BEYOND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
Responding to intergroup-level authority decisions

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Abstract

The present thesis builds on the relational models of procedural justice (RMPJ) put forward by Tyler and colleagues, which theorise about the importance of authorities being fair in the way they make their decisions. In this view, fair procedures symbolically inform people of their social standing in the society and through this, authorities can gain legitimacy. The present work expands on these models in two ways. First, it proposes that the analysis of authority-subordinate interactions should move beyond the individual-level research, to consider group and intergroup-level interactions. Secondly, it argues that identification with a social group in the first place can be a determinant of perceptions of fairness and the subsequent judgements of the decisions made by authorities. Eight experimental studies investigating group members’ responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions were conducted. The main findings suggest that (a) feelings of loyalty to one’s group increase preference for ingroup favouring decisions regardless of whether these decisions are fair or not, (b) culture and its underpinning values can shape perceptions of fairness in relation to authority decisions, and (c) people generally expect authorities to be fair to others regardless if they are of low or high social standing, but ideologies about the structure of the social hierarchy can inform these expectations of fairness. The findings are discussed in the light of the RMPJ and the implications for governing divided societies.
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<td>Belief in a competitive world</td>
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<td>BTC</td>
<td>Big Ten Conference</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>Cultural orientation scale</td>
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<td>DAP</td>
<td>Decision acceptance pattern</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Horizontal collectivist</td>
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<td>HI</td>
<td>Horizontal individualistic</td>
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<td>MY</td>
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<td>NI</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>NIBPS</td>
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<td>NU</td>
<td>Northwestern University</td>
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<td>OSU</td>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>Procedural justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>PREC</td>
<td>Psychology Research Ethics Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCET</td>
<td>Queensland Community Engagement Trial</td>
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<tr>
<td>QUB</td>
<td>Queen’s University Belfast</td>
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<td>RMPJ</td>
<td>Relational models of procedural justice</td>
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<td>RWA</td>
<td>Right-wing authoritarianism</td>
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<td>SDO</td>
<td>Social dominance orientation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>University of Michigan</td>
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<td>UU</td>
<td>University of Ulster</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Vertical collectivist</td>
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Thesis overview

‘Obedience to authority’ is a phrase that for most psychologists resonates with the legacy of Milgram, especially his 1963 study, which controversially showed that people are willing to commit terrible acts to others under the directive of an authority. The conclusions, which more recently became contested (see Haslam, Reicher, & Birney, 2014; Haslam, Reicher, Millard, & McDonald, 2015; Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012), suggest that when powerful authorities give orders, people lose their sense of agency and blindly obey authority. In this view, obedience to authority is not the matter of ‘want’ or active engagement, but the matter of ‘must’ and the lack of control. In other words, powerful authorities can influence a range of behaviours from administering electric shocks in Milgram’s case to lending money to strangers or picking up a piece of rubbish under the directive of a uniform-dressed individual in Bickman’s (1974) study. In the latter, the uniform became a symbolic representation of the individual’s position as a recruited member of an authority that represents the system.
‘Authority’ is a word that comes from the Latin ‘auctoritas’ and ‘auctor’. This term was used to describe people with a self-attributed responsibility while recognising that they can fulfil the civil function to make life easier (Morselli & Passini, 2011). Therefore, authorities such as the police and government are an integral part of societies, providing social order via the establishment of explicit laws and norms and enforcing them.

Understanding how authorities can foster high levels of compliance with the law is at the heart of the stability of the social system. While obedience is what authorities are set out to achieve, disobedience is not entirely dysfunctional (Passini & Morselli, 2009). Disobedience promotes social change and protects against authoritarianism and undemocratic use of power. Equally, however, disobedience can be destructive to the system, for example, when it is guided by self-interest motives or is against the values and norms of the system. Thus, understanding how authorities function and wield power is highly relevant for all individuals in the social system they represent; by studying these processes more can be learnt about how authorities can foster obedience in a way that engages all parts of communities and groups. An example of this is particularly well demonstrated in the elaborated social identity model, whereby understanding how the police actions have a potential to change others’ self-categorisations can inform practices that de-escalate crowd violence and ensure safety and security for all involved (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2009; Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004).

With the potential impact that the study of processes underpinning the authority power can have, the core of the present thesis is the relationship between group identity, fairness, and authority decisions. In Chapter 2, I assess the current state of the literature by bringing together the interdisciplinary literature on authorities. First, the concept of authority legitimacy is explained as a distinct type of power that authorities need to be attributed to be considered effective. The present thesis builds on the procedural justice (PJ) theory to understand authority legitimacy. I give an overview the evidence in support of the PJ theory, focusing on the perspectives underpinning the relational models of procedural justice (RMPJ) explanations for the fair process effect. In this account, fair procedures are
important because they communicate relevant messages about one’s social standing. Nevertheless, Chapter 2 concludes with a critique of the PJ approach in understanding responses to authority decisions. The main concerns discussed in the present thesis stem from the emphasis on the individual-level analysis that the PJ literature tends to focus on and the relative objectivity in judgements of fairness it assumes.

Having discussed the traditional literature on the PJ and authorities, in Chapter 3, I move on to review the social identity framework and its significance in understanding relations with authorities. I begin with an in-depth description of social identity theory and the self-categorisation theory as a way of understanding one’s complex identity. In particular, Chapter 3 focuses on how group processes and the larger intergroup context have the potential to transform one’s understanding of fairness. In the present thesis, I set out to explore the wider context of social identities in relation to the authority decisions that concern them in an attempt to deepen our understanding of the way in which authorities wield power. Broadly speaking, these approaches can be categorised into four main areas: (1) the individual level, investigating how individuals’ ideologies and moralities shape intergroup-level responses to authority decisions, (2) the group level, focusing on intragroup processes, (3) the intergroup level, examining how intergroup relations, relative social standing and perceived conflict contributes to our understanding of responses to authority decision, and finally, (4) the cultural level, whereby I consider how cultural values underlie people’s judgements of authority decisions. Thus, I adopt the social identity approach in its full potential, understanding social identity-driven behaviour through the lens of cultural and structural settings in which they take place (Reicher, 2004; Tajfel, 1972).

The first group of questions set out in the present thesis relates to the idea of group loyalty, following the arguments of Leung, Tong, and Lind (2007) who suggested that groups care more about the outcomes of the decisions than they care about the procedures employed during the decision-making. They suggested that groups have responsibilities to be loyal and this is what leads to an increased importance of the outcomes. In Chapter 4, I test and build on this idea across four experimental studies, whereby I investigate the role of
ingroup loyalty on responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions. I provide support for the hypothesis that increased loyalty to own group leads to group members’ processing of authority decisions in ways that is more ethnocentric and group-interested.

In Chapter 5, I turn to the cross-cultural literature to understand how values such as loyalty may come into conflict with other values in hierarchical societies. I investigate the case of Malaysia (MY), a vertical collectivist (VC) culture, to understand how people respond to authority decisions that are either favouring or disfavouring to their group and compare it to a convenience sample of Northern Ireland (NI) students. Although I find differences in how the two cultures respond to the intergroup-level authority scenarios, these individual-level variances in the responses are not linked to the individual-collectivism but to moral values and moral concern for authority in particular.

Finally, the last empirical chapter continues to explore the idea of preference for hierarchical societies, this time, focusing on the construct of social dominance orientation (SDO). Instead of being interested in people’s responses to authority decisions, in this chapter, I ask ‘how do we expect authorities to treat others?’ and question whether people want equal fairness for everyone, regardless of their social standing. Chapter 6 tests these ideas in three experimental studies and shows that people expect authorities to give other groups equal amount of voice, regardless of their social standing. However, when it comes to the fairness of resource distribution, competitively threatening groups create stronger expectations that authority should allocate them less favouring outcomes. I also show that SDO, but not right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) or belief in a competitive world (BCW), predicts patterns of expectations of authority fairness.

Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of the thesis as well as their theoretical contributions. I focus on how the present thesis adds to the distinctions between authority power and other types of power, which paves the way for more theoretical work to be developed in this domain. I follow by suggesting what such new model of authority should consider, based on the findings of the present thesis. Finally, I discuss the importance of studying these processes on how authorities such as the police officers are trained, but
also in relation to establishing legitimacy in divided societies, which may be struggling with social disorder and contention. By doing so, I set out an agenda for future research.
Authorities, such as the police or the government, are unique in that their mere appointment is, at least in theory, supposed to grant them with a power to make decisions about the society they serve. Serving the people and maintaining the social order within the appointed system is specifically what the role of legitimate authorities consists of. It is in the best interest of society, then, that people comply and cooperate with the authorities because this provides stability to the system they represent. Therefore, the question of why people obey the law has become central to the study of authorities, but also a title of the seminal book on authority legitimacy by Tyler (2006).

To answer this question and to understand how authorities can exercise their power in a way that leads to voluntary compliance, I review research on authority legitimacy, drawing heavily on research on policing. Firstly, the focus falls on legitimacy, the type of power that authorities such as the police possess, or at least they should. I then compare legitimacy to the other types of power in terms of what it can achieve. Given the benefits of legitimacy, the chapter then turns to understanding what makes authorities legitimate. The research underpinning the principles of what I will call the ‘procedural justice (PJ)’
hypothesis’ has undoubtedly produced the most fruitful and thorough explanations of how authorities can gain legitimacy. For this reason, I overview the various models of PJ which explain why fairness is important. Finally, the chapter concludes with an observation that the wider context of the decision-making as well as some other identity processes has often been overlooked by much of the research on authority. I argue that the group context of authority decision-making is the key to understand the dynamics of compliance with and endorsement of authorities.

**Legitimate power of authorities**

Power is one of the fundamental processes studied in social science (Russell, 1938). It is important to consider then how authorities are capable of wielding their power in theory. Power is defined as the ability to control or influence others; it exists as a property of a social relationship (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; French & Raven, 1959). Therefore, it does not relate to the position one holds, but instead, the process of how one can get others to act in line with one’s will. At the outset, it is also important to note that broadly speaking, this thesis encompasses all types of authority. Consequently, I do not restrict the analysis of the literature to any specific authority; nevertheless, I discuss policing research extensively, simply because the police as authorities are thoroughly studied not only within the discipline of social psychology but also within the criminology and law. In fact, the criminal justice system itself is a structure which is entirely reliant on wielding the authoritative power to promote compliance with agents such as the police. Thus, I bring the vast knowledge from the research on the policing to make arguments that will well apply to authorities and the type of power they wield more generally.

According to Turner’s (2005) three process theory of power, legitimacy is distinct from influence and coercion. Influence involves having an effect on another’s will, and thus exerting power on the world through them. In that sense, then, legitimacy is not a form of influence because it does not involve convincing another why one should obey. Furthermore, Turner identifies control as another way to wield power if influence is unavailable or ineffective. Control can be facilitated either through coercion or authority, the
latter being what I refer to as legitimacy here. Coercion involves getting people to do things through applying reinforcement in forms of punishment or rewards (see also French & Raven, 1959; Reynolds & Platow, 2003). Thus, exercising coercion may be corresponding to yielding power against other’s will. Certain aspects of law enforcement, indeed, involve coercion; for example, through the criminal justice system or, on a smaller scale, through administering fines for minor offences. In the case of legitimate power, however, Turner claims that the individual voluntarily submits to power neither because they are influenced nor coerced. Certainly, relying on coercion may not only be excessively costly but also destructive of the shared identity and legitimacy on which persuasion and authority are based (Betham, 1991; Turner, 2005). Therefore, legitimacy relies on voluntary deference grounded in the recognition that the authority’s power is appropriate and thus, accepted.

Although Turner’s model captures the typologies of power in a highly systematic manner, how legitimacy is defined as a social power is based on exclusion. That is, the model largely describes what legitimacy is not, but it does not offer a thorough engagement of what legitimacy is. To overcome this shortcoming, for now, I consider the breadth of legitimacy definitions already existing within the literature. Criminologists especially, have devoted a lot of their time into unpacking the complexities of legitimacy (Harkin, 2015; Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Huq, Jackson, & Trinkner, 2016; Jackson et al., 2012; Jackson, Bradford, MacQueen, & Hough, 2016; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Tankebe, 2013; Trinkner & Tyler, 2016; Tyler & Jackson, 2013, 2014). The traditional account of legitimacy relates to the idea that authorities need to be obeyed even if their decisions are wrong (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). In other words, legitimate power provides the means of shaping behaviour, which originates from the belief that submission to authority is necessary even if the decision is contradictory to one’s own beliefs (French & Raven, 1959). Thus, in this view, compliance to legitimate authorities is independent of the content of the decision, even if it comes with negative consequences. However, this perspective does not recognise that people sometimes resist authority power, even if wielded by a legitimate agent. Understanding the conditions of powerlessness or
illegitimacy is pivotal to capture what power really is (Pratto, 2016). In this sense, being in a recognisable position of authority and possessing legitimacy may not be sufficient to grant wider compliance.

Others have theorised about legitimacy as a recognition that authorities represent a shared set of moral values (Hough et al., 2010; Tyler & Jackson, 2013). In other words, legitimacy is constructed by recognising that the values of society are reflected in the actions of authorities and their understanding of right and wrong. Once this value is internalised, it results in everyday compliance with the law, even despite the physical absence of the authority to impose sanctions for disobeying. Certainly, this also involves an element of trust and confidence that the authorities would not exceed the boundaries of their power, even in situations of uncertainty. Therefore, in this view, legitimacy is understood as a belief that authorities respect the limits of their power as defined by shared values (Huq et al., 2016).

Adding complexity to the debate on legitimacy is that the suggestion that the obligation to obey may not be considered as a consequence of legitimate power, but rather a result of feeling coerced (Jackson et al., 2016). For example, the typical legitimacy item ‘You should obey police even if they are wrong’ maintains to reflect the moral value that police represent and, thus, endorsement of this statement leads to compliance with authority decision in a purely voluntary way. On the other hand, someone else may consider supporting this statement on the basis that disobedience to authority is likely to result in a form of punishment or some other unpleasant consequences. Therefore, endorsement of this item and the sequential deterrence, in this case, would be far from voluntary. Although the outcome for both of these situations is exactly the same - it results in compliance - feelings of coerced obligation to obey are negatively linked to positive expectations of police behaviour. Therefore, a compliant behaviour is not inevitably an indication of accepting authority as a legitimate agent, as it may be mistakenly assumed.

Nevertheless, legitimacy as a concept used in this thesis can be understood as a belief that based on the moral values of society, authorities are just and proper, which leads to motivation to obey their decisions, regardless if they are right or wrong, favouring or
disfavouring. This motivation specifically, is why authority figures should pursue to gain and maintain popular legitimacy. Evidence suggests that people who perceive police as legitimate are more likely to follow the law in their everyday lives (Tyler & Lind, 2002), regardless of their opinions of the legal system as a whole (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2013). Furthermore, legitimacy leads to an increased compliance (Mastrofski, Spines, & Supina, 1996; Tyler, 2006), cooperation (Tyler & Fagan, 2008), empowerment of authorities (Tyler & Jackson, 2014; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011) and engagement with authorities (Blader & Tyler, 2009; Tyler & Blader, 2003). These effects extend beyond policing research and are true to other areas such as taxation authorities (Murphy, 2005) and courts (Ramirez, 2008; Tyler & Jackson, 2014; Tyler & Sevier, 2014). In that sense, legitimacy is at the heart of authority purpose across the board, promoting social order and harmony within the society they serve.

Conversely, the lack of authority legitimacy can be detrimental for both the subordinates and the power-wielders themselves. Perceptions of police ineffectiveness and illegitimacy in low socioeconomic communities are linked to increased violence with the community members pressured to take the law into their own hands, ironically further fractionating the community (Kurbin & Weitzer, 2003). An increase of paramilitary-style policing may also be observed (Steenkamp, 2014). Thus, a loss of authority legitimacy can lead to instability and increased social disorder within communities.

However, disobedience to authority does not always need to be destructive. Passini and Morselli (2009) suggest that although antisocial disobedience to authority, defined as serving one’s own interest, reproduces or preserves social inequalities, disobedience can also be prosocial. Standing up to authority to protect from authoritarianism or loss of democracy is constructive as it serves the whole society and promotes social change. Therefore, while authority obedience may be an important tool for social control and maintaining relative stability in society authority represents, studying conditions whereby people reject the authority and their decisions is as important as the study of obedience. Only through the
investigation of disobedience, the consequences and pathways to legitimacy loss can be understood.

Encountering authorities

Approximately a fifth of the US population comes into contact with police every year, with traffic stops being the most common point of an encounter (Eith & Durose, 2011). Although police-citizen encounters are mostly positive (Pehrson, Devaney, Blaylock, & Bryan, 2017), the negative experiences are argued to be four to fourteen times more likely than positive experiences to impact attitudes towards the police (Skogan, 2006). Despite direct encounters with the police being relatively infrequent and generally positive, it is those interactions specifically that became the centre of interest for researchers to study police-citizen relations.

It is important, however, to consider how those 80 percent who do not encounter police every year form their impressions of the police. One line of research suggests that simply observing the police patrols and being aware of the police activities may be sufficient to evaluate police effectiveness (Bradford, Jackson, & Stanko, 2009). Indirect forms of communication with the public, such as leaflet drop, increase public’s awareness of police activities (Hohl, Bradford, & Stanko, 2010). Furthermore, hearing about others’ experiences can shift attitudes towards the police, especially from negative to positive (Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, & Ring, 2005). Bringing together arguments regarding the direct and indirect contact with authorities, Trinkner and Tyler (2016) argue that through multiple experiences like this, people develop a relationship with the law and the set of moral values that the system represents. This highlights the relatively static nature of authority-citizen relations; once the initial impressions of the authorities and the system are formed, they remain somewhat stable (Erber & Hodges, 1995). Thus, the subsequent encounters may not be as influential in shaping relationship with authorities.

Motivations to submit to authority’s power

Having established that legitimacy is the key ingredient to authorities’ power, researchers became interested in how legitimacy can be boosted. The outcome of this pursuit
is the research tradition around two key motivations for complying and cooperating with police: instrumental and relational (Tyler, 2006). In other words, people cooperate with police either because they are concerned about the outcomes they may receive in case of the former motivation or like in the case of the latter motivation because they care about their relationship with authority. Firstly, I will focus on the arguments surrounding instrumental motivations, and I will return to relational motivations for cooperating with authorities in more depth later in this chapter.

The idea surrounding instrumental approaches begins with an assumption that authorities have access to a great deal of resources. For example, the police have the power to not only issue fines but also to arrest criminals and provide security for communities. It is reasonable, then, that people want to access and benefit from those resources as much as they can. Therefore, the basic claim here is that people support authorities if they can gain from them in the present or future exchanges. These ideas go back to the early theories on equity (Adams, 1966; Messick & Cook, 1983), whereby people are considered as cost-benefit analysts who weigh distributions of resources in comparison to one’s own investments in the exchange. Judgements of authority resource distributions, in this perspective then, are underpinned by the crude input-output exchanges to ultimately reach equity. Thus, if instrumental motives are the basis for complying with authorities, then people would comply with authorities if the distributions of the resources are made in a favouring way to maximise benefits.

An example of purely instrumental motivation is outcome favourability, which is a judgement of how beneficial the outcome of the authority decision is. It is conceptually distinct but highly correlated with distributive justice, whereby fairness of resource distribution is emphasised (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Although outcome favourability is clearly an instrumental concern, there is less clarity regarding whether distributive justice is an instrumental or a relational concern. On the one hand, judgements of distributive justice are linked to outcome favourability (Bianchi et al., 2015) and thus, distributions that are favourable are more likely to be also perceived as
distributively fair. In that way, distributive fairness may be indicative of resources and thus, be an instrumental concern. Distributive fairness is also conceptualised as instrumental in Tyler’s work. For example, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) argue that ‘instrumental perspective, suggests that the police gain acceptance when they are viewed by the public as (...) fairly distributing police services across people and communities (distributive fairness)’ (p. 514). Similarly, in Tyler’s (2003) paper, distributive justice and outcome favourability are both considered as instrumental motives. On the other hand, distributive justice can also be argued to be primarily a relational concern, but only if compliance is a result of a belief that authorities distribute resources in a particular way because it reflects the values of the society they serve. Thus, if society emphasises unequal distribution of resources and people care about their relationship with authorities, then they should comply with this distribution because societal norms are at the basis of this exchange. Therefore, although distributive justice is important in encouraging people to comply with authority, its conceptualisation in terms of instrumentality versus relationality is unclear.

There is more agreement regarding other elements of instrumental motivation to comply with authorities. One suggestion is that people’s fear of getting caught and being punished is the basis for their law compliance (Beccaria, 1963; Bentham, 1948), which in Turner’s (2005) model may represent coercion more closely than authority legitimacy. Sanctions are established to inhibit criminal activity and reduce the likelihood of reoffending. Thus, the punishment needs to be immediate, certain and severe in order to discourage people from committing it (Beccaria, 1963). Otherwise, the benefits of committing a crime may outweigh the costs which will make people more encouraged to break the law. Therefore, the assumption is that people are rational agents who make sophisticated calculations about the benefits and costs when it comes to law abidance. If the risk of getting caught outweighs the profits of breaking the law, people follow the law.

In line with this, suggestions were made that minor crimes should be heavily monitored and punished accordingly to avoid later serious crimes (Kelling & Coles, 1996). Despite such proactive crime control having some influence on reducing crime, and thus
increasing perceptions of police effectiveness (Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2012), the evidence did not suggest that these practices increased legitimacy, but rather that they were associated with deterioration of police-citizen relations (Smith, Allen, & Danley, 2007). The random ‘stop, question and frisk’ model evolved into treating innocent citizens as suspects, translating mistrust and exclusion, instead of respect and trustworthiness (Tyler, Jackson, Mentovich, & Fleming, 2015). Therefore, although some may obey simply on the basis of avoiding punishment, encouraging cooperation on the basis of instrumental reasons may not be effective.

To investigate whether instrumental reasons really matter, Jackson, Bradford, Hohl, and Farrall (2009) examined British Crime Survey data from 1984 to 2005/06, noting that there was a decline in confidence in police over the years. If people comply with the law for instrumental reasons, then variables such as higher crime rates would be responsible for this decline in confidence. However, over those years, crime levels have actually fallen, which is inconsistent with the instrumental reasoning for police legitimacy. Indeed, others have argued that people do not choose to engage in or avoid a behaviour simply on the basis of its legal status (MacCoun, 1993) and imprisonment does not prevent future crimes (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007). Therefore, although the instrumental models provide some plausible theoretical explanations for why people comply with authorities, the evidence from the field is mixed. Furthermore, Thibaut and Walker (1975) disputed that distributive justice judgements alone can fully account for how people arrive at fairness evaluations. They argued that the processes that take place during decision making are equally, if not more, important.

**Procedural justice and authority legitimacy**

Thibaut and Walker (1975) were among the first to introduce the PJ hypothesis, placing emphasis on the procedures that are employed during an encounter and, more specifically, the extent to which those procedures are perceived to be fair. In the early conceptualisations of PJ, fair treatment was understood to be important because it implies that one has control over how the decision is made. In a way, then, PJ was very much in the
spirit of other instrumental approaches, whereby people only care about the fairness of authorities to maximise their benefits. Thibaut and Walker recognised two aspects of the procedures that contributed to overall positive evaluation: (1) process control, the extent to which people’s own judgement in relation to the decision was allowed and (2) decision control, whether this input was recognised in the decision-making. Leventhal (1980) was in agreement with Thibaut and Walker regarding the superiority of PJ over the importance of distributive justice. He further identified ways in which authorities may improve the manners around their decision-making to improve the perceptions of their PJ. This included applying rules consistently, accurately, and with no bias. He argued that decisions must also be reversible if they are incorrect. Thus, over the years, as the PJ was formulated, a lot of researchers were keen to systematically compare and contrast the distributive justice and PJ accounts (Folger, 1977; Gilliland, 1995; Hauenstein, McGonigle, & Flinder, 2001; Törnblom & Vermunt, 1999). Early work contextualised the PJ in relation to reactions to any decisions (see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996), but not authority decisions specifically.

The concept of PJ was only later linked to police legitimacy. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that PJ is the primary predictor of authority legitimacy. In their study, they interviewed New Yorkers about their views on the police to evaluate the relative importance of PJ and distributive justice in informing judgements of police legitimacy. In other words, if the police are seen to conduct themselves in a fair and respectful manner, they are more likely to be granted legitimacy by the wider public.

Although different operationalisations of PJ were used in the early days of the theory (see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996), the current literature more consistently describes four components that are essential for PJ. Two of these relate to whether the decision was made fairly, that is (1) allowing for opinion voicing, and (2) neutrality in decision making; and two of them are concerned with citizen treatment, (3) respect for the citizen and, (4) whether the authority is acting with trustworthy motives (Goodman-Delahunty, 2010; Tyler, 2004). The first component, voice, provides an opportunity for a citizen to participate in the decision-making process and thus conveys that one’s opinion matters to the authorities.
(Folger, 1977). Therefore, it is comparable to process control concept of Thibaut and Walker (1975). Studies demonstrate that voice provision, in contrast to voice denial, increases perceived fairness of the authority (Hildreth, Moore, & Blader, 2014; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Platow et al., 2013). Voice manipulation, therefore, is the most widely accepted form of manipulating PJ (van den Bos, 1999). The second ingredient, neutrality, is concerned with ensuring that authorities are not biased in their decision-making. This means that decision transparency and consistency are likely to enhance the view of the procedures as fair. Thirdly, showing respect during an encounter, similarly to voice provision, demonstrates that citizens are treated with dignity and that their input matters. Finally, the inferences about the trustworthiness of the motives have also an impact on judgements of fairness, especially in the police-initiated encounters (Murphy, 2009). The stop should be perceived as having a genuine cause or having been conducted randomly so that feelings of being targeted based on some stereotypical characteristics are not produced. In this instance, citizens should be provided with a motive for the encounter in order to see it as fair.

The evidence for PJ effect is considerable. In a two-wave study, Murphy, Hinds, and Fleming (2008) found that judgements of procedural fairness predicted levels of perceived legitimacy over time. Furthermore, the PJ effect is sustained independently of solving the issue or establishing the truth during the encounter (Tyler & Folger, 1980; Tyler & Sevier, 2014). Other studies have replicated this relationship across studies and settings, including, police-citizen encounters (Bradford, Murphy, & Jackson, 2014; Elliott, Thomas, & Ogloff, 2011; Hohl et al., 2010; Jackson, Asif, Bradford, & Zakia Zakar, 2014; Mazerolle, Bennett, Antrobus, & Eggins, 2012; Murphy & Cherney, 2011; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004), organisations (Bianchi et al., 2015; Blader & Tyler, 2009; De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; van Dijke, De Cremer, & Mayer, 2010), and taxation (Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Systematic synthesis of research has also confirmed the support for the link between the PJ and authority legitimacy (Mazerolle, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013), painting PJ as the dominant explanatory framework in police legitimacy research. Uncovering this relationship was remarkable from the perspective of policing, because the police do not
possess much control over instrumental judgements such as fluctuating crime rates or the number of resources they can give to one community. What they can do, however, is to treat people fairly and respectfully; and this is precisely what creates the perception of legitimacy according to the available evidence.

PJ has been so influential that the theory is already having a real life impact on police practice (Tyler, Goff, & MacCoun, 2015). Police PJ training is widely emphasised in police forces across the world to an extent that information regarding the link between procedural justice and police legitimacy is available as a resource from the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training in the US. A systematic evaluation of these training programmes has only been considered relatively recently. In one of the assessments of the police procedural justice training, the effects short-term were pointing towards the effectiveness of such training in endorsing principles of fairness in everyday power-wielding, but there is a considerable decay effect in the long-term among police officers (Skogan, Van Craen, & Hennessy, 2014). Another notable experiment, the Queensland community engagement trial (QCET), has further evaluated the effectiveness of PJ training in the eyes of the public. They operationalised the four elements of PJ as identified by Goodman-Delahunty (2010) and integrated them into everyday encounters between the police and citizens during a random breath test. Mazerolle, Bennett, Antrobus, and Eggins (2012), alongside the Queensland police, developed scripts incorporating elements of PJ. These scripts were then employed by the police officers in the experimental condition, whereas the control condition officers continued conducting stops business-as-usual. Drivers in the experimental condition reported higher levels of compliance and satisfaction with the police in comparison to the control condition, advocating for the effectiveness of PJ in those encounters. More recently, QCET was replicated in Scotland, while seeking to extend the support for these effects for the overall evaluations of authorities (MacQueen & Bradford, 2015). Surprisingly, there was no evidence for the effect of the intervention on police trust or legitimacy, leaving authors puzzled as to why hypotheses were not supported. Perhaps procedurally fair authorities can positively impact the encounter itself, but the extent to
which these effects are generalisable to people’s overall judgement of legitimacy is another question. For example, in another experiment which was set in the context of speeding violation stops procedural treatment participants reported more favourable perceptions of the police officers during the encounter as well as higher levels of satisfaction than the controls, but procedurally just treatment did not influence the view of police in general (Sahin, 2014). Thus, positive actions of one authority figure may not be sufficient to change the perceptions of what prototypical police officer conduct looks like (see Richards & Hewstone, 2001 for discussion on subtyping).

**Distributive justice versus procedural justice**

Before turning to discuss PJ models in more detail, considerations surrounding the contrasting importance of distributive justice versus PJ should be discussed. As I already mentioned, with the rise of the PJ in the 1970s, there has been a lot of debate regarding which of the two takes the upper hand in shaping people's reactions to decisions. Therefore, there is an assumption that these two types of justice are conceptually distinct and are often pitted against each other as predictors (Pehrson, Devaney, et al., 2017). Some evidence clearly points to this. For example, in the meta-analysis of organisational justice, Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) found that distributive justice and PJ are distinct in terms of their outcomes, with the former linked to general satisfaction, whereas the latter associated with general commitment in the organisational context. However, although these two types of justice are theoretically distinct, evidence suggests that they are also interdependent, correlating highly in meta-analyses (Hauenstein, McGonigle, & Flinder, 2001; see also Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005). Consequently, it is challenging to provide evidence that one form of justice exists without the other, despite that in theory, they should be separate. Moreover, their combined effects are heavily intertwined; manipulations of PJ affect distributive justice and vice-versa (Törnblom & Vermunt, 1999). Furthermore, factor analysis provides little support for the typically assumed factor distinction between procedural and distributive justice (Pehrson et al., 2017). Instead, the solution suggests there are two factors, but they are *impartiality* and *interpersonal*, with the former consisting of a
combination of distributive and PJ and the latter comprising of PJ items relating to interpersonal respect only. These ambiguities are much like those I earlier noted regarding (non-) instrumentality of distributive justice; there is a lack of clarity regarding the link between distributive and procedural judgements. Taking into considerations all these arguments, in line with Ambrose and Arnaud (2005), I do not distinguish between subtypes of fairness and suggest that judgements of overall fairness, as a face value assessment of fairness, may form a more appropriate basis for investigating how people respond to authority decisions. In this view, it is up to the perceiver to determine the criteria for what they deem fair.

**Relational models of procedural justice**

So far, I considered the instrumental motivations for why people comply with the police. To recap, in this view, people comply with the authorities because compliance is the means to avoid punishment or to maximise favourable outcomes from authorities. As such, PJ theory, proposed by Thibaut and Walker (1975), is also driven by instrumental motivations, whereby people desire receiving voice and being treated fairly because it provides control over the decision (Folger, 1977; see also van Prooijen et al., 2008). However, in this part of the chapter, I will consider models which propose that the importance of PJ is a result of the deep concern people have about their relationship with authorities (Tyler, 1997). Collectively, these models are referred to as the RMPJ. The present thesis focuses on the models accredited to the work of Tyler and colleagues because of its overlap with the policing and authority research, but other relational models such as fairness heuristic theory feature more frequently in the organisational literature (Lind, 2001; van den Bos, 2001a). An inconsistency within Tylerian models that is worth noting at the outset is that the theoretical proposals that make up the RMPJ disagree over the role of identity in explaining the relationship between PJ and judgements about authority. The group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992) argues that identity moderates the relationship between PJ and authority impressions, whereas the group engagement model
(Tyler & Blader, 2003) argues that identity is a mediator of this relationship. I will now turn to discussing the assumptions and the evidence for both of these models.

**The group-value model and relational model of authority**

The first suggestion about the role of social identity was put forward by the group-value model and a later extension in a form of the relational model of authority, which applied the ideas from the former model to the context of authorities (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The argument here was that fair procedures, as employed by authorities, are important because they inform individuals of their social standing (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). In line with this argument, studies find that experiencing procedural fairness is associated with higher self-esteem (Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993) and higher feelings of respect (Heuer & Stroessner, 2011; Platow, Brewer, & Eggins, 2008; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998). Thus, fair treatment from authorities can affirm or disaffirm one’s status in the group. Much like positive distinctiveness is a source of identity self-esteem (Hogg & Abrams, 1988), being treated fairly by the authorities can be used to infer one’s social standing and self-esteem.

The group-value model, therefore, argues that perceptions of fair treatment by authorities lead to the delineation of identity, informing of intragroup standing and respect. Intragroup standing, in turn, affects fellow group members’ perceptions of these authorities.

More importantly, the model makes predictions for when PJ is more relevant. Only the cues about PJ coming from the ingroup authorities have the power to inform one of their social standing; being mistreated by an outgroup authority does not convey any identity-relevant information about one’s inclusion and standing in that society (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). Therefore, ethnic minorities who do not integrate or assimilate with the subordinate culture may be more concerned with instrumental issues than with the relational aspects of PJ when assessing the legitimacy of authority (Murphy & Cherney, 2011). However, if those minorities adopt a superordinate group identification, relational motivations for complying with authorities may well be relevant (Huo et al., 1996). Further support for the importance of perceived group membership of authority was provided.
experimentally by Smith et al. (1998; Studies 1 and 2) who found that if the university authority was categorised as belonging to the ingroup (i.e., affiliated with one’s own university), students’ self-evaluations of being respected were more likely to be affected, as opposed to when the authority affiliation was associated with another (outgroup) university. Therefore, the group-value model proposes that identity has a moderating role in the relationship between PJ and authority judgements, with fair procedure judgements being only relevant when an individual identifies with the authority because it informs them of their social standing.

The group engagement model

A later extension, the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2003) argues that procedural justice has the capacity to enhance cooperation with authorities, but proposes a slightly different process. This starts with PJ influencing individual’s identity and belonging to the group, which in turn leads to, what authors termed, extra-role behaviour. In other words, when authority is procedurally fair towards an individual, this allows them to perceive themselves as a valuable group member, and this perception creates an expectation that one will act on the behalf of the group in prosocial ways. One of such ways could be to support the decisions of authority that wield power over the group.

