0 \), and the effect of self-interference is stronger than the jamming link, i.e., \( a < 0 \). In the other cases, depending on the situation, Eve chooses her transmit power.
IV. IMPERFECT CHANNEL ESTIMATION AT EVE

In the previous sections, we have investigated the considered system with the assumption of perfect channel estimation at Eve. In this section, the effect of imperfect channel estimation at Eve will be studied.

A. MMSE Channel Estimation for the Jamming Link

In order to perform beamforming from Alice to Bob, both have to exchange their CSI during training sequence. Normally, this information is exchanged via public channel and the framework of training sequence can be known at Eve. Therefore, Eve can perform channel estimation of eavesdropping link. The received signal at Eve will be studied.

Firstly, Bob sends training signals to Alice for enabling Alice creating the pre-code matrix. As a consequence, Eve overhears this information and performs channel estimation for the jamming channel. At Eve, the received signal from Bob is given as

\[
y_j = \sqrt{P_B} \hat{g}_j x_{sp} + w_j, \quad (31)
\]

where \(x_{sp}\) is the pilot signal from Bob, \(E\{|x_{sp}|^2\} = 1\), \(P_B\) is the transmit power of Bob, and \(w_j \sim \sigma_0 \mathcal{CN}(0, I_N)\) is the AWGN at Bob. In this work, we assume that the minimal mean square error (MMSE) channel estimation is processed at Eve. The estimated channel from Bob to Eve is given as

\[
\hat{g}_1 = C_{g_1,y_1} C_{y_1}^{-1} y_1 = \frac{P_B \beta_1}{P_B \beta_1 + \sigma_0^2} \hat{g}_1 + \frac{\sqrt{P_B \beta_1}}{P_B \beta_1 + \sigma_0^2} w_1 x_{sp}^*, \quad (32)
\]

where \(C_{g_1,y_1} = \sqrt{P_B \beta_1} I_N x_{sp}^*, C_{y_1} = (P_B \beta_1 + \sigma_0^2) I_N\). From (32), it is observed that \(\hat{g}_1 \sim \beta_1 \sqrt{\frac{\gamma_0}{\gamma_0 + 1}} \mathcal{CN}(0, I_N)\), where \(\gamma_B = P_B / \sigma_0^2\).

We denote the estimation error for the jamming channel as follows:

\[
\mathcal{E}_J = \hat{g}_1 - \hat{g}_1 = \frac{\sigma_0^2}{P_B \beta_1 + \sigma_0^2} \hat{g}_1 - \frac{\sqrt{P_B \beta_1}}{P_B \beta_1 + \sigma_0^2} w_1 x_{sp}^*, \quad (33)
\]

where \(\mathcal{E}_J\) is independent of \(\hat{g}_1\) and \(\mathcal{E}_J \sim \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_0^2}{\gamma_0 + 1}} \mathcal{CN}(0, I_N)\).

B. MMSE Channel Estimation for the Eavesdropping Link

After receiving the training signals from Bob, Alice sends feedback to Bob to inform the channel state. At the same time, Eve obtains these training signals and performs the channel estimation for the eavesdropping link. The received signal at Eve is formulated as

\[
y_E = \sqrt{P_A} \hat{g}_E x_{sp} + w_E, \quad (34)
\]

where \(w_E \sim \sigma_0 \mathcal{CN}(0, I_M)\) is the AWGN at Eve. As a consequence, the estimated channel at Eve is

\[
\hat{g}_E = C_{\hat{g}_E,y_E} C_{y_E}^{-1} y_E = \frac{P_A \beta_E}{P_A \beta_E + \sigma_0^2} \hat{g}_E + \frac{\sqrt{P_A \beta_E}}{P_A \beta_E + \sigma_0^2} w_E x_{sp}^*, \quad (35)
\]

where \(C\) is the covariance matrix, \(C_{\hat{g}_E,y_E} = \sqrt{P_A \beta_E I_M x_{sp}^*}, C_{y_E} = (P_A \beta_E + \sigma_0^2) I_M\). As observing (35), \(\hat{g}_E \sim \beta_E \sqrt{\frac{\gamma_0}{\gamma_0 + 1}} \mathcal{CN}(0, I_M)\).

We denote the estimation error for the eavesdropping channel as

\[
\mathcal{E}_E \triangleq \hat{g}_E - \hat{g}_E = \frac{\sigma_0^2}{P_A \beta_E + \sigma_0^2} \hat{g}_E - \frac{\sqrt{P_A \beta_E}}{P_A \beta_E + \sigma_0^2} w_E x_{sp}^*. \quad (36)
\]

It is worth noting that because of the property of MMSE estimation, \(\mathcal{E}_E\) is independent of \(\hat{g}_E\) and \(\mathcal{E}_E \sim \sqrt{\frac{\beta_E}{\gamma_0 + 1}} \mathcal{CN}(0, I_N)\).

C. Closed-form Expression for Finite K, M, N

1) Ergodic Legitimate Rate: After having the estimated channel of the jamming channel, Eve creates beamforming to Bob. The jamming signal from Eve is designed as

\[
s_j = \sqrt{P_J} \frac{\hat{g}_J}{\|\hat{g}_J\|} x_J + w_L. \quad (38)
\]

From (38), when imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve, the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel can be formulated as

\[
\hat{R}_L = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{P_A \|g_L\|^2}{P_J \mathbb{E}\{\|\hat{g}_J\|^2\} + \mathbb{E}\{\mathcal{E}_J^H \hat{g}_J\|g_L\|^2\}} \right) + \sigma_0^2 \right\} \quad (39)
\]

From (39), the following lemmas are given.

