Violent Self-Narratives and the Hostile Attributional Bias


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Chapter 2

Violent Self-Narratives and the Hostile Attribution Bias

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Abstract

As is evident in the various chapters in this volume, David Canter has made numerous contributions to the field of psychology and to criminological or forensic psychology in particular. One legacy that is sometimes overlooked, however, is his work on the self-narratives behind patterns of violent offending. In his classic book *Criminal Shadows*, Canter argues that the analysis of self-narratives should be “at the heart of offender profiling” (1994: p119). In the 18 years since Canter’s initial contribution, the role of self-narratives in the aetiology of violent or abusive behaviour has been the subject of some fascinating studies in criminology and criminological psychology. Yet, the study of self-narratives of violence has not occupied centre stage in either forensic or investigative psychology as advocated in *Criminal Shadows*. The purpose of this chapter is to seek to reinvigorate this interest by situating the study of self-narratives within the better known and better developed tradition of cognitive information processing, in particular drawing on research on the “hostile attribution bias” as a “missing link” in forensic narrative psychology. In what follows, we briefly outline narrative identity theory, and then do the same for the role of the hostile attribution bias in the aetiology of violent or aggressive behaviour. Finally, we attempt to synthesise these two literatures in the hopes that doing so will better demonstrate the value of understanding self-narratives in the study of violent behaviour, as originally argued by Canter and his associates over a decade ago.
Introduction

As is evident in the various contributions to this volume, David Canter has made numerous contributions to the field of psychology and to criminological or forensic psychology in particular. He is widely recognised as a pioneering thinker in environmental psychology, quantitative methodology and of course in the research speciality he helped to establish himself, investigative psychology. One legacy that is sometimes overlooked, however, is his work on the self-narratives behind patterns of violent offending. Writing in the early 1990's, Canter and his students (e.g., Alison & Parkinson, 1995; Canter, 1994) were among the first in forensic psychology to show an interest in the personological study of identity narratives. In his classic book Criminal Shadows -- later versions of which were even subtitled "Inner Narratives of Evil" – Canter argues that the analysis of self-narratives should be “at the heart of offender profiling” (1994: p119). In doing so, he introduced the personality psychology of Dan P. McAdams (1985) to an entirely new audience of policing experts, criminologists, and forensic psychologists.

Canter and his students argued that violence should be seen as an interpersonal transaction involving characteristic and psychologically entrenched ways of dealing with other people. This, of course, was not a new idea. Every detective knows that a serial offender is likely to have a modus operandi or a vague pattern to his or her behaviour that can link various crimes in a sequence. Canter’s contribution, however, was to try to make sense out of these behaviours by connecting them to a person’s internal dialogue or self-narrative. By understanding the “stories offenders live by”, Canter and his students argued that investigators can better predict and understand offending behaviour. Alison and Parkinson write:

The advantage that the narrative approach has over ‘modus operandi’ is that in the latter the investigator can only make limited and static inferences about the offender’s background. [...]
In the former the investigator may gain insight into the whole psychological pattern that identifies that individual (1995: p21).

Although Canter (1994) traced the idea that offenders are often driven by personal "myths" back as far as Bolitho (1926), his real contribution was to situate this idea in the developing work on self-narratives and identity in contemporary personality psychology, in particular the work of McAdams at Northwestern University. In his ground-breaking theoretical work in identity psychology, McAdams (1985, 1993) argues that if you want to know the answer to the question "who am I?" (in other words, if you want to know my identity), you first have to know my "story". The construction and reconstruction of one's life story narrative (or “personal myth”), integrating one's perceived past, present, and anticipated future, is the process through which modern adults imbue our lives with unity, purpose, and meaning. Overwhelmed with the choices and possibilities of modern society (Fromm, 1941), modern individuals internalise this autobiographical narrative in order to provide a sense of coherence and predictability to the chaos of their lives.