Notably, this model takes a slightly different approach to the relationship between social identity and PJ. In this view, the effect of PJ on authority judgements is mediated by identification. Namely, PJ shapes one’s perceptions of intragroup standing according to the group engagement model, whereas the group-value model posits that PJ perceptions are only relevant when one cares about their intragroup standing within the group that authority represents. The support for the group engagement model came from studies carried out in the organisational context. Employers that made decisions in a fair way fostered the workplace identity of employees which, in turn, encouraged employees to engage in workplace behaviour that benefits the workplace as a whole (Blader & Tyler, 2009). In this perspective, PJ has a potential to engage individuals that were, even previously, not identified as belonging to the group the authority represents. This is in contrast to group-
value model that claims that the effects of PJ do not transfer to those who do not identify with the group that authority represents.

Evidence suggests that in line with the group engagement model and in contrast to the group-value model, belonging to the same ingroup as the authority may not necessarily be a prerequisite for the effectiveness of PJ. In the reanalysis of the original QCET study, Sargeant, Antrobus, Murphy, Bennett, and Mazerolle (2014) found that in the PJ treatment condition, social identification with the Australian community did not moderate the effect of PJ on police legitimacy. Similarly, others suggest that when people experience procedurally just treatment from authorities, it enhances their superordinate identity, one that authority represents, regardless of their background (Bradford et al., 2014). On the other hand, what is more problematic for the group engagement model is that disrespecting a group member may also, paradoxically, lead to extra-role behaviours (Sleebos, Ellemers, & de Gilder, 2006). Disrespect toward a group member may question their group affirmation, and thus, the individual may be more motivated to act on behalf of the group. However, it is not clear whether being disrespected by the authorities, such as the police, would also result in a higher compliance as a way of individual earning their inclusion. Research suggests this may not necessarily be the case because when one experiences negative contact with authorities, this reduces the cooperation with the authorities (Skogan, 2006). Furthermore, feeling unfairly treated in those encounters does not lead to dis-identification with the group authority represents, but to excluding the authority and their actions from one’s moral circle of values (Pehrson et al., 2017). Therefore, experiencing negative treatment from authorities may not only decrease cooperation but also impact the relationship between the individual and the authority without affecting the identification level towards one’s group. Nevertheless, although the role of social identity in those processes is not clear, social identity is certainly one of the key factors in understanding how people come to understand and accept authority decisions. However, closer integration of research on the role of identity in authority decisions is required.

**Does procedural justice affect identity?**
The RMPJ certainly make a strong case for the role of the PJ in shaping individual’s identity as supported by the evidence overviewed so far, but there are some uncertainties regarding the role of social identity in the process of accepting or rejecting the authority decision. As the RMPJ maintain, through interacting with authorities, individuals use PJ cues to derive their knowledge of who they are and where they stand. Whether social standing involves being highly regarded by other group members or simply feeling included in the group, however, has not really been addressed by the relational model theorists (van Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilke, 2004b). Research shows that a mere activation of concerns surrounding one’s status or inclusion increases individual’s sensitivity to PJ cues (van Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002, 2004a; van Prooijen et al., 2004b; van Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilke, 2005). That is, the feeling of being included and respected within the group as well as making status salient encourages individuals to seek out identity-relevant fairness signals. In contrast, those who are uncertain about their position in the society do not respond to the PJ messages to the same extent, which is in line with the relational models.

However, other relational models such as the fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001; van den Bos, 2001a; van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997) or the uncertainty management theory (Lind & van den Bos, 2002; van den Bos, 2001b; van den Bos & Lind, 2002) contend that PJ information is more relevant in situations of certainty. They argue that people use information about procedural fairness as a heuristic to evaluate how the authority decision should be appraised in situations of high uncertainty (Lind, 2001; van den Bos et al., 1997; van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). When there is not a sufficient information about the decision-maker, people rely on PJ to evaluate the decision (van den Bos et al., 1998). In that vein, the fairness heuristic theory contests that PJ from the hands of authority does not communicate inclusion and high social standing, but rather that it is a useful tool for manoeuvring through the world of uncertainties. In such way, the fairness heuristic theory maintains that PJ may only be informative when other cues which can override the
importance of PJ are unavailable, much in line with the value protection model of justice reasoning discussed later in this section.

Adding to the ambiguity, the RMPJ do not explicitly explain how shared identity with those around them can determine how the authorities are perceived. Observing injustice done to others may be just as powerful in shaping perceptions of authority, and the subsequent future compliance, as experiencing the injustice personally. Through self-categorising as the member of the same group as the victim of the authority injustice, the group members become a part of one’s self-concept. Through this, the injustice done to other group members becomes an injustice done to oneself (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). This is similar to what Skarlicki and Kulik (2004) refer to as a self-interest motive, whereby people care about the injustice done to others to the extent that it may happen to them. They further identify moral imperatives as driving the concern for others on the basis that it is morally right to care about injustice. Yet, the mechanisms underpinning this process of being concerned for the injustice done to others are not explicitly a part of the RMPJ, because these models mainly focus on explaining how fair procedures affect one’s own status. The evidence for group-value model’s assertion that fair procedures are indicative of one’s group standing and only their own standing is mixed.

As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, it may be that PJ does not inform people of their social standing as much as social identity shapes people’s views and understanding of authority decisions. These arguments are prevalent in frameworks that were developed in isolation to the RMPJ. For example, Braithwaite (2003) proposed that the awareness of the authority power is threatening to subordinates because it has the potential to restrict one’s freedom. As a consequence, people place varying levels of social distance between themselves and authorities (see also Braithwaite, Murphy, & Reinhart, 2007). In this taxonomy of degrees of social distance, disengaged individuals pose a particularly interesting case, demonstrating how one’s identity shapes understanding of authority decisions. These individuals and groups reject the means and goals of the decision-making authority, which may manifest itself in avoiding authority or being implicated by their
decisions. This behaviour signals a desire to leave the system and thus, it is unlikely that they would comply with any of the authority decisions. Although an approach to rectifying disengagement could be the use of fair procedures to produce perceptions of legitimacy, the evidence suggests that fair procedures are actually counterproductive among the disengaged; attempts to be fair are perceived as untrustworthy (Murphy & Cherney, 2012). Tyler and Jackson (2013) note that this is problematic for the universality of PJ and suggest that disengagement from authorities may be a distinct problem to low legitimacy. In this way, PJ is a solution to low legitimacy, but not to disengagement from authorities.

Finally, PJ may not matter at all if the authority decision concerns a highly moral issue. Bauman and Skitka (2009) found that in responding to a decision relating to a salient moral issue such as abortion, people who expressed strong pro-life or pro-choice attitudes were less likely to be sensitive to voice provision. Instead, their response to the decision was determined by whether the outcome served their moral convictions or not. The idea that moral judgements may override the importance of procedural fairness is central to the value protection model of justice reasoning (Skitka, 2002). People are motivated to protect their moral convictions from potential threats and they are willing to dismiss political decisions as unfair if they threaten those values. Moreover, moral mandates are distinct from strong attitudes in that lead to rejection of others holding dissimilar views (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Thus, the study of moral values can further shed light on how people respond to authority decisions. A coherent model should be in a position to explain how people become disengaged with authorities, how normatively fair decisions made by authorities become dismissed by disengaged groups and individuals as well as how moral convictions can interfere with the responses to authority decisions. Whether this is the place for the PJ theory to expand or a space for an alternative theory to form is another question.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I reviewed the research on how authorities can promote compliance within the society they serve. The evidence here suggests that PJ is the main driver of authority legitimacy. The work of Tyler and colleagues put forward the most prominent set
of models to explain how identity processes are at the heart of fair treatment from authorities, whereby receiving fair treatment from authorities communicates that one is respected member of the society that authority represents, which in turn leads to recognising authority as a legitimate representative of the society they serve. Identity processes in the perceptions of authority fairness are clearly relevant, but the nature of these processes is contested even within the RMPJ as they propose competing models of social identity moderation and mediation. Alternative models propose that there are boundary conditions to the effectiveness of PJ such as moral values, which can diminish the importance of PJ in decision acceptance. To understand the dynamics of social identities and its relationship with fairness, in the following chapter, I turn to the legacy of Tajfel and Turner, the social identity approach.
Towards an intergroup-level understanding of responses to authority decisions

Having outlined the assumptions of the RMPJ as well as some of their shortcomings, the focus in this chapter is to understand how group membership may inform perceptions of fairness as well as responses to authority decisions. I begin this chapter by outlining the main premises of social identity theory and its implications for studying human behaviour. Through the lens of this theory, I consider how thinking of oneself as a group member has the power to shape interactions with authorities and perceptions of authority fairness. Although the RMPJ propose that people care about their relations with authorities and explain how they pay attention to messages about their standing in the wider society, these models do not consider how fairness judgements are formed in the first place. As I will argue throughout the present thesis, social identity is not only the outcome of fairness as the RMPJ propose but also its determinant. Figure 3.1 shows the theoretical relationship between identity and fairness in the RMPJ as contrasted to the theoretical assumptions of the
present research; thus, I emphasise that fairness is not merely a pre-determined starting point of authority-subordinate relationship in which authority acts more or less fairly, but also an end to a dynamic interplay between identity and the wider context. I will discuss the group-level and intergroup-level research that investigates how being a part of a social group shapes understandings of fairness. This research has mainly been conducted in isolation from research on policing or authorities, but I argue that the insights from the social identity research can be extremely valuable in understanding how individuals arrive at judgements of authority fairness. Finally, I describe qualitative evidence from protests in Northern Ireland (NI) as well as the US demonstrating that perceptions of fairness are fuelled by the intergroup context, and how these, in turn, may be related to judgements of authority decisions. I end the chapter by outlining the structure of empirical evidence presented in this thesis.

![Figure 3.1](image.png)

*Figure 3.1.* The relationship between identity and fairness in responses to authority decisions in the relational models as contrasted with the theoretical focus of the present research.

**From individuals to groups: The social identity approach**

Due to the interpersonal focus of the PJ theory, police legitimacy research has typically focused on how individuals perceive authority and their decisions to investigate the underpinnings of legitimacy. Yet, society, which authorities such as the police serve, is made up of social groups that are more than the sum of individuals who belong to this social
system. Furthermore, some decisions made by the authorities have consequences for groups as a whole, even if they are made in the context of a single individual who may be a part of a particular social group. Therefore, any new frameworks examining how the authorities yield their power successfully should take the diversity of the groups in the society and the implications of such diversity into account. Such perspective brings the potential to understand the power of authorities in a less reductionist manner by adopting a more holistic approach to studying how groups perceive authority figures and their decisions in the wider context of the society. The foundation for achieving this lies in linking social groups to how groups behave.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), along with the self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), together referred to as a social identity approach, were developed as an alternative to the models that emphasised individual characteristics to explain the atrocities of World War II such as aggression or authoritarian style. These theories, in the view of social identity theorists, did not provide sufficient explanations of how otherwise ordinary, decent people could commit such acts of violence towards people on the basis of their group membership. Fundamental to the social identity theory is the idea that group behaviour is a product of a switch from seeing the self as an individual person to perceiving the self in terms of group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Further to this, people have strong desire to maintain a positive social identity. Indeed, groups provide people with enormous benefits, including the sense of belonging and self-worth (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1991; Correll & Park, 2005), reducing uncertainty about people’s identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1993) and an increased physical wellbeing (Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009). In fact, the more groups one belongs to, the more positive are the outcomes (Jetten et al., 2015; Miller, Wakefield, & Sani, 2016). Categorisation is the cognitive process that underpins the said shift from personal to social identity (Turner et al., 1987). It involves depersonalisation or perceiving individuals through the virtue of their groups’ stereotypes and not necessarily their individual characteristics. As a consequence, the differences between ingroup members (people who are perceived to have a shared
belonging to the same group) and outgroup members (people who are perceived to belong to
groups other than the ingroup) become more salient and exaggerated. In other words,
members of the ingroup are seen as more similar to the self, and members of the outgroup
are seen as very different. This recognition of shared reality with other group members is
what drives people to act in line with their ingroup norms; being a group member involves
behaving and thinking like a prototypical group member (Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989).
This influence does not originate from feelings of obligation, but from the internal
recognition that these actions are at the heart of the membership of this group.

A series of seminal studies have contributed greatly to the development of social
identity approach. The ‘minimal group paradigm’, which resulted in a number of studies,
were conducted by Tajfel and his colleagues in the 1970s (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament,
1971). Although the term social identity was not used in the original manuscripts, this
research investigated the effect of social categorisation and intergroup discrimination. The
central contribution of these studies was the finding that the mere process of categorising
others as belonging to ingroup or not produces ingroup favouritism and drives group
behaviour. In the studies, a group of participants was divided into two arbitrary groups and
could only identify others through their group membership. The task was to allocate
incentives between a member of the ingroup and a member of the outgroup. The results
suggested patterns of ingroup favouritism as participants systematically awarded more
incentives to the ingroup members than the outgroup members. Therefore, Tajfel noted that
there was a general preference to favour ingroup members over outgroup that only later, he
attributed to the group members seeking to differentiate themselves from the outgroup on
dimensions of value; ingroup favouritism was the tool to achieve it (Tajfel, 1972). Thus, the
very idea that people would favour benefiting the ingroup in comparison to outgroup, even if
there is a cost to the ingroup in absolute terms sparked the development of the social identity
approach, which is also central to this thesis in ways that will become clearer later in this
chapter.
The other set of studies that have built the legacy of the social identity approach was conducted by Sherif and colleagues in the Robbers Cave summer camp in the 1960s (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; see also Platow, Hunter, Haslam, & Reicher, 2015). Twenty-two boys attending the camp were split into two groups. For the first few days of the study, the two groups did not meet, but rather they were socialised and housed with members of their own group only. After this, the researchers set up a number of challenges with prizes in order to create competition between the two groups. Under some conditions, one group could achieve their goal at the expense of the other group. The dislike between the two groups emerged over days as they called each other names, raided each other’s cabins and refused to eat in the same hall. In the final stage of the experiment, Sherif and others attempted to reduce the tension between the two groups by creating tasks in which all boys had to cooperate. Through this superordinate goal, the two groups became positively interdependent on one another, which over time led to the reduction of intergroup friction.

The conclusion from the Robbers Cave study was that the rivalry between the two groups was observed to create a strong dislike for the other group. Therefore, competition for resources created intergroup hostility – something that Tajfel and Turner drew on when proposing that the self exists on the continuum between the personal identity (the ‘I’) and the social identity (the ‘us’) while explaining the collective reality of belonging to a psychological group. Once this competition was replaced with cooperation, intergroup relations improved considerably.

One of the key distinctions between personal and social identity is that although there is only one personal identity, social identity has a capacity for multiple ‘us’ through belonging to a number of social groups. One can belong to as many sociological and psychological groups as one wishes to or qualifies for if the group membership is dependent on the criteria met (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). The importance of any given social identity is contingent on how accessible certain group membership is in the individual’s cognition within a given situation (Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991). Once the identity becomes accessible and thus salient, this leads to a higher identification and exhibiting behaviours
that are in line with the relevant group membership norms (Dick, Wagner, Stellmacher, & Christ, 2005). Thus, thinking about the self as a football club fan can result in distinct behaviours to categorising the self as a woman in comparable contexts; the behavioural differences reflect the norms of the salient group. Finally, groups are self-defined, which means that only those who consider themselves British Muslim, for example, have a capacity to determine the content and norms of the group identity over time. Members of this group may also look up to other British Muslims who are perceived to truly reflect the values of this group in their actions and thoughts; however, which individuals are identified as prototypical of a group is highly based on the context of categorisation rather than a fixed concept (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, & Onorato, 1995). Taken together, social identity is crafted as a result of a range of cognitive processes which are contingent on the individual’s context (see Hogg & Reid, 2006 for a review). Thus, the content of social identity is shaped by the cultural and structural setting in which the social identity is enacted (Reicher, 2004).

For the remainder of this chapter, I will firstly focus on the evidence for how social identity shapes people’s understanding of fairness, firstly at an intragroup-level, by influencing how group members perceive fairness, and secondly extending to the intergroup-level, emphasising how the larger context of the social existence shapes fairness.

**Fairness through the lens of social identity**

How do people reach the conclusion that a decision is fair? Despite judgements of fairness being the core of the PJ theories, they do not consider how individuals arrive at these judgements in the first place. There is an implicit assumption that if the authority is fair and provides voice opportunities, have trustworthy motives and treat them with respect, then they should be perceived as such. However, even at the interpersonal level, people make sense of fairness inconsistently, applying different rules of fairness across different situations. For example, some suggest that procedural fairness is emphasised in relation to decisions about oneself, whereas distributive justice is emphasised in decisions relating to others (Lupfer, Weeks, Doan, & Houston, 2000) and one’s own behaviours are typically...
perceived as fairer than others (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985). Furthermore, research by Braga and colleagues (2014) has demonstrated that providing individuals with contextual information about authority-subordinate encounter, such as telling them that the officer was previously recognised for their integrity in work or that he or she has been inconsistent in their decision making, can influence to what extent this encounter is perceived as fair and rightful. Thus, even when the encounter between authority and the subordinate is perceived as truly interpersonal and not involving social identities, there is a reasonable flexibility in how authority fairness is interpreted. Extending this argument, I will demonstrate that the categorisation of self as a group member changes the dynamic of interpreting authority fairness.

The group-level analysis

The rules of fairness, just like any other group norms, are a reflection of a group’s social reality. Thus, it is the group in question, not scholars or third parties, that decides what constitutes of fairness and what it does not (Platow & O’Brien, 2009). The elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour demonstrates how fairness is constructed based on the shared reality of the group identity (Drury & Reicher, 2009; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000). Crowd conflict arises with incongruity between perceptions of what constitutes a legitimate and fair action. Therefore, although the police may deem restricting the movement of protestors as just, the conflict may arise if the crowd perceives it as otherwise. Therefore, fairness in the context of identities is not what the authority actor intends, but what the recipient experiences and perceives.

There is a strong evidence to suggest that identity shapes perceptions of distributive justice. In one study, Wenzel (2001) demonstrated how the content of group membership is utilised to guide people to make entitlement judgements. One Psychology department was presented as superior in methodological skills to another Psychology department in an outgroup university, whereas the outgroup department was rated as superior in theoretical skills (or vice-versa). Then, participants were provided with a job recruitment scenario including candidates who scored either high or low on methodological and theoretical skills,
among others. Participants’ task was to judge which candidate was more entitled to the position. Participants who highly identified themselves as Psychology students, judged candidates who were more competent in the skill that was more relevant to their own department as having more entitlement to the job. Therefore, judgements of distributive fairness and entitlement were linked to group identity. Another study also supported the assertion that identity shapes fairness judgements (Platow, Hunter, Branscombe, & Grace, 2014). In this research, Australians and New Zealanders were asked to indicate the fairest method of determining the ranking of countries’ performance in the Olympics. Typically, countries are ranked in terms of the total medals won, but this method favours large and disfavours smaller countries. In line with the expectations, the authors found that participants preferred distributions that improved their country’s ranking. For some, it meant preferring unconventional ranking methods as a way of enhancing their country’s relative standing. Similarly, in the context of mergers between groups, people favour the pattern of the merging of their organisations that would benefit their immediate subgroup’s social status (Giessner, Viki, Otten, Terry, & Tauber, 2006). Therefore, given that authority decisions are linked to beneficial resources, groups may deem decisions that elevate their social standing as more fair than others.

Furthermore, there is some evidence that these ethnocentric biases are relevant to PJ judgements as well. To demonstrate this in the context of authority decisions, Radburn, Stott, Bradford, and Robinson (2016) manipulated the social categories of the recipients of the police actions presented in a video format. They found that the judgements of the police fairness differed subsequently based on whether the policed were categorised as ingroup members or not. Violent treatment of the police towards the ingroup members was perceived as less fair than the same actions towards the outgroup members. This is in line with the assumption that social identity influences judgements of fairness, but in contrast to how justice theories are construed in criminology literature I reviewed in Chapter 2, whereby fairness is presented as a static concept, reflecting, assumedly, a universal and uncontested type of fairness. However, more evidence is needed on how identity driven judgements of
fairness, in turn, are linked to responses to authority decisions. For example, it is not clear whether the ethnocentric group-based evaluations of fairness would be suppressed once faced with a decision from a proper and just authority. On one hand, if the authority is perceived as a legitimate agent of the society, then, according to the common understanding of legitimacy, it prescribes obedience even if the authority decision is wrong, or, in this case, even if the decision disfavours the group. On the other hand, appraising fairness in ethnocentric ways is a part of enacting social identity; favouring decisions, regardless if they are fair or not, has a potential to elevate the group’s relative standing. This creates a dilemma for the group members on whether to comply with authority or stick by their own group; I will come back to discussing this argument of conflicting values in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

However, for now, it is important to note that decisions regarding groups are more likely to be judged in terms of collective outcome favourability than PJ in comparison to the decisions regarding individuals (Leung et al., 2007). Therefore, group-level authority decisions may be more likely driven by the group’s self-interest than the judgements of authority legitimacy or procedural fairness (see also Peate, Platow, & Eggins, 2008). This is similar to what I argued in the previous chapter: outcomes and PJ appear to be intertwined and not completely distinct (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Kwong & Leung, 2002; Törnblom & Vermunt, 1999; Wu & Wang, 2013). Thus, the outcomes the groups receive can alter group’s experience of procedural fairness (see also Platow, Hoar, Reid, & Harley, 1997; van Prooijen & Zwenk, 2009; Visschers & Siegrist, 2012). Over-relying on fair procedures and how they impact identification with other members of the society the way the RMPJ do is likely to overlook how groups function in this regard. Identifying how group processes influence group members’ perceptions of authority decision fairness or acceptance of those decisions is key to understanding the full extent of the impact of authority decisions.

The intergroup-level analysis

Apart from the intragroup processes, the intergroup context of the authority decision is also highly relevant for fairness judgements. At the outset, it is important to note that
despite the interpersonal focus of traditional authority legitimacy research, the relationship between the authorities and the society they represent can be conceived as a multipartite one, with an authority serving more than one group in the society (Wenzel & Jobling, 2006). This, sometimes, requires balancing the demands of different sections of society when making the decision. For example, one of the jobs of the police is to protect the vulnerable people who may be concerned about antisocial behaviour or drugs misuse in their community. Those vulnerable adults may request the police assistance when they notice a group of ‘suspicious’ young people hanging around outside their house. This puts the authority in the situation whereby they need to decide to either respond to the call and move the young people on, even if there is no evidence of wrongdoing, to put the caller’s mind at ease, or to ignore the call and make those vulnerable individuals feel fearful while simultaneously allowing the young people to enjoy the public space as any citizen could. Thus, each decision the police makes, for example, has a potential to, at least be interpreted, as serving one group in the society over another.

The literature on the RMPJ rarely considers how different social groups may interpret authority decisions. Despite being built on social identity theory and an assumption that groups are central to people’s social wellbeing, the group-level and intergroup-level contexts of authority decisions are understudied in the literature on the RMPJ. In their early work, Tyler and Lind (1992) acknowledge that the role of authorities becomes more important, but also more controversial, in situations of social conflict. This is a very important point because when resources are scarce, people seek out authorities to make rightful decisions to settle the dispute. At the same time, any allocation of resources may be deemed as less or more fair by different beneficiaries based on whether the allocations are deemed to favour one’s group or not. Despite recognising this in the early years of the relational models, subsequent research on authority power has focused mainly on the individual encounters with authority, while distinguishing the personal relationship people have with the authorities as central. Thus, the key argument here is that the research on authorities must recognise the impact of decision-making not only for the individuals and
their identity but also should take into account the group context in which the decision is made. I should make clear that I do not dispute that fairness from authorities clearly matters, but how the judgement of fairness will be reached will largely depend on the wider context that the action of the authority itself.

Having acknowledged that authority decisions may be potentially relevant for intergroup contexts, it is worth considering how such contexts shape perceptions of fairness. Firstly, group members may use outgroups as a reference for making sense of the fairness and their own group’s outcomes and treatment. In line with social identity theory, information about own group membership is, in part, derived from other groups, whereby groups try to make themselves positively distinct from others (Turner, 1975). These comparisons may ultimately lead to feelings of relative deprivation or relative gratification (Davis, 1959; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). In other words, people do not make judgements of fairness in isolation to the social context, but primarily by comparing how they are treated and what they are entitled to in comparison to other groups; group members may feel that they are either better off or worse off in relation to others. This comparison can take place either at the interpersonal level, making judgements of fairness in relation to other individuals, or at the intergroup level, whereby feelings of deprivation or gratification are experienced in comparison to other groups (Runciman, 1966). Both of the types of relative deprivation are also likely to have distinct consequences, for example, relative deprivation at interpersonal level is likely to result in stress outcomes, whereas intergroup relative deprivation may be more predictive of collective action (Dubé & Guimond, 1986). It is the latter that is relevant to the present thesis.

Observations from a post-conflict society such as NI provide a clear example of how the historical context of identities and the intergroup context influence perceptions of fairness. To provide some context, in the 1920s Ireland was partitioned with the north part forming a part of the UK and the rest of the Ireland forming a sovereign state. NI is currently resided by Irish Nationalist and Republicans, typically of Catholic background, whose desire it is for the North to be reunited with the remainder of the island and by Unionists and
Loyalists, mostly of Protestant background, who wish to remain the part of the UK. The contradictory goals of the two communities clashed towards the late 1960s when ‘The Troubles’ – a period of ethno-nationalist conflict – emerged. Although the peace agreement was reached in 1998, some parts of NI still remain divided (McVeigh & Rolston, 2007; Mulcahy, 2005). It is in this intergroup context that the argument that identities drive perceptions of PJ is relevant.

During a period of loyalist protests in 2013, Nolan and colleagues (2014) interviewed members of both communities on their views regarding how these protests were policed. Protestors demanded the reversal of a decision to only fly the British flag at Belfast City Hall on designated days. This decision was made in an attempt to bring Belfast flag display policies in line with other British cities which also only fly the Union Jack on the designated days. Loyalists, however, mobilised and took it to the streets to express their dissatisfaction. The police became the centre of criticism by Nationalists for their handling of the protests, being accused of ‘tiptoeing around [the protestors] and watching them bring the place to a standstill’ (Nolan et al., 2014, p. 114). These condemnations of the police action created a pressure for the authorities to alter their tactics. Thus, over the following days, the police became more proactive in ensuring the protests caused little disruption. This, however, led to perceptions of unfair treatment on behalf of the Loyalists, who claimed that police were brutal towards them and disrupted their right to protest peacefully. In conclusion, regardless of what the police actions were, one of the communities were more dissatisfied than other and ‘achieving’ PJ was challenging. Clearly, what constitutes fair treatment was not shared and agreed by the two communities and the police were placed in a difficult situation whereby they struggled to provide feelings of fairness for both parts of the communities.

Perhaps the observation that the police may still struggle with the public support after they have implemented what they deemed were informed and fair actions is the most convincing call for an alternative theoretical framework. Such an account needs to recognise how social identity functions regarding perceptions of authority fairness. Societies troubled
by unrest provide the means of testing the theoretical assumptions of concepts like legitimacy or procedural fairness because in those cases, the authority-public relationship has to be (re)built. These power-wielding problems are not unique to post-conflict societies in any way, perhaps they are best described as a feature of diverse societies.

Remarkably similar interactions are unfolding during protests such as Black Lives Matter (Wing, 2015). These protests became infamous because the police tended to be heavy-handed from the onset. Having recognised the injustice behind this violence, some police officers decided to join the protest during one of the events, which was met with a new wave of criticisms. Clearly, there were some members of the public who deemed harsh treatment of police as an appropriate way to control the disorder and a police officer joining the protest was labelled as political and disloyal to the police and the public. Therefore, in this case, the dissatisfaction with police fairness appears to be underpinned by much broader beliefs about race-based intergroup relations in the US in a similar way to that of NI dissatisfaction with policing of protests is tied to the ethno-national intergroup conflict. Not only the group identity drives the perceptions of fairness, as I overviewed in this chapter, but also the intergroup setting may encourage the groups to positively differentiate based on the relevant dimension of fairness, creating even more divergent perceptions of what fairness constitutes. Thus, the context of group identity during the authority decision-making is highly relevant for how those decisions will be received by the relevant groups.

The present research

Having overviewed the existing literature on authority legitimacy and fairness, I identified limitations in the current state of the theory. To start with, PJ research relies on the interpersonal contact between authorities and subordinates and does not consider how people respond to authority decisions in the intergroup contexts. Further to this, PJ research tends not to consider how identities have the ability to shape fairness judgements, subsequently influencing how the authority decisions are perceived. To this end, I sought to address how the context of identity influences perceptions of authorities and the decisions they make. Reiterating the point made at the start of this chapter and in Figure 3.1, I adopt a framework
whereby the process of categorising the self as a member of a social group is a point of
departure for understanding a whole array of processes, in addition to being an explanatory
approach for why people care about authority fairness as the RMPJ typically emphasise. It is
through dynamic categorisation processes, which are embedded in the context of social
behaviour, that authority decisions come to be construed in the first place (Radburn et al.,
2016). Group members dynamically construct their shared reality of fairness, often in
ethnocentric way (Platow et al., 2014). The present research aims to recognise group
members as dynamic actors in forming their responses to authority decisions as opposed to
passive recipients of authority actions, thus characterising those who receive authority
decisions as experts on what it really means to experience fairness and unfairness (see
Shapiro, 2001). This signals a shift in the approach to studying authorities; the interest here
not only lies in whether people have trust and confidence in authorities and how they
perceive their decisions, but also in how the specific decisions may be evaluated in the
specific time and context by the groups affected by the decision.

Further to this, the current research sought to examine authority decisions that are
intergroup-level in their nature. Therefore, I focused on the authority decisions about social
groups to understand how the intergroup context of the decision-making affects responses to
authority decisions. By doing so, I move away from research that typically focuses on the
authority decision-making in the context of, for example, police-citizen encounters as an
interpersonal-level interaction. Studying authority in the context of interpersonal
relationships reduces our capability to understand the phenomenon as a whole. To address
this, the present research recognises that (1) the role of authority extends beyond dealing
with individuals (2) the way social groups perceive authority decisions is more complex than
the sum of individual members’ perceptions of the decision, and (3) holding authority
sometimes involves making decisions about groups and managing expectations from
different corners of society. Finally, there is a dearth of research aiming to understand the
everyday struggles to obtain legitimacy in post-conflict societies (such as NI, see Mulcahy &
Ellison, 2001, see also Bradford et al., 2014 for discussion on South Africa). In such
contexts, repairing or rebuilding the relationship between authorities and citizens and understanding how these relations drive perceptions of authority fairness should be at the centre of exploratory frameworks. Such an account would also provide a holistic approach to the study of authority power rather than focusing on specific authorities such as the police.

The current research focuses on the wide range of authorities, including regulatory bodies (which I address in Studies 1, 4), referees (Study 2), and governments (Studies 5, 7, 8) who make decisions regarding social groups on the everyday basis. How authorities can foster cooperation in divided societies is a theoretical question that has a potential to transform the communities we live in.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.2.** Overview of the processes investigated in the present thesis.

Therefore, across the three empirical chapters, I explore the wider context of social identities and authority decisions in an attempt to deepen our understanding how people accept and reject authority through the responses to their decisions. I do so in a non-sequential manner whereby each chapter takes a slightly different position and addresses these questions from a distinct angle. Broadly speaking, these approaches can be categorised
into four main areas: (1) the individual-level, investigating how individuals’ ideologies and moralities, as proposed by the value protection model of justice reasoning (Skitka, 2002), shape intergroup-level responses to authority decisions, (2) the intragroup level, focusing on the group processes such as norms, (3) the intergroup-level, examining how intergroup relations, relative social standing and perceived conflict contributes to our understanding of responses to authority decisions, and finally (4) the cultural level, whereby I consider how cultural values, among other aspects, underlie people’s beliefs about the nature of authority power (see Figure 3.2). Thus, working to the full potential of the theory, I study identity-relevant behaviour through the lens of cultural and structural settings in which they take place (Reicher, 2004). Given that experimental methods are scarce in the authority literature (Jackson, Tyler, Hough, Bradford, & Mentovich, 2015), I also set out to address the hypotheses using experimental paradigms.

In Chapter 4 (Studies 1-4), I investigate the role of group processes in shaping responses to authority decisions. I hypothesise that group norms, such as loyalty, can predict how group members perceive the fairness of ingroup favouring and ingroup disfavouring decisions, and consequently, how these group members respond to authority decisions. Thus, I highlight the importance of intragroup dynamics in shaping the relations with authorities. In Chapter 5 (Study 5), I seek to extend the idea that loyalty is an important construct in intergroup-level authority decisions, this time, in the context where loyalty to the group matters as much as obedience to authorities, namely in the VC cultures. I compare two culturally different samples to investigate how the cultural context of authorities influences groups responses to authority decisions. I also test how moral beliefs on values such as loyalty, fairness, and authority determine responses to authority decisions. Finally, in Chapter 6 (Studies 6-8), I investigate the role of outgroup status and ideological beliefs in shaping entitlement to fairness from authorities. To this end, I test the assumption underlying the RMPJ that fairness is the source of information about one’s social standing. This allows me to investigate the impact of relative group status, as well as individual ideologies regarding the shape of the hierarchies in the society, influence people’s perceptions
regarding what is fair in the hands of authorities. Further to the main research questions examined in Chapters 4-6, I also investigate the impact of perceived intergroup competition (Study 4) as well as intergroup attitudes (Studies 3, 7, 8) in shaping perceptions of fairness of authority decisions and the subsequent acceptance of those decisions.
To be loyal is to protect the group from disfavouring outcomes from authorities¹

People comply and cooperate with authority decisions if they believe that these authorities are legitimate (Mastrofski et al., 1996; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Jackson, 2014; van der Toorn et al., 2011) and as I previously discussed, PJ has been established as key antecedent to legitimacy (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Having already suggested that the research on authorities tends to be limited to the individual-level encounters, I propose to explore how processes at group level may shape perceptions of authority decisions. Given that social identities are key in determining individuals’ perceptions and behaviours (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), I suggest that group processes have the power to influence how group members respond to intergroup-level authority decisions. Specifically, the extent to which group members feel loyal towards their own group may inform how

¹ Study 2, presented in this chapter, was originally discussed at the biennial meeting of the International Society for Justice Research in Kent, England in July 2016. Also, I would like to thank Meghan McNamara for suggesting the research context for Study 4 and her help with collecting data.
group members respond to authority decisions regarding their group. In other words, I propose that ingroup loyalty, or predisposition to enhance group welfare and reduce the negative consequences (Silver, 1997; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001), can have an effect on the extent to which group members endorse or reject authority decisions.