Lemma 6: When imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve, the exact closed-form for ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is given as

\[
\hat{R}_L \approx \frac{1}{\ln 2} \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} \frac{1}{(K-1-k)!} \left( \frac{-\gamma J B^2 N + \gamma_J B + \gamma_B B + 1}{\gamma A \beta L (\gamma_B B + 1)} \right)^{K-k-1} \times \left( \frac{-\gamma J B^2 N + \gamma_J B + \gamma_B B + 1}{\gamma A \beta L (\gamma_B B + 1)} \right)^{K-k-1} \times \exp \left( \frac{-\gamma J B^2 N + \gamma_J B + \gamma_B B + 1}{\gamma A \beta L (\gamma_B B + 1)} \right) \times \left( \frac{-\gamma J B^2 N + \gamma_J B + \gamma_B B + 1}{\gamma A \beta L (\gamma_B B + 1)} \right) \quad (40)
\]

Lemma 7: When imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve, the approximation for the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is formulated as follows:

\[
\hat{R}_L \approx \frac{1}{\ln 2} \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} \frac{1}{(K-1-k)!} \left( \frac{-\gamma J B^2 N + \gamma_J B + \gamma_B B + 1}{\gamma A \beta L (\gamma_B B + 1)} \right)^{K-k-1} \times \left( \frac{-\gamma J B^2 N + \gamma_J B + \gamma_B B + 1}{\gamma A \beta L (\gamma_B B + 1)} \right)^{K-k-1} \times \exp \left( \frac{-\gamma J B^2 N + \gamma_J B + \gamma_B B + 1}{\gamma A \beta L (\gamma_B B + 1)} \right) \times \left( \frac{-\gamma J B^2 N + \gamma_J B + \gamma_B B + 1}{\gamma A \beta L (\gamma_B B + 1)} \right) \quad (41)
\]
Eq. (41) is obtained by using the identity (13).

Remark 4: From (41), we can observe that
\[ \hat{R}_E \xrightarrow{\gamma_m \to \infty} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_A \beta_l \gamma_k}{\gamma_j \beta_j N + 1} \right), \] (42)
which is similar to (12). In other words, Eve can benefit from the high transmit power at Bob. Besides, another observation is as follows:
\[ \hat{R}_E \xrightarrow{\gamma_j \to \infty} \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_A \beta_l K}{\gamma_j \beta_j N + 1} \right), \] (43)
which means that when Bob uses a very small transmit power to make the channel estimation process at Eve difficult, malicious attack benefits from increasing the transmit power but loses the advantage of the number of transmit antennas at Eve.

2) Ergodic Eavesdropping Rate: Within the full-duplex mode, at the receive antennas, Eve receives her jamming signal. Therefore, the received signals at Eve is formulated as
\[ y_E = \sqrt{p_A} g_E x + \sqrt{p_J} g_J \hat{g}_j \| g_E \|^2 x_j + w_E, \] (44)
After performing channel estimation, Eve deploys MRC technique to process the received signals. Consequently, the received signal at Eve after MRC process is given as
\[ y_E^{\text{MRC}} = \sqrt{p_A} \| g_E \|^2 x + \sqrt{p_J} \frac{g_J^H \| g_E \|^2}{\| g_E \|^2} E x + \sqrt{p_J} \frac{g_J^H}{\| g_E \|^2} \hat{g}_j x_j + w_E, \] (45)
where \( \hat{g}_j = G_j \frac{\hat{g}_j}{\| \hat{g}_j \|} \) and \( \hat{g}_j \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, I_M) \).

Alice considers the estimated channel as the true channel and the last three terms in (45) as the interference and noise. Therefore, the ergodic eavesdropping rate is given in (46) on the top of the next page. Step (a) in (46) is obtained by using the properties of circularly symmetric normal vectors \( \| g_E \|^2 \mathcal{CN}(0, \sigma_g^2 + 1) \), \( \frac{g_J^H}{\| g_E \|^2} \| g_E \|^2 \mathcal{CN}(0, \sigma_g^2) \), \( \| \hat{g}_j \|^2 \mathcal{CN}(0, \sigma_g^2) \), and the identity (13).

From (46), the following lemmas are given.

Lemma 8: When imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve, the exact closed-form expression for the ergodic eavesdropping rate is formulated as follows:
\[ \hat{R}_E = \frac{1}{\ln 2} \sum_{m=0}^{M-1} \frac{1}{(M-m-1)!} \left[ (\gamma_A \beta_l + 1)(\gamma_j \sigma_g^2 + 1) + \gamma_A \beta_E \right]^{M-m-1} \times \exp \left( \frac{(\gamma_A \beta_l + 1)(\gamma_j \sigma_g^2 + 1) + \gamma_A \beta_E}{\gamma_A \beta_E^2} \right) \times \frac{\gamma_A \beta_l^2}{\gamma_A \beta_E^2} \] (47)
\[ + \sum_{p=1}^{M-m-1} (p-1)! \left( \frac{(\gamma_A \beta_l + 1)(\gamma_j \sigma_g^2 + 1) + \gamma_A \beta_E}{\gamma_A \beta_E^2} \right)^{-p}. \]

Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.

Lemma 9: When imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve, the approximation of the ergodic eavesdropping rate is given as
\[ \hat{R}_E \approx \hat{R}_E^{\text{asym}} \triangleq \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_A \beta_E M}{\gamma_A \beta_E^2 + 1} \right). \] (48)

Proof: Eq. (48) is obtained by using identity (13).