In making this link between personality psychology and forensic sciences, Canter and his associates caught a very important intellectual wave, sometimes referred to as the “narrative turn” in the social sciences (Brown, Nolan, Crawford & Lewis, 1994). Over the last two decades, the idea that identity is an internal narrative has achieved a privileged place in the social sciences and humanities, with adherents like Paul Ricoeur, Roger Schank, and Charles Taylor. The distinguished Harvard psychologist Jerome Bruner argues:

Eventually the culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the self-telling of life narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience, to organise memory, to segment and purpose-build the very “events” of a life. In the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives. (1987: p15)

The equally distinguished London School of Economics sociologist Anthony Giddens agrees, arguing that in modernity, “A person’s identity is not to be found in behavior, nor - important though this is - in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going” (1991: p54). Theodore Sarbin has even suggested that the narrative should be seen as the “root metaphor” (1986: pvi) for the entire field of psychology and indeed many within the growing field...
of “narrative psychology” largely accept Jean-Paul Sartre's famous claim that the human being “is always a teller of stories, (s)he lives surrounded by his (or her) own stories and those of other people, (s)he sees everything that happens to him(her) terms of stories and (s)he tries to live his(her) life as if (s)he were recounting it” (cited in Bruner, 1987: p21).

In the 18 years since Canter's initial contribution, the role of self-narratives in the aetiology of violent or abusive behaviour has been the subject of some fascinating studies in criminology and criminological psychology (for a review, see Presser, 2009). Some of the most important recent contributions to narrative criminology, in fact, has been produced by Canter and his colleagues themselves. For instance, in a highly creative recent essay (drawing on musical notation among other sources), Canter (2008) utilises the idea of narrative to try to bridge the seemingly impossible gap between psychological thought and legal thought. More recently, Youngs and Canter (2009, 2011, forthcoming) have embarked on a fascinating project to identify a typology of archetypal themes in the self-narratives of violent offenders drawing on Northrop Frye's literary criticism, among others. Indeed, much of the important work developed by graduates of Canter’s Investigative Psychology Unit has been strongly influenced by narrative theory (see Alison & Stein, 2001; Canter, Grieve, Nicol & Benneworth, 2003; Canter & Ioannou, 2004; Fritzon & Brun, 2005; Porter & Alison, 2004; Salfati, 2000; Sarangi & Alison, 2005).

Nonetheless, it has to be said that, outside of these few examples, the study of self-narratives of violence has not occupied anything like centre stage in either forensic or investigative psychology as advocated in Criminal Shadows in 1994. The purpose of this chapter is to seek to reinvigorate this interest by situating the study of self-narratives within the better known and better developed tradition of cognitive information processing, in particular drawing on research on the ‘hostile attribution bias’ as a ‘missing link’ in forensic narrative psychology. In what follows, we briefly outline narrative identity theory, and then do the same for the role of the hostile attribution bias in the aetiology of violent or aggressive behaviour. Finally, we attempt to synthesise these two

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3 See also Day and Bryan, (2007), Green, South and Smith (2006), McKendy (2006), O'Connor (2000), Pullkinen and Aaltonen (2003), Snow and Powell (2005) and Stefanakis (1999). Among the most innovative research in this regard has been in the literature on desistance from crime (Culley, 2004; Gadd & Farrall, 2004; Vaughan, 2007) and offender rehabilitation (e.g., Kleckar & Ting, 2004; Ward & Marshall, 2007).

4 Not all of this work focused on profiling or even the self-narratives of violent offenders. Indeed, in one of the most theoretically innovative contributions, Alison and Stein (2001) analyse victims’ accounts of sexual assault, as reported to the police, and found that these narratives reflect abusive variants of more conventional interactional processes.
literatures in the hopes that doing so will better demonstrate the value of understanding self-narratives in the study of violent behaviour, as originally argued by Canter and his associates over a decade ago.

**Identity as a Story**

*Life must be understood backwards. But…it must be lived forwards. And if one thinks over that proposition it becomes more and more evident that life can never really be understood in time simply because at no particular moment can I find the necessary resting place from which to understand it – backwards* (Kierkegaard, 1843).