**Responding to the authority decisions: Individual- versus group-level**

People’s actions may differ based on whether they perceive themselves in terms of personal identity or their social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Similarly, reactions to authority decisions regarding individuals are underpinned by distinct processes compared to those regarding groups. In the context of political decisions, Leung, Tong, and Lind (2007) showed that when decisions regarded individuals, perceptions of PJ of such decisions were the best predictors of the decision endorsement, in line with the traditional PJ research (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). However, when the decision was made at the group-level, outcome favourability, or the extent to which the decision was favouring the group, was a stronger predictor of whether a decision would be accepted or not. Therefore, decisions with favourable outcomes for the group were more likely to be endorsed, whereas unfavourable decisions were less likely to be accepted, regardless of the perceptions of PJ. These findings suggested that fairness may not be the universal driver of increased compliance and cooperation with authorities, particularly in group-level decisions.

One group process accounting for the group-level preference for accepting authority decisions based on their favourability was put forward by Leung et al. (2007). They argued that endorsing the group’s interest and being loyal to one’s group is a fundamental part of being in a group. Thus, group members are expected to act in ways that benefit the group, including supporting authority decisions that benefit them but rejecting those that may be harmful to the group. This group loyalty acts as a moral mandate; it is an internalised value stemming from the core morality (Skitka, 2002). Moral values such as loyalty, have shown to overcome the importance of procedural fairness in acceptance of moral decisions (Skitka & Mullen, 2002). I return to discussions on moral values in more detail in Chapter 5. What is relevant for now is that research investigating process-by-outcome interaction on decision
acceptance generally supports the assertion that PJ judgements may not always be the driver of decision acceptance (Brockner, 2002; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2003; Kwong & Leung, 2002; Wu & Wang, 2013; Wu & Wu, 2015). When outcomes are favourable, or in line with one’s moral values (Skitka & Mullen, 2002), fair procedures do not affect the decision acceptance. In other words, individuals may accept favourable decisions, even if they are unfair. Despite the plausibility of the suggestions put forward by Leung et al. on the potential role of the group loyalty in responses to authority decisions, these claims were not systematically tested in any previous research. Yet, understanding how group-based processes shape people’s reactions to authority decisions is important for uncovering how authorities may increase group-level compliance.

**Ingroup loyalty**

At the individual-level, loyalty is a sacred moral value, one of the five basic moral foundations (Haidt, 2012). It is characterised by high levels of moral commitment towards one's collective and it exists on a continuum within the moral world (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloocchi, 2014). At the group level, ingroup loyalty can be broadly characterised as the willingness to act in order to advance the group’s welfare and limit any actions that may harm the group (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001, but some stress that high levels of loyalty do not guarantee a commitment to act on behalf of the group, Silver, 1997). Thus, loyalty can be conceived as the extent to which group members intend to be loyal to their group at the individual level. Moreover, loyalty may also be expected of individuals at the group level, for example, even when loyalty is not a group norm (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996). Group norms can be inferred from the behaviour and actions of other group members (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Thus, when other group members endorse the principles of loyalty and act in ways that prove their commitment to the group, other group members may infer this norm and be motivated to act in ways that display group loyalty.

Loyalty can be manifested in a number of ways including keeping the group’s secrets even in the face of high benefits for betrayal (Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2016; Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013) or staying in a group despite negative outcomes (Ellemers,
Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Levine & Moreland, 2002). Others suggested that loyalty functions as a ‘social glue’ that holds the groups together and protects it from threats to its stability (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). In terms of the antecedents of loyalty, it is generally assumed that social identification with the group is a prerequisite for any form of loyalty to arise (Silver, 1997), but identification and loyalty are understood to be distinct concepts. Indeed, high identifiers usually display higher loyalty than low identifiers (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001), nonetheless, it is also theoretically viable for one to strongly identify with a group without displaying loyalty.

Although high levels of loyalty are desirable for groups to flourish, displays of loyalty can hinder the intergroup relations. In the empirical studies, loyalty has been linked to derogatory attitudes towards other groups (Li & Brewer, 2004) and approval of violence towards the outgroup (T. R. Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006). Therefore, in the context of intergroup-level authority decisions, loyalty may be further exhibited by providing less support to decisions that favour the other group. Yet, little prior research, to our knowledge, has looked at the impact that intergroup relations have on the ways group members perceive decisions made about their own and other groups (for an exception, see Peate, Platow, & Eggins, 2008).

**Overview of hypotheses**

Ingroup loyalty comes with an expectation that one will accept decisions based on their instrumentality for the group and to protect the group’s interest, thus putting their group’s wellbeing at the forefront of their actions. Therefore, I propose that authority decision outcomes which threaten the group’s position or wellbeing may thus be dismissed by these loyal group members, even if the decision was made in a fair way. Conversely, when group members do not exhibit ingroup loyalty, they may respond to the decision based on its fairness or be less likely to disagree with the unfavourable authority decision. Further to this, I also investigated whether people judge ingroup-favouring decisions as fairer.

Given the link between social identification and ingroup loyalty, it was also expected that high identification, as a construct distinct to group loyalty, would further
predict similar patterns of behaviour to ingroup loyalty. Thus, I set out to investigate whether identification and loyalty are distinct concepts, which in turn individually contribute to responses to the authority decisions. Indeed, Leung et al. (2007) reported a moderating effect of social identification strength on the importance of outcome favourability in policy endorsement. That is, only high identifiers were more likely to favour policies that were favourable to the group and not low identifiers (see also Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-Schneider, 1992). Therefore, although the focus of this study is on ingroup loyalty, social identification strength may have similar effects on decision acceptance of intergroup-level authority decisions.

The present studies

To empirically test these claims, the effect of ingroup loyalty on intergroup-level authority decision acceptance was investigated in four experimental studies in the context of university students (Study 1), sports fans (Studies 2 and 4), and Catholic and Protestant communities in NI (Study 3). More importantly, the studies presented in this chapter extend previous work by focusing on the intergroup context of authorities’ decisions. As such, they not only construe authorities as decision makers at the individual-level but also recognise them as central in managing the interests of different societal groups. Studies 3 and 4 further tested the impact of intergroup relations on the group members’ responses to authority decisions. Ingroup identification strength is also measured across all four studies, but only Studies 3 and 4 directly compare the contributions of loyalty and ingroup identification strength in relation to responses to authority decisions. Although it was expected that these two constructs will be distinct, it was not clear whether one of the constructs would be more important.

Collectively, these studies enable us to explore the mechanisms underpinning authority decision endorsement. Understanding how group membership, group processes and the larger intergroup-level context affect responses to authority decisions is the first step in learning how authorities can manage contradictory group interests in effective ways.

Study 1
Study 1 was set in the context of psychology students responding to decisions about an uneven allocation of funds for a work experience stipends scheme between two groups of students by an external authority. It was expected that participants would accept a favourable (to the ingroup) decision more than an unfavourable one, and to view favourable decisions as fairer. However, this difference was predicted to be contingent on an ingroup norm of loyalty rather than fairness.

Method

Participants. In NI, there are two major universities offering undergraduate psychology programmes, creating an intergroup context for this study. Participants were recruited from Queen’s University Belfast (QUB) and University of Ulster (UU) through their local universities. Ninety-five participants were from QUB and 51 were from UU, giving a total of 146, with a mean age of 22.30 (SD = 6.90). Of those, 90% were female and 10% were male. They participated for either course credit or for a raffle draw of a voucher worth £20.

Design and procedures. The study took place online and employed 3 (group norm: loyalty, fairness, control; between-groups) x 2 (outcome favourability: favouring, disfavouring; within-groups) mixed design. The group norm was manipulated at three levels (loyalty, fairness, control) using a scenario methodology. The study took around 15 minutes to complete. Ethical consent was granted by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee (PREC) at QUB (and a permission from the UU ethics chair to recruit students at the other university was also obtained).

Ingroup norm manipulation. Having been randomly assigned to an ingroup norm condition, participants read bogus extracts from interviews with other psychology students in their university (see Appendix 1.1 for study materials). In the loyalty norm condition, the fictitious fellow students were quoted as saying that psychology students at their university are loyal and that they look out for their own, whereas participants in fairness norm condition read they are concerned with fairness (for example, when they receive feedback on their assignments). In a control group, the ingroup fictional interviewees emphasised that
being fun was their norm. Similar manipulations of group norms were previously used by others (see Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Jetten et al., 1996; Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013). As a manipulation check, participants identified the key word that the students quoted in the interview described their community as. To reinforce this ingroup norm, participants were asked to recall any examples of student behaviours demonstrating this quality.

**Decision favourability manipulation.** Participants then read about the issue of employability and importance of work experience for psychology graduates. A potential input from an external organisation that governs and accredits both of these courses is Northern Ireland branch of British Psychological Society (NIBPS) was introduced. This involved a scheme with a weekly stipend for students wishing to undertake professional work experience in accordance to one’s career aspirations. Decision favourability was a within-group factor and thus, participants were presented with two hypothetical decisions regarding the NIBPS scheme in a random order. One decision was favourable to the ingroup, i.e., participants read that ‘the grant will be awarded in 70:30 [ingroup university] to [outgroup university] ratio. This means that 70% of grant available will be going to [ingroup university] undergraduate students’ while the other decision was unfavourable with proportions switched over accordingly, i.e., 30% of grant available to ingroup university versus 70% awarded to outgroup university. In both decisions, a justification to award higher percentage to one university was provided, for example, ‘In 2015, 36% of UU psychology graduates were in full-time employment in comparison to 53% of QUB students.’

**Decision acceptance.** Participants responded to two items measuring decision acceptance on five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree): ‘I accept the NIBPS decisions’ and ‘I agree with NIBPS decision’. Higher score indicated higher agreement with a decision (r = .80).

**Fairness.** Participants also responded to one item measuring the perception of fairness: ‘What do you think about the fairness of this decision?’ on a five-point Likert scale (1 = unfair; 5 = fair). Higher score indicated higher perception of fairness
**Ingroup identification strength.** Participants’ identification with psychology students at their institution was measured using a four-item identification scale (e.g., ‘I identify myself with other [ingroup university] psychology students’; Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1995) Responses were given on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) with higher scores indicating higher identification with psychology students at their institution (α = .83).

**Results**

Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects or interactions of the university affiliation; thus, the data were collapsed across the universities in the subsequent analyses. However, the order of scenario presentation had an effect on decision acceptance, $F(1, 144) = 16.04, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .10$. When ingroup favourable decision was presented first, the difference in decision acceptance between the two conditions was larger, $F(1, 72) = 57.79, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .45$ than when outgroup favourable decision was presented first, $F(1, 72) = 8.82, p = .004, \eta^2_p = .11$. Therefore, the subsequent analyses controlled for the effects of order.

**Manipulation check.** Participants’ written responses to the manipulation check were coded as either correct or incorrect. Across all three conditions, participants were more likely to identify a correct group than an incorrect one, $\chi^2(6, N = 146) = 280.96, p < .001$. Six participants responded incorrectly to the manipulation check, but they were uniformly distributed across three conditions, $\chi^2(2, N = 146) = 1.23, p = .54$. Furthermore, the differences between correct and incorrect responses in manipulation check on mean decision acceptance were non-significant across both decision conditions. Therefore, these cases were included in the main analyses. For details of the alternative analyses which exclude those cases please see Appendix 1.2.

**The Ingroup Norm*Favourability interaction on decision acceptance.** A two-way 3 (ingroup norm) x 2 (favourability) mixed ANOVA, controlling for the effects of order, was conducted to investigate the effect of interaction on decision acceptance (see Table 4.1 for descriptive statistics). There was a main effect of favourability on decision
acceptance $F(1, 142) = 62.70, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .31$. Participants accepted authority decisions that were favouring the ingroup ($M = 3.24, SD = .96$) more than decisions that were disfavouring the ingroup ($M = 2.59, SD = .92$). However, the main effect of ingroup norm, $F(2, 142) = .68, p = .508$ and the Ingroup Norm*Favourability interaction on decision acceptance were non-significant, $F(2, 142) = .58, p = .560$.

**The Ingroup Norm*Favourability interaction on perceived fairness.** A further 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted, this time to evaluate the effects of this interaction on perceived fairness while controlling for the effects of order. A similar pattern emerged: decision favourability had a significant main effect on perceived fairness, with ingroup favourable decisions perceived as more fair ($M = 2.73, SD = 1.21$) than ingroup unfavourable decisions ($M = 2.19, SD = 1.04$), $F(1, 142) = 26.59, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .16$. The main effect of ingroup norms, $F(2, 142) = .68, p = .508$, as well as Ingroup Norm x Favourability interaction both had non-significant effects on perceived fairness $F(2, 142) = 2.11, p = .125$.

Table 4.1

*Decision acceptance means and standard variations in the experimental conditions (Study 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingroup norm</th>
<th>Loyalty M (SD)</th>
<th>Fairness M (SD)</th>
<th>Control M (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup favourable decision</td>
<td>3.16 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.25 (0.76)</td>
<td>3.29 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup unfavourable decision</td>
<td>2.50 (.97)</td>
<td>2.72 (.87)</td>
<td>2.56 (.91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The relationship between decision acceptance and perceived fairness.** Having observed similar patterns of effects for both decision acceptance and perceived fairness, a bivariate correlation was conducted to evaluate whether these two constructs are related. The analysis showed that these measures were highly correlated, $r(145) = .71, p < .001$. This suggests that decisions that were perceived as fairer were also more likely to be accepted.
The effect of ingroup identification strength on the decision acceptance. To analyse the effects of social identity strength on decision acceptance in favourable and unfavourable decisions, a new variable indexing the difference between favourable and unfavourable decision acceptance scores conditions, decision acceptance bias, was computed. Higher scores indicated a higher preference for ingroup favouring decision. Having controlled for the effects of order, there was no relationship between decision acceptance bias and ingroup identification strength, $r(141) = -.10, p = .227$.

Discussion

Across all ingroup norms, a preference for ingroup-favouring decisions over outgroup-favouring was observed. In the subsequent analyses, decision acceptance and fairness ratings were highly correlated, which suggests that judging the same authority decision as fairer, based on their outcome favourability, is associated with higher likelihood of accepting this decision. This ethnocentrism in understanding fairness resonates with findings that fairness perceptions are contingent on the extent to which the outcome is favourable to the group (Platow et al., 2014). However, the expected effects of ingroup norms and identification were not observed. Norms of loyalty and fairness may have been ineffective in this study because of a low relevance of the norms of loyalty and fairness among university students. Study 2 was conducted to test the loyalty hypotheses in an alternative setting.

Study 2

Study 2 employed a similar approach to the manipulation of ingroup norms, this time in the context of the English Premier League. Football provides a useful setting for studying how multiple groups react to authority decisions, with two groups involved in a match who are arbitrated by an authority figure, a referee. Referees make multiple decisions during a single match that affect both teams, fostering a natural conflict of interest between the groups, but also providing a context for decision favourability to be manipulated. This time, the fairness of the decision was also manipulated, predicting that ingroup norms of fairness would increase preference for fair decisions over unfair decisions in comparison to
loyalty ingroup norm, whereas norms of loyalty would increase preference for ingroup-favouring decisions over disfavouring. Lastly, I predicted that ingroup identification strength would increase the importance of decision favourability relative to fairness in determining decision acceptance regardless of the ingroup norm.

**Method**

**Participants.** Participants \((N = 132)\) were 92% male, 8% female, with a mean age of 26.06 \((SD = 7.98)\) who self-identified as Manchester United supporters. They were recruited through social media and discussion boards dedicated to Manchester United football club and English football in general. Two £20 vouchers were raffled as an incentive among those who completed the study.

**Design and procedures.** The study took place online and employed a 2 (ingroup norm: loyalty versus fairness; between participants) x 2 (decision fairness: fair versus unfair; within participants) x 2 (decision favourability: favourable versus unfavourable; within participants) mixed design. Manchester United football club fans were randomly assigned to either a loyal or fair group norm condition. The study took 15 minutes to complete and the ethical consent was granted by the PREC at QUB.

**Ingroup norms manipulation.** Similar to Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to an ingroup norm condition and read extracts from bogus interviews with other Manchester United fans (see Appendix 2.1 for study materials). In the loyalty norm condition, fellow fans were quoted as saying that their club is built on loyalty and that supporting their team regardless if they win or not is typical of Manchester United fans. For example, the extract stated: ‘*Our club is loyal. (…) If it wasn’t for people being loyal in football, the club would mean nothing to anyone. We stand by our players no matter what and this is what Red Devils are about.*’ In the fairness condition, true sportsmanship was emphasised. For example, participants read: ‘*Our club is fair. (…) If it wasn’t for people being fair in football, we wouldn’t know true winners from average performers. It’s the talent and willpower of our Red Devils which determines whether they are succeeding. It’s*
not about who can fake an injury to benefit their team.’ A manipulation check identical to Study 1 was employed.

**Referee decision videos and decision acceptance measure.** Thirty-two videos depicting referee decisions from Manchester United matches were initially pre-tested in an independent sample of 17 neutral football fans who were not affiliated with Manchester United or their main rivals’ clubs. These pilot participants indicated whether the decision in each video was fair or not. Videos with over 70% agreement were then categorised as ‘fair’ or ‘unfair’ accordingly. Where a decision favoured Manchester United, for example, admitting a free kick or a yellow card to the opponent, the video was categorised as ‘favourable’, and where it favoured the opponent team the video was categorised as unfavourable. In this way, I developed a stimulus set of sixteen videos for the main study, with four videos in each of the four conditions: (1) fair/favourable; (2) fair/unfavourable; (3) unfair/favourable; (4) unfair/unfavourable. However, following data collection, the favourability categorisation of the videos was checked by two independent raters for validity. One of the unfair/favourable videos was considered ambiguous (the decision was neither clear-cut favourable or unfavourable) and thus was removed from the main analyses. Thus, the unfair/favourable condition had only three videos.

Participants viewed the sixteen videos in a random order and each video was accompanied by a written description of the decision, including the players and clubs involved. The length of videos was, on average, 30.40s long (SD = 8.04). Participants responded to two items for each video on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree): ‘I accept the referee’s decisions’ and ‘I refuse to agree with the referee’s decision’ (reverse-coded). Higher scores indicated higher agreement with a decision (α = .73).

**Ingroup identification strength.** Participants’ identification with Manchester United was measured using an adaptation of Mael and Ashforth (1992) organisational identification scale. Participants responded to four items such as ‘When someone praises Manchester United, it feels like a personal compliment’ on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 =
strongly agree). Higher scores indicated higher identification with Manchester United (α = .63).

Results

Manipulation check and preliminary analyses. Participants’ responses to the manipulation check were coded as either congruent with the ingroup norm condition or not. Participants across both conditions were more likely to identify a correct keyword than an incorrect one, χ²(1, N = 132) = 82.19, p < .001. However, those who either failed to identify a keyword or identified an incorrect one (n = 13) were uniformly distributed across both conditions, χ²(1, N = 132) = .35, p = .56. Furthermore, the differences between correct and incorrect responses in the manipulation check on mean decision acceptance were non-significant across all conditions. Therefore, these cases were included in the main analyses. For details of the alternative analyses which exclude those cases please see Appendix 2.2.

The Ingroup Norm*Fairness*Favourability interaction on decision acceptance. A three-way 2 (ingroup norm) x 2 (fairness) x 2 (favourability) mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether ingroup norms determined patterns of decision acceptance (see Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics). Favourable decisions were accepted more than unfavourable ones, F(1, 130) = 63.15, p < .001, η² = .33, which was further qualified by a Favourability*Ingroup Norm interaction, F(1, 130) = 2.73, p = .015, η² = .05. Furthermore, the main effect of fairness was significant, F(1, 130) = 675.53, p < .001, η² = .84, but the main effect of ingroup norm was non-significant, F(1, 130) = 1.86, p = .176, as was the Fairness*Ingroup Norm interaction, F(1, 130) = 1.52, p = .219. Finally, the Fairness*Favourability interaction on decision acceptance was significant F(1, 130) = 2.12; p = .015, η² = .05.

Favourability*Ingroup Norm interaction on decision acceptance. To probe this interaction further, four t-tests with a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of p = .013 were conducted. Participants in the loyalty norm condition accepted favourable referee decisions (M = 3.50, SD = .50) more than unfavourable (M = 2.89, SD = .51), t(60) = 7.08, p < .001, d = .91. This pattern also occurred in the fairness norm condition, but with a smaller effect.
size, \( t(70) = 4.04, p < .001, d = .51 \). Furthermore, when decision outcome was favourable, participants in the loyalty norm condition were more accepting of referee decisions (\( M = 3.50, SD = .50 \)) than participants in the fairness norm condition (\( M = 3.27, SD = .49 \)), \( t(130) = 2.66, p = .009, d = .46 \). However, when the decision outcome was unfavourable, there was no significant difference between the two ingroup norms, \( t(130) = .71, p = .482 \) (see Figure 4.1).

Table 4.2

*Decision acceptance means and standard variations across all experimental conditions (Study 2)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Loyalty norm</th>
<th>Fairness norm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( M (SD) )</td>
<td>( M (SD) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair/favourable</td>
<td>4.25 (.59)</td>
<td>4.19 (.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair/unfavourable</td>
<td>3.85 (.54)</td>
<td>3.92 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfair/favourable</td>
<td>2.75 (.83)</td>
<td>2.36 (.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfair/unfavourable</td>
<td>1.93 (.79)</td>
<td>1.98 (.71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Favourability*Fairness interaction on decision acceptance.** Four paired-samples t-tests (with a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level \( p < .0125 \)) were carried out to investigate the Favourability*Fairness interaction (see Figure 4.2). Significant differences were observed across all four conditions. Favourable fair decisions (\( M = 4.22, SD = .58 \)) were accepted more than unfavourable fair (\( M = 3.89, SD = .59 \)), \( t(131) = 5.34, p < .001, d = .93 \) or favourable unfair decisions (\( M = 2.54, SD = .83 \)), \( t(131) = 19.09, p < .001, d = 3.32 \). Similarly, unfavourable unfair decisions were accepted less (\( M = 1.96, SD = .75 \)) than favourable unfair (\( M = 2.54, SD = .83 \)), \( t(131) = 6.44, p < .001, d = 1.12 \) or unfavourable fair decisions (\( M = 3.89, SD = .59 \)), \( t(131) = 23.75; p < .001, d = 4.13 \).
**Figure 4.1.** Distribution of decision acceptance scores across two ingroup norms in favourable/unfavourable decision outcomes (Study 2). *Note:* The box represents the lower and upper quartile and the horizontal line denotes median. Outliers are marked with a dot.

**Figure 4.2.** Mean decision acceptance across Fair*Favourable conditions (Study 2).

**The effect of ingroup identification strength on the decision acceptance.** Similar to Study 1, a decision acceptance bias variable was computed as the mean acceptance of favourable decisions minus the mean acceptance of unfavourable ones. There was a weak
positive correlation between this new variable and ingroup identification strength, \( r(129) = .20; p = .025 \), meaning that for those who strongly identified with Manchester United, the magnitude of difference in accepting favouring decision over disfavouring was larger.

**Discussion**

In line with the original hypotheses, when decision outcome was favourable to the group, participants that were exposed to loyalty ingroup norms were more likely to accept those decisions than participants who were exposed to the norms of fairness. However, there was no difference in decision acceptance across two ingroup value groups when the decision was unfavourable to the group. A norm of ingroup loyalty, therefore, increased the preference for ingroup favouring decisions, regardless of whether the decision was fair or not. In contrast to the predictions, the pattern of ethnocentrism was not evident when decisions were unfavourable as the difference between loyal and fair ingroup norms on decision acceptance was, in this case, non-significant.

Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the interaction of ingroup norm and fairness on decision acceptance was non-significant. Those who were presented with an ingroup norm of fairness were *not* more readily responsive to the authority fairness and did not prefer fair decisions over unfair more than those in the loyalty norm condition. However, it is likely that in the context of football, loyalty may be a more prevalent ingroup norm than the norm of fairness, despite both of these behaviours being evident in football. Studying these processes in an alternative setting may be more informative. Finally, this time, the preference for ingroup favouring decisions correlated with reported social identification strength as Manchester United fan. Although this is line with our predictions and Leung et al. (2007) finding, the magnitude of the effect reported here is small.

It is likely that inconsistencies across Study 1 and 2 are due the nature of the groups involved. For example, it could be argued that the norm of loyalty is prevalent among football fans (see Richardson, 2003; Stuart & Parker, 1997), which makes the manipulations of those norms more accessible for these groups to adapt. In other words, being a football fan more plausibly entails a norm of loyalty to own team. It may be that, in such context,
loyalty norms are more salient than the norms of fairness, since the effects for the loyalty ingroup condition were observed in Study 2. One limitation of Study 2, however, is that the interactions observed in the present study can only be evaluated in terms of ingroup (i.e., Manchester United fans), while they engaged with a variety of outgroups. Thus, so far, I have been unable to evaluate the effect of intergroup relations on patterns of authority decision acceptance. Given this shortcoming as well as inconsistencies in the role of ingroup loyalty on decision acceptance across experimental designs in Study 1 and 2, Study 3 introduced two new elements. Firstly, I decided to measure outgroup attitudes to evaluate their role in responses to authority decisions. Secondly, I employed a measure of ingroup loyalty to identify whether the strength of loyalty to own group predicts responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions, distinctly from the effects of social identification strength.

Study 3

Study 3 was conducted in the context of post-conflict NI communities: Catholic and Protestant. These two community groups have different views regarding the political allegiances of NI and are often perceived to be in the opposition to each other (Muldoon, McLaughlin, & Trew, 2007). The relations are also often perceived as a ‘zero sum’ culture, whereby the relative gain in the status of one community group is treated as a relative loss of status in the other community group (Leach & Williams, 1999). In such a context, being an authority figure, such as the police or the government, is particularly challenging as it demands making decisions that will be accepted by both sides of the community. Adding to the challenges of governing post-conflict societies, the police has historically struggled to gain legitimacy among the Catholic community due to the perceptions of mistreatment during the Troubles (Ellison & Mulcahy, 2001; Mulcahy, 2005). Thus, the intergroup setting of NI policing is a complex one, requiring authorities to carefully balance the competing needs of the two community groups, as well as historical injustices.

The specific cultural context that provided the basis for Study 3 is parading. Parades in NI are common, with almost 5,000 parades taking place in 2014/15, of which around 10%
are flagged as highly sensitive (The Parades Commission, 2015). These parades are regarded as contentious due to their routes or paramilitary symbol displays and the calls to modify them are ongoing. Moreover, some of the parades are culturally Protestant, such as the Twelfth parade, taking place on 12th July, honouring the Battle of the Boyne. On the other hand, some parades are tied to the Catholic culture. An example of this is Saint Patrick’s parade, celebrated on 17th March to commemorate Saint Patrick, the patron of Ireland. Although Saint Patrick’s Day now tends to be portrayed as an inclusive day for all communities, up to the early 2000s it was restricted to Irish nationalist/Catholic areas in NI. Admittedly, these two parades are not completely equal in terms of their exclusiveness, whereby some Protestants and people around the world celebrate Saint Patrick’s Day, whereas the Twelfth tends to be mainly celebrated exclusively by the Protestant community. However, during both of the celebrations, flags are widely exhibited: Union Jack at the Twelfth and Tricolours at the St Patrick’s, and such display of flags is still a contentious issue in NI (Nolan & Bryan, 2016).

Study 3 aimed to extend the support for the role of ingroup loyalty in authority decision acceptance. It was expected that ingroup favourable decisions will be accepted more than ingroup unfavourable decisions and that this effect will be stronger for those reporting higher ingroup loyalty. I also considered another measure of loyalty next to the perception of norms of loyalty, namely an intention to act in loyal ways towards the group (Silver, 1997). Loyalty norm perception, as manipulated in Studies 1 and 2, relates to an awareness that being a part of the particular group requires loyalty because this is what the group values, whereas loyalty intention is an individual-level variable associated with self-expressed intent to act on behalf of the group. Given that the research on different types of loyalties is scarce, the present study can evaluate the relative contribution of the kinds of ingroup loyalty as well as the ingroup identification strength in relation to responses to authority decisions. Thus far, the manipulation of the group norm of loyalty predicted preferences for ingroup favouring authority decisions, but it is not clear whether these effects will be sustained once other measures are introduced.
I also aimed to explore whether the effect of ingroup loyalty is present for decisions affecting both ingroup and outgroup in the same way. To this end, unlike in the other studies in this chapter, I investigated responses to the group-level authority decisions, based on the assumption that the zero-sum nature of the community relations may implicitly create such intergroup-level context. Thus, even if decisions were made about an outgroup, it would be expected that people will care about the implications of such decisions for their own group standing. In addition, the literature suggests that people are more lenient in judgements about the ingroup wrongdoing in comparison to the outgroup (Halabi, Statman, & Dovidio, 2015) and they may even enjoy disfavouring treatment to the outgroup (Leach & Spears, 2009). Thus, I sought to clarify whether displays of ingroup loyalty lead to the preference for ingroup favouring decisions, but also to the lesser acceptance of authority decisions favouring the outgroup.

Finally, the studied context has allowed for investigation of two further variables. Firstly, I hypothesised that the perceptions of the intergroup relations and specifically the attitudes towards the other community can further affect the patterns of responses to decisions. It was expected that negative outgroup attitudes may lead to the preference of disfavouring treatment of authorities towards the outgroup, but a preference towards ingroup favouring decisions. Secondly, I explored the role of police legitimacy in responses to their decisions. According to the traditional PJ literature, legitimate authorities can grant compliance even if their decisions are sometimes wrong. Thus, the present study offers an opportunity to test whether police legitimacy can predict patterns of responses to ingroup- and outgroup-related decisions.

Method

Participants. Participants of Catholic and Protestant background from NI (N = 173) aged $M = 26.86, SD = 10.85$, were recruited via social media and community organisations. Sixty percent were female and 40% were male. Almost equal proportions of the sample indicated to be of Catholic and Protestant background (48% Catholic, 52% Protestant) and
they came from a similar proportion of segregated and mixed areas (see Table 4.3). They participated for either course credit or for a raffle draw of two vouchers worth £30 and £20.

Table 4.3

Self-reported area of origin among Catholic (n = 84) and Protestant (n = 89) subsamples (Study 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Predominantly Catholic</th>
<th>Predominantly Protestant</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic community</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant community</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Design and procedures.** The study employed a 2 (group target: ingroup, outgroup; between groups) x 2 (decision favourability: favouring, disfavouring; within groups) mixed design. Data collection took place online in April 2016 during a time free of contentious parades. The survey took 15 minutes to complete. Ethical approval was received from PREC at QUB.

**Group target manipulation.** Participants were randomly assigned to either ingroup- or outgroup-based scenarios regarding one of the two parades, i.e., either The Twelfth parade as a typically Protestant parade or the St Patrick’s Day as a typically Catholic parade.

**Decision favourability manipulation.** Participants read descriptions of two ways of handling the parade they were assigned to, by the patrolling police, displayed in a random order (see Appendix 3.1 for study materials). One description favoured the parade attendees, allowing them to consume alcohol on the streets and overlooking the antisocial behaviour. On the other hand, the second description disfavoured the parade attendees; the heavily armed police strictly applied the law to all those who were drinking and misbehaving, condemning their behaviour. Following on with the logic of Study 1, efforts were made to match the fairness of both decisions, in one case being too lenient and in another case, being too harsh.
**Decision acceptance and fairness.** Participants responded to two items to indicate their acceptance of the police decision in both favourability instances: ‘I accept the decisions made about handling this parade’ and ‘I agree with the decisions made about handling this parade’ on a five-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*). Higher scores indicated higher agreement with a decision (the internal reliability between those two items was high, $r = .90$). To calculate the relative preference for favouring decision over disfavouring, much like in the previous studies, the decision acceptance score for the disfavouring decision was subtracted from the score for the favouring decisions. Positive scores in the resulting variable reflected a preference for favouring handling of the parade, whereas negative scores indicated a preference for the disfavouring handling of the parade. I refer to this variable as decision acceptance pattern (DAP). Participants also judged the fairness of the police parade handling via one item ‘I think the decisions about handling this parade were fair’ on the same five-point scale.

**Ingroup loyalty.** Following the scenario-based manipulations, ingroup loyalty was measured using a scale Silver (1997), which consisted of eight items such as ‘How willing are you to help organise activities for this community?’ and ‘How willing are you to help this community when it needs you?’ Participants responded on a five-point Likert scale (1 = *not willing at all*; 5 = *extremely willing*) with higher scores indicating higher loyalty ($\alpha = .93$). However, because this scale was measuring intended loyalty as opposed to tapping into whether there is a loyalty norm among the community members, a new six-item scale was created. This loyalty norm scale was initially piloted using online game players reporting on the norms of loyalty among their gaming community ($n = 84$). Five items such as ‘Members of my community support each other no matter what’ or ‘Belonging to my community requires commitment’ were used in the main study. Participants responded to these items with their community (Catholic or Protestant) in mind on a five-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*).

**Ingroup identification strength.** Participants’ identification with their own community was measured using Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) scale. Participants
responded to four items such as ‘I identify myself with other Catholic/Protestant people’ on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) Higher scores indicated higher identification with one’s own community (α = .90).

**Police legitimacy.** A scale from Reisig, Bratton, and Gertz (2007) was used to assess police legitimacy. Participants responded to seven items such as ‘You should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong’ and ‘Disobeying the police is hardly ever justified’ on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicated higher perceived legitimacy (α = .78).

**Outgroup attitudes.** Outgroup attitudes were measured using Haddock, Zanna, and Esses (1993) feeling thermometer. Participants indicated their overall attitude towards the other community on an 11-point scale (0 = extremely unfavourable, 10 = extremely favourable). A higher score indicated more favourable outgroup attitude.

**Results**

**Preliminary analysis.** I began by entering loyalty norm scale items alongside intended loyalty and ingroup identification scales into exploratory factor analysis with Oblimin rotation, allowing factors to correlate, to determine whether these scales measure distinct constructs. In line with the prior expectations, parallel analysis (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007) determined there are three distinct factors. All items in intended loyalty and identification scales loaded on two separate factors accordingly and there were no cross-loadings (see Appendix 3.2 for factor loadings). However, in items relating to loyalty norm, items 1 and 5 did not load on any factor. Thus, those two items were excluded from the main analysis, meaning loyalty norm scale comprised of three items (1) I would stand by any member of my community; (2) Members of my community support each other no matter what; and (3) Loyalty is what keeps my community together. The three items were internally reliable (α = .77).