Similar to the perfect channel estimation scheme, the ergodic eavesdropping rate in the imperfect channel estimation scheme depends on the transmit power but does not depend on the number of transmit antennas at Eve. In addition, as the transmit power at Alice is high, (48) approximates (17). Therefore, the channel estimation process at Eve benefits from increasing the transmit power at Alice.

3) Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate: The exact-closed-form expression of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate can be calculated directly from (40) and (47) as follows:
\[ \hat{R}_S = \lim_{\gamma_j \to \infty} \left[ \log_2(\tilde{\Psi}) \right]^+, \] (49)
From (41) and (48), the approximation for the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system is expressed as
\[ \hat{R}_S^{\text{asym}} \triangleq \left[ \hat{R}_E - \hat{R}_E^{\text{asym}} \right]^+ = \left[ \log_2(\tilde{\Psi}) \right]^+, \] (50)
where
\[ \tilde{\Psi} = \left[ \frac{\gamma_j \beta_l \beta_E^2 N + \gamma_j \beta_j + \gamma_j \beta_j + 1 + \gamma_A \beta_l K (\gamma_j \beta_j + 1)}{\gamma_j \beta_l \beta_E^2 N + \gamma_j \beta_j + \gamma_j \beta_j + 1} \right] \times \left[ \frac{(\gamma_A \beta_E^2 + 1 + \gamma_j \sigma_g^2)(\gamma_A \beta_E + 1) + \gamma_A \beta_E^2}{(\gamma_A \beta_E^2 + 1 + \gamma_j \sigma_g^2)(\gamma_A \beta_E + 1) + \gamma_A \beta_E^2} M \right]. \] (51)

Lemma 10: The asymptotic expression of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate when transmit power at Alice is high with imperfect channel estimation at Eve is given as follows:
\[ \hat{R}_S^{\text{asym}} \triangleq \lim_{\gamma_j \to \infty} \left[ \log_2 \left( \frac{K \beta_l (\gamma_j \beta_j + 1) + \gamma_A \beta_E^2 + 2}{(\gamma_j \beta_j \gamma_A \beta_E N + 1 + \gamma_j \beta_j + 1) \beta_E M} \right) \right]^+. \] (52)

Remark 5: When imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve, increasing transmit power at Alice still cannot guarantee an improvement in secrecy performance for the legitimate side. Besides, increasing the numbers of transmit and receive antennas at Eve can reduce the effect of the self-interference and imperfect channel estimation on the malicious attack.

D. Asymptotic Analysis

1) Power Scale Law at Eve: When imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve, the power scale law still holds true at Eve, i.e., the transmit power at Eve can be reduced proportionally to \( \left( \frac{1}{\gamma_j} \right)^\alpha \), where \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \).

Proof: Plugging \( \gamma_j = \frac{\tilde{\gamma}_j}{\tilde{\gamma}_j^\alpha} \) into (50), where \( \tilde{\gamma}_j \) is the maximal transmit power of Eve. When the number of transmit antennas at Eve, i.e., \( N \) is large, \( \tilde{\Psi} \) can be rewritten as
\[ \hat{\Psi} \xrightarrow{N \to \infty} \frac{2 \gamma_A \beta_E + 1}{\gamma_A \beta_E (M + 2) + 1 + \gamma_A \beta_E^2 M} < 1, \] (53)
\[ \hat{R}_E = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\mathcal{P}_\lambda \| \mathbf{g}_E \|^2}{\| \mathbf{g}_E \| \| \mathbf{s}_E \| + \| \mathbf{w}_E \|^2} \right) \right\} \]  

which guarantees that \( \hat{R}_S = 0 \).

Although suffering from imperfect channel estimation, Eve can reduce her transmit power by increasing her number of transmit antennas, followed by a reduction in the effect of self-interference.

2) Rule for the Number of Antennas at Eve: When imperfect channel estimation is taken into account at Eve and the transmit power at Alice and Eve is high, the number of antennas at Eve for guaranteeing \( \hat{R}_E = 0 \) is constrained as

\[ \nu > 1 + \log \left( \frac{\beta_L \sigma_t^2 (\gamma_B \beta_j + 1)}{\beta_j \beta_L e^\alpha e M} \right) \frac{1}{\log(K)}. \]  

(54)

where \( N = \epsilon_n K^\alpha, M = \epsilon_m K^\nu, \gamma_j = \rho \gamma_A, \epsilon_m > 0, \epsilon_n > 0, \alpha > 0, \nu > 0, \) and \( \rho > 0 \).

As been observed from (54), when Bob uses small transmit power, (54) becomes the condition for the number of receive antennas at Eve as follows:

\[ \nu > 1 + \log \left( \frac{\beta_1 \sigma_1^2}{\beta_j \beta_L e^\alpha} \right) \frac{1}{\log(K)}. \]  

(55)

We also observe that when Bob uses high transmit power, (54) becomes (25).