According to McAdams, people solve the problem of identity by constructing a self-narrative. A self-narrative is a story that a person forms to explain their behaviour, motivations, feelings and desires within a meaningful, sequential framework. In other words, the self-narrative is the person's response to the question 'Who am I and how do I fit into the wider world?' In this way, narratives have an 'internal logic' (Canter, 1994) and are used to make life understandable and predictable. They are also believed to keep the human experience of meaninglessness and existential void at bay (McAdams, 2006). Consequently, the problem of identity is "the problem of arriving at a life story that makes sense – provides unity and purpose – within a sociohistorical matrix that embodies a much larger story" (McAdams, 1985: p18).

These stories or self-narratives represent personal outlooks and theories of reality, not reality itself. While based on historical fact, the self-narrative is thought to be an imaginative rendering, a sort of myth-making through which the past is reconstructed, edited and embellished in order to create a coherent plot and themes. Like the symbolic interactionist mantra "If (persons) define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas & Thomas, 1928: p572), narrative psychology is premised on the idea that "stories hold psychological truth" (McAdams, 1999: p496) even if they are not precise or objective recalling of fact. Their value is not so much in what they tell us about the past (which will by definition be biased, incomplete and imprecise), but what they say about the person's future. Giddens writes, "Each of us not only 'has,' but lives a biography" (1991: p14). These narratives explain actions in a sequence of events that connect up to explanatory
goals, motivations, and feelings. They then act to shape and guide future behaviour, as persons act
in ways that accord to the stories they have created about themselves (McAdams, 1985).

Moreover, self-narratives can also provide a framework within which to incorporate the
various roles and conflicting events within a person’s life (McAdams, 2006). Bruner (1986) states
that it is our ability to reflect on our actions and create stories sensitive to context which allows us
to explain and give meaning to behaviours which violate perceived core characteristics. In this way,
we use stories to make sense of, rationalize and account for our experiences, be they successes or
tragedies. Not every aspect of a person’s life requires such internal explanation. Brushing one’s teeth
at night or saving part of one's salary in a bank are rarely central features in an identity story,
because these behaviours are so common that they require little justification. Generally, narratives
focus on deviations from normative behaviours or the experiences in a person's life that, when taken
in totality, make them unique as an individual: achievements, predicaments, failings and
aberrations. Therefore, self-narratives are:

Based on biographical facts, but [...] go considerably beyond these facts as people selectively
appropriate aspects of their experience and imaginatively construe both past and future to
construct stories that make sense to them and to their audiences, that vivify and integrate life
and make it more or less meaningful. (McAdams, 2001: p101)

Unlike personality traits, which tend to be largely stable over time, the narrative identity can
and does change throughout life. In fact, our stories have to be “routinely created and sustained in
the reflexive activities of the individual” (Giddens, 1991: p52). Erikson (1959) and Elkind (1968)
argue that people first begin to shape individual identities during adolescence. Teenagers therefore
go through a 'psychosocial moratorium' where they ‘try on’ various possible selves ‘for size’. As
such, numerous therapeutic efforts have been directed to the possibility of re-creating one’s self-
narrative in more socially adaptive directions (e.g. White & Epston, 1990).

Moreover, these dynamic narratives are not created in a vacuum (Kohli, 1981). Identity
theorists argue that identity is very much shaped within the constraints and opportunity structure of
the social world in which people live. In this way, self-narratives are constructed by drawing from
the available narratives within society:
Societies provide occupational, ideological, and relational resources upon which the individual can draw in formulating his or her own identity. The resources are shaped into a personalised life product which ideally confers upon the individual a sense of unity and purpose - a feeling/belief that the person is whole and that his or her life is justified by a reason, mission or goal. (McAdams, 1985: p4)

Rather than stripping individuals of community and macro-historical context, narrative analysis can inform our understandings by illustrating how the person sees and experiences the world around them. Narratives are therefore excellent data for the analysis of the underlying sociostructural relations of a population (Bertaux, 1981).

**Self-Narratives and Crime**

Self-stories may be especially crucial in understanding offending behaviour. Personal “myths” are thought to be the primary mechanism through which individuals are able to maintain a sense of self-worth in the face of moral, social and personal failings and stigmatisation. Epstein and Erskine use this “need to maintain a coherent, integrated conceptual system” or “theory of reality” to explain “behaviour that either is manifestly self-destructive or is maintained in the absence of reinforcement” (1983: p135). Most critically, narrative reconstruction becomes necessary when a person experiences some threat to his or her identity (see Maruna & Ramsden, 2004). Scott and Lyman argue: “Since it is with respect to deviant behaviour that we call for accounts, the study of deviance and the study of accounts are intrinsically related, and a clarification of accounts will constitute a clarification of deviant phenomena.” (1968: p62).