**Decision acceptance and perceived fairness within experimental conditions.** Firstly, it was checked whether the two decisions were perceived to be of equal (un)fairness by both community groups. In contrast to our expectation, the disfavouring and seemingly
harsh decisions were perceived as fairer ($M = 3.50, SD = 1.02$) than the lenient and favourable decisions ($M = 3.08, SD = 1.11$), $t(169) = 3.63, p < .001, d = .39$. However, as shown in Figure 4.3, participants accepted authority favourable treatment towards ingroup ($M = 3.49, SD = .99$) more than the same treatment towards the outgroup ($M = 2.71, SD = 1.10$), $t(170) = 4.90, p < .001, d = .75$, and they also deemed favourable treatment of their ingroup fairer ($M = 3.34, SD = 1.05$) than the same favourable treatment of the outgroup ($M = 2.62, SD = 1.20$), $t(170) = 4.21, p < .001, d = .75$. There was no difference in decision acceptance of unfavourable treatment between ingroup and outgroup, $t(169) = 1.81, p = .071$, but participants did perceive ingroup disfavouring decisions as less fair ($M = 3.15, SD = 1.09$) than the same outgroup disfavouring decisions ($M = 3.68, SD = 1.08$), $t(168) = -3.17, p = .002, d = -.49$.

**Figure 4.3.** Distribution of perceived fairness and decision acceptance scores whereby favouring and disfavouring decisions are made in relation to the ingroup or the outgroup (Study 3). *Note:* The box represents the lower and upper quartile and the horizontal line denotes median. Outliers are marked with a dot.
To evaluate whether loyalty, either as a norm or as an intention, affects how people respond to authority decisions (DAP) that relate to either ingroup or the outgroup (Target Group), these variables were entered into ANCOVA analysis, adding ingroup identification, police legitimacy and outgroup attitudes as additional variables for exploratory purposes. The correlations between those variables are available in Table 4.4 and the summary of the ANCOVA is in Table 4.5. Intended loyalty, $F(1, 167) = 8.45, p = .005, \eta^2 = .05$, but not loyalty norm, $F(1, 167) = .84, p = .362$, predicted DAP when in interaction with Target Group. Therefore, an intention to be loyal towards group members, but not perceptions of loyalty as group norm (or identification strength), predicted different DAP, depending on whether the decision related to the ingroup or the outgroup. The Target Group*Outgroup Attitudes had a significant interaction on DAP, $F(1, 167) = 11.53, p = .001, \eta^2 = .05$.

Furthermore, in the exploratory analysis, neither legitimacy, $F(1, 167) = .45, p = .505$ nor the Target Group*Legitimacy interaction, $F(1, 167) = 6.58, p = .055$, predicted DAP. To probe the significant interactions further, a moderation analysis was conducted.

Table 4.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. DA (F)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.86 ***</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. DA (UF)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.86 ***</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.18 *</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.21 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fairness (F)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fairness (UF)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.17 *</td>
<td>-.19 *</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.20 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Loyalty norm</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.44 ***</td>
<td>-.32 ***</td>
<td>.37 ***</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Loyalty intention</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.26 ***</td>
<td>.44 ***</td>
<td>-.31 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. OG attitudes</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.18 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Identity</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Legitimacy</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, DA = decision acceptance, F = favourable decision, UF = unfavourable decision, OG = outgroup.
Table 4.5

**ANOVA exploring the effects of target of authority decision (ingroup versus outgroup) on DAP along with the interactions qualified by loyalty, identification, outgroup attitudes and legitimacy measures (Study 3)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>F (1, 167)</th>
<th>( \eta_p^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Group</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty Norm</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty Intention</td>
<td>4.00*</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Attitudes</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Group*Identity</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Group*Loyalty Norm</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Group*Loyalty Intention</td>
<td>8.45**</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Group*Legitimacy</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Group*Outgroup Attitudes</td>
<td>11.59**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* 

* \( p < .05 \), ** \( p < .01 \). F value and the effect size are displayed.

**Moderation analysis.** Loyalty intention and outgroup attitudes scores were entered into the moderation model predicting DAP across ingroup and outgroup decisions using the PROCESS model 2 template and bias-corrected bootstrapped (\( n = 10,000 \)) 95% confidence intervals (Hayes, 2012). The overall model was statistically significant and explained 25% of variance, \( F(5, 162) = 10.63; p < .001, R^2 = .25 \). Loyalty intention was a significant predictor of DAP, \( b = .22, se = .10, p = .038, 95\% CI [.01, .43] \), which was qualified by Target Group*Loyalty Intention interaction, \( b = -.49, se = .22, p = .023, 95\% CI [-.92, -.07] \). That is, higher intended loyalty predicted larger difference between ingroup and outgroup decision acceptance, \( b = -1.60, se = .30, p < .001, 95\% CI [-2.20, -1.01] \). When loyalty was lower, the effect was marginally significant, \( b = -.60, se = .30, p = .049, 95\% CI [-1.20, -.01] \). Simple slope analyses indicated that higher intended loyalty was related to a preference for more favourable decisions when the decision was regarding the ingroup, \( b = .49, se = .16, p = .008, 95\% CI [.16, .82] \), but not the outgroup \( b = -.01, se = .14, p = .967, 95\% CI [-

---

2 Although the three-way interaction was significant, I did not probe it because it was not central to the aims of the study.
.27, .25] (see Figure 4.4). In other words, higher loyalty increased preference for ingroup-favouring decisions, but had no effect on the decisions concerning the outgroup.

Turning to the outgroup attitudes, these were a non-significant predictor of DAP, $b = -.01, se = .05, p = .933, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.11, 10]$, but the effect was qualified by Target Group*Outgroup Attitudes interaction, $b = .34, se = .10, p = .002, 95\% \text{ CI } [.13, .54]$. Lower outgroup attitudes predicted larger DAP difference between ingroup and outgroup decisions, $b = -1.83, se = .31, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-2.43, 1.22]$, whereas when outgroup attitudes were higher, the difference in DAP between ingroup and outgroup decisions was non-significant, $b = -.38, se = .30, p = .215, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.97, .22]$. Simple slope analysis indicated that outgroup attitudes predicted DAP for both ingroup and outgroup decisions, but in the opposite directions. For ingroup decisions, lower outgroup attitudes predicted higher preference for favouring decisions $b = -.19, se = .08, p = .023, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.34, -.03]$. For outgroup decisions, lower outgroup attitudes predicted higher preference for disfavouring decisions, $b = .15, se = .07, p = .03, 95\% \text{ CI } [.02, .29]$ (see Figure 4.5). Thus, positive intergroup attitudes can reduce group-interested responses to authority decisions, while negative attitudes create divisions in how people respond to authority decisions.

![Figure 4.4. Target Group*Loyalty Intention moderation on DAP (controlling for outgroup attitudes, Study 3).](image-url)
In line with the hypotheses, Study 3 supports the assertion that ingroup loyalty predicts preference for decisions that are favourable to the ingroup. However, it was the intention to be loyal towards one’s group as opposed to the perceived loyalty norm that affected the patterns of the authority decision acceptance. This suggests that the individual’s intention to act on behalf of the group may be more predictive of responses to authority decisions than just perceiving that the group norm is to be loyal (see Study 2). Furthermore, the effect of loyalty on preference for favourable outcomes was found to be specific to the authority decisions regarding the ingroup, but not the outgroup. Among those expressing low loyalty intentions, a preference toward ingroup favouring decisions in comparison to the same decisions made about the outgroup was marginal, suggesting that loyalty may well account for biases in responses to ingroup and outgroup decisions. This does not mean that other factors are not relevant here. For example, Study 3 also found that when the outgroup was rated positively, participants accepted ingroup and outgroup decisions equally. However, less favourable outgroup attitudes were linked to a preference for the disfavouring

*Figure 4.5. Target Group*Outgroup Attitudes moderation on DAP (controlling for loyalty intention, Study 3).
handling of the parade when it concerned the outgroup while producing a higher preference for favouring decisions when they concern the ingroup. Finally, police legitimacy was not a significant predictor of responses to authority decisions. In other words, higher legitimacy did not necessarily grant higher compliance with the authority decisions or reduce ingroup bias, in contrast to what legitimacy studies typically suggest (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Jackson, 2014).

Therefore, unlike Study 1, Studies 2 and 3 provided support for the argument that loyalty to one’s group, both experimentally manipulated and self-report, led to an increased preference for ingroup favouring decisions. Given that the intergroup competition was a prominent feature of the studies that supported the loyalty hypothesis (i.e., football and NI samples involved groups that are historically more competitive), it was hypothesised that the effects of loyalty may be moderated by the perceptions of intergroup competition. This assertion has recently been supported by other research, whereby high (versus low) competition increased loyalty to one’s group, which in turn led to less ethical behaviour (Hildreth, Gino, & Bazerman, 2016; Study 4). In the same way, I suggest that loyalty may be a particularly relevant group-directed value when responding to authority decisions that are made in highly competitive contexts. Therefore, I set out to test whether intergroup competition moderates the effect of loyalty on responses to authority decisions.

**Study 4**

Study 4 was set in the context of the US college sports rivalries. To set up the intergroup scenario involving an authority figure making a decision, the study focused on the Big Ten Conference (BTC). The BTC is a sports tournament including only major Midwest American colleges. Thus, the governing body has an authority to make decisions regarding any of the teams that participate in the tournament. Within the contest, a prominent football rivalry exists between University of Michigan (UM) and Ohio State University (OSU; Emmanuel, 2010). Within this context, it was expected that ingroup loyalty will predict ingroup bias in accepting or rejecting decisions made by the BTC when such decision concerns the team perceived as highly competitive. Conversely, when the
intergroup decision is made in low intergroup competitive context, the ingroup loyalty will not predict decision acceptance bias.

**Method**

**Participants.** At first, data from 150 participants was collected and following the data analysis, I decided to increase the power by collecting more data. To account for the potential inflation of Type I error, I applied Pocock boundary correction at .029 level (Pocock, 1977; see also Lakens, 2014). The final sample consisted of 219 participants with a mean age of $M = 20.84$ ($SD = 3.03$) who were current students of OSU. Forty percent identified as male, 58% as female and 2% as other/prefer not to say. They were recruited through their university and social media. They participated in an exchange for prize draw entry to win one out of three $20$ vouchers.

**Design and procedures.** The study took place online and employed 2 (intergroup competition: low versus high; between groups) x 2 (decision favourability: favourable versus unfavourable; within groups) mixed design. It took 10 minutes to complete and ethical approval was obtained from PREC at QUB. Permission to access emails of OSU students was also granted from the enrolment services analysis and reporting office at OSU.

**Intergroup competition manipulation.** To select high- and low-competition outgroups, OSU alumni ($n = 19$) who graduated between 1991 and 2016 were asked to rate the competitiveness between OSU and five different outgroup universities participating in the BTC on a scale from 1 to 10. There was a main effect of outgroup on reported levels of competitiveness, $F(1.46, 72) = 7.19, p = .006; \eta_p^2 = .29$. Post-hoc tests adjusted for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of $p = .005$ indicated that only one of the comparisons was statistically significant. UM was perceived as a more competitive outgroup to OSU than Northwestern University (NU), $t(18) = 5.09, p < .001, d = 1.21$ (see Table 4.6 for descriptive statistics).
Table 4.6

Mean and standard deviations of rated levels of competitiveness between the OSU and five other colleges in the pilot of Study 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Rated competitiveness with OSU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers University</td>
<td>4.63 (3.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana University</td>
<td>5.68 (3.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Maryland</td>
<td>4.79 (4.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>4.42 (3.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>8.05 (2.88)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, UM was selected as a high-competition outgroup, whereas NU was selected as a low-competition outgroup. Thus, the participants in the main study were randomly assigned to either read a scenario regarding their own university and UM or their own university and NU. As a manipulation check, participants were asked about the level of competitiveness between their ingroup university and the assigned outgroup university as well as measured their outgroup attitudes.

**Decision scenario.** Scenarios were designed in a similar way to Study 1, whereby participants read a short paragraph introducing them to the context of the study. Participants were informed that an external authority, the BTC, launched a travel scheme allowing students from the participating universities to apply for grants to cover the travel costs to attend games (see Appendix 4.1 for study materials). Following this, participants were introduced to two decisions. One favoured the ingroup university in relation to either low or high competition outgroup university, awarding $16,210 to their ingroup university and $6,908 to an outgroup university, which approximately equalled to a 70:30 ratio. Another decision disfavoured the ingroup, but benefitted the same outgroup, awarding exactly the opposite sums. These two decisions were displayed to all participants in a random order, but the order of presentation was controlled for throughout the analyses. Similar to previous studies, decision acceptance and fairness were measured using the same items as in Study 3. The two decision acceptance items were internally reliable in the present sample (α = .76)
Measures of intended loyalty, loyalty norm and ingroup identification strength.

The scale items for these measured were exactly the same as in Study 3 but were adapted to the ingroup in question. The original intended loyalty ($\alpha = .88$), loyalty norm ($\alpha = .82$) and identification strength items ($\alpha = .88$) items had an acceptable internal consistency, but just like in Study 3, additional analyses were conducted to ensure all items load on separate factors accordingly.

Results

Preliminary results.

Factor analysis. Intended loyalty, loyalty norm and ingroup identification strength items were entered into an exploratory factor analysis with Oblimin rotation to determine whether these scales measure distinct constructs. Parallel analysis (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007) determined there are three distinct factors. All items in identification scale loaded on one factor accordingly and the same three loyalty norm items (2, 3, and 4) as in Study 3 loaded on one factor (see Appendix 4.2 for factor loadings). Finally, for the intended loyalty, all items with an exception of two (item 1 and 8) loaded onto one factor (see Table 4.7 for details). Thus, I decided to exclude the items that did not load accordingly resulting in six items in loyalty intention scale ($\alpha = .87$), three items in loyalty norm scale ($\alpha = .84$) and four items in ingroup identification scale ($\alpha = .88$).

Table 4.7

Comparison of loyalty intention items used in Study 3 and 4 based on the factor analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loyalty intention items</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
<th>Study 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How willing are you to risk your life fighting to defend this community?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How willing are you to help organise activities for this community?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How willing are you to obey this community’s rules and standards?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How willing are you to defend this community publicly, even if this causes controversy?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How willing are you to donate your free time to this community?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How willing are you to donate money on a regular basis to this community?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How willing are you to help when this community when it needs you?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. How willing are you to wear a symbol (distinctive clothing, etc.) of this community?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Manipulation check. Due to an error in the programming of the online questionnaire, only around a half of participants ($n = 102$) completed the manipulation
check. In line with the pilot study and the prior expectations, participants perceived UM ($M = 8.88, SD = 1.56$) as more competitive with OSU than NU ($M = 4.42, SD = 2.04$), $t(100) = 12.12, p < .001, d = 2.40$. However, attitudes towards the students of both outgroups were no different, $t(103) = 1.53, p = .127$.

**Responses to favouring and disfavouring decisions.** A paired samples t-test was conducted to investigate the effects of decision favourability on decision acceptance and perceived fairness of the decision. Overall, participants were more likely to accept ingroup favouring decisions and perceive them as fairer than disfavouring decisions (see Table 4.8 for means and t-statistics).

**The effect of loyalty on decision acceptance bias across intergroup competition conditions.** As in the previous studies, I calculated the difference between mean decision acceptance for favouring and disfavouring decision for each participant. Hayes (2012) PROCESS model 1 template was employed to assess the role of intended loyalty on decision acceptance bias with intergroup competition as a moderator and order as a covariate using bias-corrected bootstrapped ($n = 10,000$) confidence intervals. The overall model explained 15% of the variance and was statistically significant, $F(4, 214) = 9.20, p < .001$. Intended loyalty was a significant predictor of decision acceptance bias with higher levels of loyalty leading to increased decision acceptance bias, $b = .57, se = .10, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI} [0.37, 0.78]$. Perceived intergroup competition was not a significant predictor, $b = -.28, se = .16, p = .087, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.60, .04]$. Finally, in contrast to our predictions, Intergroup Competition*Ingroup Loyalty interaction did not have an effect on decision acceptance bias when evaluated against the Pocock-corrected .029 alpha value, $b = -.43, se = .21, p = .041, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.84, -.02]$.

Table 4.8

*Descriptive statistics and paired t-test results for ingroup favouring and disfavouring decisions (Study 4)*
Table 4.9

Correlations in Study 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Decision acceptance bias</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.25 ***</td>
<td>.33 ***</td>
<td>.41 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Loyalty norm</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.57 ***</td>
<td>.57 ***</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Loyalty intention</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.58 ***</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ingroup identification strength</td>
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Note: ***p < .001

Exploratory analyses. Given that the intergroup competition did not affect decision acceptance bias but higher intended loyalty predicted increased preference for ingroup favouring decisions, I decided to explore the relationship between identity, loyalty and decision acceptance (see Table 4.9 for correlations). Both ingroup loyalty scales and the ingroup identification measure were entered into multiple linear regression (see Table 4.9 for correlations). All three predictors explained 17% of variance, $F(3, 215) = 15.71, p < .001$. However, the effect of loyalty intention on decision acceptance bias was no longer significant, $b = .24, se = .13, p = .069, 95\% CI [-.02, .49]$ nor was the effect of loyalty norm on decision acceptance, $b = -.03, se = .12, p = .779, 95\% CI [-.27, .21]$. Ingroup identification strength was the only significant predictor of decision acceptance bias; stronger identification with the group predicted higher preference for ingroup-favouring decisions, $b = .40, se = .10, p < .001, 95\% CI [.21, .61].

Discussion

It was expected that the group loyalty intention would predict decision acceptance bias in the highly competitive intergroup context, but not when the competition was low.
However, the findings suggest that those with higher intention to be loyal were more likely than those with lower levels of loyalty intentions to prefer ingroup-favouring authority decisions across both high and low competitive conditions equally. However, it is important to highlight that in this study, low competition outgroup did not represent the lack of competition altogether and thus, it is possible that the competitive nature of BTC requires group members to be loyal, regardless whether the authority decision concerns the biggest rival or an outgroup that is more peripheral. These findings are somewhat in line with Study 3, whereby outgroup attitude predicted patterns of decision acceptance bias for decisions regarding both ingroup and outgroup. Both of these studies suggest that outgroup perceptions are an important part of the story about how responses to authority decisions formed.

However, the effect of loyalty on decision acceptance bias was no longer present when social identification strength was considered. This finding is contrary to other studies reported here whereby social identity strength had small (Study 2) or a non-significant effect (Study 1 and 3) on decision acceptance bias.

**General discussion**

Across four studies, I investigated the impact of ingroup loyalty, a predisposition to enhance group welfare and reduce the negative consequences, on patterns of responses to decisions made by authorities. The data suggests that loyalty tends to enhance the preference for ingroup favouring decisions in the context of intergroup-level authority decisions, regardless of whether the decision is fair or not (Study 2). In other words, being loyal to one’s group requires members to advance the group’s relative standing by accepting favouring decisions. However, the effects of loyalty appear to be intertwined with the effects of social identification strength. Thus, it is unclear whether high group identifiers display more loyalty (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001), which in turn leads to the observed patterns of responses to authority decisions or whether the identification is the driver of the effect as in Study 4. More research on the systematic untangling of this relationship is needed as both of these variables had varying effects across all four studies.
What is certain, nevertheless, is that an affective aspect of the identity manifests itself across responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions across the many contexts investigated in this chapter.

This research also provides support for claims made by Leung et al. (2007) who suggested that being an ingroup member comes with a moral responsibility of being loyal to one’s group. The present data suggests that higher intentions for loyalty do not just predispose individuals to act on behalf of their group, in ways suggested by Silver (1997), but also implies ways in which intention to be loyal manifests itself in a form of accepting and rejecting authority decisions, based on their implications for the group (Studies 3 and 4). In theory, if the authority is perceived as legitimate, everyone should defer to their decisions, even if they are wrong (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Yet, Study 3 did not find the police legitimacy to be a significant predictor of responses to authority decisions. The present research questions whether authority legitimacy in the context of the intergroup-level decisions is the key; group members who are very loyal are more likely to accept authority decisions based on whether they harm or advance their group goals regardless of authority legitimacy. In a way, responses to authority decisions seem to be much in line with what leadership literature suggests that group members expect of their leaders (Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001). That is, group members prefer decisions that favour them and thus, they judge decisions that favour them as more fair than those that disfavour them (Studies 1, 3, and 4). This has important implications for how authorities conduct themselves in the context of the intergroup-level decisions as they must be prepared that not all decisions that are made in a fair way will be accepted and interpreted as such by the groups involved.

However, it may be that when the rules are clear and widely understood, such as the rules of a football game (Study 2), the fairness of the decision still plays a considerable role in shaping people’s reaction to those decisions. In some cases, it may simply be too challenging to reject a decision that was widely understood to be made in a fair way, as specified by the set of rules. However, in other settings tested in the present studies, fairness rules were not set in stone and what was considered fair was open to interpretation. For
example, being lenient towards parade attendees in Study 3 may have been interpreted as either fair or unfair, depending on the membership of the perceiver, which is in line with research by Radburn et al. (2016) who show that perceptions of fairness are shaped by group membership. Group members created and understood what constitutes fairness through the virtue of their identity and as a consequence, decisions that were clearly disadvantageous to them were interpreted as more unfair than decisions that were marked by positive outcomes. Identifying whether the extent to which the fairness rules are visible and commonly agreed affects how one perceives the fairness of the authority decisions would be a valuable question for future research.

**Intergroup relations and authority decisions**

As set out in the hypotheses, the present studies also sought to examine the role of intergroup relations, such as competition and outgroup attitudes, in responding to authority decisions. The studied contexts varied in the nature of their intergroup relations, with some sharing past of a violent conflict (Study 3) and others experiencing spikes in the levels of competition during the sporting events (Study 2 and 4). Taking this into consideration, it was predicted that loyalty may only be associated with ethnocentric preferences under the conditions of intergroup competition; however, Study 4 did not find that manipulating the level of perceived group competition moderated the effect of loyalty on decision acceptance bias. Regarding the role of intergroup attitudes, Study 3 found that these influenced responses to decisions made by authorities. That is, unfavourable attitudes towards the outgroup created a stronger preference for lenient, favourable authority treatment if it regarded an ingroup but a stronger preference for harsh and disfavouring treatment when it concerned the outgroup. In contrast, when outgroup attitudes were highly favourable, there was no difference in evaluations between ingroup and outgroup decisions. Therefore, harmonious intergroup relations may help reduce biases in responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions.

The findings from Study 3 are particularly insightful for understanding the impact authorities’ decisions may have for intergroup relations and peacebuilding. Those who live
in the aftermath of protracted conflict rely on authorities such as government and the police to promote peace in the society. If transforming the relations between the groups in conflict is not prioritised in such settings, this can rapidly undermine the authorities and their decisions. Given that the support for the relationship between outgroup attitudes and responses to authority decisions was not investigated in all studies, other aspects of intergroup relations such as perceived threat (which I explore in Chapter 6) may play a role here.

**Limitations**

Despite contributing to the current knowledge on the intergroup-level authorities, this research is limited in several ways. Firstly, I tested our hypotheses across multiple contexts, which may explain why the findings in relation to loyalty are not entirely consistent across the studies. In particular, our original hypotheses, inspired by Leung et al. (2007) research were developed in relation to the group norms, particularly the norms of loyalty. However, measuring the norms of loyalty in Study 3 and 4 was more challenging and did not influence group members’ responses to authority decisions in the same way that intention to group loyalty did in those contexts. It is likely that these forms of loyalty and types of ‘sacrifices’ that are expected are contingent on the nature of the group membership itself. For example, taking ‘one for the team’ in the context of a terrorist group may potentially mean risking one’s life, but in a context of employees, it may involve working an extra shift to cover for someone who is sick. Future research should address how displays of loyalty as uniquely defined by the group may manifest themselves in relation to encounters with the authorities. Nevertheless, the conclusions from this research are based on the assumption that these two forms of loyalty, the intention to be loyal and the norm for group loyalty may be underlined by a common factor. That is, recognising that being loyal to one’s group is important is associated with an expectation that one will follow this rule and thus, display intentions to be loyal.

Secondly, our ability to compare the present research to that typically carried out in the domain of authority is limited because I employed a general measure of fairness (see
Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005) as opposed to distinguishing between procedural and distributive justice in line with the traditional literature. Therefore, although the present research finds that fairness perceptions are shaped by the group membership, it is unclear whether these effects are specific to only general measures of fairness. I discuss this limitation in more detail in Chapter 7.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the present set of studies moves beyond the PJ understanding of how individuals respond to authority decisions. Firstly, I extended the level of analysis from the individual to intergroup-level, acknowledging that authorities manage multiple groups, with potentially contradictory goals, in the society. Secondly, I detach the weight from the perceptions of fairness as the key antecedent to wider compliance and instead focus on understanding how specific processes associated with social identity within and between groups lead to appraisals of authority decisions, including perceptions of the decision fairness and acceptance of those decisions. Evidence provided here supports the assertion that ingroup loyalty leads to increased preference for decisions that favour the ingroup (Studies 2-4). Making sense of how group members respond to authority decisions requires the understanding of the larger context of the decision making, from the norms and values that guide group behaviour to affective perceptions towards the outgroup(s) involved.

As it was discussed in relation to Studies 1 and 2, the norms of loyalty tend to be naturally more prominent and plausible among some groups more than others. For example, loyalty to one’s own group is a central feature of the collectivist cultures (Bond, 1994; Earley & Gibson, 1998). Therefore, moving to explore values such as loyalty, as determined by the cultural context that the intergroup decision takes place, and how these can define authority-groups interactions was a natural empirical step for this research. In the following chapter, I explore how values associated with specific cultural contexts may clash when responding to authority decisions that concern own group and how responses to the same authority decisions may be culturally bounded.
Conflicted beliefs: Cultural and moral values in responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions

At the heart of collectivism lies the idea that the interests and needs of the group one belongs to are more important than those of a single individual (Hui & Triandis, 1986). In other words, the consequences of one’s actions in collectivist cultures are considered through their impact on the wider collective. In many ways, then, collectivism and its values reflect the discussions around group loyalty in the previous chapter, but the former reflects a cultural predisposition to perceive the world in terms of ‘us’, whereas loyalty tends to be group-specific. In both cases, an individual behaviour is motivated by improving the material circumstances of the group. This concern for the group may have an impact on responses to authority decisions. Even the fairest of decisions may not be welcomed as it

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3 The study from this chapter was presented at the European Association of Social Psychology in Granada, Spain in July 2017. I would like to thank Miriam Park for the mentorship and hosting me in Monash University Malaysia while I was collecting data and Patricio Saaverda Morales for his comments on the earlier version of the chapter.
may be adverse to the goals of the group affected by those decisions, and as I showed in the previous chapter, more loyal members of the group may perceive decisions that are disfavouring to their group as less fair. Thus, this loyalty for the group may sometimes need to be overlooked in order to obey an authority decision that is made in a fair way, because fairness is the basis for legitimate authority.

I suggest that people decide to accept or reject the authority decision, guided by a set of distinct values. Such values may originate from the wider cultural background (Hofstede, 1980) and also being shaped by an individual’s own moral values in regards to what is right or wrong (Graham et al., 2011). This chapter will explore both of these sources focusing first on lessons from cross-cultural psychology. This approach goes beyond studying the mere differences of known psychological effects across different settings, but also more importantly, it derives new knowledge about the extent to which the explored constructs are universal by comparing between different cultures. Therefore, by comparing how groups respond to authorities across cultures, one can come to a better understanding of the role of authorities in the society. Secondly, this chapter will explore moral values, also referred to as moral concerns, in relation to responses to authority decisions. Given that the morality can override the importance of PJ in reactions to decisions (Bauman & Skitka, 2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2002), it is relevant to investigate moral values that may particularly be detrimental to understanding group members’ responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions. In this vein, the present research focuses on three moral concerns, which may predict unique outcomes, namely moral concern for fairness, loyalty, and authority. Thus, investigating how values, whether they are cultural or moral, lead people to respond to authorities is specifically what the present study has set out to explore.

**Cross-cultural research in psychology**

In the previous chapter, I discussed the contribution of Leung et al. (2007) in systematically exploring how social identity may change perceptions of authority decisions and suggesting group loyalty as the driver of these effects. All three of the reported studies were conducted in Hong Kong, typically considered to be a collectivist country. Thus, the
group-level preference for ingroup favouring decisions rather than fair decisions could be argued to stem from cultural predispositions to perceive oneself in terms of the collective. Therefore, the extent to which these findings are specific to the collectivist context is unclear.

The distinction between the collectivistic and individualistic societies was one of the early basic distinctions made by cross-cultural psychologists (Bond, 1994). In collectivist countries, such as Hong Kong, the self is viewed as a part of a group or collective, which emphasises a strong bond with the group. Collectivist countries are therefore characterised with interdependence and concerned with maintaining group harmony. In contrast, individualism is concerned with autonomy, personal development and the emphasis on ‘I’ (Hofstede, 2001). For example, Western countries such as the UK, Australia and US tend to be high in individualism, whereas Eastern countries such as Malaysia, Japan and Hong Kong tend to be high in collectivism. Therefore, due to the extent to which Leung et al. ethnocentric effects are universal or culturally-specific is not clear, a direct comparison between individualistic and collectivist culture is necessary to determine whether collectivists are more likely than individualists to endorse authority decisions that favour their own group.

In general, collectivists tend to emphasise deference to the group norms (Bond & Smith, 1996), whereas individualists oppose conformity to group norms (Gelfand, Triandis, & Chan, 1996). However, this does not mean that identification with an ingroup in collectivist cultures is higher; rather, those from individualistic and collectivist cultures are equally likely to devote their attention to distinct processes as a way of being a group member. In collectivist cultures, the intragroup processes are the ones of most importance, and because of this focus, the intergroup processes may not matter as much as in the individualistic cultures (Yuki, 2003). Similarly, referring to the individualism-collectivism distinction as East-West, Graham et al. (2011) found that Eastern countries care about loyalty to the ingroup more than their Western counterparts. Therefore, a direct comparison of samples across cultures can provide more evidence on whether cultural context in which
groups exist may lead to an emphasis on favouring decisions that are ethnocentric rather than responding to them on the basis of fairness when dealing with authorities.

Extensions to the traditional individualist-collectivist dimensions were put forward in efforts to understand the complex nature of cultural values. A more recent perspective incorporating power distance argues that vertical or a horizontal structure within a society also matters (Shavitt, Torelli, & Riemer, 2010; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). The vertical dimension emphasises the hierarchical nature of the groups, assuming that there are social inequalities between them, and endorses the importance of deterrence to authorities. In contrast, the horizontal orientation is concerned with social equality, egalitarianism, and co-habitation for all individuals and groups, but they do not submit to the authority (Triandis, 1995). Thus, four typologies of cultural orientation were proposed, expanding further on the traditional theory of individualism-collectivism. In the vertical individualist (VI) cultures (such as the UK), people strive competitively to gain relative status to others. In horizontal individualist (HI) cultures (such as Australia), independence is promoted, but not at the cost of equality. In the horizontal collectivist cultures (HC; traditionally observed in Israeli kibbutz), interdependence and intergroup equality are both emphasised, whereas in the VC (such as MY) people are interdependent, but also highly hierarchical in their structure. Thus, cultural orientation typology captures a combination of two dimensions of the cultural values.

Hofstede (2001) also acknowledges the horizontal versus vertical distinction but uses the terminology of low and high power distance. The idea behind this distinction is very similar: power distance relates to the desirability of difference in power between those in high power positions and low power positions. Thus, countries low in power distance (such as Denmark or Sweden) expect power to be distributed equally within the society and its structures such as organisations, whereas high power distance countries, such as MY or Mexico, normalise high inequalities in power within those organisations. Arguably, there are both conceptual and structural differences in those terms, with Hofstede’s power distance definition concerning to what extent powerless individuals in the society accept the
inequalities in a unipolar way, whereas vertical and horizontal dimensions being bipolar and characterising support for hierarchies in the society (Shavitt, Lalwani, Zhang, & Torelli, 2006). However, they broadly refer to the same idea of culturally emphasising power differentials or promoting equality. Nevertheless, the cultural orientation framework put forward by Triandis and Gelfald (1998) is unique in combining the individualism-collectivism dimensions with horizontal-vertical dimensions, capturing the depth of cultural contexts. Thus, I employed this framework in the present study.

**VC and authority decisions**

Based on the theoretical descriptions of Triandis and Gelfald’s (1998) cultural orientations, it becomes clear that VC makes an interesting case for understanding how groups respond to authority decisions. In this context, the two values tied to the culture, collectivism and hierarchy emphasis, may clash with one another while responding to authority decisions that are not beneficial to the group. On one hand, sacrificing for the good of the group is a salient feature of this culture (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). This is because behaviours here are motivated by the goals and values that are shared with the broader collective (Triandis, 1988). This means that group members may be expected to accept or reject authority decisions based on their favourability to the group. On the other hand, given the structure of vertical societies, authorities are a prominent feature of the hierarchy. Triandis and Gelfald (1998) noted that in VC, ‘if in-group authorities want them [individuals] to act in ways that benefit the in-group but are extremely distasteful to them, they submit to the will of these authorities’ (p. 119). Therefore, VC creates a cultural context whereby disobeying authority decision is counter-normative. In responses to authority decisions, those raised in the VC context may feel the pressure to agree with the authority; by disobeying authorities, they can undermine the social power of authorities, which can have a detrimental effect on maintaining the power imbalances that are so fundamental to this culture.

Indeed, in vertical societies, whereby power differences between societal groups are increased, individuals’ reactions to the lack of voice provision by power-holders are not as
strong in comparison to their low power distance counterparts (van den Bos, Brockner, van den Oudenalder, Kamble, & Nasabi, 2013). In other words, it can be expected that in the vertical cultures, one is more likely to accept authority decisions even if they are made in an unfair way, because of the prominent role that authorities hold (see also Leung & Tong, 2004). Vertical cultural orientation is also found to correlate with authoritarianism (Kemmelmeier et al., 2003), or the notion that people must strictly submit to the authority and the conventional norms, even at the expense of political freedom (Altemeyer, 1998). Therefore, vertical societies may be more inclined than horizontal societies to obey the authority decisions.

However, it is not clear whether the same principle would apply if the authority decision was directly opposing the interests of the ingroup. Receiving beneficial outcomes from authorities clearly accomplishes some resource-based goals of the wider collective and thus, collectivist cultures may be more likely than individualist cultures to pursue those on behalf of the group. By the same virtue, they may also disagree with decisions that disfavour their group than those in the individualistic cultures. Direct comparison of individualistic and collectivistic nations could shed light on whether cultural orientation points to some group processes that matter for authority decision acceptance.