E. Transmit Power Optimization Scheme for Cyber-weapon

Similar to the perfect channel estimation scheme, the optimization problem can be formulated as

\[ \min_{\gamma_j} R_E^2 - \hat{R}_E^2 \]  

s. t. \[ \hat{R}_E > \hat{R}_E^2, \]  

\[ 0 \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j_{\text{max}}}, \]  

(56)

where \( R_E^2 \) is the pre-defined target rate of the eavesdropping channel and \( \gamma_{j_{\text{max}}} \) is the maximal transmit power of Eve. From (56), an equivalent optimization problem can be expressed as

\[ \min_{\gamma_j} \hat{\Theta}(\gamma_j) \]  

s. t. \[ \hat{a} \gamma_j + \hat{b} > 0, \]  

\[ 0 \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j_{\text{max}}}, \]  

(57)

where \( \hat{\Theta}(\gamma_j) = 1 + \frac{\hat{a} + 1}{\hat{c} + 1}, \hat{a} = \gamma_A \beta_0 M \beta_j (\gamma_A \beta_E + 1)(\gamma_B \beta_j + 1), \hat{b} = \gamma_A (\gamma_B \beta_j + 1) \hat{c} = \beta_0 \sigma_0^2 (\gamma_A \beta_E + 1)(\gamma_B \beta_j + 1), \hat{d} = (\gamma_A \beta_E + 1)(\gamma_B \beta_j + 1), \) and \( \hat{e} = (\gamma_A \beta_E + 1)(\gamma_A K \beta_L + 1)(\gamma_A \beta_j + 1). \)  

(58)

\[ \gamma_j^* = \begin{cases} \arg \max \gamma_j \in \{0, \min(\gamma_{j_{\text{max}}} \gamma_{j_{\max}})\} \hat{\Theta}(\gamma_j), & \text{if } \hat{a} > 0, \hat{b} \geq 0, \hat{d} \hat{b} \hat{e} > \hat{a} \hat{d} \hat{c}, \min(\gamma_{j_{\text{max}}} \gamma_{j_{\text{max}}}), \text{if } \hat{a} > 0, \hat{b} < 0, \end{cases} \]  

(60)

\[ 0, \text{ other cases}, \]

where \( \gamma_{j_{\text{max}}} = \frac{1}{\hat{a}}(\hat{b} \hat{c} + \sqrt{b^2 \hat{c}^2 + \hat{a}^2 \hat{d} \hat{c} - \hat{a} \hat{b} \hat{d} c}). \]

Proof: The proof follows a similar method as given in Appendix C.

V. NUMERICAL RESULTS

In this section, we first provide numerical results based on Monte-Carlo simulation to evaluate the tightness of our approximation for the ergodic secrecy rate.

In Fig. 2, comparisons among simulation, closed-form, and the approximation of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate in the perfect and imperfect channel estimation schemes are demonstrated respectively. In this setup, the number of transmit antennas at Alice, the number of receive antennas and the number of transmit antennas at Eve are set at \( M = N = K \) and \( M = N = 3K \), the transmit power of Alice is set at \( \gamma_A = 30 \) dB, the transmit power of Eve is set at \( \gamma_j = 20 \) dB, the transmit power of Bob is set at \( \gamma_B = 10 \) dB, \( \beta_0 = 1, \beta_L = 1, \beta_j = 10^{-1}, \) and \( \epsilon = 10 \). We can observe that the approximation are tight, especially at large numbers of antennas. Therefore, we use these approximations for the following numerical work. In addition, from the figure, as the number of antennas at Eve is large, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate decreases. The phenomenon can be explained from (12)(for the case of perfect channel estimation at Eve) and (41)(for the case of imperfect channel estimation at Eve). As setting the number of transmit antennas at Eve, i.e., \( N \),
However, increasing the number of antennas at Alice can does not guarantee an improvement in secrecy performance. Besides, from (17) and (48), as the number of receive antennas at Eve, i.e., $N$, increases, the eavesdropping rate increases. As a consequence, the secrecy rate of the considered system reduces when $M$ and $N$ are set proportional to $K$ and $K$ increases. Besides, under the effect of imperfect channel estimation at Eve, the malicious attack is less effective.

Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the effect of the numbers of antennas at Alice and Eve on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system in the perfect and imperfect channel estimation schemes, respectively. In this setup, $K = \{50, 100\}$, $M = \{50, 100\}$, $N = \{50, 100\}$, $\beta_L = \beta_E = 1$, $\beta_J = 0.1$, $\sigma_I = 10$, $\sigma_J = 10$ dB, $\gamma_B = 10$ dB. As increasing the transmit power at Alice, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate increases and then saturates. The reason is that although increasing transmit power can help legitimate link to decrease the effect of jamming signal from Eve, it also enables Eve to eavesdrop more information. In addition, in the imperfect channel estimation scheme, a greater transmit power at Alice also enhances the channel estimation process at Eve. Therefore, in the legitimate side’s point of view, raising the transmit power does not guarantee an improvement in secrecy performance. However, increasing the number of antennas at Alice can enhance the ergodic secrecy rate. At the illegitimate side, raising the number of either transmit or receive antennas can decrease the secrecy performance of legitimate side. Besides, the results have shown that the higher the transmit power at Alice is, the better the effect of increasing the number of receive antennas at Eve is. Meanwhile, deploying a higher number of transmit antennas at Eve significantly decreases the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system.

Fig. 5 demonstrates the effect of the transmit power at Bob on the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system. System parameters are set as $K = 100$, $M = 50$, $N = 70$, $\beta_L = 5$, $\beta_J = 0.5$, $\beta_E = 1$, $\sigma_I = 2$, $\gamma_J = 5$ dB and $\gamma_A = \{0, 10, 20\}$ dB. As increasing the transmit power at Bob, the ergodic secrecy rate decreases. The explanation is that when the transmit power at Bob increases, the error of the channel estimation process at Eve for the jamming channel decreases. Therefore, the jamming process at Eve is more effective followed by a reduction in the ergodic secrecy rate.