Indeed, the question of ‘why did they do it?’ is central to the criminologist’s quest, and posing the same question to offenders themselves has been a part of criminology since the origins of the discipline (see Bennett’s 1981 history in *Oral History and Delinquency*). Perhaps the best known response to this line of inquiry is the account that makes up Clifford Shaw’s (1930) *The Jack-Roller: A Delinquent Boy’s Own Story*. Traditionally, life stories such as these were interpreted somewhat literally by criminologists in the Chicago School as indications of the social processes that might lead to criminal behaviour (see Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). For instance, Shaw “made
no attempt to pursue the implications of the Jack-Roller’s idiosyncratic point of view for an understanding of his involvement in delinquent conduct” (Finestone 1976: p101). Instead, these life histories were collected in order to provide “concrete and vivid” illustrations of the lives of young people in disadvantaged areas (Shaw 1929: p124) or to focus attention on the social factors involved in criminal aetiology (Shaw & McKay, 1931). To some extent, this literalist tradition continues today in oral history research in criminology (see Laub & Sampson, 2003).

Yet, this is not the only way to interpret the accounts people give for their actions (see esp. Gadd & Jefferson, 2007; Koesling & Koesling, 2007; Maruna & Roy, 2007). As C. Wright Mills suggested, “The differing reasons men give for their actions are not themselves without reasons” (1940: p904). The interest in life narratives among many contemporary social scientists is not so much in the substantive events these stories depict (what happened in their lives), but more the meanings individuals attach to such facts. How people choose to frame the events of their lives says as much about the psychology of the individual – their personality, identity or self – as it does the actual events and structural conditions experienced (Bruner, 2004; McAdams 1985; 1993). In his interview with John Laub, Donald Cressey put the argument this way: “Listening to people tell you why they did it does not give you explanations of why they did it. When you ask people why they commit crime, they make sounds. I call them verbalizations. These are data. You study them” (Laub, 1983: p139, emphasis added).

The study of offender verbalizations as “data” in criminology might have originated with Cressey’s (1953) study of embezzlers’ excuses, but it has since become associated primarily with Gresham Sykes and David Matza's (1957) article ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency’. The important idea at the heart of this argument (hereafter, “neutralization theory”) was that the excuses and justifications that deviants use to rationalize their behaviours might themselves be implicated in the aetiology of deviant behaviour. As Sykes and Matza note “It is by learning these techniques that the juvenile becomes delinquent” (1957: p667).

Nonetheless, identity is an on-going process, not a tangible or permanent quality of an individual. Any narrative typology needs to be based on the understanding that individuals develop and adapt their stories constantly over time (Giddens, 1991). Though various categories of self-
stories may be identified, narrative psychology does not seek to divide persons into “types” in the way that offender categories based on trait scores might (Megargee & Bohn, 1979). Canter characterises such a misuse of narrative psychology as being based on a ‘cafeteria view’ of life stories, whereby a narrative identity is understood as a permanent ‘thing’ that can be quickly identified and labelled:

The cafeteria view of life stories pulls the framework back into the realms of static characteristics. Instead of having distinguishing ear lobes, criminals can be recognised by the particular heroes they endorse. Life is not that simple. Narratives are moving targets that change their shape in response to life circumstances (1994: p312).

Trait psychology implies that the “criminal personality” is something stable and permanent. Yet, considerable longitudinal and ethnographic research on crime over the life course indicates that so-called “criminal careers” are sporadic, short-lived and largely shaped by social and developmental context (Canter, 1994; Currie, 1991; Graham & Bowling, 1995; Katz, 1988; Sampson & Laub, 1992, 1993; Sullivan, 1989). Narrative psychology offers a dynamic, developmental perspective that can be seen as a viable alternative to the positivist paradigm in criminology (Sarbin, 1986). By going beyond traits or simple ‘modus operandi’ and trying to understand aspects of the whole person, criminologists and psychologists can better understand the change and development in criminal behaviour over time.