Moral concerns

Investigating values from the perspective of cultural orientation may, however, be limiting. Some argue that more variability is observed within a culture than between cultures (see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002) and thus, investigating values that drive cultural differences may be more appropriate. Research suggests that what is considered moral can be driven by the cultural values (Vauclair et al., 2015; Vauclair & Fischer, 2011). Indeed, contrasting moral guides of Confucian teachings with Western education suggests that being brought up in those respective cultures may foster a distinct set of values (Bedford & Hwang, 2003). Moral values were traditionally studied from a philosophical perspective, considering the rights and wrongs in the light of harm caused and justice (Haidt, 2008). In reaction to a heavy focus on harm and fairness as primary sources of moral decisions in
psychological research, the moral foundations framework was put forward (Graham et al., 2011, 2012; Haidt, 2012). This model proposes that there are five basic evolved moral values or concerns that individuals deeply care about to varying extents. Graham, Haidt and colleagues subsequently proposed that the five universal foundations are not only care/harm and fairness/cheating, but also loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. They further grouped the former two as individualising moralities, that is, foundations that facilitate rights and freedom of individuals. Loyalty, authority and, sanctity, on the other hand, are referred to as binding foundations, domains that support social cohesion and bind groups and institutions together. In general, these moralities are capable of predicting individual and social phenomena from political preferences (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007) to environmental attitudes (Feinberg & Willer, 2013) and religiosity (Johnson et al., 2015). Therefore, the content of one’s moral concerns can predict a range of judgements and behaviours and given that some researchers have theorised about legitimacy as recognition of shared moral values (Hough et al., 2010; Tyler & Jackson, 2013), these beliefs may be applicable to the study of responses to authority decisions.

Three of the moral foundations that are particularly relevant for the present questions are fairness, loyalty, and authority. These moral concerns, in theory, should be capable of predicting the patterns of responses to the authority decisions made about two or more groups, as I have been studying in the present thesis. Individuals who care about the foundation of fairness, in particular, may use overall fairness of the decision to determine whether they accept or disagree with authority decisions. On the other hand, those who care about loyalty to one’s own group would consider whether or not such a decision is harmful to one’s group before accepting it. Finally, those holding a moral concern for authority may accept any decision that authority makes because disagreeing with authority decisions would pose a threat to the social order. An analysis of these values may not only be useful at an individual-level but also at a country-level. Typically, differences in endorsing particular moral values are present when comparing individualistic and collectivist countries, but only within loyalty and purity domains, whereas the effect size for harm, fairness and authority
were very small (Graham et al., 2011). This is somewhat surprising given the evidence vertical cultures are characterised as submissive to authority (Kemmelmeier et al., 2003; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

More broadly, however, there is an array of moral concerns that may or may not interact with each other to shape human behaviour. Yet, research has often overlooked how the interaction of two or more moral concerns, especially when they would suggest a conflicting outcome would predict a specific behaviour or judgement. For example, even though there is a wide consensus that it is wrong and immoral to lie, lying is relatively common (Depaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Therefore, moral concerns act as proscriptions as opposed to the determinants of the action (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), much like the definition of group loyalty from the previous chapter (Silver, 1997). Thus, the link between specific moral concerns and concrete behaviours is a complex one and more research dedicated to whether moral concerns actually predict the intended outcomes is needed.

The present study

The aim of the present study was to investigate how the potential competition between different values may impact on how group members respond to the intergroup-level authority decisions. Given the peculiarities of VC cultures in relation to responding to authority decisions as discussed above, the present study was set in a country characterised by those values and in comparison to an individualistic country. To this end, the present research was set in MY, a traditionally VC country. For a relative comparison, I chose a convenience sample in NI, traditionally an individualistic country. Based on the previous work on the cultural profiles across countries, it would be expected that the MY sample will be more collectivist than the NI sample, but both samples would be considerably more vertical than horizontal in their orientation (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Although NI may be assumed to be a VI country, whereas MY as a VC country, given the target sample was student-based, some deviations from these assumptions are likely. In particular, not much research on cultural values has been carried out in NI, despite its unique positioning. On one
hand, NI belongs to the UK, which is typically described as a typical VI country. However, at least 35% of the population considers themselves more Irish than British (ARK, 2016). This could potentially mean that their cultural values are more in line with Ireland’s than the UK’s. Although the UK and Ireland are neighbouring countries, according to Hofstede data there are slight differences between them on the dimensions of interest here. For example, Ireland scores lower on the aspects of power distance (28 versus 35 in the UK on a scale of 1-100) and individualism (70 versus 89 in the UK). Some even disagree on whether the UK is more VI or HI; Triandis (1996) described the UK as having lower income inequality than the US, but considerably higher than Sweden, a prototypical HI country, suggesting relatively vertical orientation of the UK. On the other hand, Park, Blenkinsopp, Oktem, and Omurgonulsen (2013) research supported the idea that the UK is HI, because of that it is not clear whether NI would be characterised in terms of VI or HI cultural dimensions.

Thus, the present study was set up to directly compare how the MY sample responds to the authority decisions in comparison to the NI sample. As with the previous Studies 1, 3 and 4, the current study was designed to capture whether group members would accept or would find fair an intergroup-level authority decision that either favours their group while disfavouring the outgroup or disfavouring their group while favouring the outgroup. As with the previous studies, both decisions were presented in a random order and as hypothetical. In this context, I devised three groups of hypotheses in relation to: (1) the patterns of responses to authority decisions in MY and NI; (2) the effects of moral concerns on responses to authority decisions in the MY and NI samples; and (3) understanding of fairness in the MY and NI samples. I explain these groups of hypotheses below. Altogether, testing these hypotheses will indicate how group and cultural processes can influence responses to authority decisions, beyond an assessment of PJ.

**Patterns of responses to authority decisions in MY and NI**

VC orientation, hypothesised to be more prevalent in the MY sample, was expected to lead to one of three outcomes in terms of participants’ responses to authority decision. First of all, as collectivism is more concerned with interdependence and belongingness to
groups, authority decisions that favour the ingroup are more likely to be accepted in the MY sample than the NI sample. In the same vein, it would be expected that decisions which disfavour the ingroup are more likely to be rejected by the MY sample than the NI sample. However, a feature of the VC is that hierarchies are important for the harmonious society making authorities an essential puzzle piece in the social hierarchy. By disagreeing with authority decisions, such as those that disfavour own group, an individual undermines the authority’s power. Therefore, the contrasting prediction is that if the vertical orientation is more prevalent within the VC than collectivism, there may be a pressure within the MY sample to reduce the potential consequences of rejecting authority decisions. This would lead to the MY sample agreeing with both favouring and disfavouring authority decision more than NI sample and judging those decisions as fairer. Thus, these two hypotheses labelled as 1a and 1b are tested in opposition to one another.

The final possibility is that the MY sample will attempt to maintain both features of the VC in the case of ingroup disfavouring decisions. One such observation of both elements of the VC would be judging ingroup-disfavouring decisions among MY sample as fairer than NI sample as a way of preserving the importance of authority, but simultaneously disagreeing with those decisions as a way of preserving the importance of the collective. Theoretically, both decisions are equal in their distributive (un)fairness, as the resources split remains the same across both favourability conditions and justifications are provided in both cases. Other studies found that participants generally judge normatively unfair decisions that favour their group as more fair than normatively fair decisions that disfavour the group (Platow, O’Connell, Shave, & Hanning, 1995; Platow, Reid, & Andrew, 1998). Whether this pattern would uphold in the VC cultures to the same extent, is another question this research addressed.

**Moral concerns and responses to authority decisions**

The second part of the hypotheses regards the link between moral concerns at the individual-level within the two samples and their connection to responses to authority decisions. It was expected that the MY sample would be associated with higher concern for
loyalty and authority than in NI sample because of the hypothesised prominence of VC in the MY sample (Hypothesis 3). In other words, moral concern for loyalty was expected to be an expression of collectivism, whereas a concern for authority to be an expression of vertical cultural orientation. Finally, I did not expect to find any sample differences in terms of fairness (Hypothesis 4); I elaborate this hypothesis in the following section on cultural understanding of fairness.

If differences between the two samples are observed across these domains of morality, then it would be expected that moral concerns specific to the cultural orientation could account for the variations in responses to authority decisions, whether it is decision acceptance or perceived fairness (Hypothesis 5). Therefore, on the one hand, if loyalty is more prevalent among the MY sample than the NI sample and is the driving mechanism for moral behaviour, it can be expected that responses to intergroup decisions will be based on whether they help or harm the group within the MY sample, but not the NI sample. On the other hand, if moral concern for authority or fairness are held important for the NI or the MY sample, more uniform responses to authority decisions, regardless of which group benefits from those decisions, can be expected. Thus, Hypothesis 5 builds on Hypotheses 1a and 1b by theorising about the moral concerns as the driving mechanism behind differences in responses to authority decisions at the individual level. The relationship between those moral concerns and the responses to authority decisions may unfold differently across the two samples, thus I formulate this relationship between morality and the responses to authority decisions as moderated by the country sample.

**Cultural understanding of fairness**

The final strand of hypotheses relates specifically to the ways culture can determine how fairness is regarded and perceived in the society. As it was mentioned in the previous section, no differences in moral concern for fairness between the samples were expected to be found. Although fairness may be understood differently in those contexts, according to Graham et al. (2011, p. 380), ‘concerns about harm and fairness are so widespread that they might be said to be universally used foundations of morality (upon which cultures construct
different ideas as to what counts as harm or what kinds of distributions are fair). Therefore, I expect that the two samples will be similar in their endorsements of fairness as a moral concern. However, how these expressions of fairness are articulated may be relevant to the ways authorities are expected to wield their power. I propose and test two key differences between the VC-oriented MY sample and the NI sample.

Firstly, the fairness expectations from authority become the focus. In other words, do both samples, expect authorities to always be fair and under all circumstances? Or is there a perceived flexibility with which authorities can use the rules of fairness? In line with van den Bos et al. (2013), it was expected that for the MY sample, the perception of complete and consistent fairness may be less pronounced in comparison to the NI sample, due to the relative acceptance of social inequalities (Hypothesis 6), assuming that the NI cultural profile is not as clearly vertical as the MY profile is. That is, if authorities have significantly more power in VC cultures, people would expect them to sometimes violate the boundaries of their power and thus, observing such unfairness would be deemed within the expected norms. Secondly, following this line of reasoning, it was expected that the extent to which authorities are perceived as legitimate in the MY sample will be greater than in the NI sample (Hypothesis 7).

**Study 5**

**Methods**

**Participants.** Participants (N = 318) were invited to take part as long as they were citizens of the country or indicated their ethnic background as either White in the NI sample or Asian in the MY sample. Participants students from QUB (NI university, n = 162, 62% female) with a mean age of 21.91 (SD = 5.70) and from Monash University Malaysia (MY university, n = 156, also 62% female) with a mean age of 20.22 (SD = 2.04). Participants were recruited locally through the researchers at both universities. Two vouchers worth £20, or MY Ringgit equivalent, were raffled as an incentive among those who completed the study.
Design and procedures. The study employed a quasi-experimental 2 (Sample: MY vs NI, between-groups) x 2 (Decision favourability: ingroup favouring versus disfavouring; within-groups) design with data collected in universities in both countries. The questionnaire was administered online in English across both countries as per course instruction language. The study took 15 minutes to complete and ethical approval was granted by the PREC at QUB.

Authority decision scenario. First, participants were presented with an article describing a desirable student internship programme with a major multinational company in conjunction with the national governments of each respective country (see Appendix 5 for the study materials). The relevant governmental departments were Department for Employment and Learning in NI and Ministry of Higher Education in MY. The announcement stated that 15 places will be offered to be distributed between the ingroup and the relevant outgroup university. Because there are only two universities in NI, the choice of the outgroup university was limited, but in choosing the outgroup university in MY, I matched the relative intergroup status between the universities based on the anecdotal evidence so that in both cases, the ingroup university was of relatively higher status to the outgroup. Following the announcement of the scheme, attention checks were employed, but participants could go back to the previous page to re-read the scenario. Thus, no participants were excluded at this stage for failing the attention check.

Scheme attractiveness. At this point, participants were asked whether they agree that the proposed schemes are attractive and of interest for: (1) them personally, and (2) students at their university on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). This was used to confirm that the favourable outcome is desirable by the participants and their ingroup.

Decision favourability manipulation. Next, the manipulation of the outcome of the authority decision took place within-group at two levels. The decision regarding the distribution of the internship places was made in either ingroup favourable or unfavourable manner. The ingroup favourable decision read the following:
Now imagine that the internships are announced by the government in the following way.

The statement says ‘We recognised that in the past year the government provided significantly more funding for [outgroup university] for similar internship developments than for [ingroup university]. It has been decided that this disadvantage should be accounted for.

Therefore, we will allocate the internships in 2:1 [ingroup university] to [outgroup university] ratio. In practice, it means that 10 [ingroup university] undergraduate students and 5 [outgroup university] students will be accepted to “Google Team Insider” programme.’

The ingroup unfavourable decision followed the same format, this time with five ingroup university students allowed to be accepted and 10 outgroup university students but the reason being ingroup university students are consistently more employable after graduation. The two decisions were presented in a random order and the potential effects of the presentation order were statistically controlled for.

**Decision acceptance and perceived fairness.** For each of the two decisions, participants responded to the two key outcome variables, namely decision acceptance and perceived decision fairness. To measure decision acceptance, participants responded to two items: ‘I accept the government decision’ and ‘I agree with the government decision’ on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree; \( r = .85 \)). One item, ‘What do you think about the fairness of this decision?’ measured perceived fairness, also on a five-point scale (1 = unfair; 5 = fair).

**Cultural orientation scale (COS).** Triandis and Gelfand (1998) scale was used to measure participants’ individual preference for the four dimensions of cultural orientation (HI, VI, HC, VC) by responding to 16 items, four per subscale. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 = never or definitely/no and 9 = always or definitely/yes. All four subscales were internally reliable in the MY sample (HI \( \alpha = .76 \), VI \( \alpha = .73 \), HC \( \alpha = .80 \), VC \( \alpha = .81 \)) and the NI sample (HI \( \alpha = .78 \), VI \( \alpha = .77 \), HC \( \alpha = .84 \), VC \( \alpha = .71 \)).
Moral foundations questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). Next, 18 subscale items measuring the morality of ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, fairness/reciprocity were completed by participants. Nine of these, three per moral concern, assessed to what extent people use these three moral concerns to assess whether something is morally right or wrong, e.g., ‘whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country’ (ingroup/loyalty item) or ‘whether or not someone was denied his or her rights’ (fairness/reciprocity item; 1 = not at all relevant; 6 = extremely relevant). For the other nine items, participants were asked to judge statements such as ‘Respect for authority is something all children need to learn’ (authority/respect item) or ‘It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself.’ (ingroup/loyalty item; 1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree). Thus, each moral concern was measured by six items. Higher scores indicated higher relevance of the particular moral concern. Internal consistency of these subscales was moderate to good in the MY sample (fairness α = .57, loyalty α = .67, authority α = .64,) and the NI sample (fairness α = .64, loyalty α = .66, authority α = .73).

Ingroup identification strength (Doosje et al., 1995). Participants’ identification with ingroup university was measured via four items on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree): ‘I identify myself with other [university] students’, ‘I see myself as a [university] student’, ‘I am glad to be a [university] student’, and ‘I feel strong ties with [university] students’. Higher scores indicated higher ingroup identification (MY α = .80, NI α = .83).

Authority legitimacy. To address the Hypothesis 7, I decided to measure authority legitimacy in a context of a specific authority, separate from the manipulation scenario. Because scales measuring police legitimacy are better established in the research, I decided to focus on the police as authorities as a way of tapping into the overall predispositions of perceiving authorities as legitimate. Participants responded to seven items adapted from Reisig, Bratton, and Gertz (2007) such as ‘You should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong’ and ‘Disobeying the police is hardly ever justified’ on five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) Higher score indicated higher
authority legitimacy. However, the internal consistency of this scale was poorer in MY ($\alpha = .45$) than in NI ($\alpha = .64$).

**Fairness expectations.** Finally, to measure fairness expectation, 11 PJ and five distributive justice items from Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) research were adapted to capture expectations of whether these aspects of fairness can be compromised. Participants were asked to consider actions of the police, as a specific authority, as something they should always do without exception, coded as 0, or sometimes may compromise, coded as 1. The examples of statements were ‘Treat people fairly’ or ‘Enforce the law equally with all people’. Based on the research that finds both of these facets to be underlined by a common factor (Pehrson et al., 2017), an aggregate score across all 16 items was computed with a higher score indicating higher willingness to compromise fairness ($\alpha = .71$ in both samples).

**Results**

**Preliminary analyses.**

**Scheme attractiveness.** In general, MY students expressed more interest ($M = 4.54$, $SD = .73$) in the internship than the NI students ($M = 4.00$, $SD = .11$), $t(277) = 5.13$, $p < .001$, $d = .62$. However, when asked about whether others in their university would be interested, the difference was non-significant across both samples, $t(300) = .140$, $p = .890$. Despite the difference at the individual-level, both samples expressed high levels of interest in the scheme.

**Sample cultural orientation.** The NI and MY samples were compared on dimensions of cultural orientation using independent samples t-tests (see Figure 5.1). The NI sample scored higher in HI ($M = 6.80$, $SD = 1.36$) than the MY sample ($M = 6.18$, $SD = 1.34$), $t(316) = 4.02$, $p < .001$, $d = .45$. On the other hand, the MY sample scored higher in VC ($M = 6.80$, $SD = 1.45$) than the NI sample ($M = 6.34$, $SD = 1.46$), $t(316) = 2.90$, $p = .005$, $d = .33$. The samples did not differ significantly on VI, $t(316) = 1.03$, $p = .305$, or HC orientations, $t(316) = .19$, $p = .853$. Thus, the MY sample fitted the VC orientation, while the NI sample orientation was more in line with the HI rather than VI.
Patterns of responses to authority decisions in MY and NI samples. To address Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2, a mixed ANCOVA with the country sample as a between-groups variable, decision favourability as a within-group variable, and order as a covariate was conducted to investigate perceptions of fairness and decision acceptance (see Figure 5.2 for boxplots). Decision favourability had a significant main effect on perceived fairness, $F(1, 314) = 6.57, p = .011, \eta^2_p = .02$, with ingroup-favouring decisions ($M = 2.61, SD = 1.17$) perceived as more fair than disfavouring decisions ($M = 2.21, SD = 1.09$). Furthermore, the MY sample ($M = 2.56, SD = .94$) perceived both decisions, regardless of their favourability, as more fair than the NI sample ($M = 2.27, SD = .94$), $F(1, 314) = 7.33, p = .007, \eta^2_p = .02$. However, Sample*Favourability interaction on perceived fairness was non-significant $F(1, 314) = .19, p = .667$, meaning the differences between the two samples in decision acceptance were uniform across favouring and disfavouring decisions.

![Boxplot](image)

*Figure 5.1. Cultural orientation preferences in MY and NI samples. Note: The box represents the lower and upper quartile and the horizontal line denotes median. Outliers are marked with a dot.*

Secondly, the same analysis was conducted for perceived fairness with very similar patterns of findings found that ingroup-favourable decisions ($M = 3.00, SD = 1.14$) were
accepted more than unfavourable decisions ($M = 2.48, SD = 1.09), F(1, 314) = 27.32, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .08$. Furthermore, the MY sample ($M = 2.90, SD = .98$) accepted both decisions more than the NI sample ($M = 2.58, SD = .89$), $F(1, 314) = 9.78, p = .002, \eta^2_p = .03$.

Sample*Favourability interaction on decision acceptance was also non-significant, $F(1, 314) = 2.30, p = .130$.

Based on the correlations, neither perceived fairness nor decision acceptance was linked to the preference for VC at the individual level. In fact, none of the outcome measures correlated with either of the four types of cultural orientation, except for a small positive relationship between decision acceptance and fairness with VI orientation in the NI sample, $r(318) = .13, p = .026$, which was not a part of the original hypotheses. Therefore, individual-level preferences for cultural orientation were not related to responses to authority decisions.

![Figure 5.2](image.png)

*Figure 5.2. Distribution of perceived fairness and decision acceptance scores in favouring and disfavouring decisions across the MY and NI samples (Study 5).* Note: The box represents the lower and upper quartile and the horizontal line denotes median. Outliers are marked with a dot.

**The effects of morality on responses to authority decisions.** Next, to address Hypotheses 3 and 4, a series of independent t-tests were conducted to evaluate sample
differences (Sample) in the domains of morality (Fairness, Loyalty, Morality; see Table 5.1). The MY sample displayed greater moral concern for loyalty, $t(316) = 5.25, p < .001, d = .59$ and higher moral concern for authority than the NI sample, $t(316) = 4.56, p < .001, d = .51$.

The difference between the two samples in terms of concern for fairness was marginally significant, $t(316) = -1.99, p = .047, d = .22$, with the NI sample scoring slightly higher than the MY sample.

Table 5.1

*Moral concern scores by sample with associated independent t-test statistic*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral concern</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>MY</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-1.99*</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>MY</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>5.25***</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>MY</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>4.54***</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p < .05, ***p < .001

To investigate whether these judgements of morality led to different appraisals of fairness across the two types of decisions as specified in Hypothesis 5, similar to previous studies, a new variable reflecting the difference in appraised fairness of favouring decision and fairness of disfavouring decision, whereby zero scores indicated appraising both decisions as the same in terms of fairness and a positive score indicated appraising ingroup-favouring decision as more fair. This variable was then used as a dependent variable in an ANCOVA model, with the country sample as an independent variable and the three moral foundations as covariates, controlling for the effects of order. Moral concern for fairness, $F(1, 308) = 6.86, p = .009, \eta_p^2 = .02$, and moral concern for authority, $F(1, 308) = 6.58, p = .011, \eta_p^2 = .02$, both had significant effects on appraisal of the fairness of the two decisions.
(see Table 5.2). To check the direction of the effect, a multiple regression was conducted with all three moral concerns as predictor variables. Unexpectedly, in both cases, higher moral concern for authority, $\beta = .26, t = 3.33, p < .001$ and moral concern for fairness, $\beta = .11, t = 2.02, p = .044$, increased the likelihood of appraising the ingroup-favouring decision as more fair. Moral concern for loyalty did not affect decision fairness appraisal, $F(1, 308) = 3.24, p = .073$. Correlations for the two samples independently are also reported in Table 5.3.

Table 5.2

**ANCOVA exploring the effects of target of sample (MY vs NI) on perceived fairness and decision acceptance (across both favouring and disfavouring decisions) along with the interactions qualified by moral concerns (Study 5)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Perceived fairness</th>
<th>Decision acceptance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F(1, 308)$</td>
<td>$\eta^2_\text{p}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness moral concern</td>
<td>6.86**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty moral concern</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority moral concern</td>
<td>6.58*</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample*Fairness</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample*Loyalty</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample*Authority</td>
<td>8.41**</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p*<.05, **p**<.01. F value and the effect size are displayed.

Furthermore, the effect of moral concern for authority on the decision fairness appraisal was qualified by the interaction with the sample, $F(1, 308) = 8.41, p = .004, \eta^2_\text{p} = .03$. This was not the case for the Sample*Fairness or Sample*Loyalty interaction (see Table 5.2). The Sample*Authority interaction was then probed using moderation analysis via PROCESS macro model 1 (Hayes, 2012) with moral concern for authority entered as an independent variable and country sample as a moderator of fairness appraisal across the two decisions, controlling for the effects of order, using bias-corrected bootstrapped (n = 10,000)
confidence intervals (CI). Authority*Sample interaction, $b = .36, se = .16, p = .021, p = .022$, 95% CI [.06, .67] was uncovered via simple slope analysis (see Figure 5.3). Moral concern for authority did not predict fairness appraisal in MY sample, $b = -.01, se = .12, p = .986$, 95% CI [-.24, .24], but in the NI sample, higher moral concern for authority predicted more likely appraisal of ingroup-favouring decision as fairer, $b = .36, se = .10, p < .001$, 95% CI [.17, .56].

Figure 5.3. Sample*Authority moderation on fairness assessments across the two decisions.
### Table 5.3

**Correlations in Study 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fairness (favouring decision)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.75***</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fairness (disfavouring decision)</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.78***</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Decision acceptance (favouring)</td>
<td>.75***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<td>4. Decision acceptance (disfavouring)</td>
<td>.50***</td>
<td>.77***</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.09</td>
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<td>5. HI</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<td>.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
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<td>6. VI</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. HC</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. VC</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<td>9. Fairness morality</td>
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<td>-.13</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
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<td>10. Loyalty morality</td>
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<td>.07</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.57***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>11. Authority morality</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Legitimacy (police)</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.12</td>
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<td>13. Fairness compromise</td>
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<td>.18*</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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<td>.20*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Values for the MY sample are below the diagonal and the NI sample values are above.*
The second ANCOVA analysis entered the same variables, this time with the decision acceptance bias as the outcome variable (see Table 5.3), which was calculated via the same subtraction method as described for the fairness score. As Sample*Authority interaction was the only significant interaction, I investigated whether the same moderation effect prevailed for the decision acceptance responses. The overall model was statistically significant explaining 7% of variance, $F(4, 312) = 5.69, p < .001, R^2 = .07$. Moral concern for authority was a significant predictor of decision acceptance bias, $b = -.76, se = .25, 95\% CI [-1.27, -0.25]$, which was further qualified by Sample*Authority interaction, $b = .52, se = .16, 95\% CI [.21, .83]$. Simple slope analysis indicated that in the MY sample, higher moral concern for authority decreased the decision acceptance bias, $b = -.24, se = .12, p = .045, 95\% CI [-.48, -.01]$. In the NI sample, however, higher moral concern for authority had the opposite effect and increased the decision acceptance bias, $b = .28, se = .10, p = .006, 95\% CI [.08, .47]$ (see Figure 5.4).

![Figure 5.4](image.png)

**Figure 5.4.** Authority*Sample moderation on decision acceptance bias.

Therefore, two moderation analyses found that in the NI sample, higher moral concern for authority was associated with higher preference for ingroup-favouring decisions as they perceived those decisions as more fair and accepted them more than those with low concern for authority. In the MY sample, however, higher moral concern for authority was
related to decreased ingroup preference in terms of decision acceptance, but it had no effect on the perceptions of fairness.

**Cultural understanding of fairness.** In the last set of analyses linked to the Hypothesis 6, I investigated whether the MY sample was more willing to compromise the fairness of authorities than NI sample. Independent samples t-test indicated that there was no difference in students’ willingness to compromise fairness by the authorities across the two samples, $t(316) = 1.28, p = .201$. In both samples, out of 16 statements, participants indicated that fairness can be compromised for around 3 items, but the variance from the mean was large in both cases (MY: $M = 3.14$, $SD = 2.68$; NI: $M = 2.77$, $SD = 2.47$). Overall fairness expectation scores correlated negatively with moral concern for fairness in both MY, $r(155) = -.20$, $p = .011$, and NI sample, $r(161) = -.35$, $p < .001$ (see Table 5.4), meaning that those who express moral concern for fairness were less willing to compromise the fairness of authorities. Furthermore, fairness expectation scores correlated positively with moral concern for authorities in NI, $r(161) = .17$, $p = .036$, but not in MY sample, $r(155) = -.06$, $p = .478$. Moral concern for loyalty was not linked to the fairness expectation in the MY, $r(155) = -.05$, $p = .515$, or the NI sample, $r(161) = .01$, $p = .92$.

Finally, despite the MY sample expressing more moral concern for authority than the NI sample as reported in Table 5.2, contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 7, the NI samples reported higher levels of legitimacy in police ($M = 3.52$, $SD = .61$) than the MY sample ($M = 3.02$, $SD = .48$), $t(315) = 8.08$, $p < .001$, $d = .91$. Therefore, moral concern for authority within a nation or culture does not necessarily grant higher levels of legitimacy.

**Discussion**

The aim of the present study was to investigate the cultural underpinnings of responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions (see Table 5.3 for the summary of the hypotheses). Although, in line with the prior expectations, the cultural orientation of MY was largely characterised by VC, but also high levels of HC, the cultural orientation of NI was not found to be characterised by VI. Instead, NI had a strong HI profile. The NI sample profile was similar to that of the UK sample reported by Park et al. (2013) with high levels
of both VI and HI. However, the present study is among the first to consider the cultural profile of NI specifically in isolation from the rest of the UK.

Table 5.4

*Summary of the evidence for the hypotheses in Study 5*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Evidence from Study 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patterns of responses to authority decisions in MY and NI</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a. Authority decisions that favour the ingroup are more likely to be accepted in the MY sample than NI sample, whereas disfavouring decisions will be rejected more by MY sample than the NI sample (collectivism dominance hypothesis).</td>
<td>No support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. The MY sample will agree with authority decision more than NI sample and judge those decisions as more fair irrespective of their favourability (vertical orientation dominance hypothesis).</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The MY sample will judge ingroup-disfavouring decisions as fairer than the NI sample but will disagree with it more than NI sample (the VC hypothesis).</td>
<td>No support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moral concerns and responses to authority decisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The MY sample will display greater concern for loyalty and authority than the NI sample.</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. There will be no differences between the samples in concern for fairness.</td>
<td>No support (i.e. significant difference was found)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Judgements of moral concerns across the two samples will be linked to their responses to authority decisions within the samples.</td>
<td>Partial support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural understanding of fairness and authorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The MY sample will accept greater flexibility in the way authorities apply rules of fairness than the NI sample.</td>
<td>No support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The MY sample will regard authorities such as police as more legitimate than the NI sample.</td>
<td>No support</td>
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*Patterns of responses to authority decisions in MY and NI*

Having set up an authority decision that benefits either the ingroup or outgroup, I directly compared how the MY and NI samples perceived the fairness of the authority decisions and subsequently, responded to them. The MY sample deemed all decisions,
regardless of favourability, as more fair and also accepted those decisions more than the NI sample. This is in line with the vertical dominance hypothesis, a prediction that the MY sample would accept authority decisions regardless of their consequences for the group because authorities are an important element of vertical societies; undermining authority decisions potentially threatens the social system authorities represent. However, I found no evidence for the collectivism dominance hypothesis. It was expected that the MY sample may disagree with ingroup-disfavouring decisions more than the NI sample, as a way of expressing their collectivistic values, but there was no difference in how the MY and NI samples responded to group disfavouring decisions. Therefore, the patterns of responses among the MY sample suggest a suppression of collectivist values whilst supporting authority power and maintaining the vertical dimensions of the culture. This demonstrates that fairness is not just perceived through the lens of social identity as suggested by Radburn et al. (2016) and explored in Study 1, 3 and 4, but also through the cultural understanding of how fairness should be expressed.

Linking these individuals’ responses to authority decisions cultural orientation, they were not related to the individual-level preferences in cultural orientation. Thus, despite that there are country-level differences in how the MY and NI samples responded to these intergroup-level authority decisions that can be theoretically linked back to cultural differences and vertical dominance hypothesis specifically, there was no evidence that these responses were linked to the individual-level COS scores. However, this does not out rule the possibility that cross-cultural differences in cultural preferences account for these effects. In other words, country-level preferences in cultural orientation may well predict responses to authority decisions, but testing this assertion requires utilising country-level aggregate COS scores from more countries.

**Moral beliefs and responses to authority decisions**

Furthermore, having observed the effects of the country sample on responses to intergroup-level authority decisions, I explored the role of moral beliefs, as outlined by moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2011, 2012; Haidt, 2012) in accounting for these
effects. I expected that individual-level moral concern for fairness, loyalty and/or authority can explain observed patterns. Firstly, cultural differences in the importance of these moral foundations were observed, with MY sample considerably more concerned about loyalty and authority, in line with our predictions. This is largely consistent with the VC depiction of MY, whereby ingroup loyalty and prominence of authorities is emphasised. Furthermore, in contrast to Graham et al. (2011), I found a significantly higher but small in the effect magnitude, moral concern for fairness among NI sample in comparison to the MY sample. I will come back to the discussion regarding the meaning of fairness in cross-cultural contexts later in this chapter.

Next, I explored the role of these moralities across the samples in responses to authority decisions. A significant interaction between moral concern for authority and culture on how group members assessed decisions in contrast to one another was found. For the NI sample, higher moral concern for authorities was linked to higher likelihood to perceive ingroup favouring decisions as consistently fairer than outgroup favouring decisions. In other words, those with high moral regard for authorities tended to also respond to authorities’ decisions in a way that prefers ingroup favouritism. Furthermore, the same pattern was observed when comparing NI students’ responses to the decisions in terms of self-reported acceptance. Neither of the two findings was in line with my expectations, nor did they make apparent sense theoretically. Perhaps the concept of moral concern for authority resonates with the RWA, which is typically associated with higher prejudice against other groups (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010). Thus, in this way, this desire for social stability and submission to authority may be linked with higher derogation of the outgroup and the decisions that favour the outgroup at the cost of the ingroup.

However, for the MY sample, the effects of moral concern for authority on responses to authority decisions were closer to our prior expectations. When the perceived fairness of the two decisions was compared, the effect of authority on the fairness appraisal was null. However, this was not the case for decision acceptance patterns across the two
decisions. MY students that had high moral concern for authorities were less likely to agree with ingroup favouring decision over outgroup favouring decision. Thus, high concern for authority can be argued to have reduced ingroup favouritism, regardless of perceptions of fairness. Observing this relationship in a VC nation, but not in NI suggests that the cultural environment plays a role. The findings appear to resonate with the idea that authorities represent a shared set of moral values and what those values are may be distinct across cultures (Hough et al., 2010; Tyler & Jackson, 2013). For the VC orientation, when the importance of authority increased, the collectivistic tendency to accept decisions that are favouring one's group diminished. This is much in line with the view that people manage these competitive cultural orientations and an increase in the importance of authority may result in behaviour that is less collective as a way of managing these cultural expectations. Because NI is not a VC country holding cultural beliefs on the importance of both authorities and collectives, this relationship was not observed in this context. One possible mechanism for this may be that people resolve the conflicts imposed by their values by placing more weight on one or the other value. However, there was no support for the hypotheses that the other two moral foundations, fairness, and loyalty, were directly linked to the responses to authority decisions.

**Cultural understanding of fairness**

Finally, I tested whether an understanding of what constitutes fairness is shaped by the cultural environment. As it was stated in the previous section, higher moral concern for fairness was present among the NI sample in comparison to the MY sample, but it was a small effect. Further to this, there was no evidence that the MY sample was more likely to endorse authorities, such as the police, to compromise fairness in their dealings with the public compared to their NI counterparts. This is in line with what Graham et al. (2011) described as the universal concern for fairness regardless of the cultural background. Therefore, although the content of fairness may be culturally determined and some countries may express more moral concern for fairness as the principle over other countries, individuals across both cultures emphasised that authority fairness is important. They were
generally not supportive of authorities overstepping their boundaries and acting in ways that undermine the conduct of fairness. However, this does not mean that they would reject authorities acting unfairly, but at the ideological level, they are happy to lend support for the idea of emphasising fairness.

Interestingly, although the MY sample expressed higher moral concern for authorities than the NI, they perceived authorities, the police in this instance, as less legitimate than the NI sample. This points out that holding a position of authority in cultures of highest respect for authorities does not automatically grant legitimacy.