In Fig. 6, the power scale law of the number of transmit antennas at Eve in the perfect and imperfect channel estimation schemes is presented. In this figure, the transmit power at Eve that satisfies $R_E = R_M$ versus the number of transmit antennas at Eve is plotted. The system parameters are set $\gamma_A = \gamma_B = 1$ dB, $M = 30$, $K = 50$, $60$, $70$, $\beta_L = \beta_E = \beta_J = 1$, and $\sigma_I = 1$. It is observed that when the number of transmit antennas at Eve is double, the required transmit power at Eve is reduced approximately by 3 dB.

Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 plot the difference between $R_E$ and $R_L$ versus $\gamma_A$ in the perfect and imperfect channel estimation schemes. The system is configured as $M = 50$, $N = 50$, $\beta_L = \beta_E = \beta_J = 1$, $\sigma_I = 1$, $\gamma_{J, \text{max}} = 15$ dB, and $\gamma_B = 30$ dB. We consider three cases (i) the cyber-weapon uses the fixed transmit power for jamming, (ii) the cyber-weapon deploys transmit power optimization scheme for jamming based on the statistical CSI, and (iii) the simulation of the case when the cyber-weapon implements transmit power optimization scheme based on the instantaneous CSI b. The power optimization scheme based on the instantaneous CSI is performed.

\[^b\]From Eve’s point of view, it is very hard or almost impossible to obtain the instantaneous CSI of the channel from Alice to Bob for optimizing its transmit power.
as follows:

\[
\max_{\gamma_j} \quad P_{E}^{\text{inst}} - P_{L}^{\text{inst}}
\]

\[
s.\ t. \quad P_{E}^{\text{inst}} > P_{L}^{\text{inst}},
\]

\[
0 \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j,\text{max}}.
\]

From the figures, the case of optimal transmit power with the instantaneous CSI outperforms the other cases at the expense of the full system’s CSI knowledge. It is obviously that by using the instantaneous CSI, Eve can adjust her transmit power more quickly followed by a better performance. The case of optimal transmit power with the statistical CSI shows higher \( R_E - R_L \) than that in the maximum transmit power case as the transmit power at Alice decreases. The reason is that when the transmit power at Alice is small, the transmit power of Eve in the optimal transmit power case can be decreased to reduce the effect of the self-interference, followed by an enhancement in the eavesdropping rate. Meanwhile, when the transmit power at Alice is high, both Alice and Eve receive more information. In this situation, Eve increases her transmit power to degrade the legitimate channel. Besides, increasing the number of antennas at Alice can restrain the effectiveness of the power optimization scheme at Eve.

In Fig. 9, the performance comparison of the proposed cyber-weapon, a massive array eavesdropper, and a massive array jammer is shown. In this setup, three adversaries have the same number of antennas, i.e., the massive array eavesdropper and jammer are equipped with 100 antennas, the cyber-weapon is equipped with 50 receive antennas and 50 transmit antennas. Other parameters are set as \( \beta_L = \beta_E = \beta_J = 1 \), \( \sigma_1 = 1 \), \( \gamma_{j,\text{max}} = 15 \) dB. The massive array jammer uses \( \gamma_{j,\text{max}} = 15 \) dB as its jamming power. From the figure, we can observe that from the viewpoint of the illegitimate side, a massive array jammer have the worst performance. The legitimate side can easily counter the attack of the jammer by increasing its transmit power. A massive array eavesdropper shows a better performance than the jammer does when her can successfully wiretap the information from the legitimate

\[\text{side. However, when the transmit power at the legitimate side increases, no improvement is witnessed in the performance of the eavesdropper. The proposed cyber-weapon achieves the best performance among the three adversaries since her can dynamically launch different malicious attack scenarios.}\]

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, from the perspective of the illegitimate side, the abilities of a full-duplex massive array cyber-weapon have been investigated with taking the effect of imperfect channel estimation at the cyber-weapon into consideration. The exact closed-form, tight approximation, and asymptotic expressions of the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system in the
From (1), it is observed that

$$X = \|H_L\|^2$$

follows the gamma distribution, i.e., $X \sim \Gamma(K,1)$. The probability density function (PDF) of $X$ is

$$f_X(x) = \frac{1}{K(x)^K} x^{K-1} \exp(-x).$$

Thus, the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is derived as follows:

$$R_L = \int_0^\infty \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma L_2}{\gamma J N L_2} \right) dX(x) = \frac{1}{1} \sum_{k=0}^{K-k-1} \frac{1}{(K-1-k)!} \left( -\gamma J N L_2 \right)^{K-k-1} \exp(-x)$$

$$= -\exp \left( \frac{\gamma J N L_2}{\gamma L_2} \right) \left( -\gamma J N L_2 \right)^{-1} \prod_{i=1}^{K-k} \left( \frac{1}{(K-1-k)!} \right).$$  

From (1), it is observed that $\|g_L\|^2 = \beta L$ follows the gamma distribution, i.e., $X \sim \Gamma(K,1)$. The probability density function (PDF) of $X$ is

$$f_X(x) = \frac{1}{K(x)^K} x^{K-1} \exp(-x).$$

Thus, the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is derived as follows:

$$R_L = \int_0^\infty \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma L_2}{\gamma J N L_2} \right) dX(x) = \frac{1}{1} \sum_{k=0}^{K-k-1} \frac{1}{(K-1-k)!} \left( -\gamma J N L_2 \right)^{K-k-1} \exp(-x)$$

$$= -\exp \left( \frac{\gamma J N L_2}{\gamma L_2} \right) \left( -\gamma J N L_2 \right)^{-1} \prod_{i=1}^{K-k} \left( \frac{1}{(K-1-k)!} \right).$$  