Increasingly, researchers are beginning to use narrative psychology to understand changes in criminal behaviour and the conscious, and unconscious, processes involved in the construction and maintenance of identities. This is particularly true in research on the topic of desistance from crime (see Maruna, 2004; Culley, 2004; Gadd & Farrall, 2004; Vaughan, 2007). For example, Maruna (2001) investigated the process through which offenders are able to desist from criminal activity by comparing the self-narratives of active and desisting offenders as well as their scores on a variety of psychometric questionnaires. Whereas few significant differences were observed between the two groups on their basic personality tests, the two groups did differ in terms of the patterns in their self-narratives. Those continuing to engage in criminal activity were characterised as ascribing to a ‘condemnation script’ in which they attributed a distinct lack of hope for the future to the lessons they had learned in a contaminated past. In contrast, the desisting group typically ascribed to a self-
narrative that Maruna labels a ‘redemption script’ emphasising their inherent goodness and characterising their involvement in criminal activity as a temporary attempt to obtain power in bleak circumstances. This and similar studies of desistance complements the applied research and theory around offender rehabilitation that links offending to patterns of thought and social cognitions (e.g. Bosch & Monshouwer, 2002; Bush, 1995; de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Dodge, 2003).

**Biased Cognitions**

In recent years, the role of social-information processing has taken a central place in the psychological understanding of violence. Theories of social-information processing provide a framework for understanding how aggression is mediated by cognition (Barlett & Anderson, 2011; Dodge, 2003; Reijntjes, Thomaes, Kamphuis, Bushman, de Castro & Telch, 2011). These theories suggest that individuals develop routinised patterns of processing social cues that help to shape behavioural outcomes (Dodge, 2003; Huesmann, 1988; Newell & Simon, 1972). Crick and Dodge (1994) propose a social-information processing theory involving six steps: the encoding of social cues; the interpretation of social cues; the clarification of goals; response access and construction; response decision; and behavioural enactment. Numerous researchers have examined the social-information processing of habitually violent individuals to determine whether they have ‘biases’ or ‘errors’ in their cognitions that might contribute to their aggressive behaviours (see Dodge & Newman, 1981; Huesmann, 1988).

The most robust finding in this regard is the hostile attribution bias (see esp. the meta-analysis by de Castro, et al., 2002). Hostile attribution bias involves the tendency of some individuals to routinely make attributions of hostile intent to the actions of others (Nasby, et al.1979). In particular, hostile attribution bias has been found to be strongly associated with reactive aggression whereas instrumental forms of aggression are typically linked to positive outcome expectancies for violence (de Castro et al. 2002; Walters, 2007; Reijntjes et al. 2011). Longitudinal studies of children, such as those by Weiss, Dodge, Bates and Pettit (1992), Dodge, Pettit, Bates and Valente (1995), Egan, Monson and Perry (1998), and Dodge, Crozier and Lansford (2001), find a relationship between measures of the hostile attribution bias and aggressive behaviour, even when controlling for prior levels of aggressive behaviour and intelligence. This effect has also been found among adolescents and samples of adults convicted of serious violent crimes (see Dodge, et. al, 2001). Individuals who engage in aggressive behaviour are therefore believed to selectively focus upon and perceive more hostile cues over and above other cues within a social setting, form more
hostile interpretations of ambiguous situations and generate more violent responses to these situations (Dodge, 2003; Dodge & Newman, 1981).

A related cognitive bias is the denial of responsibility for one’s aggressive actions. For instance, neutralization theory in criminology suggests that “much delinquency is based on what is essentially an unrecognized extension of defenses to crimes, in the form of justifications for deviance” (Sykes & Matza, 1957: p666). Sykes and Matza identify five ‘neutralization techniques’ that allow offenders to engage in wrongdoing without suffering from pangs of guilt: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of condemners, and the appeal to higher loyalties. They argue that it is by learning these techniques that juveniles become delinquent. More recently, Bandura (1990) developed a similar theory of ‘moral disengagement’ involving the following ‘techniques’ for avoiding self-sanction: displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distorting the consequences of an action, dehumanising the victim, and assuming the role of victim for one’s self (see also Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & Gibbs, 2000; Gibbs, Potter & Goldstein, 1995; Slaby & Guerra, 1988).