Limitations and conclusions

Collectively, the present findings point to some fascinating differences in the processing of intergroup-level authority decisions across cultures. However, I am wary that the differences in perceptions of fairness and decision acceptance were not directly linked to the cultural orientation as measured by COS (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), at least at the individual level. Thus, the conclusions drawn in this research are limited to a direct comparison between only two countries investigated in this research. A more comprehensive account of such processes observed in countries with a range of cultural profiles is required in order to build a broad cross-cultural picture. In such case, employing multi-level modelling would also be advantageous, whereby cultural and moral values are not only considered an individual-level variable, but also a country-level variable. The difficulty with conducting such intergroup-level research across cultures is ensuring that the groups involved across different settings are closely matched and comparable. In the case of the present research, relying on university students was optimal in ensuring that the groups are of similar status and demographics. However, whether sacrifices at the collective level for other university students as opposed to more identity-central groups, such as one's ethnic community, can be comparable, is another question. Future research could study how intergroup-level authority decision scenarios concerning one’s more fundamental identities may better link responses to authority decisions with moral and cultural values.
Ultimately, the question of how people across cultures respond to authority decisions and manage different cultural expectations is an important one, because it sheds light on the social systems these groups function in. Therefore, the understanding of authorities’ actions across cultures is not universal, but instead, it is shaped by cultural expectations of what it means to exist in a particular social system. Future research may consider how culture’s historical past or trajectories of social change influence those expectations of fairness. If the social system promotes values that may sometimes lead to contradictory responses in specific situations, then according to our findings, people actively try to manage the expectations of those values and choose one over another. However, what this research did not manage to demonstrate is the direct link between cultural values and specific behaviours.

Nevertheless, I built on the existing work on authority and fairness by extending the scope of analysis to culture and values. In other words, I present the relationship between authorities and groups as dynamic and informed by the context of the decision-making, as opposed to being based on the set of prescribed rules of what authority should or should not do to achieve compliance. I argue that the values of the society that authorities serve, whether they are cultural or reflective of people’s moral concerns, can determine how one perceives fairness and, subsequently, respond to those decisions. Therefore, authorities must understand these values in order to be endorsed (see also Jackson et al., 2012). Otherwise, these values can stand in a way of promoting harmonious relationships between authorities and the public they serve.

Having considered how cultural preferences shape social systems and how some accept societal inequalities more readily than others, these can clearly define the limits and acceptability of authority power. In the following and the last empirical chapter, I extend on this relationship between the structure of society and the authority power by considering how ideological beliefs of supporting versus rejecting hierarchies within the social systems guide people’s judgements of fairness in the intergroup-level authority decisions.
Hierarchies determine expectations of intergroup authority fairness

‘(…) groups in power create rules not only that maintain that power, but also rules that allow them to continue to obtain the lion’s share of the resources in the name of fairness’ (Platow & Hunter, 2001, p. 210)

The focus of the present chapter is to understand whether people seek fairness or forms of fairness such as the provision of voice from the authorities for everyone equally. Voice provision is commonly used to manipulate PJ in experimental studies (van den Bos, 1999). Research shows that providing people with an opportunity to voice their opinions increases perceived fairness of the authority in contrast to the denial of voice (Hildreth,

4 Study 7 and 8, presented in this chapter, were originally discussed at the International Society for Political Psychology meeting in June 2016 in Edinburgh, Scotland.
Moore, & Blader, 2014; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Platow, Filardo, Troselji, Grace, & Ryan, 2006). Conversely, I also explore what can predict expectations of less fair treatment or voice provision from authorities. Having already discussed the RMPJ in detail in Chapter 2, there are two arguments stemming from that chapter that are relevant to the present chapter. The first is that PJ is key to perceiving authorities as legitimate. This relationship between fairness and legitimacy implies that authorities should strive to be fair at all times because being perceived as fair is a desirable outcome resulting in legitimacy, but is fairness also something that others desire?

According to the moral foundations theory, fairness is a universal human concern (Graham et al., 2011, 2012). People react to systemic injustices by engaging in protests or other forms of collective actions to restore fairness (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). The legitimacy of authorities, such as the police and government, also depends on the extent to which they are perceived to be fair (Tyler, 2006). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that people want and expect fairness from authorities. Similarly, supporting virtuous and moral fairness can be considered admirable (Bai, 2016); however, unfairness too can sometimes be highly desirable, for example, if it comes with some benefits. To morally approve these outcomes, people may feel the need to justify the authority decision as fair or moral to avoid negative connotations associated with supporting injustice. People may do so by denying their privileged position (Knowles & Lowery, 2012) or through justifying the system and viewing it as legitimate (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; van der Toorn et al., 2014). Being in a group also comes with membership-related responsibilities such as increasing the welfare of one’s own group and adhering to the established or implicit norms (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Balancing the need to be loyal to one’s group while endorsing the principles of fairness, however, may not always be compatible, especially when unfair decisions are beneficial to the group as I demonstrated in Chapter 4. Thus, even though the consequences of unfairness may sometimes be preferred in such context, there is a strong drive to justify it and present oneself as supporting fairness.
The second argument relevant to this chapter is that people derive their own social standing from their experiences of fair or unfair treatment from authorities (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler et al., 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Status or social standing, used in this research interchangeably, are defined as relative positioning in terms of prominence and respect (Anderson, Willer, Kilduff, & Brown, 2012) that is conferred by others in the group (Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012). Thus, being treated fairly by the authority conveys that one is a respectable and meaningful member of society or the group that the authority is assumed to represent (Tyler, 1989). What is not clear, however, is whether the reverse is also true: do people expect authorities to treat others on the basis of their social status as a way of affirming their position in society? The present research investigated the role of group’s social standing on expectations of fairness to establish whether low status groups are expected to receive less fair treatment than other higher status groups. Finally, I argue that the ideological beliefs about the structure of society can inform one’s perceptions of what is fair for the other and own groups.

Fairness and social standing

Most of the research on the RMPJ focused on the relationship between receiving procedurally just treatment and its effect on the identity, including increased intragroup respect (Heuer & Stroessner, 2011; Platow et al., 2008; Smith et al., 1998) and self-esteem (Koper et al., 1993). These findings reinforce the idea that being treated fairly is necessary for people to feel appreciated in the collectives they belong to, making fairness desirable. Less attention was given to considering how people expect to be treated by authorities and whether they want fair treatment at all. The notion of expectations of authorities’ fairness refers to views on how people want authorities to act towards themselves and others, but this is not necessarily equal to what the authorities would do in such context. For example, in Study 3, one of the Northern Irish communities may have expected the police to react to the anti-social behaviour during the parade of the other community as opposed to overlooking it, but this did not mean that the police would fulfil those expectations. The previous chapter attempted to investigate this idea of expectations via a fairness expectations measure, where
no differences were found in the extent to which people across the two cultural samples were willing to compromise fairness. Building on the RMPJ, in this chapter I ask whether the extent to which people expect authorities to treat others fairly is contingent on their social standing.

People reason about justice differently based on whether it is directed at self or others (Messick et al., 1985; Sutton & Douglas, 2005). Therefore, the extent to which people expect authorities to be fair towards self may well differ to the justice sought for others. Building on the RMPJ, it is plausible to suggest that groups that are of high social standing may assume to be treated more fairly than groups that are of low social standing. In other words, do people expect authorities to treat low status groups, who may be of low social standing because they are mistreated by authorities, with less fairness than other, higher status groups? Whether this is the case is not clear in the literature and may be a plausible thesis. Research suggests that voice is not always expected or desired by everyone, but instead is a function of social identity and group membership, with more established group members expecting to be given voice when it is relevant to their identity (Platow, Huo, Lim, Tapper, & Tyler, 2015). On the other hand, however, voice can have adverse effects, for example, when groups feel disengaged from the system (Braithwaite, 2003). In such case also, people may demand low status groups to be less included in decision-making or treated less fairly, because they may not be included by the authority to the same extent.

However, an alternative suggestion is that in principle, people would expect the authority to treat everyone, including ingroup and outgroup members equally, despite their outgroup standing. The argument here is that outgroup status may not affect the perceptions of how fair authorities should be toward that group because the voice is symbolic and, apart from signalling inclusion and respect, it does not come with material goods or other resources. Resources, on the other hand, are something that groups care about more so than procedurally fair treatment (Leung et al., 2007). As I already showed in the previous two chapters, people prefer decisions that come with better outcomes for their ingroup, but it is not clear whether the status of the outgroup would shape expectations of the outcomes given
to those groups by the authority. Research suggests that high status groups are also perceived as more competitive (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Therefore, one suggestion may be that in competitive intergroup settings, ingroup members are more likely to benefit from restricting resources to high status outgroups than low status outgroups because this reduces the strain of competing for the resources. As with procedural fairness, the role of outcome expectations from authorities toward other low and high status groups has not been investigated, but it poses a theoretically-relevant extension of fairness models for understanding the relationship between identity and authority fairness.

Social hierarchies, inequality and understanding fairness

To further understand how the expectations of authority fairness may be shaped, I propose that ideological beliefs about the system, specifically SDO, may inform such expectations. Social dominance theory takes a perspective of the society as a group-based hierarchy with comprising dominant and subordinate groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Hierarchies tend to emerge spontaneously as groups pursue power and social status (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). At the individual-level, however, people may be motivated to support social inequality and legitimise oppression of other, subordinate groups, who are at the bottom of the hierarchy as a way of stabilising the hierarchy. Those favouring such ideologies tend to score highly in SDO measures, whereas those who express more egalitarian values and preference for equality of all groups tend to score low in SDO.

Unsurprisingly then, increases in one’s status may lead to higher support for social inequality and higher SDO scores as a way of maintaining the dominant position (Huang & Liu, 2005). Alongside RWA (Altemeyer, 1998), SDO predicts a range of social and political attitudes (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), but the two stem from different motivational goals (Duckitt, 2001; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). RWA, characterised as support for conventional values, social stability and submission to authority, is underpinned by the belief that the world is a dangerous place. On the other hand, SDO stems from the perception of the social world as a competitive place where resources and power are scarce. Therefore, those who express SDO views tend to legitimise group-based inequality as a way
of reducing the competitive threat to their own group position in society. However, critics suggest that SDO scores are highly dependent on the social category one has in mind while completing the measure (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003) and the general construct of SDO is as much an outcome as an antecedent of support for specific kinds of support for hierarchy, such as sexism and racism (Pehrson, Carvacho, & Sibley, 2017).

Authorities too are a vital part of social hierarchies. Through an access to social resources, they are in a unique position whereby they can either enhance or attenuate the already existing group-based status differences. While the PJ models reinforce the idea that authorities need to be fair in order to be perceived as legitimate, it is people that endorse social inequalities who are most attracted to the positions of authority such as the police force (Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991; Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003). Therefore, authorities may employ gestures of procedural fairness, such as appearing neutral or providing groups with voice, while simultaneously distributing resources in a way that is hierarchy enhancing, giving more resources to those of high status. Subordinates that share SDO ideologies may also expect authorities to distribute resources in ways that maintain the stability of hierarchy. Indeed, Gerber and Jackson (2016) found that high SDO individuals are supportive of excessive police physical violence as a way of granting compliance with hierarchy-threatening citizens, for example, non-violent demonstrators. In other words, people may support or justify normatively unfair police behaviour if it is in line with their hierarchy ideologies and thus ensures that the low status groups remain in their place in the hierarchy. In line with this, Armstrong (2013) found that high SDO people tended to judge outcomes favouring high status individuals as more fair than outcomes favouring low status individuals. In conclusion, SDO is associated with approval of decisions that disfavour and mistreat low status groups as a way of enhancing the group-based hierarchies.

The present research

The purpose of the present research was to understand the link between group social standing and fairness expectations in the context of the intergroup-level authority decisions.
Specifically, two indices of fairness were investigated. Firstly, I considered whether the group standing in the social hierarchy produces expectations on the extent to which people expect authorities to treat groups of low or high status fairly. Therefore, the focus here was on the procedurally just treatment, including the provision of voice. It was expected that because of the symbolic nature of procedural fairness, outgroup status will not affect the perceptions of how fair authorities should be toward the outgroup, nor that there will be differences between PJ expectations for one’s own another group. Thus, this hypothesis predicts an effect contrary to the implicit assumptions of the group-value model whereby high status comes with better procedural treatment (Smith et al., 1998).

The second index of fairness investigated in the present research was the way in which authorities were expected to distribute outcomes between groups. As with the previous hypothesis, I tested whether group’s relative social standing impacts how these expectations of outcome distributions are formed. Given the increased importance of resources over PJ at the group-level, it was expected that group status may shape expectations of how authorities should distribute outcomes. Specifically, as higher status groups may be more competitive, I expected authorities to admit fewer resources to the higher status outgroups who may have a potential to gain status and dominance, in comparison to the low status group that do not gain too much by receiving some favourable outcomes. Thus, admitting resources to the low status groups does not threaten the privileged position of the ingroup.

The role of SDO in understanding the link between the intergroup status and fairness judgements was also explored. It was expected that SDO will moderate the relationship between group standing and expectations of fairness from the authority. That is, high SDO ingroup members will authorities to admit more resources to outgroups of equal or higher status than to the lower status outgroups to ensure that the low status groups remain subordinate. In other words, it is expected that high SDO will reverse the pattern of expectation of outcome distribution, whereby low status groups and not high status groups are expected to be given less favouring outcomes. For the same reason, I expected SDO
moderation patterns to be the same for the expectations of fair treatment, whereby low status groups are expected to be deprived of fair treatment or voice more so than high status groups. Given that the construct of SDO is closely tied to other ideological beliefs such as RWA or belief in a competitive world (BCW; Duckitt, 2006), the present studies controlled for these.

Finally, building on the findings from Study 3, whereby positive outgroup attitudes had a buffering effect for ethnocentric preferences for ingroup favouring decisions over outgroup favouring ones, Studies 7 and 8 included measures of outgroup attitudes. Warm attitudes towards an outgroup can shift negative emotions such as contempt, which are associated with low and high status groups, to more positive emotions such as admiration (Fiske et al., 2002). Therefore, outgroup attitudes can further moderate the relationship between group status and the expectations of fairness with more favourable outgroup attitudes associated with more positive expectations of authority fairness.

The hypotheses were tested in three studies. Study 6 used minimal groups whereby participants were told their group was in conflict with either lower, equal or higher status group. Their task was to assess how a social dilemma should be resolved by an authority figure. Study 7 and 8 were carried out in the context of British citizens voting to leave the European Union. The UK government’s decision on post-Brexit immigration policy was the focus of those studies. The status of EU citizens living in the UK status was manipulated as either low or equal to that of a typical British citizen to evaluate the effects of group status on authority fairness expectation. Taken together, these studies contribute to the theoretical conceptualisations of fairness in the context of authority decisions. I expand on the empirical findings of the RMPJ by investigating the relationship between one’s status and the fairness others perceived that they deserve from authorities. In other words, the focus here is on the extent to which the same levels of authority fairness are sought and expected for everyone (regardless of their group status) by everyone (regardless of their hierarchical ideologies).

Study 6
Study 6 tested whether outgroup status predicts people’s expectations for authority fairness in an online experimental setting, whereby outgroup status was manipulated at three levels in a hypothetical abstract context. In this intergroup context, it was predicted that all groups will expect to be treated in the same way by the authorities, but outgroups of low status would be more likely to be expected to receive favourable outcomes than those of high or equal status. Furthermore, SDO was anticipated to moderate the effects of outgroup status on outcomes from authority with expectations of fewer outcomes towards low status groups, but not equal or high status groups.

Method

Participants. Participants \( N = 149 \), 41% male) were on average 27.80 years old \((SD = 9.77)\). They were recruited via social media and online participant pools. They were given an opportunity to enter a prize draw of £30 voucher in exchange for participation.

Design and measures. The study was presented as an abstract and creative thinking task (see Appendix 6 for study materials). Participants were assigned to either low, equal or high outgroup status condition. The study, available via an online survey, took around 10 minutes to complete and ethical approval was granted from the PREC at QUB.

Outgroup status manipulation. Participants were told to imagine the hierarchical structure of society in a social pyramid form with the high status groups at the top and low status groups at the bottom of the social ladder. They were asked to imagine that their group fits somehow in the middle of this hierarchy and they were given the details of another group, which was either manipulated to be at the same level as the ingroup (equal outgroup status), at the top of the social ladder (high outgroup status) or at the bottom of the pyramid (low outgroup status). Subsequently, they were told to imagine that this group, referred to as Group X, is in a long-running dispute between with their own group. Because this conflict could not be resolved among the group members, a police officer (an authority figure) was asked to attend to the matter.

PJ expectation. Participants were asked to respond to eight items (four per group) on a Likert scale \( (1 = \text{strongly disagree}; 5 = \text{strongly agree}) \) about what police should do to
their own group and the outgroup: ‘treat your group/group X with respect’ ‘treat your group/group X fairly’, ‘give honest explanations to your group/group X’, and ‘consider your group’s/group X’s views when deciding what to do’. These items were adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003); only items that are related to the specific encounter treatment were selected, whereas more general items such as to ‘accurately understand and apply law’ were dropped. Higher scores indicated a greater expectation of procedurally fair treatment for the ingroup or outgroup respectively (both $\alpha = .96$).

**Outcome expectation.** As real-life resources tend to be limited, participants were asked to indicate how they think the authority figure should distribute them in a form of abstract ten tokens between their own group and group X. The variable of interest here is the number of tokens participants admitted to the outgroup, but because all participants had to use ten tokens, the number of tokens given to the ingroup can be easily inferred.

**SDO (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).** Participants responded to 16 items such as ‘Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups’ or ‘We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible’ (reserve-coded) on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicated higher SDO ($\alpha = .94$).

**RWA (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009, adapted from Altemeyer, 1998).** A shortened, eight-item scale was employed to measure RWA ideology. Participants responded to statements such as ‘Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fibre and traditional beliefs’ or ‘Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly’ (reverse-coded) on a nine-point Likert scale (-4 = strongly disagree with this statement; +4 = strongly agree with this statement). The shortened version of RWA scale correlates very highly with its 30-item counterpart (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009). In the present study, higher scores indicated higher RWA ($\alpha = .85$).

**BCW (Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2013).** Participants responded to ten items such as ‘It’s a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times’ or ‘Honesty is the best
policy in all cases’ (reverse-coded) on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicated a stronger BCW ($\alpha = .83$).

**Results**

**Expectations of fairness and outcomes from the authority across outgroup status conditions.** Firstly, mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether participants would expect authorities to treat ingroup and outgroup members with the same levels of fairness and whether this is qualified by outgroup status. The effect of target group (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup) on PJ expectation was non-significant, $F(1, 146) = .03, p = .863$. Further to this, Target Group*Outgroup Status interaction was also non-significant, $F(2, 146) = .36, p = .723$. Therefore, people sought fairness in treatment for their own group and the outgroup equally, regardless of the outgroups social standing in relation to their ingroup.

In terms of outcome expectation, outgroup status had a significant effect on the expected outcome from the authority, $F(2, 146) = 5.13, p = .007, \eta^2_p = .07$ (see Figure 6.1). People expected authorities to give more resources to the low status outgroup ($M = 5.22, SD = 1.04$) than the equal outgroup status condition ($M = 4.46, SD = 1.50$), 95% CI (.17, 1.35). The outcome distribution expected for the high status outgroup was not significantly different from the equal status group, 95% CI (-.39, .79), or the low status group, 95% CI (-1.17, .04).
Figure 6.1. Outgroup outcome expectations as a function of the group status.

**SDO as a predictor of fairness.** Correlations between expectations of treatment (for ingroup and outgroup separately) and outcomes on the one hand and SDO, RWA and the BCW, on the other hand, were computed to evaluate whether SDO predicts expectations of authority fairness (see Table 6.1). Neither outcome expectations, \( r(149) = -.11, p = .189 \), nor PJ expectation for own group, \( r(149) = -.16, p = .057 \), were significantly correlated with SDO. However, higher SDO predicted lower expectations of fair treatment towards the outgroup, \( r(149) = -.20, p = .013 \). That is, those higher in SDO were more likely to expect authorities to treat the outgroup with less fairness.

To investigate whether SDO moderates the effect of outgroup status on expectations of authority fairness and outcomes, three moderation analyses using Hayes (2012) PROCESS macro model 1 were carried out. In each model, RWA and BCW were entered as covariates of the moderator. SDO did not moderate the effect of outgroup status on fairness expectation for the ingroup, \( F(3, 144) = 1.61, p = .191 \), or outgroup, \( F(3, 144) = 2.29, p = .081 \). It also did not moderate the effect of outgroup status on outcome expectation, \( F(3, 144) = 2.40, p = .071 \).
Table 6.1

Correlations between outcome and PJ expectations and ideological beliefs (SDO, RWA and BCW; Study 6)

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PJ expectations (outgroup)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.20 *</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.46 ***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.28 ***</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>BCW</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Discussion

As expected, there was no difference in the extent to which participants sought out fair treatment from authorities for both ingroup and outgroup. The outgroup’s relative social standing also did not affect the extent to which participants were expecting authorities to treat those groups fairly or not. Outgroup status, however, had an effect on participant’s judgements of the fairest outcome distribution by the authority. In this context, participants were generally quite happy for the authority to split the resources equally, however, when the outgroup was portrayed as having low status, people were more likely to have authority allocate them more resources than if the outgroup was of equal status. There are possibly two explanations for this. One is that, in line with our expectations, ingroup members are more willing to give more resources to the low status group than the equal status outgroup, because equal status outgroups are more threatening to the ingroup. This, however, does not explain the lack of significant differences between high status outgroup and the other two conditions. Therefore, it is quite likely that the intergroup scenario was not salient enough and participants saw the low status members through the virtue of a common ingroup identity (for example, ‘they are unemployed, but they are my fellow citizens’). Thus, they were admitting resources to the low status group as they empathised with them and perceived them to be in need (see Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). Furthermore,
people are highly likely to seek equal distributions in laboratory and abstract settings than in the real world (Starmans, Sheskin, Bloom, Christakis, & Brown, 2017).

Nevertheless, Study 6 found that those higher in SDO were more likely to expect authorities to deprive outgroup of procedurally fair treatment, regardless of their status; this complements Gerber and Jackson’s (2016) finding that SDO was linked with the approval of police violence against a threatening outgroup. Overall, there was also little control over which social groups participants were thinking about when completing this task nor were they asked about it retrospectively. With this limitation in mind, Study 7 was designed to test the hypotheses in the context of real-life social groups and authority decisions.

**Study 7**

Study 7 was carried out in the context of the outcome of the 23 June 2016 UK referendum vote to leave the European Union (EU). Issues associated with free movement of people and economic immigration were the amongst the most prominently debated throughout the campaign, with calls for control measures to be implemented (Alfano, Dustmann, & Frattini, 2016). The study was carried out in December 2016, with no plans regarding any policies post Brexit having been revealed. Specifically, this study focused on the potential policies regarding non-UK EU immigrants and their status in the UK following the Brexit. In 2015, there were 3.2 million EU citizens living in the UK, thus making up around 5% of the UK population (Office for National Statistics, 2015). Such a context allows for investigation of fairness expectations associated with the process of the decision making as well as the outcome of the decision itself. The current study only focused on equal and low status outgroups for two reasons. First, because the EU citizens make up a numerical minority in the UK and as immigrants and they do not tend to be perceived as high status, it was unfeasible to manipulate their social status as relatively high. Second, Study 6 did not find any meaningful differences in outcome expectations when comparing a high status outgroup with an outgroup of equal or low status.

Study 7 and 8, unlike the previous study, measured voice expectation as a proxy measure for expectations of PJ. The hypotheses in relation to outcome expectation and voice
expectation were the same, assuming that outgroup status will not affect voice expectation, but predicting that EU immigrants portrayed as having equal social status, comparing to those portrayed with lower status, relative to that of a typical British citizen would be expected to receive less favourable outcomes from the authority. This effect was expected to be further moderated by SDO. In addition to the previous hypotheses, the role of outgroup attitudes in shaping expectations of authority fairness was also considered. Because Study 7 used established groups, evaluation of outgroup attitudes was more feasible than in Study 6, whereby groups were artificial and abstract. Building on the findings from Study 3, I explore whether the relative intergroup status influences not only the expected authority outcomes, but also whether the outgroup attitudes can moderate this relationship, with positive outgroup attitudes having a buffering effect. In other words, I expected that more positive outgroup attitudes will predict more favouring expectations of authority treatment in terms of outcomes and voice provision. However, there were no specific predictions on whether this effect will be more prominent for the equal or low status outgroups or both equally were made.

Method

**Participants.** One-hundred-and-seventy-two participants were recruited via social media channels dedicated to politics (such as Twitter and Reddit). The study was advertised as seeking views on Brexit and immigration. After excluding participants who responded incorrectly to the attention check \( n = 17 \), the sample consisted of 155 participants aged \( M = 30.17, SD = 9.99 \). Only participants who are UK citizens and have voted in the EU referendum on 23 June 2016 were invited to participate. The majority of participants were ‘remain’ voters (82.6%), with only 17.4% reporting voting ‘leave’.

**Design and procedures.** The study, available via online survey, took around 15 minutes to complete and ethical approval was granted from the PREC at QUB. Participants were assigned to read one of the two articles on the status of EU immigrants in the UK, describing them as either (1) comparable to the status of a UK citizen, or (2) of a lower status. These articles were made up for the study. Then, participants were presented with a
decision the government needs to make a part of the process of leaving the EU. This time, procedural fairness was conceptualised in terms of voice provision as opposed to fair treatment per se. As in Study 6, two key variables were investigated: PJ and outcome expectations from the authority. Participants’ SDO and attitudes towards EU citizens were measured in order to test the hypothesised interaction between SDO, outgroup attitudes and outgroup status. RWA and BCW were measured as control variables. Participants also completed an attention check directly after exposure to the scenario to ensure high quality of data.

**EU citizen status manipulation.** Participants read a passage on the policy regarding the EU immigrants in the UK post-Brexit (see Appendix 7 for study materials). In one condition, EU citizens currently residing in the UK were portrayed as having lower salary and worse living conditions (low outgroup status), whereas in another condition, having comparable salaries and living conditions (equal outgroup status).

**Manipulation check.** Participants were presented with a social ladder and asked to indicate on which rung they thought a) they stand, b) typical British person stands, and c) typical EU citizen living in the UK stands. The perceived status of typical British person and typical EU citizen living in the UK were compared to evaluate whether they are in line with the outgroup status condition participants were assigned to.

**Voice expectation.** Participants were asked to what extent ingroup and outgroup members should be consulted by the government to assist with the policy making. Specifically, it was emphasised that the present research is concerned with what participants deem the fairest way of dealing with this issue. This involved responding to six items (three for each side) such as ‘The British government should consult British members of the general public’ (ingroup voice item, $\alpha = .96$) or ‘The British government should consult EU citizens living in the British cities’ (outgroup voice item, $\alpha = .98$) on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). These items were created for the present experiment.
Outcome expectation. Participants were asked what would be the fairest decision British government could make regarding the immigration policy post Brexit. Participants responded on an eight-point scale (1 = EU citizens who have arrived to the UK prior to Brexit should undergo scrutiny to assess whether they should continue to stay or not; 8 = All EU citizens who have arrived to the UK prior to Brexit should be allowed to stay regardless of their prior contributions.). Therefore, higher scores indicated more outgroup favouring decision as the fairest.

Outgroup attitudes. Outgroup attitudes were measured using Haddock, Zanna and Esses (1993) feeling thermometer. Participants indicated their overall attitude towards an unknown EU citizen living in the UK (0 = extremely unfavourable, 10 = extremely favourable). Higher scores were associated with more favourable outgroup attitudes.

Social identification strength. A scale by Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) was adapted to measure social identification strength. Participants indicated their identification with the British people by responding to four items such as ‘I am glad to be British’ or ‘I identify myself with other British people’ on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Higher score indicated higher identification strength ($\alpha = .89$).

Ideological beliefs. Just as in Study 6, SDO, RWA and BCW scales were employed. All scales were internally reliable within the present sample $\alpha = .94$, $\alpha = .68$, and $\alpha = .82$ respectively.

Results

Manipulation check. A mixed ANOVA with outgroup status condition as between group factor and positioning of typical British person and EU citizen living in the UK on the ladder as within group factor was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of manipulation. There was a significant Status Condition*Target Group interaction on perceived status $F(1, 152) = 35.75, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .19$ (see Figure 6.2). To investigate this interaction, four t-tests were conducted with Bonferroni-corrected alpha level, $p = .0125$. In line with manipulation, the difference between status conditions on British citizens’ status was non-significant, $t(152) = 2.08, p = .039$, whereas participants in the low outgroup status condition marked EU
citizens as having lower status ($M = 3.79, SD = 1.35$) than participants in the equal status condition ($M = 4.51, SD = 1.08$), $t(152) = 3.61, p < .001$. Similarly, the difference in status between EU citizens and British citizens in the equal status condition was non-significant, $t(72) = 2.28, p = .025$, whereas in low outgroup status condition, British citizens were judged as higher in social standing ($M = 5.09, SD = 1.25$) than EU citizens ($M = 3.79, SD = 1.35$), $t(80) = 8.79, p < .001$. Thus, the outgroup status manipulation was successful.

**The effect of outgroup status on expected fairness.**

**Voice expectation.** Multivariate one-way ANOVA investigating the effect of outgroup status on voice expectation for British and for EU citizens was conducted. The main effect of outgroup status on EU citizens’ voice was non-significant, $F(1, 153) = 2.59, p = .109$. However, the outgroup status manipulation had a significant effect on expectations of British citizens’ voice, $F(1, 153) = 4.23, p = .041, \eta^2_p = .03$. When outgroup status was expressed as equal status, participants expected fairer voice than when the outgroup status was low (see Table 6.2 for descriptive statistics). Furthermore, a mixed ANOVA was used to evaluate the effects of voice expectation for ingroup versus outgroup as within-groups factor as a function of outgroup status as between-groups factor. Both main effects and the interactions were non-significant ($Fs < 3.71, ps \geq .06$).

**Outcome expectation.** One-way ANOVA on the effect of outgroup status on outcome expectation for EU citizens who arrived to the UK prior to Brexit revealed a non-significant effect, $F(1, 153) = 2.07, p = .434$ (see Table 6.2). That is, there were no differences in the fairest decision British government could make regarding the immigration policy post Brexit between those who read the equal and low status articles.
Moderation effects of SDO and outgroup attitudes on outgroup voice expectation. PROCESS macro method (Hayes, 2012) was used to evaluate the moderating effects of these variables on the relationship between outgroup attitudes and expectations of voice and outcomes, controlling for the effects of RWA and BCW. Correlations are reported in Table 6.3. Two separate analyses using the PROCESS model 2 template were conducted.

**Descriptive statistics for the fairness expectations across the outgroup status conditions (Study 7)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outgroup status</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice expectation (ingroup) a</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice expectation (outgroup) a</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>4.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome expectation b</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>6.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* a = measured on 1-7 scale, b = measured on 1-8 scale.
Table 6.3

*Correlations in Study 7*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ingroup voice</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.79 ***</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.16 *</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.17 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Outgroup voice</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.27 ***</td>
<td>-.23 **</td>
<td>-.24 **</td>
<td>-.22 **</td>
<td>.32 ***</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Expected outcome</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.49 ***</td>
<td>-.32 ***</td>
<td>-.24 **</td>
<td>.41 ***</td>
<td>-.29 ***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SDO</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.45 ***</td>
<td>.47 ***</td>
<td>-.54 ***</td>
<td>.32 ***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RWA</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.26 **</td>
<td>-.36 ***</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. BCW</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.39 ***</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Outgroup attitudes</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. British identification</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

The results for the model with voice expectation as a dependent variable are reported first. This model explained 20% of the variance, $F(7, 147) = 5.15, p < .001$.

Outgroup attitudes were a significant predictor of expected outgroup voice, $b = .24, se = .08, p = .004, 95\% CI [.08, .40]$ whereas SDO was not $b = .02, se = .18, p = .893$. Furthermore, outgroup status was also a significant predictor of expected outgroup voice, $b = .56, se = .28, p = .043, 95\% CI [.02, 1.11]$. Outgroup Status*Outgroup Attitudes interaction was not a significant predictor of outgroup voice expectations, $b = -.02, se = .16, p = .911$, but Outgroup Status*SDO produced a negative interaction term, $b = -.85, se = .33, p = .012, 95\% CI [-1.51, -.19]$. To illustrate this interaction, simple slopes were produced. Outgroup status had an effect on judgement of outgroup voice expectations, but only for lower SDO individuals, $b = 1.35, se = .31, p = .001, 95\% CI [.53, 2.16]$, but not for higher SDO individuals, $b = -.28, se = .43, p = .521$. When outgroup status was portrayed as equal, low SDO individuals were more likely to expect authority to give them fairer voice than in comparison to the low outgroup status condition. Comparison of individuals with lower versus higher SDO as a function of the outgroup status manipulation revealed that there was no effect of SDO in the equal outgroup status condition, $b = .35, se = .25, p = .163$, and in the low status condition,
the difference was marginally significant, $b = .41, \, se = .23, \, p = .045, \, 95\% \, CI \, [.01, \, 1.02]$ (see Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3. Judgements of outgroup voice expectations as a function of outgroup status (low versus equal) and SDO (low versus high; Study 7).

**Moderation effects of SDO on expected outcome expectation.** Secondly, a similar moderation model was used to evaluate moderation effects of SDO and outgroup attitudes, this time, on outcome expectation. Overall, the model explained 35% of the variance, $F(7, 147) = 11.15, \, p < .001$ (see Figure 6.4). Outgroup status was not a significant predictor of outcome expectation, $b = -.19, \, se = .25, \, p = .441$, but SDO, $b = -.62, \, se = .16, \, p < .001 \, 95\% \, CI \, [.67, \, -.30]$, and outgroup attitudes, $b = .19, \, se = .07, \, p = .010, \, 95\% \, CI \, [.05, \, .34]$ both were. Furthermore, Outgroup Status*SDO interaction $b = .99, \, se = .30, \, p = .001, \, 95\% \, CI \, [-1.57, \, -.41]$ and Outgroup status*Outgroup attitudes interaction $b = -.51, \, se = .14, \, p < .001, \, 95\% \, CI \, [-.79, \, -.23]$ were both significant. Simple slope analysis was conducted to illustrate the nature of these interactions at two levels (low versus high) for each moderator (see Figure 6.5 and 6.6).
Figure 6.4. Beta coefficients of SDO and outgroup attitudes moderating the relationship between outgroup status and outcome expectation (Study 7). Note: Interaction effects are provided after slash.