The Appendix A

**Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3**

From (10), the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is expressed as

$$R_L = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \log_2 \left[ 1 + \frac{\gamma L_2}{\gamma J N L_2} \right] \right\}. \quad (A.1)$$

From (1), it is observed that $\|g_L\|^2 = \beta L$ follows the gamma distribution, i.e., $X \sim \Gamma(K,1)$. The probability density function (PDF) of $X$ is

$$f_X(x) = \frac{1}{K(x)^K} x^{K-1} \exp(-x).$$

Thus, the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is derived as follows:

$$R_L = \int_0^\infty \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma L_2}{\gamma J N L_2} \right) dX(x) = \frac{1}{1} \sum_{k=0}^{K-k-1} \frac{1}{(K-1-k)!} \left( -\gamma J N L_2 \right)^{K-k-1} \exp(-x)$$

$$= -\exp \left( \frac{\gamma J N L_2}{\gamma L_2} \right) \left( -\gamma J N L_2 \right)^{-1} \prod_{i=1}^{K-k} \left( \frac{1}{(K-1-k)!} \right).$$  

**Appendix B**

**Proof of Lemma 5**

When the transmit power of Alice is high, the asymptotic expression for the ergodic legitimate rate can be calculated as

$$R_L^{\text{asy}} = \left[ \log_2 \left( \lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \Psi(\gamma) \right) \right].$$

Similarly, the exact closed-form for the ergodic rate of the eavesdropping is attained as in (16).

**Appendix C**

**Proof of Power Optimization Scheme at Eve**

The first derivative of $\Theta(\gamma_j)$ is given as

$$\Theta'(\gamma_j) = \frac{-2ac\gamma_j^2 + 2bc\gamma_j + ae + bd}{(c\gamma_j^2 + d\gamma_j + e)^2}. \quad (C.1)$$

From the condition $a\gamma_j + b > 0$, we consider three cases, i.e., $a < 0$ and $b > 0$, $a > 0$ and $b < 0$, and $a > 0$ and $b < 0$.  

1) Case 1— $a < 0$ and $b > 0$: in this case, it is observed that $\Theta(\gamma_j)$ is minimal when $\gamma_j = 0$. Therefore, the optimal solution for transmit power at Eve $\gamma_j^*$ is 0.  

2) Case 2— $a > 0$ and $b < 0$: Considering the discriminant of quadratic equation $\Theta'(\gamma_j) = 0$ as follows:

$$\Delta = 4b^2c^2 + 4a^2e^2 + 4abcd. \quad (C.2)$$

If $\Delta \leq 0$ then $\Theta'(\gamma_j) < 0 \forall \gamma_j > 0$. Therefore, $\Theta(\gamma_j)$ is a decreasing function $\forall \gamma_j > 0$. The optimal solution $\gamma_j^*$ is $\gamma_j^* = 0$. If $\Delta > 0$, equation $\Theta'(\gamma_j) = 0$ has two different roots

$$\gamma_{1j} = \frac{2bc + \sqrt{\Delta}}{2ac} > 0 \text{ and } \gamma_{2j} = \frac{2bc - \sqrt{\Delta}}{2ac}. \quad (C.3)$$

We consider two sub-cases $2bc > \sqrt{\Delta}$ and $2bc < \sqrt{\Delta}$. In the sub-case $2bc > \sqrt{\Delta}$, we can observe that $\gamma_{2j} > 0$. As a consequence, $\Theta(\gamma_j)$ is increasing with $\gamma_{1j} \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{2j}$.
and decreasing with $\gamma_3 > \gamma_{j1}$ and $0 < \gamma_j < \gamma_{j2}$. Therefore, the optimal solution $\gamma^*_j$ is

$$\gamma^*_j = \arg \max_{\gamma_j \in \{0, \gamma_{j\min}, \gamma_{j\max}\}} \Theta(\gamma_j). \tag{C.4}$$

In the sub-case $2bc < \sqrt{\Delta}$, it is observed that $\gamma_{j2} < 0$. Therefore, $\Theta(\gamma_j)$ is increasing with $0 \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j1}$ and decreasing with $\gamma_{j1} < \gamma_j$. As a result, the optimal solution $\gamma^*_j$ is

$$\gamma^*_j = \arg \max_{\gamma_j \in \{0, \gamma_{j\min}, \gamma_{j\max}\}} \Theta(\gamma_j). \tag{C.5}$$

3) Case 3--- $a > 0$ and $b < 0$: The condition for the transmit power of Eve becomes $\gamma_3 > \frac{b}{a} > 0$. We assume that $\gamma_{j\max} > \frac{b}{a}$. It is observed that $\Delta > 0$, $\gamma_{j1} > 0$, and $\gamma_{j2} < 0$. Therefore, $\Theta(\gamma_j)$ is increasing with $\frac{b}{a} \leq \gamma_j \leq \gamma_{j1}$ and decreasing with $\gamma_{j} > \gamma_{j1}$. As a result, the optimal solution $\gamma^*_j$ is

$$\gamma^*_j = \min (\gamma_{j1}, \gamma_{j\max}). \tag{C.6}$$

In the other cases, i.e., $a\gamma_3 + b < 0$, the ergodic eavesdropping rate is smaller than the ergodic legitimate rate, i.e., $R^*_E < R^*_L$. In these cases, the optimal transmit power of Eve is $\gamma^*_E = 0$.