This theoretical focus on the role of excuse-making in the psychology of crime and violence has had a profound influence on the applied world of offender treatment, where excuses and justifications are often assigned the specialist label of ‘cognitive distortion’ (see Abel, Gore, Holland, Camp, Becker & Rathner 1989; Blumenthal, Gudjonsson & Burns, 1999). Murphy defines ‘cognitive distortions’ as “Self-statements made by offenders that allow them to deny, minimize, rationalize and justify their behaviour” (1990: p332). A primary purpose of treatment interventions is “to identify and confront [these] cognitive distortions, rationalisations and excuses for offending” (Salter, 1988: p114), although this is controversial (see esp. Maruna & Mann, 2006)

Considerable questions remain, moreover, about how and why these cognitive patterns emerge in the first place. Dodge (2003) theorises that environmental stimuli, emotions and life scripts influence an individual’s social-information processing. Additionally, he states that an individual’s biased cognitions “may emerge at least partially as an adaptive response to past life experiences of actual threat, such as physical abuse and peer victimization” (Dodge, 2003: p256).
Self-Narratives and Social Information Processing

We suggest that hostile interpretation biases and other habitual cognitions might usefully be understood as emerging out of a person’s self-narrative. Indeed, the storied identity itself can be seen as an active ‘information-processing structure’, a ‘cognitive schema’ (Blackburn, 1994) or a ‘construct system’ (Tagg, 1985) that is both shaped by and later mediates social interaction. Caspi and Moffitt (1995) argue that a person’s self-narrative may act as a filter for the encoding and processing of social information as different people exposed to the same situation will react differently as they interpret events in a manner consistent with their understanding of self (self-narrative), their understanding of others and their previous experience. Self-narratives may also act as a filter in the clarification of goals by filtering out goals that are inconsistent with an individual’s self-narrative.

Lonnie Athens (1997) takes something like this perspective in his study of violent men. In his analysis, he suggests that there are four interpretations of situations which can result in aggressive behaviour: physically defensive, frustrative, frustrative-malefic and malefic. According to Athens, physically defensive interpretations are formed when individuals believe they will soon be physically attacked and/or that someone close to them is in danger of being physically attacked. Frustrative interpretations are formed when an individual assumes that their wishes are being resisted and/or when they feel they are being forced to carry out a specific action against his or her will. Frustrative-malefic interpretations are formed when an individual assumes that he/she is being resisted, disrespected or forced to engage in behaviour against their will. Finally, malefic interpretations refer to an individual’s assumption that the actions of another are deliberately attempting to belittle or disrespect them. Athens suggests that people with violent self-images tend to engage in more confrontations as they tend to form more frustrative, frustrative-malefic and malefic interpretations. He argues that individuals with non-violent self-images typically only behave aggressively when they form physically defensive interpretations.

Beck (1999) also suggests that individuals tend to engage in confrontations when they form hostile interpretations. However, Beck expands upon this to propose that individuals with a vulnerable or insecure sense of self will be extra sensitive to certain social situations and perceive insults where none were intended. A vulnerable or insecure sense of self is thought to be one which is steeped in feelings of shame and humiliation (Beck, 1999; Butler, 2008; Gilligan, 1996; 2001; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Young, 1999, 2003). Beck (1999) argues that a shame based sense of self leads an individual to react to perceived assaults by fighting back or attacking someone weaker than
him/herself. In addition, such individuals are assumed to believe that the only way available to them to maintain their identity, reputation and claim to respectability is through the use of aggression. More specifically, he suggests that an insecure sense of self may increase an individual’s biased cognitions, such as their overgeneralisations of hostility, hostile attributional bias and denial of responsibility for aggressive behaviour.