**Outgroup Status** × **SDO.** Individuals with higher SDO were more likely to expect authorities to give fewer favouring outcomes for the equal status outgroup than the low status outgroup, $b = -1.17$, $se = .38$, $p = .003$, 95% CI [-1.92, -0.41]. In contrast, for lower SDO individuals, there was no effect of outgroup status on the outcome expectation, $b = .72$, $se = .36$, $p = .051$. Furthermore, the difference between lower SDO and higher SDO individuals within the two outgroup status conditions were compared. When the outgroup was depicted as having low status, there was no difference between lower SDO and higher SDO individuals in their judgement of the outcome expectation, $b = -.37$, $se = .24$, $p = .118$. However, when the outgroup was portrayed as having equal status, higher SDO individuals were more likely to expect less favouring authority outcome than lower SDO individuals $b = -.82$, $se = .23$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-1.28, -.37] (see Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5. Judgements of outcome expectation as a function of outgroup status (low versus equal) and SDO (low versus high; Study 7).

**Outgroup Status*Outgroup Attitudes.** Next, simple slopes analysis was conducted to investigate this interaction. Outgroup status had opposite effect on outcome expectation judgement based on whether the attitudes towards the outgroup were higher or lower. Unexpectedly, when the attitudes towards the outgroup individuals were higher, individuals judged the equal status outgroup as deserving less favouring outcomes than the low status outgroup, $b = -1.23$, $se = .38$, $p = .002$, 95% CI [-1.98, -.47]. However, when the outgroup attitudes were lower, individuals were more likely to deem the outgroup as deserving more favouring outcomes when their status was equal as opposed to low, $b = .85$, $se = .38$, $p = .027$. When those with lower and higher outgroup attitudes were compared as a function of outgroup status, there was no difference in judgements of outcome expectation when the outgroup was of equal status, $b = .05$, $se = .10$, $p = .632$. However, when outgroup was portrayed as having low status, those who expressed higher outgroup attitudes judged more favouring outcomes as fair in comparison to those who expressed disliking the outgroup, $b = .30$, $se = .10$, $p = .003$, 95% CI [.10, .49] (see Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6. Judgements of outcome expectation as a function of outgroup status (low versus equal) and outgroup attitudes (low versus high; Study 7).

Discussion

Following a manipulation of EU citizens’ status, the equal outgroup status was associated with increased expectation of voice from authority for the ingroup members. Thus, an outgroup that may compete with the ingroup was linked to increased expectation for authority to provide voice to the ingroup. Outgroup status, however, did not directly affect the extent to which the ingroup expected authorities to give voice to the outgroup or the outcome given to them, similar to Study 6. Study 7 also found that SDO had moderating effects on the impact of outgroup status on perceived fairness for both outcomes and voice. For outcome expectation, this effect was contrary to what was expected, higher SDO was associated with lower expectations of outcomes distributed to the equal status group than to the low status group. In terms of voice, outgroup status did not matter to high SDO individuals as they indicated they would expect the same level of voice given to those groups. However, for low SDO people, equal outgroup status was associated with higher expectations of voice, in line with the PJ theory suggestion that voice is status-signalling. Finally, outgroup attitudes appeared to have a buffering effect for outcome expectations for low outgroup status; the more favourable the attitudes were, the more likely positive outcomes were expected for the low status outgroup.
However, Study 7 did not measure perceived threat, which is a potential confounding variable in this context. EU citizens who were portrayed as equal status may have simply be perceived as higher potential threat to British values and resources (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and not because they are threatening competitively, which may explain why higher SDO individuals expected authorities to give less favouring outcomes to equal status outgroup in comparison to a low status outgroup. Without a manipulation, EU citizens as equal status would have been more likely to be perceived as low status but being told that their status is now similar of that of the ingroup would mean that their status is less stable and prone to improving, thus appearing more competitively threatening as they climb up the social ladder. However, it is low status groups that typically appear more threatening (e.g., Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006) and thus the effects discussed here may be driven by factors other than the relative status. Testing the hypotheses in a setting with more static outgroup standing can help to clarify this relationship.

**Study 8**

Study 8 was largely based on the same design as Study 7. The key difference between the two studies was that Study 8 included a manipulation of outgroup status by focusing on two specific nationalities of EU citizens who may be considered of equal and low status as opposed to manipulating the status of EU citizens as a group. Because snowballing sample in Study 7 attracted more remain voters than leave voters, I decided to use a recruitment tool in attempt to recruit sample that was more representative of the British population in terms of the referendum vote. The UK participants (N = 202), aged M = 35.43, SD = 11.93, were 63% Remain voters, 24% Leave voters and 13% did not vote. They were recruited from Prolific Academic and paid £1.25 for completing a 15-minute survey. Prolific Academic was selected because of its considerable proportion of British participants; as a recruitment tool, it tends to produce high quality and reliable data (Peer, Samat, Brandimarte, & Acquisti, 2017). The ethical approval was granted from the PREC at QUB.

Participants read a similar scenario whereby they were told about the implications of Brexit on immigration policy, this time focusing on the specific group of EU citizens (see
Appendix 8 for study materials). Germany and Romania were chosen as the equal and low status outgroup respectively because of similar proportions of those nationals currently living in the UK (286,000 for Germany and 220,000 for Romania). Romania was also picked as low status because of the restrictions imposed on their ability to move to the UK and because they more recently became an EU member state.

Participants completed an attention check, and the same set of dependent variables (outcomes, voice) in relation to either low or equal status country. In addition to SDO ($\alpha = .95$), RWA ($\alpha = .76$), and BCW measures ($\alpha = .75$), participants also completed symbolic and realistic threat measures in relation to the country they were assigned to. These included responding to items adapted from Velasco Gozáles et al. (2008) such as ‘Germans/Romanians are a threat to the British culture’ (symbolic threat) and ‘Because of the presence of Germans/Romanians, unemployment in the UK increased’ (realistic threat) on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). These subscales were combined into one overall measure of threat with higher scores indicating higher perception of threat from the outgroup ($\alpha = .95$).

**Results**

**Manipulation check.** Just as in the Study 7, a mixed ANOVA was conducted with status condition as a between-group factor and positioning of the ingroup and the outgroup on the ladder as a within-group factor on perceived status. There was a significant Status Condition*Target Group interaction on perceived status $F(1, 200) = 94.36, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .32$. In line with the manipulation, in the low status condition, the Romanian citizens in the UK were perceived as lower status ($M = 3.73, SD = 1.51$) than the ingroup ($M = 5.67, SD = 1.51$), $t(103) = 12.06, p < .001, d = 1.29$. On the other hand, German citizens living in the UK were perceived to be of no different status to the ingroup, $t(97) = .47, p = .629$.

**The effect of outgroup status on fairness expectation.** In a series of independent t-tests, I investigated whether outgroup status has an effect on expectations of authority voice and outcomes (see Table 6.4). Outgroup status had no effect on the expectations of voice for the ingroup $t(200) = .59, p = .557$, nor for the outgroup, $t(200) = -.69, p = .490$. The low
status group, however, was expected to be given less favourable outcomes from the authority \((M = 5.38, SD = 2.34)\) than the equal status outgroup \((M = 6.18, SD = 2.06)\), \(t(200) = -2.57, p = .011, d = .36\).

Table 6.4  
**Descriptive statistics for two outgroup status conditions (Study 8)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outgroup</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice expectation (ingroup)(^a)</td>
<td>Low status</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal status</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice expectation (outgroup)(^b)</td>
<td>Low status</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal status</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome expectation (^b)</td>
<td>Low status</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal status</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: \(^a\) measured on 1-7 scale, \(^b\) measured on 1-8 scale.*

Table 6.5  
**Correlations in Study 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ingroup voice</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Outgroup voice</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td>-.24***</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Expected outcome</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-.44***</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.55***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>7. Outgroup attitudes</td>
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*Note: \(^*\) \(p < .05\), \(^**\) \(p < .01\), \(^***\) \(p < .001\)*

**Moderation.** The same double moderation model as illustrated in Figure 6.4 (see p. 133) was conducted with expected outcome and expected outgroup voice as outcome variables. Correlations are reported in Table 6.5. When expected outcome was the dependent
variable, the model explained 39% of the variance, $F(5, 196) = 24.64, p < .001$. Higher SDO predicted more disfavouring outcomes for the outgroup, $b = -.53, se = .12, p < .001$, 95% CI [-.78, -.28], whereas higher outgroup attitude predicted expectation of more positive outcomes for the outgroup, $b = .42, se = .06, p < .001$, 95% CI [.30, .53]. However, neither Outgroup Status*SDO, $b = .09, se = .27, p = .740$, nor Outgroup Status*Outgroup Attitudes, $b = -.08, se = .12, p = .474$, indicated significant interactions on expected outcome suggesting that the relative standing of the outgroup did not influence expectations of outcomes.

Another double moderation with outgroup voice expectation was conducted with the same variables entered for all predictors. The model explained 16% of variance $F(5, 196) = 7.44, p < .001$. However, neither SDO, $b = .18, se = .11, p = .102$, nor outgroup status, $b = -.23, se = .23, p = .316$, predicted outgroup voice expectation. Higher outgroup attitudes, however, predicted higher expectation for outgroup voice, $b = .23, se = .05, p < .001$, 95% CI [.14, .33]. Finally, as with expected outcome, neither Outgroup Status*SDO, $b = -.01, se = .22, p = .955$, nor Outgroup Status*Outgroup Attitudes, $b = -.05, se = .10, p = .624$, predicted expectations of outgroup voice.

**Exploring the role of intergroup threat.** Given that the moderation patterns revealed in Study 7 were not upheld in the present study, I decided to explore whether perceived threat explained the more disfavouring expectations of outcome for the low status ingroup in comparison to the equal status ingroup. To do so, a mediation model using Hayes (2012) PROCESS model 4 template using bias corrected bootstrapped ($n = 10,000$) confidence intervals was conducted. Higher manipulated outgroup status predicted lower threat, $b = -.91, se = .17, p < .001$, 95% CI [-1.26, -.56]. Higher threat, in turn, predicted less favourable authority decision outcome expectation, $b = -.94, se = .11, p < .001$, 95% CI [-1.15, -.73]. Direct effect of outgroup status on outcome expectation was non-significant, $b = 0.96, se = .28, p = .837$, but the indirect pathway via threat was, $b = .86, se = .22, 95%$ CI [.47, 1.34], indicating full mediation. This pattern of mediation was also present for outgroup voice expectation as an outcome variable, but with weaker effects as demonstrated
in Figure 6.7. Therefore, low group status is associated with higher perceptions of threat. High perceptions of threat, on the other hand, are related to lower expectations of positive outcomes and voice provision by the authorities.

**Figure 6.7.** Mediated effect of outgroup status and threat on authority decision outcome expectation and outgroup voice expectation (Study 8). Note: Coefficients for outcome expectations effects are above the line, whereas coefficients for outgroup voice expectation effects are below the line; *****p < .001.

**Intergroup threat as the driver of interaction effects.** Thus far, the analysis suggested that perceived threat of the outgroup, rather than their relative status drives the expectations of authority fairness. To understand under which conditions under which SDO and outgroup attitudes may moderate the effects of threat on authority fairness, Model 2 template was used to run the double moderation with outgroup threat as a predictor, SDO (controlling for RWA and BCW) and outgroup attitudes as moderators and outcome expectation as the outcome variable in the first model and outgroup voice expectation in the second. In the first model, \( F(7, 194) = 21.00, p < .001 R^2 = .43 \), Threat*SDO interaction was significant, \( b = .19, se = .09, p = .031, 95\% CI [.02, .36] \). Simple slope analysis revealed

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\(^5\text{Threat*Outgroup Attitudes interaction was non-significant in this model, } b = .06, se = .04, p = .134.\)
that among those higher in SDO, there was no difference in outcome expectations for lower and higher threatening outgroups, $b = -.11, se = .17, p = .543$. However, among those lower in SDO, they expected the authority to give more favouring outcomes to the outgroup that was of a low threat than a high threat, $b = -.52, se = .17, p = .003$, 95% CI [-.86, .18]. When the outgroup was perceived as higher in threat, there was no significant difference in expectations between lower and higher SDO individuals had for authority outcome distribution, $b = -.24, se = .17, p = .168$. However, when the outgroup was perceived as lower in threat, higher SDO individuals were more likely to expect authorities to make less favourable decisions to the outgroup in comparison to lower SDO individuals, $b = -.59, se = .20, p = .004$, 95% CI [-.99, -.20] (see Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.8. Authority decision outcome expectation as a function of intergroup threat (low versus high) and SDO (low versus high; Study 8).
Figure 6.9. Authority voice expectation towards as a function of intergroup threat (low versus high) and outgroup attitudes (low versus high; Study 8). Note: OG = outgroup.

In the second model\(^6\), predicting the expected outgroup voice, \(F(7, 194) = 7.39, p < .001\) \(R^2 = .21\) only Threat*Outgroup Attitudes interaction was significant, \(b = .09, se = .03, p = .005, 95\%\ CI [.03, .16]\) (see Figure 6.9). High outgroup attitudes did not affect voice expectations for either low or high threat groups, \(b = .19, se = .17, p = .365\). However, when outgroup attitudes were low, people expected high threatening groups to receive less voice than low threatening groups, \(b = - .28, se = .12, p = .023, 95\%\ CI [-.52, -.04]\). When the outgroup was perceived as lower in threat, there was no significant difference in voice expectations for the outgroup between those holding lower and higher outgroup attitudes, \(b = .05, se = .07, p = .513\). However, when the outgroup was perceived as higher in threat, those expressing less favourable attitudes towards this outgroup were more likely to expect authorities to give this outgroup less voice in comparison to those with more positive attitudes, \(b = .26, se = .07, p < .001, 95\%\ CI [.13, .40]\) (see Figure 6.9).

Discussion

The aim of Study 8 was to extend the support from the findings of Study 7. Just like in Study 6 and 7, there was no evidence that outgroup status predicts the level of voice or

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\(^6\) In this model, Threat*SDO interaction was non-significant, \(b = .03, se = .08, p = .667\).
procedural treatment one expects of authority. Similar to Study 7, higher SDO predicted less favourable outcomes for the outgroup, however, the interaction patterns differed slightly across those two studies. In addition, caution needs to be taken when comparing Study 7 and 8 directly because it is likely that the threat levels experienced for the low and equal status groups were not equivalent. In Study 8, low status groups were more threatening than equal status groups and this threat was related to people to expect authorities to grant them less voice and less favourable outcomes. However, it is not clear whether the same mechanisms were in place in Study 7 as threat measures were not employed in that study.

**General discussion**

Across three studies, I explored whether groups expect authorities to be fair to all groups equally through providing procedurally fair treatment or voice as well as favourable outcomes. Results provided support for the idea that the authority fairness is contextual and subjective and it is shaped by the ideological beliefs about social inequalities as well as the intergroup context of the decision. Such investigation of fairness in the context of the group dynamics is what is frequently absent from the account of the RMPJ. As Platow and Hunter (2001; quoted at the beginning of this chapter) point out it is not just that established groups operate the fairness rules in a way that blatantly benefits them but also as I show in this chapter, in a way that is in line with their beliefs about where is the place of groups in the hierarchy. Thus, groups build on their ideological beliefs about hierarchies and, incorporating what they know about the relative standing of the other group and their potential threat, they make fairness judgements in the effort to preserve or abolish the existing hierarchy by expecting the authority to treat some groups differently to others and giving them different outcomes. However, because the evidence for the specific hypotheses was mixed across the three studies, I will integrate these findings one by one in relation to the predictions and the relevant studies.

**Intergroup status and fair treatment from authorities**

Firstly, findings from across all three studies consistently suggest that people expect authorities to provide voice and fair procedures to outgroups equally, regardless of the
outgroup status. Although the RMPJ suggest that people derive information about their social standing based on their treatment from authorities (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler et al., 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992), this relationship does not appear to work the other way round. That is, people do not tend to base their judgements of voice deservingness from authorities for other groups on their social standing, nor ethnocentric preferences in relation to expectations of voice are observed. However, in Study 7, those low in SDO tended to grant fairer voice to the equal status outgroup in comparison to the low status outgroup, which is somewhat contradictory to the assumptions of the social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Although this theory does not make predictions specific to the treatment of other groups and is more resource-based, by definition, low SDO individuals should strive for the principles of egalitarianism among all groups and thus, would not be expected to seek advantageous treatment for the equal status group over the low status group.

However, in Study 8, there was no evidence of the moderating role of SDO on voice expectations, providing inconclusive results for the present hypotheses. Notwithstanding, Study 7 and 8 were not entirely comparable and may need to be evaluated in their own rights. In Study 8, lower status outgroups were perceived as more threatening, which in turn was associated with lower expectations of voice. In other words, people expected authorities to treat low status group less fairly and give them fewer opportunities for voice if they were perceived to be competitively threatening to the majority ingroup, which is in line with the social dominance theory assumptions that low status groups are more likely to be discriminated against (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thus, perhaps group status itself is not a sufficient signal to expect authorities to treat low status groups less fairly, but groups that threaten the stability of the social system may be expected to be denied procedurally fair treatment. These findings shed light on how authority fairness may sometimes be perceived as inappropriate if directed at threatening groups.

**Intergroup status and outcomes**

People’s expectations of authority distribution of outcomes tell quite a different story. In Study 6, whereby the experiment set up might have been too artificial, people
expected the authority to distribute more outcomes to the low status groups than equal status groups. However, in Study 8, this difference was reversed with more outcomes expected to be distributed to the equal status group, most likely because the low status group was more threatening. Finally, in Study 7 the outcome expectation did not differ between the low and equal status groups. Therefore, the relationship between outgroup status and the outcomes sought in the authority decisions is unlikely to be straightforward. People may be motivated to expect authorities to distribute fewer or more resources to the outgroup, based on the size of the group, attitudes towards that group or the extent to which they are perceived as competitively threatening.

In Study 7, there were variations in what the expected outcome of authority decisions should be, depending on the moderators in question. For example, there were disagreements between those at the two ends of the spectrum of SDO about the outcome expectations for the equal status outgroup, with high SDO people calling for far more disfavouring outcomes than low SDO individuals. This could be because a traditionally low status group, EU citizens in the UK, were conceived as gaining status in the equal status condition, which posed a threat to the social hierarchy. However, there was a general agreement on the outcome for the equal status group among those who expressed warm and cold attitudes towards the outcomes. In contrast, outgroup attitudes drove the judgements of fairness regarding the outcome for low status outgroup, with those with warm outgroup attitudes judging more favouring outcomes as fair, showing again that positive outgroup attitudes can protect low status groups from expectations of authority unfairness against them.

Finally, in relation to the hypotheses that people with high SDO would deprive a low status group of resources by expecting the authority to give them less favourable resources in comparison to the equal status group, there was a mixed support. In Study 7, high SDO individuals expected the authority to give less favourable outcomes to the equal status group in comparison to the low status group. However, it is likely that the equal status condition in this context was perceived as a traditionally low status group already gaining
status, therefore, already causing instability in the social system. This is in line with Gerber and Jackson (2016) and Armstrong (2013) research suggesting that those high in SDO generally are harsher in their expectations of authority fairness towards the competitively threatening groups. On the other hand, in Study 8, high SDO predicted the same level of expected outcomes for both higher and lower threat outgroups. Therefore, the results in relation to the specific ways in which SDO may influence people’s expectation of authority outcomes to the equal and low status groups are inconclusive.

Limitations

Although testing some novel assumptions, the present set of studies has some shortcomings that limit its ability to draw meaningful conclusions. Despite manipulation checks pointing to Study 7 and 8 equal and low status outgroups being perceived as so, it is possible that the intergroup threat may have been driving some of the interactions. Measuring intergroup threat in Study 7 would have had a potential to tease apart the status and threat effects, but unfortunately, this was not a part of the original study. One may argue, however, that in the case of Study 7, the equal status group was more threatening, perhaps on a comparable level to that of the low status group in Study 8. Even if this is the case, the stability of their social standing was remarkably different with the equal status group in Study 7 gaining status versus low status group in Study 8 status being relatively fixed. This alone has constrained our ability to provide a consistent test of SDO moderation hypothesis. Therefore, future research will need to carefully consider the context in which the groups are investigated.

Secondly, the decision outcomes in Study 7 and 8, although investigating the extent to which outcomes should be favourable or unfavourable for the outgroup may not have been completely perceived as intergroup-level by all. Thus, a favouring decision for the outgroup was not necessarily received as zero-sum and disfavouring for the ingroup majority like it did in Study 6. Whether such decision would be perceived as zero-sum or not may be intertwined with the effects of perceived competitive threat with those perceiving outgroup as the realistic threat more likely to view the favouring outcomes as taking away the
valuable resources from the majority. Therefore, caution needs to be taken when considering these findings as reflecting the intergroup-level processes of authority decisions.

**Conclusion**

In a series of three studies, I sought to investigate whether authority fairness is universally pursued for everyone, regardless of their social standing. Although in most cases equal levels of authority fairness and voice provision are expected, more threatening outgroups may be expected to be admitted less voice in decision-making matters. When it comes to expectations of decision outcomes that authorities should make, ideological beliefs about the support for social inequality may be one of the determinants, but more systematic research is required to disentangle specific effects on low and equal status groups.

This line of research not only informs us of how groups perceive fairness, but potentially enables predictions about patterns of dissatisfaction with authority decisions in the future. For example, policies regarding competitively threatening outgroups may be more likely to cause disagreement among those with differing SDO ideologies. On the other hand, policies regarding low status or unthreatening outgroup status may be more likely to be disputed among those expressing warm or cold attitudes towards the group in question. Thus, understanding the routes to disputing authority fairness may lead to better understanding how intergroup-level authority fairness can be enhanced.
Tyler and colleagues’ contribution to our understanding of PJ in shaping support for authorities such as the police has been remarkable, both in terms of its theoretical advances (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992) as well as the practical implications for how policing training has been shaped (MacQueen & Bradford, 2015; Mazerolle et al., 2012; Skogan et al., 2014; Tyler et al., 2015). The aim of the present thesis was to build on the wealth of the interdisciplinary work in criminology, psychology and law by adopting a social psychological perspective on how group identities may shape the understanding of fairness in relation to authority decisions. The argument that identities are central to the processes underpinning the success of PJ in promoting authority legitimacy is the core of Tylerian RMPJ and thus not a new one. Relational models argue that being treated fairly by the authority communicates something important about one’s social standing in the society that the authority represents. In the present thesis, I expand on the relationship between identity and fairness in an attempt to uncover how authority decisions affect not only individuals who may identify as group members, but also groups as an entity. The key difference is that in the present research, I focus on the idea that the identity is not
just a mediator or moderator of the relationship between fairness and decision acceptance, but that it shapes perceptions of fairness in the first place.

Addressing concerns on the limited use of experimental methods in the PJ field (Jackson et al., 2015), experimental scenario-based designs were employed to investigate processes underpinning responses to authority decisions at the intergroup-level, recognising that the role of authority extends beyond dealing with individuals but also with groups and it involves managing the expectations of different groups in the society. To this end, I focused on the wide range of authorities, including regulatory bodies (which I addressed in Studies 1 and 4), referees (Study 2), and governments (Studies 5, 7, 8) who make decisions regarding social groups on the everyday basis. Across the three empirical chapters, I explored the wider context of social identities and authority decisions, understanding social identity-driven behaviour through the lens of cultural and structural settings in which they take place (Reicher, 2004).

The present thesis offers analysis at four levels: (1) individual-level, investigating how intention to be loyal towards one’s group (Studies 3 and 4) and values such as moral concern for authority (Study 5) shape intergroup-level responses to authority decisions, (2) group-level, focusing on group norms of loyalty and fairness (Studies 1 and 2), (3) intergroup-level, examining intergroup relations (Study 3), perceived competition (Study 4), and intergroup social standing (Studies 6-8), and finally (4) cultural-level, investigating how cultural context underlies people’s beliefs about the nature of authority power and shapes responses to authority decisions (Study 5). Reflecting back on these empirical contributions, the common theme running through the chapters is that values determine perceptions of fairness, whether it is loyalty for own group (Chapter 4), values stemming from the cultural background or morality (Chapter 5) or the beliefs on the place of the groups in society (Chapter 6). Thus, the present thesis resonates with the work of Skitka and Mullen (2002) who suggested that PJ effects may not be present if authority decision regards an issue relevant to individual’s morality, an idea central to the value protection model of justice reasoning (Skitka, 2002).
Next, I will outline and discuss the main findings in the light of the current literature. I will consider the impact in relation to theory, but also its potential future practical implications. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of the present research and reflect on how the field should move forward in the light of such shortcomings.

**Ingroup loyalty and authority decisions**

Leung and colleagues’ (2007) set the agenda for the present research by raising the possibility that groups prefer outcomes of authority decisions which favour the group over disfavouring ones because as a group member, they may feel a ‘moral mandate’ to be loyal to one’s group and thus reject the decisions that are harmful to the group. Chapter 4 set out to test this claim. In Studies 1 and 2, I experimentally manipulated group norms of loyalty and a contrasting norm of fairness to evaluate whether heightened loyalty indeed leads to a higher preference for ingroup favouring decisions. Study 2, set in the context of English football fans, supported this hypothesis. Because this was not the case in Study 1, whereby university students were the focus of the research, I argued that the content of manipulated norms needs to be plausible to the group members. Thus, ingroup loyalty may only increase preference for more favouring group decisions, irrespective of their fairness, if the group in question requires devotion under certain circumstances. An intergroup context itself could create such conditions, whereby norms and expectations of loyalty from the group members are fostered by high levels of intergroup competition.

The nature of the intergroup context to optimise the conditions for loyalty was tested in Studies 3 and 4. Both studies provided further support for Leung and colleagues’ argument that increased loyalty to one’s group acts as a moral mandate so group members are motivated to act in ways to protect their group membership, in this case, by rejecting disfavouring authority decisions and accepting decisions that benefit the group. In Study 3, intergroup attitudes predicted responses to authority decisions and perceptions of authority fairness. In an attempt to integrate the findings of Study 1, I hypothesised that perceived competition between groups increases the demand for loyalty. Despite that, Study 4 failed to provide support for this prediction; the effects of loyalty held equally strongly for low and
high intergroup competition cases. Still, it is not clear whether loyalty would also matter for conditions where there was no competition at all – something that Study 4 did not address.

Across four experimental studies, therefore, I found that increased loyalty to one’s own group leads to group members’ processing of authority decisions in ways that are more ethnocentric and group-interested. However, a concern regarding the relationship between the loyalty and social identity was also raised. Although loyalty and social identification strength were structurally distinct concepts, the effect of ingroup loyalty on responses to authority decisions disappeared when controlling for social identification strength (Study 4). More research identifying the causal pathway between identifying as group members and expressions of loyalty and how these lead to group-level processing of authority decisions is needed. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 offers some new perspectives on how processes within groups powerfully shape interactions with authorities.

**Values and authority decisions**

Further to conducting the initial four studies, I began to consider other contexts whereby loyalty to one’s own group may matter more so than in others. The literature on individualism-collectivism distinction and especially the way in which collectivism is characterised through the lens of ‘us’ and not ‘me’ (Hofstede, 2001) was seemingly a comparable setting for investigating how loyalty to one’s group, among other values, can shape responses to authority decisions. The literature suggested that collectivist countries tend to express higher loyalty to own group, as measured by the five moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011, 2012; Haidt, 2012). Building on these findings, the aim of Study 5 was to investigate how cultural orientation and other values may shape responses to the intergroup-level authority decisions. How people manage conflicts in their values became the question of interest when I considered how countries that tend to accept inequalities and are collectivist may respond to the intergroup-level authority decisions. In Chapter 5, I discussed these hypotheses in great detail. Following this, I set up the study in two cultural settings, namely MY, a typically VC country and NI, an individualistic country that accepts a degree of social inequality.
Although I found differences in how the MY and NI students responded to the intergroup-level authority scenarios, these were not linked to the hypothesised values. For example, the collectivist MY sample perceived all authority decisions as fairer and expressed more approval for those more than the individualistic NI, regardless of whether the decisions were favourable or unfavourable. This suggests that the vertical nature of the MY society may be associated with accepting authority decisions regardless of their consequences for the group because authorities are an important element of vertical societies; undermining authority decisions potentially threatens the social system authorities represent. However, these patterns of responses to authority decisions were not linked to the cultural orientation profiles, the moral concern for fairness or loyalty at the individual level. Holding high moral concern for authority, however, had the opposite effect on the way people respond to authority decisions across the MY and NI samples. In MY, higher moral concern for authority was associated with reduced preference for ingroup favouring decisions. In other words, recognising that obedience to authority is important reduced the ethnocentric responses to their decisions. This was in line with the hypothesis that holding obedience to authority as an important value would result in more uniform responses to authority decisions that are favouring and disfavouring because people would be encouraged to obey authorities regardless of the decision outcome. In the case of NI sample, higher moral concern for authority was unexpectedly associated with a higher preference for ingroup favouring decisions and higher likelihood to perceive ingroup favouring decisions as fairer, but the current state of the theory struggles to explain why this would be the case. Based on the present study, I argue that how behaviour is shaped by the social values is not simplistic and may not be linear.

Chapter 5 also explored the meaning of fairness across cultures. Here I found that the NI sample expressed higher moral concern for fairness than the MY sample, but this difference was marginal. The two samples, however, did not differ in the extent to which they expected authority fairness to be flexible. A more thorough investigation into what fairness means across cultures is warranted before drawing stronger conclusions. The idea
that fairness is related to a subjective perception of whether the authority exceeds their power or not (see Huq, Jackson, & Trinkner, 2016) is specifically what inspired the last set of the research questions.

**Social standing and authority decisions**

How do people expect authorities to wield their power? In Chapter 6, I tested the expectations of authority fairness in the context of authority decisions. I was interested whether the social standing of the outgroup would have an effect on how people expect authorities to treat others. The argument is that group members may not only be motivated to support authority decisions that benefit them, but also to back the authority decisions that reflect their beliefs on the social hierarchy the positions of different groups within that hierarchy. The RMPJ claim that fairness is the key to the legitimacy of authorities because being treated fairly by authorities communicates high social standing and inclusion. In contrast, those who are denied fair treatment from authorities may conclude they are not respected members of the society. Although people may or may not derive their own social standing from the extent to which authorities treat them fairly, in Chapter 6, I found that social standing does not shape expectations of authority fairness. In other words, whether the outgroup in question is of low or equal social status does not influence the extent to which individuals think that the authority should treat outgroups fairly and offer them the voice in decisions that concern them. Having said that, larger sample studies should be conducted to determine whether this finding falls under type II error (see below for discussion about power in the limitations section. Nevertheless, groups that are perceived as more threatening may be associated with lower expectations of authority voice.

In this chapter, I also investigated how beliefs about the hierarchical structure of the society, namely SDO, may influence people’s expectations of authority fairness. However, because there were issues in manipulating social status in Study 7 where status was not portrayed as static in equal status condition, the results in relation to the SDO were contradictory. Thus, beliefs regarding social hierarchies influence the way people expect authorities to act towards the outgroups based on whether they may be considered of low or
equal social standing, the specific mechanisms underpinning those effects require closer investigation.

**Theoretical implications**

Having reviewed the specific findings from Chapters 4-6, I will now turn to discussing the theoretical implications of this work more generally. I point towards two distinct theoretical issues, which although not directly addressed in the present set of studies, they pertain to the research questions. The first of these relates to the need for a thorough theoretical consideration of what authority power is, particularly in contrast to another type of power which recently received a lot of attention, namely leadership. I discuss how these types of power may be distinct in ways in which they modify others’ behaviour. The second theoretical implication considers how models of authority legitimacy may be extended to account for how group and intergroup processes shape perceptions of fairness, positioning the impact of authority power in the larger context.

**Authorities versus leaders**

Having situated the authority power at the centre of the present research, I contribute to the discussion on how this form of power is distinct from other forms of power such as leadership. The notion that there are different types of power in itself is not a new one; Weber (1947) has long posited that different types of authority may accomplish distinct goals. A sceptic could claim that leadership and authority are clearly distinguished constructs, with accounts such as that Turner’s (2005) contrasting leadership and authority power by considering the former as a form of influence and the latter as a form of controlling another. In practice, however, this distinction has been blurred and opened to interpretation.

The classic Milgram (1963) study was, until recently, understood to be an examination of authority obedience. Milgram argued that the experimenter, who was in a position of authority, successfully granted compliance with his orders because he removed the responsibility for those actions from the participants, which in turn led to mindless obedience. Thinking about the implications of this for everyday authorities, these claims are
quite extreme; they suggest that legitimacy of authorities is difficult to resist, which is not the case if we consider how people rebel against authorities (see Pratto, 2016). More recent work inspired by social identity framework (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) challenged the assumption of Milgram’s study (Haslam et al., 2014, 2015; Reicher et al., 2012). Haslam and Reicher, in their interpretation of Milgram studies, argued that participants were not following the orders as a result of simple obedience, but of engaged followership. That is, participants actively identified with the experimenter and the goals of the research, which enabled them to continue to administer potentially life-threatening electric shocks to another human being in the name of science. It was only when the experimenter started to make direct orders to force the participant to continue, that the common identification was interrupted and individuals were more likely to refuse to carry on.

From this account, it becomes clear that what is perceived as legitimate power or leadership-like influence can easily become a matter of interpretation. From the social identity account provided by Haslam and Reicher, Milgram’s study was one of leadership, not authority. In this view, leaders are the creative entrepreneurs of the identity, who are prototypical of the group they represent, and whose task is to promote the group interests of advancing science (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). In line with this view, the studies presented here (see Studies 1 and 3-5) suggest that people perceive the decisions that favour their group as more fair in comparison to the exactly the same decision which disfavour their group, demanding authorities to be leader-like and serving the interest of their group. However, this expectation may be an unreasonable demand on authority as they cannot advance the group’s status-quo in the way it is expected of leaders. Authorities hold a designated and static role in the society, which limits its ability to transform and grow in the same way it is expected of leaders. Their social position is closely tied to the underpinning laws of the society or group they represent and so their power is limited in that sense. As such, authorities must not exceed the boundaries of their power, which is determined by the system that establishes the authority (Huq et al., 2016). For example, considering the
example of Study 2, football referees, who act as authorities during a match between two teams, cannot make decisions that are against the code of conduct of the football association they represent. The rules are imposed by the system that referees represent and the authorities cannot manipulate these rules as it may be expected of leaders. As I showed in the present research, expectations of authority fairness are culturally universal (Study 5) insofar as people expect authorities to treat other groups fairly (Studies 6-8). However, the evidence presented in this thesis (Studies 1 and 3-5) also concedes that how authorities distribute outcomes among social groups is more detrimental to how those decisions will be received than how those groups are treated, in consonance with Leung et al. (2007).