### APPENDIX D

**Proof of Lemma 8**

From (35), it is observed that

$$\mathbb{E}\{\bar{g}_E\tilde{g}_E^H\} = \left[\frac{P_A^2\sigma_0^2}{(P_A\beta_E + \sigma_0^2)}\right] I_M. \tag{D.1}$$

Besides, we have that $\bar{g}_E \sim \sqrt{\beta_E} C N(0, I_M)$. Therefore, $\hat{g}_E \sim \beta_E \sqrt{\frac{\gamma_A}{\gamma_A\beta_E + 1}} C N(0, I_M)$. Consequently, $\parallel \bar{g}_E \parallel^2$ can be rewritten as $\parallel \bar{g}_E \parallel^2 = \frac{\gamma_A\beta_E}{\gamma_A\beta_E + 1} Y$, where $Y$ follows gamma distribution, i.e., $Y \sim \Gamma(M, 1)$. The PDF of $Y$ is

$$f_Y(y) = \frac{1}{\Gamma(M)} y^{M-1} \exp(-y). \tag{D.2}$$

The exact closed-form of the ergodic eavesdropping rate when imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve can be calculated as follows:

$$R_E = \mathbb{E}\left\{\log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\gamma_A \parallel \bar{g}_E \parallel^2}{\gamma_A\beta_E + 1 + \gamma_A\beta_E^2 + 1} \right) \right\}$$

$$= \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{\gamma_A \beta_E^2}{(\gamma_A\beta_E + 1)(\gamma_A\beta_E + 1 + \gamma_A\beta_E^2 + 1)} \right) y^M \exp(-y) dy$$

$$= \frac{1}{\ln 2} \sum_{m=0}^{M-1} \frac{1}{(M-m-1)!}$$

$$\times \left(- (\gamma_A\beta_E + 1)(\gamma_A\beta_E + 1 + \gamma_A\beta_E^2 + 1) \right)^{M-m-1}$$

$$\times \left(- \exp \left(\gamma_A\beta_E + 1)(\gamma_A\beta_E + 1 + \gamma_A\beta_E^2 + 1) \right) \right)$$

$$\times \frac{M-m-1}{(p-1)!} \left(- (\gamma_A\beta_E + 1)(\gamma_A\beta_E + 1 + \gamma_A\beta_E^2 + 1) \right)^{-p}. \tag{D.3}$$

(E.3) is obtained with the help of [28, Eq. (4.337.5)].

### APPENDIX E

**Analysis for the Case of Multi-Antenna Receiver**

We use the channel capacity of the point-to-point Gaussian MIMO channel as an upper bound for the legitimate rate of the channel from Alice to Bob when multiple antennas are used at Bob. We assume the most optimistic scenario when the multi-antenna receiver can cancel all the interference from the jammer. Thus, the channel capacity of the point-to-point Gaussian MIMO channels with equal power allocation at the transmitter is given as [30], [31]

$$C_L = \mathbb{E}\left\{\log_2 \det \left( I_V + \frac{\gamma_A}{K} HH^* \right) \right\}, \tag{E.1}$$

where $\det(\cdot)$ denotes the determinant, $K$ and $V$ are the numbers of antennas at Alice and Bob, respectively, $H$ is the $V \times K$ channel matrix from Alice to Bob, elements of $H$ are i.i.d. $CN(0, 1)$ random variables. For fixed $V$, $\frac{HH^*}{\gamma_A K} \rightarrow I_V$ almost surely when $K$ goes to infinity. The capacity is rewritten as

$$C_L \rightarrow V \log_2 (1 + \gamma_A). \tag{E.2}$$

From the above upper bound of the legitimate rate and (17), we have an upper bound for the secrecy rate of the considered system with multiple antennas at Bob as follows:

$$R_S \rightarrow \left[\log_2 \left(\frac{(1 + \gamma_A)^V}{(\gamma_A\beta_E + 1 + \gamma_A\beta_E^2)} \right) \right]^+ \tag{E.3}$$

From (E.3), we can see that when the number of receive antennas at Eve is large, this secrecy rate upper bound still converges to zero.
Appendix F
Analysis and Numerical Results for the Case of Imperfect Channel Estimation at the Legitimate Users

A. Channel Estimation at Alice

Bob sends training signals to Alice for enabling Alice creating the pre-code matrix. At Alice, the received signal is

\[ y_A = \sqrt{P_A}g_A x_p + w_A, \]

where \( w_A \sim CN(0, I_M) \) is the AWGN at Alice. In this work, we assume that MMSE channel estimation is processed at Alice. The estimated channel from Alice to Bob is given as

\[ \hat{g}_L = C_{g_A,y_A} C^{-1}_{y_A,y_A} y_A = \frac{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L}{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L + \sigma_0^2} g_L + \sqrt{\frac{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L}{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L + \sigma_0^2}} w_{A \infty}, \]

where \( C_{g_A,y_A} = \sqrt{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L} I_M x_p^{*}, \ C_{y_A,y_A} = (\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L + \sigma_0^2) I_M. \) From (F.2), it is observed that \( \hat{g}_L \sim CN(0, \sigma_A^2 I_M), \ \gamma_B = \frac{\mathcal{P}_B}{\sigma_0^2}, \) and \( \sigma_A = \beta_L \sqrt{\frac{\gamma_B}{\gamma_B + 1}}. \)