**Narratives of Shame and Over-sensitivity to Disrespect**

However, recent research has failed to confirm this theoretical relationship. Butler (forthcoming) did not find a significant association between themes present in the men’s self-narratives and the extent to which they engaged in a hostile attributional bias, overgeneralised feelings of hostility, generated hostile responses to social situations and denied responsibility for their aggressive behaviour. The extent to which the men demonstrated these ‘biased’ cognitions was also not predictive of their self-reported involvement in prisoner confrontations during a one-month follow-up period. Interestingly, however, Butler (forthcoming) found that themes of personal shame within the men’s self-narratives were predictive of future involvement in prisoner confrontations, even controlling for a measure of previous violent behaviour and other possible confounding variables.

Numerous researchers theorise that the emotion of shame can lead to aggressive behaviour as people attempt to transform and/or deflect feelings of shame into feelings of anger (see Braithwaite, 1989; Katz, 1988; Gilligan 1996; Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Young, 1999). Gilligan (1996; 2001), for instance, suggests that shame based self-narratives may lead men to engage in confrontations as they attempt to replace feelings of shame with feelings of pride achieved through an aggressive display of “manly” behaviour. Individuals with an insecure self tend to hold less positive views about themselves and seek to enhance their self-worth by obtaining positive interpersonal feedback from others (see also Brown, Collins & Schmidt, 1988; Baumeister, Tice & Hutton, 1989; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). As a result, they may be especially prone to engaging in confrontations out of a psychological need to protect the self and/or demand respect from others (see Butler, 2008; Butler & Maruna, 2009 Crocker, Park & Lee, 2006; Toch, 1992;).

Indeed, considerable research indicates that violence tends to be used in situations in which individuals feel their identity, status and/or social honour is being threatened (Katz, 1988; Staub, 2006; Wolfgang, 1958). This process is illustrated clearly in a recent study of prisoner-on-prisoner violence conducted by the authors. In interviews with 89 male, Category C prisoners at an English
prison, Butler and Maruna (2009) found that the men generally engage in an uneasy truce with one another that appears to be broken only “when there are triggers from the social environment which act on a personality that has been sensitised to shame” (Gilligan, 1996: p223). One interviewee described the causes of violence within the prison as such:

I don’t know, I think, I don’t know, disrespect is like, I think people think they are made to look little in front of other people, it is insecurity isn’t it, do you get me? Insecure in themselves so they react because they want to show the person that they can’t do that to them because they will do this and then that will send a message to anybody else who is thinking of dissing you, do you get me? (Int. #78, aged 26 – All quotes from Butler & Maruna, 2009).

When challenged or insulted, individuals with an insecure sense of self may feel that they must react to this challenge to reaffirm their sense of self and status:

Definitely, yeah, definitely, you get a lot of people who while they are in jail, a lot of people, like their mentality, a lot of people think that they have got something to prove, especially a lot of people trying to talk down to people, like disrespecting them (Int. #40, aged 32).

Somewhat ironically, then, the use of confrontational behaviour between prisoners might be seen as an expressive demand to be treated with respect among those who feel they have none:

I have a lot of expectations about what I want to be. I want to be a somebody, I don’t want to be a nobody. (Int. #85, aged 26)

Interviewed prisoners consistently described incidences of disrespect as being the most important immediate trigger for episodes of violence within the prison. Some used the term “disrespect” directly, which allowed interviewers to probe what they meant by this phrase. The most consistently

3 ‘Dissing’ was a term used by participants to refer to the process of being disrespected.
used synonym for disrespect was the experience of being ‘made to feel small’ or feelings of ‘invisibility’:

I was just queuing up and some person cut in in-front of me. I said something like ‘What is wrong with the rest of the queue?’ and he just turned round and started sort of squaring up to me and giving it this and that, and I just sort of explained to him that it wouldn’t look very good for him to be laid out on the floor […] with his little plate trying to get his dinner, you know, it might get a bit messy for him. […] I think it was more ‘Hang on, what am I invisible’ you know? […] Yeah, you know ‘You're nothing and I'm better than you and I'm going to cut in in-front of you’ (Int. #38, age 41).