Partially, the reason the processes underpinning authority and leadership power are challenging to distinguish is because social power is not tied to a position one holds but it is based on the process through which people can get others to act in line with one’s will. By placing the intergroup-level authority decisions at the spotlight of the current research, I highlight that one of the key distinctions between leaders and authorities is that the latter does not necessarily involve advancing all group’s interests equally, but more likely maintaining the status quo of the system they represent. Nevertheless, the present research stresses that those motivated to support the existing group-based inequalities or the current status quo may have different expectations as to how authorities should treat other groups, based on their status, in comparison to those who prefer the group-based equality (Studies 7-8). More research on expectations surrounding the role of authority in contrast to those of leadership is required to establish how authorities can best serve the groups in the society.

Towards a new theoretical model

The identified gaps in the literature were driven by an observation that PJ models may not be fully capable of explaining how fairness is shaped in the context of intergroup conflict such as the examples of NI flag protests or US Black Lives Matter accounts described in Chapter 3. This does not necessarily mean that the theory was inadequate, but rather that there is a scope to expand on those models. Throughout this thesis, I have argued for the importance of social psychological theories and particularly the social identity
approach in reconceptualising how people respond to authority decisions, including those of
the police. Such perspective not only builds on the principles of PJ theory but it also further
expands the scope of how we understand authorities and the system they represent while
attempting to address the distinction between the authority power and the leadership
processes. In the present research, the definition of authorities is built on the managing and
balancing the expectations of individuals and groups in the social system they represent. By
implementing the law and other less formal rules and regulations, the system also protects
the groups and their values, which allows groups to function and grow. In this vein,
governments introduce laws that aim to make societies safer and fairer for everyone that
they represent. On the other hand, PJ theories typically rely on studying perceptions of
authorities in general or decisions relating to individuals but not groups, thus not accounting
for how processes within groups as well as processes between groups can shape perceptions
of authority fairness. In the present research, I highlight that this wider perspective on
authorities and their power can inform responses to authority decisions, taking into the
account the intragroup-level (Studies 1-4) and intergroup-level (Studies 3-4, 6-8) processes
while considering the cultural factors (Study 5) as well as the individual-level ideologies
(Studies 5-8). These perspectives map onto the processes outlined in Chapter 3 (see Figure
3.2).

Such perspective has a potential to address the shortcomings of the PJ theory
outlined in Chapter 3. First, it moves beyond placing the interpersonal experiences at the
core of the authority business by recognising that the authority figures are representatives of
often diverse social system that consist of a plethora of social groups. For example, the
policies of British government (Studies 6-7) apply to the British and EU citizens living in the
country alike so the government might be expected to make policies that represent the
interest of all of those who live in the country; in the same vein, academic organisations
(Study 1) should represent the members from all universities in the same way. Even if the
decisions concern people on the individual-level, those decisions may become a concern for
those uninvolved in the decision through the perceptions of shared identity with them (see
Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). In other words, through learning about some ingroup members’ unfair treatment, one can consider that the same may happen to oneself. Indeed, even without this reflection, self-categorisation analyses would suggest that ingroup members are incorporated into one’s self-concept (Turner et al., 1987). Therefore, by adopting an intergroup-level framework, one can understand the impact of authority decisions regarding individuals and groups alike.

Secondly, such a model would recognise that the identity-relevant moral and cultural values may shape understanding of fairness, thus expanding on the processes preceding the perceptions of fairness. While authorities manage the competing expectations of social groups, it will sometimes be impossible for them to adopt a position that would address the demands of all groups. This places some groups’ interest over others; those, whose goals are not fulfilled by the authorities may choose to disengage with the system that does not reflect their aims, either temporarily or for good. More research capturing this process of disengagement, for example, when young offenders may first enter the criminal justice system and tracking how values between groups and the system may align or misalign can provide more insights into this process. For now, the present thesis flags the importance of such morally- and culturally-relevant values in determining the relationship between groups and authorities.

Considering the importance of values can help clarify why moral judgements may override the importance of fair procedures as well as the process of disengagement (Bauman & Skitka, 2009; Skitka, 2002; Skitka & Mullen, 2008). For example, Murphy and Cherney (2012) found that judgements of fairness did not predict perceptions of authority legitimacy among minorities in Australia because they questioned the value and legitimacy of the law itself. Overall, advancing new models of authorities can deepen our understanding of the authority’s role in the society and explain how authorities can achieve as well as lose legitimacy among different groups in the society they represent.

**Thinking ahead: Potential practical implications**
Despite the present research having been driven primarily by theoretical questions, there are important practical implications for developing the aforementioned models and research underpinning authority power. Specifically, I raise an issue in relation to how police-oriented PJ training may be transformed. Police officers are widely taught the principles of PJ in enabling them to create perceptions of legitimacy (Skogan et al., 2014; Tyler, Goff, et al., 2015). I suggest that such training should be complemented by an overview of social identity processes and their role in shaping perceptions of fairness. As I showed across experimental studies, ingroup favouring decisions tend to be perceived as fairer than disfavouring decisions. Having undergone a traditional PJ training, a new police officer may have misinformed expectations on the effectiveness of being fair in achieving wide compliance. Just like it was the case in the Scottish replication of QCET mentioned in Chapter 2 (Mazerolle et al., 2012), newly trained police officers may simply express cynicism in relation to the effectiveness and necessity of employing excessive gestures of fairness, ultimately sabotaging the intervention as a whole (MacQueen & Bradford, 2016). Portraying PJ as the ultimate solution, therefore, may not necessarily achieve the desired effects. Supplementing the officers’ training with understanding of the processes underpinning group behaviour and intergroup relations may be more successful in not only providing the officers with the tools for enhancing fairness but also equipping them with the knowledge that will allow them to make sense of their encounters with the public.

Further to the implications for the police training, the present research sheds light on the ways in which the support for authority decisions may be established in contexts of social unrest or political divide. Successful reestablishment of political bodies in countries that are currently struggling to reach political agreements is based on understanding how the legitimacy of the proposed government can be gained among all groups residing in the country. For example, in the context of Cyprus (see Hadjipavlovou, 2007 for background), a successful agreement on establishing political power needs to be endorsed by Greek and Turkish Cypriots equally. Insights from Studies 3, 7 and 8, suggest that positive intergroup relations can impact how authority decisions are perceived. Thus, bridging the gaps and
working on the constructive relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, according to those studies, may be an important foundation to establishing such political peace. In other words, the grassroots-level reconciliation interventions at the community-level can facilitate more successful deliberations at the political-level by increasing the likelihood that both sides of will approve of a newly established government. However, maintaining legitimacy will also depend on the way the government will distribute resources in the light of intragroup and intergroup processes taking place within the island.

Moreover, the present research is relevant to other contexts whereby political structures are well established because the systems that authorities represent are dynamic (Keating, 2009). Countries can separate, unify, but also the nations themselves can transform over time, for example, by growing in their values or changing in the demographic proportions. Along with these changes, overarching norms of the society can also shift. As shown in Study 2, ingroup norms can influence the extent to which people agree with certain authority decisions. Therefore, as these norms shift, previously acceptable decisions may become contested as the norms and values of the nation transform. As such, the meaning of authority actions is bounded by time, but also by the place, as I suggested in Chapter 5 while investigating the cultural differences between the NI and MY. Consequently, the questions posted in the present research have important implications for not only building harmonious and peaceful societies but also maintaining the existing collectives.

**Limitations of the present research**

Despite the theoretical contributions I discussed in this chapter, research on fairness and identity in the context of authorities is still largely undeveloped and has many limitations. First is the issue of what should be considered an outcome of successfully wielded authority power. In the present set of studies, I have focused on decision acceptance as the key dependent variable, based on the definition of legitimacy as accepting decisions that one may not necessarily agree with or even if they are wrong (Tyler, 2006). Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the consequences of accepting versus rejecting authority decisions in those scenarios in comparison to what might happen in a real-life encounter. For
example, were participants invested in the outcomes of those decisions knowing that they are hypothetical? Having observed a preference for ethnocentric decision across the experimental studies in the present thesis, people were clearly not neutral about the outcomes of those decisions, even if they were hypothetical in nature. However, it is not clear whether the magnitude of agreement versus disagreement observed in the present research would match the magnitude of the responses in a real-life situation.

Further considering how the responses to such decisions may manifest behaviourally in an authentic authority decision, it is important to think about whether the judgements observed in the present research are predictive of the ‘true’ judgement. People may not agree or accept authority decisions privately, but they may well indicate a level of agreement for the sake of avoiding the confrontation with the power-holder. In Study 5, I demonstrated that the tendency to agree with authority decision regardless of its favourability was stronger in MY, a VC country whereby there are cultural expectations to obey authority than in NI. The pressures to accept certain decisions while privately disagreeing, in such case, may not truly reflect people’s judgements. In addition to this, people tend to find authorities threatening as they have the power to constrain our freedom (Braithwaite, 2010). Given this anxious response to the presence of authority, it is unlikely that those who disagree with the authority decisions on ‘paper’ would actively resist an authority decision should they find themselves in such a situation. There are no social risks to rejecting or disliking decisions in a hypothetical sense, whereby standing up to authority in such a way in a real encounter could possibly have repercussions. Thus, standing up against unjust authority may require a strong commitment as well as social support from others (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Whether a tendency toward a collective action to protest against an unjust intergroup treatment of authorities is a variable that reflects a meaningful outcome is a question for future research.

However, as the influence of social media becomes more prominent, people have access to more sources of information about authorities and their actions. The exposure to news and media in the era of fake news means that people may be constrained to judge the
authority decisions based on what the journalists have presented to them. As people may react to decisions on social media differently than in the face-to-face contact, research should focus on how intergroup-level decisions are appraised in indirect, social media ‘encounters’ in comparison to more traditional direct contact. Designs can be set out to compare responses to some unfair authority decisions published in social media outlets to decisions communicated to the person directly from the authority, for example, in a form of a letter. Comparing these two contexts on outcomes such as perceptions of unfairness and measuring accompanying emotions, for example, anger or helplessness can be a fruitful avenue to address these limitations. Similarly, studying the impact of negative exposure to authorities via social media on the overall perceptions of authorities as well as the face-to-face encounters with those authorities could be a worthwhile question to address.

The second limitation relates to the statistical power of the studies presented in this thesis. The power to detect the desired effect can be elevated by increasing the sample size, depending on the size of the effect expected (Cohen, 1992). While much of the current discussion surrounding the power in the psychological science concerns mostly the proportion of false-positive findings in the publications (i.e., type I error, see Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012), low statistical power may also lead to concluding that there is no effect in the gathered data, while the effect actually exists but may not be detected (i.e., type II error).

Considering the importance of statistical power in reaching ‘correct’ conclusions in the research studies, some of the studies (e.g., Studies 1-2 and 6) in the present thesis are likely to be underpowered to detect the hypothesised effects. While necessary steps were taken to control for type I errors in cases of multiple comparisons (i.e., via alpha level corrections), type II errors cannot be corrected for as easily. In the context of Chapter 6, it was hypothesised that the voice expectation will not be based on the outgroup status, which the data supports. However, it is difficult to determine whether the outgroup status did not affect the expectations of how much voice that outgroup will be given by the authority because the effect truly does not exist or whether because the power in those studies was
insufficient and thus subject to type II error. This may mean that the present studies are limited in the sense that they may not advance our knowledge sufficiently (Maxwell, 2004). Indeed, when designing studies, researchers tend to underestimate the number of participants required to detect a particular effect size and use inaccurate rules of thumb (Bakker, Hartgerink, Wicherts, & van der Maas, 2016). However, power calculations should include the expected effect size, which may be difficult to determine in an exploratory research such as in the present thesis. Either way, it is a limitation that the present studies may be underpowered.

The third shortcoming of the present thesis concerns the trade-off between the breadth and depth of the research questions addressed by the present studies. Across three experimental chapters, a wide range of hypotheses was tested from those regarding the morality (Study 5) through to norms (Studies 1-2), intergroup relations (Studies 3-4) and even culture (Study 5). Although the aims of the thesis were comprehensive in their nature in addressing how intergroup context may shape responses to authority decisions, one could argue that this has compromised the level of depth of the findings. For example, in Chapter 4, a variety of contexts were utilised to test the effects of loyalty on responses to authority decisions (e.g., football in Study 1 and 4 or Northern Ireland community relations in Study 3). Although testing the same hypotheses in multiple settings usually increases the confidence in the studied effects, changing settings also requires introducing careful controls to ensure that the chosen contexts are closely matched. Thus, despite setting research agenda for a wide range of research questions, the present thesis could benefit from a more systematic testing of the hypotheses, for example, by exploring the research questions while carefully controlling for the context.

Fourthly and lastly, caution needs to be taken when directly comparing the findings of this research to the traditional PJ research which distinguishes it from other types of fairness, for example, distributive justice. In the present research, I focused on the overall judgements of fairness tapping into both procedural and distributive aspects, rather than their respective contributions. This limits the capability to compare the present research to the
existing literature directly. However, overall justice measures tend to represent higher face validity (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005) and there is some evidence suggesting that measures of procedural and distributive fairness do not reflect separate factors (Pehrson, Devaney, et al., 2017). Although throughout this thesis I suggest that the field should move towards overall conceptions of fairness, the claims made in the present research, especially those in Chapter 4 and 5 where fairness is measured in its broad sense, cannot be directly used to address PJ literature, which focuses only on the fairness of treatment. In contrast, the focus on voice and procedural treatment specifically in comparison to the outcomes in Chapter 6, permitted for adding to the literature on the RMPJ by investigating the role of outgroup social standing on the extent to which PJ may be sought for those groups. Although the concepts of fair treatment and outcomes are important to investigate, more work should scrutinise how these distinctions are best made to grasp what fairness and unfairness mean for those experiencing these from the hands of authority.

**Future research directions**

Taking into the consideration the theoretical contributions as well as limitations of the present research, I suggest two promising areas for the future research. Firstly, scholars should consider how authority decisions over time shape the relationship to authorities. It is not clear how the initial perceptions of legitimacy are formed and how each encounter, whether direct or indirect, impacts cumulatively on more general perceptions of a given authority. Similarly, it is not clear whether there is a cognitive template of authorities that extends across different types of authority figures. For example, young people may hold an antagonistic attitude towards adults in authority regardless of whether they are teachers, doctors or employers (Drury, 2003); in the same vein, people may be socialised with varying levels of obedience to authority. If so, do experiences with the police officers extend to those with tax authorities or government and vice-versa? How many negative experiences with authority figures does it take to disengage with the entire system and other authorities? Studying the experiences with authorities longitudinally, perhaps in settings of democratic regression, can shed light on these questions empirically.
Secondly, building on the limitations associated with face validity of hypothetical scenarios, I suggest that measuring behavioural outcomes such as the likelihood to resist authority power may be very informative in dissecting the impact of the authority’s social power on the responses to the decisions in the intergroup context. To this end, immersive virtual environments can be employed to study how group members react to authority decisions. Virtual reality technology can reproduce real-life situations in a controlled setting (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005), which would allow for new variables to be studied. For example, the use of psychophysiological measures in the research design can provide new insights on how internal value conflicts may be resolved behaviourally in an immersive encounter with authority. Taken together, the suggested research directions have a potential to contribute to practical implications I discussed earlier by facilitating governments, police, and other authorities with ways of maintaining legitimacy and nurturing stable and safe environment whereby social groups can develop and achieve their goals.

Conclusion

The present research redefines authority power as consisting of managing the expectations of social groups they represent while taking into the account the larger context of the decision to understand their impact and reception. By doing so, I suggest ways in which the PJ models could be expanded to understand how perceptions of fairness are the product of social interactions within groups, between groups and across cultural settings. Studying these processes can have a meaningful impact on creating cohesive societies that work for all.
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Appendices

Appendix 1.1: Study 1 supplementary materials

Ingroup norm manipulation materials

(1) Loyalty ingroup norm

P3: I think students here at UNIVERSITY A/UNIVERSITY B are very loyal. We help each other out because we know we are all on the same road. If it wasn’t for loyalty, I imagine it would be very hard to get through the degree. I would feel very isolated.

P1: Yeah, we would often post each other about opportunities out there to get some experience. If we can’t benefit from these opportunities directly, at least some of our class mates could benefit. And then you know that they would repay the favour and tell you about something that can be of interest to you.

(…)

P5: It’s the kind of support-system that naturally developed. I think this is just what UNIVERSITY A/UNIVERSITY B Psychology students are like, I don’t know about other courses. We just look out for our own, you know.

(2) Fairness ingroup norm

P3: I think Psychology students here at UNIVERSITY A/UNIVERSITY B are very concerned with fairness. So perhaps ‘fair’ would be a good word?

P1: Yeah, I can see what you mean. Like everyone always makes such a big deal about the feedback we receive. We’re not so much concerned with the marks that we get but how they are justified. I can understand that sometimes I don’t do so well, but as long as it’s justified. I think it’s maybe cause we have this natural interest in understanding human behaviour and this makes us more concerned with justice.

(…)

P5: A lot of us are aspiring to be clinical psychologists and I think that this empathy and being professional is important in being a UNIVERSITY A/UNIVERSITY B Psychology student.

(3) Control (fun norm)

P3: I think students here at UNIVERSITY A/UNIVERSITY B are fun. We like to socialise and go out. We rarely go out as an entire year group, but we often go out in smaller groups. We share the same interest in psychology and that’s why I think it’s so easy for us to get on with each other.

P1: Yeah, it’s more of a natural bond – my friends from home have all different deadlines at uni and it’s becoming more difficult to synchronise with them. At least with other psychology students, we can always go out after we submit assignments, after class. It’s a lot easier.

(…)

P5: University is all about having fun and so are we. After all, no UNIVERSITY A/UNIVERSITY B student is going to regret that we had too much fun when we were at uni.

[Manipulation check]
To make sure that you have read the extract carefully, please answer the following question: what was the word that UNIVERSITY A/UNIVERSITY B Psychology students used to describe their class in this extract?

Now, thinking about this word can you think of any other instances whereby this word would be appropriate to describe UNIVERSITY A/UNIVERSITY B Psychology students?
Appendix 1.2: Study 1 alternative analyses

Although the decision has been made to retain the responses from participants who failed to the manipulation check on the basis that their responses did not differ from those who completed the manipulation check accurately, inattentive participants can increase noise and decrease the quality of data (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). To this end, I present the alternative findings, which exclude participants that did not complete the manipulation check correctly.

The Ingroup Norm*Favourability interaction on decision acceptance. A two-way 3 (ingroup norm) x 2 (favourability) mixed ANOVA, controlling for the effects of order, was conducted to investigate the effect of interaction on decision acceptance. There was a main effect of favourability on decision acceptance $F(1, 135) = 47.17, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .26$. Participants accepted authority decisions that were favouring the ingroup ($M = 3.20, SD = .96$) more than decisions that were disfavouring the ingroup ($M = 2.56, SD = .90$). However, the main effect of ingroup norm, $F(2, 135) = .13, p = .882$, and the Ingroup Norm*Favourability interaction were non-significant, $F(2, 135) = .45, p = .642$.

The Ingroup Norm*Favourability interaction on perceived fairness. A further 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted, this time to evaluate the effects of this interaction on perceived fairness while controlling for the effects of order. A similar pattern emerged: decision favourability had a significant main effect on perceived fairness, with ingroup favourable decisions perceived as more fair ($M = 2.70, SD = 1.21$) than ingroup unfavourable decisions ($M = 2.17, SD = 1.03$), $F(1, 135) = 26.56, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .16$. The main effect of ingroup norms, $F(2, 135) = .88, p = .418$, as well as Ingroup Norm x Favourability interaction both had non-significant effects on perceived fairness $F(2, 135) = 1.81, p = .168$.

In summary, there are no major differences between the results reported in Chapter 4 and the alternative results.
Appendix 2.1: Study 2 supplementary materials

Ingroup norm manipulation materials

(1) Loyalty ingroup norm

Participant 3: Our club is loyal. I mean, loyalty is what football is built on. If it wasn’t for people being loyal in football, the club would mean nothing to anyone. We stand by our players no matter what and this is what Red Devils are about. Winning or losing is not what matters; what matters is giving our all in support to our team.

Participant 5: Yeah, I agree. I think our team has shown us what it means to be devoted to the club. Ryan Giggs is a prime example of this. He was a United man for his entire life and even when his playing career ended, he did not leave our side. (…) The supporters of rival teams are our enemies, simply because we have nothing in common with them; there is no other club like United. If any of our players ever would want to transfer to any of the rival teams, then they aren’t worthy of being part of Manchester United in the first place. This is what being a fan means. (…)

Participant 1: Referees make different decisions in football matches. We cheer all goals even if they probably should have been disallowed; we get angry when the other team gets unreasonable free kicks. This is the definition of a true Manchester United supporter. Others may hate us for it, but Red Devils know what loyalty means.

(2) Fairness ingroup norm

Participant 3: Our club is fair. I mean, fairness is what football is built on. If it wasn’t for people being fair in football, we wouldn’t know true winners from average performers. It’s the talent and willpower of our Red Devils which determines whether they are succeeding. It’s not about who can fake an injury to benefit their team.

Participant 5: Yeah, I agree. Some of our legendary players have shown us what it means to be good sportsmen. I can think of one great example from my grandad’s generation – Duncan Edwards. The FA lists Duncan as a role model player who encouraged the pursuit of the ball, not of the man. He was praised for his philosophy on fair play and respect to others. He is the sort of legend that our club was built on.

Participant 1: Although it’s not always easy to accept referee decisions, we definitely know when to put our head down and just agree with it. We can tell when we play good (and damn, we really had some good moments!), but most importantly, we are also able to tell when we are not satisfied with our game. I mean, have you seen any other club who has supporters like Andy Tate? Of course, it breaks our heart to do badly in the game, but we are able to admit this and even have a laugh about this. Not blame referees or other teams for playing dirty. Others may hate us for it, but Red Devils know what fairness means.
[Manipulation check]
To make sure that you have read the extract carefully, please answer the following question: what was the word that Manchester United fans used to describe their club in this extract?

Now, thinking about this word can you recall any other moments in the history of the club that can be characterised with this word? How does this moment make you feel as Manchester United supporter?
Appendix 2.2: Study 2 alternative analyses

Much like in Study 1, I offer the alternative findings, which exclude participants that did not complete the manipulation check correctly. Notable changes between the two analyses are highlighted in text.

The Ingroup Norm*Fairness*Favourability interaction on decision acceptance.

A three-way 2 (ingroup norm) x 2 (fairness) x 2 (favourability) mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether ingroup norms determined patterns of decision acceptance. Favourable decisions ($M = 3.39, SD = .50$) were accepted more than unfavourable ones ($M = 2.92, SD = .50$), $F(1, 117) = 61.93, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .35$, which was further qualified by Favourability*Ingroup Norm interaction, $F(1, 117) = 4.28, p = .041, \eta^2_p = .04$. Furthermore, fair decisions ($M = 4.06, SD = .44$) were accepted more than unfair decisions ($M = 2.25, SD = .58$), $F(1, 117) = 730.64, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .86$. This main effect of fairness was also further qualified by Fairness*Ingroup Norm interaction, $F(1, 117) = 4.22, p = .042, \eta^2_p = .04$. Main effect of ingroup norm, on the other hand, was non-significant, $F(1, 117) = 1.25, p = .265$. Finally, the Fairness*Favourability interaction on decision acceptance was significant $F(1, 117) = 5.28; p = .023, \eta^2_p = .04$.

In summary, there were two key differences between the main analysis presented in Chapter 4 and the alternative analysis above. Firstly, the effect of Favourability*Ingroup Norm interaction was slightly smaller in the alternative analysis, but the patterns of the interactions upheld. Secondly, and more importantly, Fairness*Ingroup Norm interaction which was previously found to be non-significant now revealed a significant effect. To probe this interaction further, four t-tests with a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of $p = .013$ were conducted. In loyalty norm condition, fair decisions ($M = 4.02, SD = .40$) were accepted more than unfair decisions ($M = 2.36, SD = .63$), $t(55) = .16.72, p < .001, d = 3.53$. The same pattern was also observed in the fairness norm condition (fair: $M = 4.08, SD = .48$;
unfair: $M = 2.15, SD = .52$), $t(62) = .21.71, p < .001, d = 3.86$. Furthermore, there was no difference in how those in loyalty and fairness conditions accepted fair decisions, $t(117) = .78, p = .451$. Evaluated against the Bonferroni-corrected p-value, the difference in decision acceptance of unfair decisions between those in loyalty and fairness conditions were also non-significant, $t(117) = 2.01, p = .047$. Therefore, the effect underlying the Fairness*Ingroup Norm interaction on decision acceptance is not considerable.
Appendix 3: Study 3 supplementary materials

Outcome favourability manipulation scenarios
(Parts of scripts that differ across conditions are in italics)

As Northern Ireland Life and Times survey indicates, dealing with concerns around parading is one of the most important political issues for Northern Ireland Assembly. Over the years, we have observed different ways of handling parades. In this study, we are interested in what people think in how authorities manage parades.

You will read two descriptions of parades handling and you will be asked some follow-up questions on each of them. Both of these parades are regarding the 12th July parade/St Patrick’s parade.

[Scenario 1: Protestant/Catholic favourable]

Parade 1

It was 12th July/St Patrick’s. This day is one of the busiest days for the police in the entire year. Their role is to facilitate the celebrations and ensure they run smoothly. This year, as the celebrations began, the police were present at the outskirts of the event. They sat in their vans in some of the side streets, making sure that there is no one around who may cause disorder to the events. There were a lot of intoxicated people around who continued to drink on the street, but everyone was having fun. There were a few arrests made: a few people who opposed the parade taking place and wanting to disrupt it. The next day, the police statement praised the organisers for peaceful celebrations and condemned the behaviour of trouble-makers. However, some comments appeared on social media about how police were tip-toeing around the parade and did not discipline any heavy drinkers who misbehaved.

[Scenario 2: Protestant/Catholic unfavourable]

Parade 2

It was 12th July/St Patrick’s. This day is one of the busiest days for the police in the entire year. Their role is to facilitate the celebrations and ensure they run smoothly. This year, the police expected a lot of trouble happening as the parade was contentious and provoking for some people. The police showed up heavily armed and remained close to the celebrations at all times, trying to identify anyone causing disorder from both inside and outside. Some people were already heavily intoxicated but they continued to drink on the street. The police seized as many bottles of drinks as possible because drinking in public is against the law. They also arrested some people who were taking part in celebrations for antisocial behaviour. The next day, the police statement condemned the disruptive behaviour taking place at the parade. Comments appeared on social media about how police were too harsh and targeted those celebrating rather than people who were opposing the parade and tried to interrupt it.
### Appendix 3.2: Study 3 factor analysis

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Note. Oblimin rotation was used. Loadings below 0.4 are suppressed.

KMO = .885

<table>
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<th>Bartlett's Test of Sphericity</th>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1735</td>
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</table>
Appendix 4.1: Study 4 supplementary materials

Outcome favourability manipulation scenarios

Big Ten is one of the biggest college-level sporting conferences in the US and being a part of these games can be considered a privilege. The Council of Presidents and Chancellors holds ultimate authority and responsibility for Big Ten Conference governance.

Imagine that to support more students coming to the away games, Big Ten Conference organizers decided to launch a travel scheme allowing students from the Big Ten schools to apply for grants to cover the travel costs. We are interested in how people assess two different decisions made by the authorities at Big Ten.

Travel grants will be available to different participating schools. These can be spent on coach hires or purchasing of tickets. However, Big Ten Conference organizers decided to distribute these grants to account for different inequalities among the participants. Below you are shown the amounts that have been awarded to two universities. For the purpose of this study, the remainder of universities have been blurred.

Here is decision 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Grants available to students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>$16,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[outgroup university]</td>
<td>$6,908</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this decision, please respond to the following questions:

[decision acceptance, fairness scales]

Here is decision 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Grants available to students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>$6,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[outgroup university]</td>
<td>$16,210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[decision acceptance, fairness scales]
Appendix 4.2: Study 4 factor analysis

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<th>3</th>
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Note. Oblimin rotation was used. Loadings below 0.4 are suppressed.

KMO = 0.916

Bartlett's Test of Sphericity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>χ²</th>
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<th>p</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
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</table>
Appendix 5: Study 5 supplementary materials

Outcome favourability manipulation scenario
(Parts of scripts that differ across conditions are in italics)

Please carefully read the following article.

The Northern Ireland/Malaysian government and Google offer the dream summer student internship.

Department for Employment and Learning/Ministry of Higher Education has teamed up with the local office of multinational technology giant, Google, to offer their undergraduate students the summer internship of the lifetime. The scheme runs for six weeks and is advertised as “Google Team Insider”.

Every week, the training will take place in a different Google office around the world. And here’s the best part: all costs are covered (including flights and accommodation). The new recruits will learn how the company is run from start to finish, learn secrets of employee satisfaction and find out how the new technological ideas are developed.

Department for Employment and Learning/Ministry of Higher Education commented on the scheme: “We are very pleased to that our local students can benefit from this opportunity. This will be invaluable to any student who wishes to get the work experience and learn from the best in the business. This is only the start of our collaboration with big companies like Google and we hope to extend this project to all universities nationally.”

The Department for Employment and Learning/Ministry of Higher Education decided that in the upcoming summer they can offer 15 places, which will be filled by students from Queen’s University Belfast and University of Ulster/Monash Malaysia University and Sunway University. Only two universities at a time are able to apply in this call. Applications for students of other universities will be announced in the subsequent calls.

If you’re still not convinced this opportunity is awesome, have a look at these photos of Google’s offices:

[photographs of Google offices included with source of photos provided]

Now that you have read the article, please briefly summarise what the article is about.
[The two decision outcomes presented in a random order]

[Decision 1 – ingroup favourable]
Now imagine that the scheme has been announced. In the statement it says “We recognised that in the past year the government provided significantly more funding into University of Ulster/Sunway University for similar internship developments. It has been decided that this disadvantage should be accounted for. Therefore, we will allocate the internships in 3:2 Queen’s University Belfast/Monash University Malaysia to University of Ulster/Sunway University ratio. In practice, it means that 9 Queen’s University Belfast/Monash University Malaysia undergraduate students and 6 University of Ulster/Sunway University students will be accepted to “Google Team Insider” programme.”

[Decision fairness and decision acceptance scale follow]

[Decision 2 – ingroup unfavourable]
Now, imagine that the decision is different. The statement states “We recognised that the rates of employability in students leaving higher education in Queen’s University Belfast/Monash University Malaysia are systematically higher than in University of Ulster/Sunway University. It has been decided that this disadvantage should be accounted for. Therefore, we will allocate the internships in 3:2 University of Ulster/Sunway University to Queen’s University Belfast/Monash University Malaysia ratio. In practice, it means that 9 University of Ulster/Sunway University undergraduate students and 6 Queen’s University Belfast/Monash University Malaysia students will be accepted to “Google Team Insider” programme.”

[Decision fairness and decision acceptance scale follow]
Outgroup status manipulation

This is an imaginative abstract thinking task. This means that although the concepts you may come across here are not concrete, you are invited to think about any instances in the real life where you think the situation presented below is applicable to.

The triangle below is a simple representation of the society. The higher up the triangle the group is, the higher status or prestige they have. Therefore, people who are at the top of the triangle have very high status, whereas those at the bottom have very low status. As an example, you can (but you do not have to) think about it in terms of the economic status: those at the top would be very rich people, whereas those at the bottom would be homeless or welfare recipients. Most of the people, including your group, have medium status so you are positioned right in the middle of the triangle.

Now you find out about another group, called group X. As this is imaginative task, you can bring any social group to mind that fits within their representation of triangle system below.

Imagine your group and group X are in the middle of a long-running dispute or conflict over some undefined here resources. The resolution of this dispute is very important to you and your group, but group X disagrees with your group’s propositions.

Because neither your group nor group X are willing to compromise, a police officer is assigned to resolve this matter.
Appendix 7: Study 7 supplementary materials

Outgroup status manipulation
(Parts of scripts that differ across conditions are in italics)

Please read the following passage.

The EU citizens in the UK
According to the Office for National Statistics, around 3.2 million people living in the UK in 2015 were citizens of another EU country.

A recent report suggests that the average earnings of EU citizens are considerably lower than a typical British salary, even as much as 30%. EU nationals often report working and living in conditions much worse than those of local people. / A recent report suggests that the average earnings of EU citizens are now quite comparable to those of a typical British salary. Their reported living and working conditions do not differ much to that of local people either.

Brexit and government decisions on the EU immigration
Following the decision of the UK citizens to withdraw from the EU on 23 June 2016, the British government has promised to begin the process of leaving the EU by March 2017. This process will last two full years. This means that the period post-Brexit refers to post March 2019, whereas pre-Brexit period refers to before March 2019.

The government must now make many decisions on how the process of leaving the EU will look like. In this study, we are interested in your opinion relating to the immigration policy following the Brexit and the decisions relating to

- The current status of EU citizens who have arrived to the UK prior to Brexit
- The policy regarding of incoming EU migrants post Brexit

We are interested in what do you think would be a fair way of making these decisions.

[Attention check]

How many EU citizens lived in the UK in 2015?

- 1.5 milion
- 3.2 milion
- 8.3 milion
Appendix 8: Study 8 supplementary materials

Outgroup status manipulation
(Parts of scripts that differ across conditions are in italics)

The EU citizens in the UK
According to the Office for National Statistics, around 3.2 million people living in the UK in 2015 were citizens of another EU country. Following the decision of the UK citizens to withdraw from the EU on 23 June 2016, the British government has triggered the process of leaving the EU at the end of March 2017. The period of negotiations will last two full years, which will conclude in the formal exit from the EU. This means that the period post-Brexit refers to post March 2019, whereas pre-Brexit period refers to before March 2019.

(1) Low status manipulation

Romanian citizens in the UK
The government must now negotiate many decisions on how life in the UK will look like following leaving the EU. In this study, we are interested in your opinion relating to Romanian citizens currently living in the UK. When Romania joined the European Union in January 2007, the British government placed transitional restrictions on the rights of Romanians to work in the UK, which expired in 2014. In 2015, 220,000 Romanian-born people were resident in the UK. Thus, Brexit can potentially influence the status of Romanian citizens in the UK.

We are interested in what do you think would be a fair way of making these decisions about Romanian citizens living in the UK.

(2) Equal status manipulation

German citizens in the UK
The government must now negotiate many decisions on how life in the UK will look like following leaving the EU. In this study, we are interested in your opinion relating to German citizens currently living in the UK. Germany is one of the founding members of the EU as well as one of the biggest economies in Europe. As of 2015, there are 286,000 Germans living in the UK. Thus, Brexit can potentially influence the status of German citizens in the UK.

We are interested in what do you think would be a fair way of making these decisions about German citizens living in the UK.

[Attention check]

In the passage above, which EU nationals were mentioned?

- Romanian
- German
- Turkish