We denote the estimation error for the jamming channel as follows:

\[ \mathcal{E}_A \triangleq g_L - \hat{g}_L = \sigma_0^2 \frac{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L}{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L + \sigma_0^2} g_L - \sqrt{\frac{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L}{\mathcal{P}_B \beta_L + \sigma_0^2}} w_{A \infty}, \]

where \( \mathcal{E}_A \) is independent of \( \hat{g}_L \) and \( \mathcal{E}_A \sim CN(0, (\beta_L - \sigma_A^2) I_M). \)

B. Channel Estimation at Bob

After estimating the channel from Bob to Alice, Alice sends pilot back to Bob. The purpose is to provide Bob CSI for decoding the signals. The received signal at Bob is

\[ y_B = \sqrt{P_A} g_L^H \frac{\hat{g}_L}{\| \hat{g}_L \|^2} x_p + w_B = \sqrt{P_A} c_B x_p + w_B, \]

where \( c_B = g_L^H \frac{\hat{g}_L}{\| \hat{g}_L \|^2} \). We have \( \mathbb{E} \{ c_B \} = \sigma_A \frac{\sqrt{2} \gamma_B^2}{\Gamma(K)} \) and \( \mathbb{E} \{ |c_B|^2 \} = (K - 1) \sigma_A^2 + \beta_L. \)

Bob performs MMSE to estimate \( c_B \),

\[ \hat{c}_B = \mathbb{E} \{ c_B \} + C_{c_B,y_B} C_{y_B,y_B}^{-1} (y_B - \mathbb{E} \{ y_B \}). \]

The estimation error is

\[ \mathcal{E}_B = c_B - \hat{c}_B = \sigma_A^2 \frac{\mathcal{P}_A \text{Var}(c_B) w_{B \infty} - \sigma_0^2 \mathbb{E} \{ c_B \}}{\mathcal{P}_A \text{Var}(c_B) + \sigma_0^2}, \]

where \( C_{c_B,y_B} = \mathcal{P}_A \mathbb{E} \{ |c_B|^2 \} - \mathbb{E} \{ |c_B|^2 \}^2, \ C_{y_B,y_B} = \mathcal{P}_A (\mathbb{E} \{ |c_B|^2 \} - \mathbb{E} \{ |c_B|^2 \})^2 + \sigma_0^2 \). We also have \( \mathbb{E} \{ c_B \} = \frac{\gamma_A \text{Var}(c_B)}{\gamma_A \text{Var}(c_B) + 1} \mathbb{E} \{ c_B \} \) and \( \mathbb{E} \{ |c_B|^2 \} = \frac{\gamma_A \text{Var}(c_B)}{\gamma_A \text{Var}(c_B) + 1} \mathbb{E} \{ |c_B|^2 \} + \mathbb{E} \{ \text{Var}(c_B) \} \).

\[ \mathcal{E}_B = c_B - \hat{c}_B = \sigma_0^2 \frac{\mathcal{P}_A \text{Var}(c_B) w_{B \infty} - \sigma_0^2 \mathbb{E} \{ c_B \}}{\mathcal{P}_A \text{Var}(c_B) + \sigma_0^2}, \]

The ergodic rate can be calculated similarly to (46).

C. Legitimate Rate

The received signal at Bob in information transmission phase is

\[ y_B = \sqrt{P_A} c_B x + \sqrt{P_J} \| \hat{g}_J \| x_J + \sqrt{P_J} \mathcal{E}_J \| \hat{g}_J \| x_J + w_B, \]

Since Bob only knows the estimated effective channel \( \hat{c}_B \), the ergodic legitimate rate is given in (F.8) on the top of the next page. It is observed that the ergodic legitimate rate in this case is lower than that of the case in which perfect channel estimation is considered at the legitimate users. The ergodic illegitimate rate can be calculated similarly to (46).

D. Numerical Results

Fig. 11 shows the simulation results of the considered system’s secrecy rate in the case of imperfect channel estimation at the legitimate users. In this setup, \( K = M = N = 50, \beta_L = 10, \beta_{\text{E}} = 1, \beta_1 = 0.1, \sigma_1 = 10, \gamma_{\text{J}} = 10 \) dB, \( \gamma_{\text{B}} = \{ 5, 10, 15 \} \) dB. It is observed that when the transmit power at Alice increases, the secrecy rate increases and then saturates. This phenomenon is similar to the phenomenon in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Besides, Fig. 11 also demonstrates the effect of transmit power at Bob. Decreasing the transmit power at Bob makes the channel estimation process at Eve more difficult and removes the advantage of multiple jamming antennas at Eve, followed by an increase in the secrecy rate. This point has been discussed in Remark 4.

References

\begin{equation}
R_L = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_A \text{Var}(\hat{c}_B) + \mathbb{E} \left\{ \left( \sqrt{\gamma} \| \mathbf{g}_j \| x_j + \sqrt{\mathcal{P}_J} \mathbf{E}^H_j \mathbf{g}_j \right) + w_j + w_B \right\}^2 \right) \right\}
\end{equation}

\approx \mathbb{E} \left\{ \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_A \text{Var}(\mathbf{E}_B) + \mathcal{P}_J \mathbb{E} \left\{ \| \mathbf{g}_j \|^2 \right\} + \mathcal{P}_J \mathbb{E}( \| \mathbf{E}_j \|^2 ) + \| \mathbf{g}_j \|^2 + \sigma_W^2 \right) \right\}

= \mathbb{E} \left\{ \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma_A \text{Var}(\hat{c}_B)}{\gamma_A \text{Var}(\mathbf{E}_B) + \gamma_B \gamma_j + \gamma_B \beta_j + 1 + \gamma_B \beta_j + 1} \right) \right\} \tag{F.8}


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