Participants were clear that the issue was one of both internal pride, but also external reputation. The self being shamed by acts of disrespect was a “looking-glass self” (Gecas & Schwalbe, 1983) involving the eyes of significant others:

He was queue jumping [i.e. cutting in line] and it is the same here as it is on any [prison] wing. It is sort of a respect issue, if you let someone push in in-front of you in a queue or whatever, people's opinion of you goes down slightly (Int. #68, aged 36).

[He] went around and told everybody on the wing that I was an idiot. Yeah, calling me an idiot because I couldn't pay him back [for a borrowed phone card]. I thought […] ‘Yeah, going to sort this out’. So I went up to him and I said ‘What’s all this I hear about me being an idiot?’ […] Before he said anything, I like punched him in the nose. […] I’m the sort of geezer that is a nice fellow but if someone is going around taking the piss out of me, things going round, people saying stuff about me, then I’ll do something about it (Int. #74, age 35).

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6 ‘Taking the piss’ is a colloquially term used by the participants to refer to an individual or group of individuals attempting to disrespect or belittle another.
As a result of perceived challenges to their identity, the participants generally felt compelled to ‘defend their honour’ in a similar manner as discussed by Gilligan (1996). Sometimes this sense of dignity was ascribed to one’s upbringing:

I don’t take disrespect, I’m from somewhere where we don’t take disrespect. If you disrespect me I’ll honour myself. (Int. #60, aged 29).

For many prisoners, the easiest way available to them to defend their honour, and replace their feelings of shame with feelings of pride, was through aggressive means.

**Conclusions and Implications for Policy**

Theories of social-information processing suggest that violence is linked to an over-sensitivity to perceived disrespect. Narrative research suggests this over-sensitivity may be related to personal feelings of low self-worth and shame. Numerous interventions have been developed in an attempt to help offenders reinterpret their self-narratives so as to reduce the psychological need they feel to engage in aggression. Indeed, interventions have been developed specifically focusing on the relationship between feelings of shame, masculinity and aggression (see Asser, 2002; 2004; Dobash, Dobash, Cavanagh & Lewis, 2000; Gilligan, 2001). In the Resolve to Stop the Violence Programme, for instance, men deconstruct their concept of masculinity and discuss how societal ideas of masculinity can pressurise them to engage in violence (Gilligan, 2001). The Shame Violence Intervention attempts to reduce violence by teaching men to replace feelings of shame with feelings of confidence and self-assurance obtained through non-aggressive means (Asser, 2002, 2004). Further, Maruna and LeBel (2003) argue that strengths based interventions that “ask not what a person’s deficits are, but rather what positive contribution the person can make” (Maruna & LeBel, 2003: p97) can help individuals reconstruct shame-based self-narratives and reclaim a sense of personal dignity.

Unfortunately, however, such interventions are few in number and some of the more common treatment interventions available inside prison can tend to further pathologise prisoners by attributing violent behaviour to “errors” or biases within their cognitions (see Gadd, 2004; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984; Maruna & Mann, 2006). Moreover, even the best designed treatment interventions are easily overwhelmed by the wider climate of hostility
inside and outside penal establishments) faced by prisoners and ex-prisoners. For example, Butler (2008) notes that prisoners with an insecure self tended to express more themes of stigmatisation, discrimination and exclusion in their self-narratives than those secure in their identity. She notes that these narrative themes appeared to reflect broader societal and political narratives of prisoners and their behaviour. This implies that while cognitive-based interventions may be somewhat effective at reducing aggressive behaviour, their effectiveness will remain limited until attempts are also made to understand the wider processes involved in the construction and maintenance of an individual’s identity as well as the meaning aggressive behaviour holds for their sense of self.

In particular, future research on self-narratives and violence might seek to situate these narratives within a gender and developmental context. As David Canter argued in Criminal Shadows, “Many acts of violence seem to erupt at a time when the perpetrator is searching for identity and personal meaning” (1994: p326). Research by Canter and others has been instrumental in drawing attention to the potential of self-narratives to drive individuals toward pathological behaviours. The next generation of research might usefully explore what factors lead to the development of these self-myths and what meta-narratives in the public domain (e.g. the media, popular culture, national myths about masculinity and power) work to sustain them (e.g. Matza & Sykes, 1961).
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